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Table of Contents

The Emperor Leopold—His Internal Policy—The Policy of Prussia—Leopold’s Foreign Policy—Conference of Reichenbach—Leopold and the Turks—Treaty of Sistova—Leopold crowned Emperor—Leopold and Hungary—State of Parties in Belgium—Their Internal Dissensions—Congress at the Hague—Leopold reconquers Belgium—War between Russia and Sweden—Treaty of Verela—War between Russia and the Turks—Capture of Ismail—Treaty of Jassy—Position of Leopold—The State of France—Mirabeau’s advice—Death of Mirabeau—The Flight to Varennes—Its Results: in France—The Massacre of 17th July 1791—Revision of the Constitution—Its Results: in Europe—Manifesto of Padua—Declaration of Pilnitz—Completion of the French Constitution of 1791—The Polish Constitution of 1791—The Legislative Assembly in France—The Girondins—Approach of War between France and Austria—Causes of the War—Attitude of Europe—Death of the Emperor Leopold—Murder of Gustavus ii. of Sweden—Policy of Dumouriez—War declared by France against Austria—Invasion of the Tuileries, 20th June 1792—Francis ii. crowned Emperor—Invasion of France by Prussia and Austria—Insurrection of 10th August 1792—Suspension of Louis xvi.—Desertion of Lafayette—The Massacres of September in the prisons—Battle of Valmy—Meeting of the National Convention—The Girondins and the Mountain—Conquest of Savoy, Nice, and Mayence—Battle of Jemmappes—Conquest of Belgium—Execution of Louis xvi.—War declared against Spain, Holland, England and the Empire—Catherine invades Poland—Overthrow of the Polish Constitution—Second Partition of Poland—Contrast between the resistance of France and Poland.

The Emperor Leopold.

The successor of Joseph II., the Emperor Leopold, was, except perhaps Catherine of Russia, the ablest monarch of his time. He had had a long experience in the art of government, for he had succeeded to the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1765, on the death of his father, the Emperor Francis of Lorraine. While his brother Joseph was kept until 1780 by Maria Theresa in leading-strings as far as the actual administration of the Hapsburg dominions was concerned, and was only able to exert his authority as Emperor, Leopold had from his boyhood been an absolute and irresponsible sovereign, and had imbibed from his education an Italian knowledge of statecraft. During his long reign in Tuscany he showed the finest qualities of a benevolent despot in his measures for increasing the material comforts of his people, combined with tact and diplomatic subtlety. His reforms were as sweeping as those of Joseph, but were so managed as not to set his dominions in a flame. With the help of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia, he freed the people of Tuscany from the heavy burden of an excessive number of ecclesiastics; he reorganised the internal administration, and especially the judicial system; and he showed such intelligence in grasping and partially applying the new principles of political economy as to be called ‘the physiocratic prince.’ He had been Grand Duke of Tuscany for twenty-five years, and when he succeeded his elder brother Joseph as King of Hungary and Bohemia in February 1790, he had earned the reputation of a singularly wise and prudent statesman, and of one who, if it could be done, might be expected to restore the power of the House of Austria. He abandoned the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to his second son Ferdinand, and at once applied himself to the difficult task bequeathed to him by Joseph II.

Policy of Leopold.

