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1 ¹ This introductory chapter will not consider Hobbes’s life. For an excellent biography of Hobbes, see Martinich (1999). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has three articles devoted to Hobbes’s philosophy: Adams (2019a), Duncan (2017), and Lloyd and Sreedhar (2018).

2 ² See Jesseph (2018) for discussion of this interrelation, and see Jesseph (Chapter 3, this volume) for discussion of the criticisms of Hobbes’s mathematics.

3 ³ See Gorham (Chapter 2, this volume) on Bramhall’s accusation that Hobbes is indebted to Stoic thought; McIntyre (Chapter 5, this volume) on Bramhall and Hobbes concerning the possibility of non-human animal deliberation; Curran (Chapter 13, this volume) for discussion of Bramhall’s criticisms of Hobbes’s notion of subjects’ liberties; Foisneau (Chapter 16, this volume) regarding the dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall on Scholastic distinctions.

4 ⁴ For example, essays in Courtland (2018) consider Hobbes’s ideas as they relate to contemporary issues in applied ethics and political philosophy.

5 ⁵ For a similar claim, see Blau (2019).

6 ⁶ Although the present chapter will primarily consider Hobbes as a philosopher, humanism exerted influence upon his thinking and this has been the focus of much scholarly work. For discussion of humanist rhetoric’s place in Hobbes’s development, see, e.g., Skinner (1996, 2018). Also, see Raylor (2018). The rise and fall of Hobbes’s renown in mathematics is documented in Jesseph (1999).

7 ⁷ Indeed, Hobbes’s relationship to history is complex. Concerning Hobbes’s history of the genesis of Scholastic philosophy, see Foisneau (Chapter 16, this volume); for discussion of Hobbes’s ecclesiastical history, in particular the history of the papal monarchy, see Springborg (Chapter 21, this volume). For discussion of the nature of history according to Hobbes as well as Hobbes’s own historical works, the reader is encouraged to consult the volume edited by Rogers and Sorell (2000) and papers in a special issue of Filozofski vestnik volume 24, issue 2 (2003).

8 ⁸ Chatsworth A.10 and Harleian ms. 6083. Also relevant is Ms. 5297 (National Library of Wales).

9 ⁹ For discussion of the history of the composition of Elements of Law, see Baumgold (2017, xi–xv).

10 ¹⁰ Hobbes changes the material of chapter 9 between the English and Latin editions. Discussing the differences between these two chapters would go beyond the present confines of this introductory chapter, but the account that he provides in the latter coheres with his discussion in De corpore VI.

11 ¹¹ Edwin Curley suggests that the placement of the science of the just and unjust under natural philosophy reflects the order of presentation of Leviathan where chapters 14–15 on the laws of nature precede the generation of the commonwealth in chapter 17 (see Hobbes 1994a, 49 fn. 4). Such a reading, i.e., that the table reflects the presentation order of the Leviathan, also seems supported by a 17/27 May 1657 letter from François du Verdus to Hobbes where he takes the Table as a reason to encourage Hobbes to publish more in the various subjects listed on it and not as providing insight into the structure of Hobbes’s philosophy: “I was recently reading your ‘Table of the several subjects of knowledge’ in your Leviathan: wouldn’t you like to give us this entire body of philosophy? If you gave us an outline plan of treatises on architecture, navigation, optics” (Hobbes 1994b, 471–2).

12 ¹² Parkin (2007) treats the reception of Hobbes’s civil philosophy and views on religion in England from 1640–1700. See also Mintz (1962).

13 ¹³ Hobbes’s claims in De corpore VI are discussed in Hattab (Chapter 1, this volume) and Adams (Chapter 4, this volume).

14 ¹⁴ Though see Tarlton (1998) for criticism of Taylor, arguing that there is no single coherent “Taylor thesis,” and of the reception of Taylor’s thesis by scholars.

15 ¹⁵ This introduction primarily concerns strategies for how the parts of Hobbes’s philosophy fit together, not as much the content within those parts. There has been significant disagreement concerning the Taylor–Warrender debate, and to discuss it more would go beyond what is possible in this space. More recently, Martinich (1992, 71ff) argues for a divine command approach, but Martinich also incorporates conduciveness to self-preservation as necessary to determining whether an action is moral. See also Byron (2015). Green (Chapter 10, this volume) argues that Hobbes does need to incorporate claims about divine command to undergird the moral claims he seeks to provide.

16 ¹⁶ Although for different reasons, Kavka (1986) also views Hobbes’s civil philosophy as independent from other parts of his philosophy. Kavka argues that Hobbes claimed to have provided a deductive system but failed to do so, stating that “[i]t was only by conflating logical deduction and causal reasoning that Hobbes could have dreamed of a purely deductive politics derived solely from definitions and the principle of motion” (1986, 8). Beyond issues of method, Kavka furthermore asserts that “Hobbesian political theory need not be committed to materialism, mechanism, or even determinism; it can remain neutral with respect to these ontological and metaphysical positions” (1986, 11).

17 ¹⁷ For example, see De corpore XXIV.9 (EW I.386) for the difference between geometry (De corpore Part III) and natural philosophy (De corpore Part IV).

18 ¹⁸ For a similar point, see Malcolm (2002, 147). This is related to, but is more general than, Peters’s (1956, 171) objection that premises in psychology or natural philosophy contain only descriptions and therefore no prescriptions can be derived from them.

19 ¹⁹ Hobbes countenances this ability to “consider as” in many contexts throughout his philosophy. He famously describes the laws of nature by saying that “if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then they are properly called Lawes” (Hobbes 2012, 242; 1651, 80), and he likewise defines ‘person’ using “consider as”: “A PERSON, is he, whose words and actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and action of another, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall Person” (Hobbes 2012, 244; 1651, 80). He also uses this device in mathematics, e.g., a line is a “body considered without its breadth” (EW VII.20), and in natural philosophy. In the latter, for example, if interested only in the annual path of the Earth, we “consider” it as if it were a single point (OL I.98–9), but if interested in the Earth’s diurnal motion, we consider it as a body moving with a “simple circular motion” such that all its points describe the circle that the body makes (OL IV.252). I link “consider as” to Hobbes’s account of humans’ natural state in Adams (2019b, 12–13).

20 ²⁰ Jesseph (2016) explores the roles played by endeavor in different parts of Hobbes’s philosophy.