Читать книгу A Companion to Chomsky - Группа авторов - Страница 68

Zenon Pylyshyn (1984, p. xix) suggests that “the kinds of theories cognitive scientists entertain are intimately related to the set of tacit assumptions they make about the very foundations of the field of cognitive science. In cognitive science the gap between metatheory and practice is extremely narrow.” As elsewhere, Chomsky's work revolutionized the foundations of phonology, yet the implications of SPE and related work have been neglected, to the detriment of the field. This is consistent with the failure of phonologists to accord enough weight to clear, accessible arguments made by scholars like Fodor, Jackendoff, and even Kant, relating to leading ideas of Chomsky's general philosophical outlook. Beyond phonology, philosophers and psychologists, as well as syntacticians and semanticists interested in “big picture” issues like naturalism, internalism and nativism, would be well served by paying more attention to the achievements of SPE. Working in the field, we remain enthusiastic about discovering not only how these leading ideas apply in phonology, but also how new phonological arguments can bolster Chomsky's often radical, broad philosophical stands.