Leopold found the power of Austria seriously affected by dangers from within and dangers from without. He at once undid much of Joseph’s work. He recognised the difference between consolidating and unifying a nation, which was essentially one, and a congeries of nations speaking different languages, belonging to different races, and geographically widely separated. In Tuscany he had accomplished a great work in abolishing the local franchises of the cities and building up a Tuscan state, but he understood that such a work was impossible in the divided hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg, and that the Emperor Joseph had been attempting a hopeless task. Leopold’s first step was, therefore, to restore the former state of things in such parts of his dominions as were not in open insurrection. In Austria proper, in Bohemia, in the Milanese, and in the Tyrol, the concessions of Leopold were received with demonstrations of popular gratitude. He abolished the new system of taxation and the unpopular seminaries; he recognised the separate administrations of provinces which were essentially diverse; he gave up futile attempts at unification. But, at the same time, he maintained the edict of religious toleration, the most noble of Joseph’s reforms, and introduced many slight but appreciable improvements in the local institutions which he restored. Having thus assured the fidelity of an important body of his subjects, he prepared to deal with the declared rebels in Belgium and the unconcealed opposition in Hungary. It was here that Leopold suffered most from the foreign policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph, for it was indisputable that the prevalent discontent and insurrection in Belgium and Hungary was fostered by the Triple Alliance, and especially by Prussia. He had a serious war with the Turks on his hands; his ally, Catherine of Russia, was too much occupied with her wars with the Swedes and Turks and with the affairs of Poland, to come to his help; France, excited by her internal dissensions, and with the Assembly indisposed to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1756, might almost be reckoned an enemy; the Empire had been roused to distrust by the policy of Joseph, and the Triple Alliance was openly hostile. Under these circumstances Prussia appeared at once the chief power on the Continent and the principal enemy of Austria, and it was with Prussia that Leopold first resolved to deal.

The Policy of Prussia.

The events of the year 1789 had greatly improved the position of Prussia on the Continent. The pretensions of Joseph to Bavaria had made Frederick William II., as it had made Frederick the Great, the real leader of the Princes of the Empire, and the Triple Alliance had done more to improve and strengthen his position in Europe. The classic policy of Prussia was consistent opposition to Austria, and Hertzberg, the Prussian minister, in pursuance of this policy, had made use of all Joseph’s mistakes to lower the power of the House of Hapsburg. He felt it necessary, indeed, to disavow a treaty with the Turks, which the too zealous Prussian envoy had signed in January 1790, but he was eager to make use of the difficulties of Russia and Austria caused by the Turkish war to forward Prussia’s designs on Poland. His main aim was to obtain the cession of the important Polish cities of Thorn and Dantzic, which would give Prussia complete control of the great river Vistula. The ablest Prussian diplomatist, Lucchesini, was sent to Warsaw, and on 29th March 1790 he signed a treaty of friendship and union with the Poles, by which Poland was to cede Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia in return for the retrocession of part of Austrian Galicia, which had fallen to Austria at the first partition, while Prussia promised to guarantee the territory and constitution of Poland, and to send an army of 18,000 men to the help of the Poles if they were attacked.

This treaty, shameless even in its epoch for its desertion of allies, breach of former engagements and absence of good faith, was highly approved by Frederick William II. and Hertzberg. They would not have dared to conclude it but for the seeming weakness of Russia and Austria, the partners in the former partition. Russia was hampered by the Swedish and Turkish wars, and the discontent of the ceded provinces of Poland. Austria was in a still more desperate condition. With the Turkish war still unconcluded, with open insurrection in Belgium, and disaffection in Hungary, unpopular in the Empire, and deprived of the alliance of France by the unconcealed dislike of the Assembly to the Treaty of 1756, it seemed as if the House of Hapsburg must now give way entirely to the House of Hohenzollern. Of the active encouragement given to the Turks, the Belgians, the Hungarians, and the Princes of the Empire against Austria by Prussia, mention has been made. Not less skilful was the conduct of the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Goltz, who intrigued with the more extreme leaders in the Assembly, and especially Pétion,[7] against Austria, and in particular did all in his power to increase the growing unpopularity of Marie Antoinette and to insist that she was a traitor to France.

The Policy of Leopold.

Had a less able statesman than Leopold been the successor of Joseph, the schemes of Prussia might have been crowned with success. But he had not ruled in the native city of Machiavelli for a quarter of a century for nothing; and he set to work to checkmate the designs of Hertzberg and Frederick William II. His wise measures of conciliation speedily rallied the heart of the hereditary dominions to him; and he determined to use diplomacy to establish his position in Europe before he dealt with Belgium and Hungary. He quickly perceived that Prussia’s real strength lay in the support of the Triple Alliance; her financial situation was such that she dared not undertake a serious war without the active countenance of England and Holland. He knew that it was worse than hopeless to rely upon France, and therefore at once applied to England. He protested that he did not share his brother’s attachment for Russia, or his schemes for the division of the Ottoman provinces; and he further hinted that he would abandon all attempt to reconquer Belgium and surrender it to France unless he received some assistance. Pitt felt the weight of these considerations; he did not care much about what happened to Poland, but he cared a great deal that the French should not occupy Belgium. When, therefore, the King of Prussia mobilised a powerful army in Silesia, and demanded through Hertzberg that Austria should on the one hand make an armistice with the Turks, and on the other restore Galicia to Poland, Leopold, trusting that he had broken the harmony of the Triple Alliance, made no elaborate warlike preparations, but demanded a conference.

