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Once we accept Argument One, then it is incumbent upon us to ascertain what are the constraints upon our activities that do not arise from n/Nature. This area of development might be termed artificial. All technology is artificial. One popular definition of humans is as tool-making animals.³⁵ The making (ποεῖν + τεχνή/ poein + techne) is at the etymological center of the realm of the technological which is a novel creation that will augment the realm of Nature by Homo sapiens. One way to think about these additions is by using the language of the Ancient Greek physical philosophers. The given order, Nature (φύσις/ phusis) exists. The making can either accord with Nature (κατα φύσιν/ kata phusin) or it can go against the Natural grain and thus interrupt, change, or go against Nature (παρα φύσιν/ para phusin).³⁶ Thus, one distinction of importance is between kata phusin and para phusin.³⁷

If, from Part I there is a general duty to protect Nature (phusis), then ceteris paribus one should only make things that are in accord with nature (kata phusin). But what would this mean? How much elasticity does Nature possess? At what point are we really harming Nature? And to what extent is the harm?

This is an issue in much dispute.³⁸ In the nineteenth century in Britain, during the rise of the first Industrial Revolution, the climate was heavily affected.³⁹ The conceptual dissonance on this is noted in a painting of J.M.W. Turner, Rain, Steam, and Speed: The Great Western Railway. In the painting we are presented with three facts. (1) There is a train (a new making) coming right at us over the Waterloo Bridge in London (metaphorically a symbol of augmented Nature going into the future). (2) There is a row boat (the old kata phusin) going in the opposite direction (a vision of the past). (3) In the midst of it all is an atmosphere of pollution (the present para phusin caused by the new technology). Turner makes his visual case that this is the direction of human makings in the nineteenth century in Britain. Depending upon whether one identifies with the locomotive or the row boat determines whether the critic judges positively or negatively on this.⁴⁰

Illustration J.M.W. Turner, “Rain, Steam, and Speed: The Great Western Railway,” National Gallery of Art, London, UK.

This artistic rendering illustrates a critical possible conflict between Humans (considering themselves atop the scala naturae) and Nature (the broader class which includes humans as members). The fact that humans often get this logical relation confused is the source of much confusion. The human making, poein + techne (now to be referred in shorthand as technology), is the output of human activity. It is executed within a Natural construct. But because it originates from its own designs narrowly understood, it can create community (human and/or Natural) disruption.

Community disruption is an important concept. It occurs when one member of a community acts as if s/he lives in a “community of one.” Everyday examples of this within the shared community worldview of a micro community occur when an individual or group of individuals ignores the values of the community and wish (without consultation) to impose their will upon the rest of the community.⁴¹

This debate in the nineteenth century context of Britain is complicated by another variable: a static versus a dynamic view of Nature, viewed as a system with various perturbations that affect the output. Often Nature was thought of as some sort of enclosed garden upon which humans (both separated and apart as per Part I) enter and gaze at this exotic other in order to ascertain whether they are satisfied or not.

There are echoes here of the Garden of Eden. In this theologically-based model there is a sub-portion of Nature that is especially set out as being perfect from the anthropocentric viewpoint so long as one obeys certain rules—principal being not eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.⁴² In the narrative as depicted by John Milton, what was really behind God’s prohibition to Adam and Eve was really an attempt to frame the story in terms of the seventeenth century scientific revolution—putting these dynamic ideas of a changing view of Nature (cutting edge, but controversial science) into the mouth of Eve.⁴³

The unchanging view of Nature takes another hit in the nineteenth century with Darwin and other advocates of evolutionary theory.⁴⁴ The dogma in this chapter is that the static view is the wrong way to view Nature. Nature is in constant flux⁴⁵ so that species₁ in environment₁ might prosper in time₁ but when we approach time₂ the environment may change to environment₂ such that some existing and nascent species will prosper and some others will go extinct—such as species_1. This is just a factual discussion of change, but many of the evolutionary folk (harkening back to the scale naturae) thought that this was a modern way to provide an explanation for the superiority of humans in Nature (however they are situated: outside-looking-inside or partially inside).⁴⁶

The social evolutionary attitude is also often countered by an antithetical devolutionary attitude. In the former account, people expect that human life in Nature will always improve.⁴⁷ There is much incentive among most politicians around the world to trumpet this possibility. That’s how they stay in power (so long as they are a part of the traditional ruling party).

The devolutionary attitude is rather different. These folks contend that things were better in the past and are now deteriorating. Vastly different social/political groups can take this position. For example, in Hesiod’s Theogony it is asserted that in the past, there was an age of gold. It was a far better time to be alive on earth: things were much better as opposed to the present, lower age of iron.⁴⁸ Some politicians around the world cynically set out a similar account of the status quo in order to support either their election or a revolution to change things in order to return to a previous age that was better.⁴⁹

Caring For and Protecting Nature. Another aspect of “caring” about Nature concerns whether Nature, as such, possesses positive normative value. In Argument One it was argued that humans who view nature/Nature carefully will find it to be a web of complicated systems and that when people come to understand some of the mechanism of a complicated system something akin to an aesthetic reaction occurs and this, in turn, fosters a caring attitude of protection for the system(s) so assessed. This mechanism must be linked to outcomes that are positive in their own terms (such as ongoing sustainable biocentric diversity that is beneficial to promoting and maintaining life).⁵⁰

But more is needed and the only way to get there, in this author’s opinion, is to refer to the anthropocentric attitude that a well-operating Nature helps human nature(s) to thrive. This must undergird the value/duty relation because without it, we are faced with mere factual posits. This is not an ethical egoistic position because it is made on behalf of all humanity. If anything, it approaches either a utilitarian justification (not this author’s preferred stance) or a contextual condition that allows human action to continue (the author’s preferred position). An example of this position would be the following argument.⁵¹

1 The Nature of humans, as a species, is to seek to execute purposive action according to (at least) a rudimentary understanding of deductive, inductive, and abductive logic–A.⁵²

2 In order to execute purposive action, humans require various goods of agency set out hierarchically in the Table of Embeddedness–A.⁵³

3 All humans will value as “prudentially good” that which allows them personally to act–F.

4 All humans, personally, will value as “prudentially good” the acquisition of as many goods from the Table of Embeddedness as possible (in hierarchical order)—1−3.

5 Respecting the general grounds of action, all humans are alike—F.

6 Respecting the general grounds of human action, logically there can be no idiosyncratic preference—5.

7 Whatever attaches as an essential Natural condition of a species viewed contextually from the various community worldview imperatives (shared human, extended human, eco, and extended eco) is proper to that Natural species condition—F.

8 To be “mutually life-affirming in an environmental perspective” is a fundamental positive normative environmental value—A.⁵⁴

9 Whatever is proper to a Natural species condition is morally good if the summation of all and every Natural species conditions (i.e., general, generic conditions) are mutually life-affirming in an environmental perspective—5−8.

10 The prudential values set out in premise #4 (for individuals) can be generally life-affirming in an environmental perspective—9.

11 Prudential values for particular individuals in an environmental context become general moral values when they attach to generic Natural species conditions—9, 10.

12 The prudential values set out in premise #4 are morally good and incur positive moral duties on all (capable of voluntary action) to facilitate outcomes that are life-affirming in an environmental perspective—4, 9, 11.