The Conference of Reichenbach. June 1790.

The King of Hungary and Bohemia thoroughly understood the character of the Prussian king and the intrigues of his courtiers and ministers; he knew that Hertzberg was the real enemy of Austria, and that Frederick William was unstable and easily persuaded. He felt that his own strength lay in diplomacy, not war. On 26th June the two Austrian envoys, Reuss and Spielmann, arrived at the headquarters of the Prussian army in Silesia at Reichenbach, and demanded a conference. Rather to the disgust of the Prussians, their allies of the Triple Alliance insisted on being present, and a regular congress was held, at which Hertzberg and Lucchesini represented Prussia, Reuss and Spielmann, Austria, Ewart, England, Reden, Holland, and Jablonowski, the Poles. Even the Hungarian malcontents and the Belgian rebels, relying on the promises of Frederick William, ventured to send envoys. The conclusions of the congress justified Leopold’s diplomatic skill. When Hertzberg laid the Prussian demands in full before the assembled envoys, to his surprise Jablonowski declared that the Poles would never cede Thorn and Dantzic, while the representatives of England and Holland not only advocated the maintenance of the status quo, but refused the co-operation of their governments in Prussia’s schemes for aggrandisement. The policy of Hertzberg and Kaunitz, of perpetuating the rivalry of Prussia and Austria, had failed. Leopold was far too acute to leave these matters to ministers. He placed himself in direct communication with the King of Prussia and his personal favourites, Lucchesini and Bischofswerder; he argued that the interests of the two great German states both with regard to Poland and France were identical, and on 27th July 1790 the Convention of Reichenbach was signed, by which Austria promised at once to make an armistice with the Turks, and eventually to conclude peace with them under the mediation of the Triple Alliance, while, on the other hand, the powers of the Triple Alliance guaranteed the restoration of the Austrian authority in Belgium. It was more privately arranged that Prussia should withdraw from encouraging discontent in Hungary and Belgium, and support Leopold’s candidature for the Imperial throne. This great diplomatic victory did more than merely check the active enmity of Prussia; it established the ascendency of Leopold over the weak mind of Frederick William; and it eventually, in May 1791, brought about, not indeed his actual dismissal from office, but the removal of Hertzberg, the sworn foe of Austria, from the charge of the foreign policy of Prussia.

Leopold and the Turks.

The Treaty of Sistova. 4th Aug. 1791.

The first actual consequence of the Convention of Reichenbach was the conclusion of an armistice between Austria and the Turks. The war had never been looked on with favour by Leopold, who regarded Joseph’s infatuation for the grandiose schemes of Catherine of Russia as absurd, and the dismemberment of Turkey as impracticable, and at the present time undesirable. He had not attempted to press matters against the Turks, and had withdrawn many of his best troops under Loudon from the seat of war to Bohemia to strengthen his position at Reichenbach. The Prince of Coburg, who succeeded Loudon, aided by an earthquake, took Orsova, and laid siege to Giurgevo, but he was defeated in his camp after a severe battle on 8th July 1790. This defeat was only partially compensated by a victory won by Clerfayt, and by the capture of Zettin by General de Vins on 20th July. Under these circumstances Leopold was not sorry to conclude an armistice for nine months at Giurgevo on 19th September. Shortly afterwards a congress of plenipotentiaries from Austria, Turkey, and the mediating powers met, as had been arranged at Reichenbach, at Sistova. The negotiations lasted for many months; Leopold insisted on the cession by Turkey of Old Orsova and a district in Croatia, which would make the Danube and the Unna the boundary between Austria and Turkey; Prussia at first strongly protested against any cession to Austria; the congress even for a time broke up; and it was not until Leopold adroitly got Lucchesini, the Prussian envoy, on his side, that the important Treaty of Sistova upon the terms desired by Leopold was concluded on 4th August 1791.

Leopold crowned Emperor. 9th Oct. 1790.

By this treaty the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg were relieved from the danger of foreign war; the next result which Leopold drew from the Convention of Reichenbach was the re-establishment of the Austrian ascendency in Germany. Assured of the support of Prussia, Leopold travelled to the Rhine. On 30th September 1790 he was unanimously elected King of the Romans; on 4th October he solemnly entered Frankfort, and on 9th October he was crowned Emperor. But it was not enough for him to be crowned Emperor; he had to destroy the bad effect of his brother Joseph’s attitude towards the Empire; he had to become the real as well as the nominal head and leader of the German princes, and to win back the advantages which Prussia had secured by forming the League of Princes. The opportunity was afforded to him by the disinclination of the German princes, who owned territories in Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, to accept the compensation offered to them by the French Constituent Assembly. Their protests took the shape of a clause in the ‘capitulation’ laid before him and accepted by him on his election as Emperor by which he promised to intervene on behalf of the Empire for the preservation of the rights, sanctioned by the Treaty of Westphalia, of the princes, whose interests were affected. Leopold thus seized this opportunity to pose as the head of the German Empire, and on 14th December 1790 he wrote a very strong letter to Louis XVI., in which he said: ‘The territories in question have not been transferred to the kingdom of France; they are subject to the supremacy of the Emperor and the Empire: no member of the Empire has the right to transfer that supremacy to a foreign nation. It follows, therefore, that the decrees of the Assembly are null and void so far as concerns the Empire and its members, and that everything ought to be replaced on the ancient footing.’[8]

Leopold and Hungary.

Leopold crowned King of Hungary. 15th Nov. 1790.

After being crowned Emperor at Frankfort, Leopold returned to Vienna and proceeded to establish his power firmly in Hungary. The discontent aroused in the most backward part of his dominions by the Emperor Joseph’s measures had not been appeased by that monarch’s wholesale retractation, nor even by the return of the Crown of St. Stephen. The Hungarian nobles regarded Joseph’s retractation as a sign of weakness, and, encouraged by the intrigues of Prussia and the difficulties in which Leopold was involved by the war with the Turks, resolved to obtain more sweeping concessions. The example of France exerted an influence even in Hungary, and the following sentences from a memorial,[9] presented to Leopold by the people of Pesth, might have been written by a Parisian popular society: ‘From the rights of nations and of man, and from that social compact whence States arose, it is incontestable that sovereignty originates from the people. This axiom our parent Nature has impressed on the hearts of all; it is one of those which a just prince (and such we trust Your Majesty will ever be) cannot dispute; it is one of those inalienable, imprescriptible rights which the people cannot forfeit by neglect or disuse. Our constitution places the sovereignty jointly in the king and people, in such a manner that the remedies necessary to be applied according to the ends of social life for the security of persons and property, are in the power of the people. We are sure, therefore, that at the meeting of the ensuing Diet, Your Majesty will not confine yourself to the objects mentioned in your rescript; but will also restore our freedom to us, in like manner as to the Belgians, who have conquered theirs with the sword. It would be an example big with danger to teach the world that a people can only protect or regain their liberties by the sword, and not by obedience.’ The Hungarian Diet, which Leopold had summoned for the ceremony of his coronation, and to which the people of Pesth alluded in this remarkable address, was largely attended. The Hungarian nobility regarded its convocation as a further sign of weakness, for none had been held since the accession of Maria Theresa, and prepared an inaugural act or compact, which would have reduced the kings of Hungary to a similar position to that occupied by the kings of Poland. Full of confidence in themselves they even went so far as to send envoys, as has been mentioned, to the Congress of Reichenbach. Leopold, however, had no intention of yielding to these demands; his only desire was to gain time until he had secured his position by diplomacy. Meanwhile he tried to stir up opposition in Hungary itself, by encouraging the other nationalities in the kingdom, such as the inhabitants of Croatia and the Banat. But when the Congress of Reichenbach was over, the armistice of Giurgevo concluded, and his coronation as Emperor performed, Leopold proceeded to deal with the Hungarians. He first ordered the army of 60,000 men, which he had concentrated in Bohemia to support his attitude against the Prussians, to Pesth, and then directed the Diet to remove to Presburg for his coronation as King of Hungary. He then declared that nothing would induce him to accept the proposed new constitution, or to consent to an infringement of the Edict of Toleration, and that he would only consent to the terms of the inaugural acts of his grandfather, Charles VI., and his mother, Maria Theresa. The Hungarian nobles, overcome by his firmness and the presence of his troops, yielded; the Emperor appointed his fourth son, the Archduke Leopold, to be Palatine of Hungary in the place of the late Prince Esterhazy; and it was from him that he received the Crown of St. Stephen on 15th November, on the terms he had stipulated.

Parties in Belgium.

Having gained this victory by his firmness, Leopold proceeded to win popularity by a timely concession, and proposed a law, obliging every future king to be crowned within six months of his accession. This concession was received with the wildest enthusiasm, as it obviated the possibility of conduct resembling that of Joseph II.; the Diet granted the Emperor a gift of 225,000 florins instead of the usual 100,000 florins; and the disaffected attitude of the nobility was changed for one of hearty admiration and gratitude. The bourgeois of Pesth and their declarations were disavowed; the echo of the French Revolution, which had been heard there, was quickly stifled; and the Hungarian nobility, well contented with Leopold, declined to encourage the popular aspirations. The difficulties which the Emperor Leopold encountered in Hungary were trifling to those which faced him in Belgium. But in this quarter time had worked for the House of Hapsburg, and when the Congress of Plenipotentiaries, arranged at the Congress of Reichenbach, met at the Hague in October 1790, the situation had entirely changed. The victory of the Belgian rebels in 1789 had been followed by internal dissensions, which appeared directly the new Constitution was proclaimed. The first difference was between the Van der Nootists, or Statists, as they termed themselves, and the Vonckists. The latter, inspired by the success of the French Revolution, advocated a thoroughly democratic constitution, and the organisation of a new elective system of local administration, to the great disgust of the Statists, who desired simply the restoration of the old order of things, but with the central government controlled by elected assembly instead of being in the hands of the House of Hapsburg. Curiously enough popular feeling ran in a direction very different from that followed in France. Influenced by the priests, the Belgian people, and more especially the mob of Brussels, were convinced that the Vonckists were atheists; the democrats were attacked in the streets, maltreated and imprisoned; the bourgeois National Guards refused to protect them; they were proscribed by Van der Noot and the party in power; and after many riots and disturbances Vonck fled to France in April 1790. These events greatly weakened the Belgian Republic, for the democratic party, which had been energetic in the revolution, numbered in its ranks many of the ablest and most enlightened men in the country. But even more serious was the result abroad, for the National Assembly of France and Lafayette were surprised and disgusted at the persecution of the democrats, and the sympathy of the French people was entirely alienated from the Belgian leaders. Still more striking in its effect was the conduct of the Van der Nootists towards the gallant officer, Van der Mersch, who had commanded the patriot troops in the invasion of October 1789. Not satisfied with superseding him by the Prussian general, Schönfeld, the Van der Nootists had him arrested on a charge of disorganising the Belgian army and imprisoned at Antwerp, to the great wrath of the people of Flanders, of which province Van der Mersch was a native. The conquering party was further divided. The nobility and clergy, headed by the Duc d’Aremberg, were jealous of the ascendency assumed by Van der Noot, and of the continued omnipotence of the Assembly at Brussels. Under these circumstances it was a significant fact that the Austrian troops in Luxembourg under the command of Marshal Bender were able with the help of the people themselves to occupy the province of Limburg.

Congress at the Hague. Oct. 1790.

Leopold reconquers Belgium.

The Austrians at Liége.

In October 1790 the Congress, which had been resolved on at Reichenbach, met at the Hague. The Austrian plenipotentiary was the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, the most accomplished Austrian diplomatist and ambassador at Paris, and the representatives of England, Prussia, and Holland were Lord Auckland, Count Keller, and the Grand Pensionary Van der Spiegel. Leopold now reaped the advantages of his skilful diplomacy at Reichenbach. England and Holland understood that the new Emperor was a very different man from his predecessor, and Prussia dared not act without them. As he had promised, Leopold solemnly announced his intention to restore all the charters, laws, and arrangements, which had existed in Belgium in the time of his mother, Maria Theresa, under the guarantee of the three powers, and further promised a general amnesty if his authority was recognised by 21st November. The Belgian States-General made no reply to Leopold, and the Emperor proceeded to concentrate 45,000 men under Bender in Luxembourg. Then the Belgian leaders applied to the Congress at the Hague for a prolongation of the armistice and the restoration of the state of government existing in the time of Charles VI. and not in that of Maria Theresa. These demands were supported by the representatives of the Triple Alliance, but rejected by the Austrian ambassador. On 21st November the Belgian States-General elected the Archduke Charles, the third son of the Emperor, to be hereditary Grand Duke, but the time had gone by for compromises, and on the following day Bender entered Belgium. The experiences of a year of revolution made the Belgian people not unwilling to return under the sway of Austria; the cities surrendered without a blow, and on 2d December 1790 Brussels capitulated. Van der Noot fled with his chief friends, and Belgium was won back by Leopold as easily as it had been lost by Joseph. On 8th December the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau assented to the restoration of the liberties recognised in the inaugural act of Charles VI., but Leopold disavowed his ambassador and insisted on the authority possessed by Maria Theresa at the close of her reign. Under these circumstances the mediating powers refused their guarantee, a refusal which rather gratified the Emperor than otherwise, as it freed him from the fear of foreign interference. Not only in Belgium itself, but in the neighbouring bishopric of Liége also, Leopold established Austrian ascendency. The princes of the Circle of the Empire, which adjoined, were dissatisfied with the conduct of Prussia and General Schlieffen, and appealed to the Emperor. He was only too glad to assert his authority; Schlieffen evacuated the territory; and on 13th January 1791 it was occupied by an Austrian force, which re-established the Prince-bishop in all his former authority.

Russia and Sweden.

Treaty of Verela. Aug. 14th 1790.

The entire reversal of Joseph’s policy by Leopold, the arrangements made at Reichenbach, and the friendly attitude of the new Emperor towards the powers forming the Triple Alliance, deprived Russia of her only ally at a time when the Empress had on her hands two exhausting wars with Sweden and Turkey. The former was the most serious. Gustavus III., freed from the dangers of a Danish invasion, and by his coup d’état from the formidable plots of his nobility, rejoined his army in Finland and prepared to carry on the war vigorously by land and sea. His army was too small to effect much in spite of his near approach to St. Petersburg, and his chief confidence was in his fleet. This fleet was soon blockaded in the Gulf of Vyborg by the Russian admiral, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, one of the most famous soldiers of fortune of the century; an attempt it made to break out on 24th June 1790 was repulsed, and the Russians even hoped to force it to capitulate. But, to their surprise, the Swedes broke the blockade on the 3d July, though with a loss of 5000 men, and on 9th July won a great naval victory in Svenska Sound, in which the Russians lost 30 ships, 600 guns and 6000 men. But this victory led to no corresponding diplomatic result. Catherine, defeated though she was, made overtures in no humiliated spirit to the King of Sweden, and proposed to him that, instead of quarrelling with his neighbours, he should turn his attention to the state of affairs in France. The chivalrous and romantic king was not unwilling to listen to her suggestions; he had, during a visit to Paris, been much impressed by Marie Antoinette, and was full of pity at the situation of the royal family of France and of disgust at the progress of the Revolution. He felt, too, that the war with Russia was not popular among his people, and on 14th August 1790 he signed a treaty of peace at Verela, by which the status quo ante bellum between Russia and Sweden was restored without any compensation in money or territory being obtained by the victorious Swedes.

Capture of Ismail. 20th Dec. 1790.

Treaty of Jassy. 9th Jan. 1792.

While resisting the Swedes, Catherine made her chief effort against the Turks. In this quarter the defection of Leopold and the Armistice of Giurgevo seriously compromised her position. The war had resolved itself into the siege of the strong city of Ismail, where the Turks defended themselves with the utmost tenacity. The Russian attacks were foiled again and again, and Potemkin resigned the conduct of the siege in despair. His place was taken by Suvórov, whose brilliant victory on the Rymnik in 1789 had marked him as the greatest Russian general of his time. His valour and constancy equalled those qualities in the Turks; and Ismail was stormed on 20th December 1790, after a scene of carnage which cost the lives of 10,000 Russians and 30,000 Turks. In the following year the Russians pressed onwards towards Constantinople, and on 9th July 1791 the Russian General Repnin, under whom served Suvórov and Kutuzov, defeated the Grand Vizier at Matchin. But the Empress Catherine was not inclined to follow up these military advantages. The policy of Leopold had isolated her; the Treaty of Sistova had deprived her of an auxiliary army against the Turks; the state of affairs in Poland demanded her most serious attention; and she had to observe the action of Europe on the French Revolution and of the French Revolution on Europe, in the hope of deriving some advantage for Russia from the complications. She, therefore, signed a treaty of peace with the Turks at Jassy on 9th January 1792, by which Russia retained only Oczakoff and the coast-line between the mouths of the Bug and the Dniester. By making this peace, Catherine only deferred the prosecution of the schemes of Russia against the Ottoman Empire, and certain clauses with regard to the Danubian Principalities, affording a pretext for future wars, were skilfully included in the Treaty of Jassy.

Position of Leopold.

The success of the policy of the Emperor Leopold entirely altered the situation of the European states and their attitude towards each other. He was in 1791 not only master in his own dominions, but the recognised representative of the Empire, in fact as well as in name. He had broken down the combination against Austria and the solidarity of the Triple Alliance. England was far more favourably inclined to him than she had ever been to Joseph II.; Frederick William II. of Prussia was his ally not his enemy. He was, therefore, able in 1791 to turn his thoughts to the situation of France, and to see what advantages could be drawn from the position of affairs there for the benefit of Austria. The political effacement of France in foreign affairs was due to the assumption of all real authority by the Constituent Assembly, while leaving the responsibility to the King’s ministers, and Leopold did not doubt that the result of an entire victory of the popular party would be a recurrence to the classical policy of opposition to Austria and the rupture of the Treaty of 1756. It was to his interest to prevent this, and he had therefore political, as well as personal, ends to secure in endeavouring to restore the authority of the King of France. The capture of the Bastille and the transference of the royal family to Paris were great events in the history of France, but they only affected Leopold as weakening the authority of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, the faithful allies of Austria. The behaviour of the Constituent Assembly gave him pretexts for interfering in France, in spite of the diplomatic ability of Mirabeau, and he was earnestly besought by the French émigrés, or opponents of the new state of things in France, who had gone into voluntary exile with the King’s younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, at their head, to intervene on behalf of the French monarchy.

The state of France, 1791.

The conduct of the Constituent Assembly in disorganising every branch of the executive in France had its natural effect by the commencement of 1791. The army, in spite of the effort of General Bouillé to restore discipline by making an example of some Swiss mutineers at Nancy in 1790, was rendered inefficient by the disaffection of the soldiers and the exaggerated royalism of most of the officers; the navy was in a still worse condition; the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had caused a schism, which disturbed the minds of men in all parts of France, and created an army of opponents to the work of the Assembly, who had peculiar influence over the rural communities; the issue of assignats on the security of the confiscated domains of the Church had inflated the currency, and, while giving an appearance of fictitious prosperity, had really given a feeling of insecurity to all trade and commerce; the old internal administrations of the provinces had been replaced by the new administrations of the departments, which were filled by inexperienced men, utterly unable to cope with the difficulties of a time of unrest and revolution. The practical disorganisation of the executive was meanwhile being consecrated by the measures of the Constituent Assembly, which, in the Constitution it was drawing up, in its fear of the power of the monarchy, so hampered the authority of the executive as to destroy the necessary foundations of good government.

Death of Mirabeau.

In its ardour for the Rights of Man and the principle of election, the Constituent Assembly forgot the need for enforcing the authority of the law, and the necessity for providing a strong arm to carry it into effect. Mirabeau had clearly perceived that France was drifting into a state of anarchy. In his secret notes for the Court he insisted on the importance of restoring its proper power to the executive, and he advised the King to leave Paris and call the partisans of order to his side. Civil war, he contended, was preferable to anarchy, cloaked by fine words; it would openly divide France into the adherents of order and of disorder, and result in the maintenance of the popular rights sanctioned by the royal power. The King was to acknowledge the right of the people to legislate, and tax themselves through their representatives, but was to point out the importance of maintaining a strong government to secure the happiness of the governed. Against foreign war, however, Mirabeau strongly protested; foreign interference would rouse the spirit of national patriotism, and if the King was suspected of favouring the foreigners, it would result in the overthrow of the monarchy, and in a long struggle before the country could agree on a new form of government. However, on 2d April 1791, Mirabeau died, and France was deprived of its most sagacious, if not its only, statesman. In truth, Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette had no wish to take Mirabeau’s advice; the King regarded civil war as a horrible calamity, and to be shunned in every way and at any sacrifice; the Queen longed for the interference of her brother, the Emperor, and begged him to intervene to restore the royal authority. The King’s religious convictions were wounded by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy; the Queen was roused to wrath by the feeling that she was a prisoner, by daily insults in the press, and by the degradation of the power of the monarchy. On 18th April 1791 the royal prisoners were prevented by the Parisians from going to Saint-Cloud for Easter, and on 18th May the Emperor Leopold issued a circular to all crowned heads calling attention to the position of the King of France in his capital. On 20th May he had an interview with the Comte de Durfort, a secret emissary from the Tuileries, at Mantua, and charged him to tell the King and Queen of France that ‘he was going to concern himself with their affairs, not in words, but in acts.’

The Flight to Varennes. 21st June 1791.

The action of the Parisian mob on 18th April caused Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette to resolve to escape secretly from Paris, since they were obviously prisoners and could not leave openly. They determined, contrary to the advice so often given by Mirabeau, and contrary also to the wishes of the Emperor and of his able representative at the Hague, the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, who knew France better than any living diplomatist, to fly towards the frontier. Leopold, under the pretext of supporting his authority in Belgium and Luxembourg, and that of his allies, the Elector-Archbishop of Trèves and the Bishop of Liége, massed his troops upon the frontier in readiness to succour or assist, and Bouillé, who commanded at Metz, made preparations to have the part of his forces on which he could rely ready to receive the fugitive monarch. On 20th June 1791 the royal family left Paris by night, after the King had drawn up a declaration protesting against the whole of the measures of the Constituent Assembly, and disavowing them. The flight, from a combination of circumstances, ended in the royal family being stopped at Varennes, and being brought back to Paris in custody. It had the most momentous results upon the history of the French Revolution, which are sometimes disregarded in the recollection of the romantic circumstances attending it.

Results of the Flight to Varennes.

The Massacre of 17th July in Paris.

The primary result of the flight to Varennes was the sudden comprehension by France that Louis XVI. was an unwilling collaborator in the work of reconstituting the French government on a new basis. Hitherto the people, and even the leaders of the Constituent Assembly, had believed in his acquiescence, if not in his hearty assistance. But the declaration, left behind on the occasion of his flight, proved the contrary. The statesmen of the Constituent Assembly, including the makers of the new Constitution, such as Le Chapelier and Thouret, and the triumvirate of Duport, Barnave, and Lameth, who, after Mirabeau’s death, were the undisputed leaders of the majority, saw they had gone too far, and that in their desire to weaken the royal authority, they had seriously weakened the executive, and had made the King’s position intolerable. They therefore threw the blame of the flight to Varennes on the subordinates in the scheme, ignored the King’s declaration, and acted on the supposition that he was misled by bad advisers. This attitude not being wholly approved by the Jacobin Club, which, through its affiliated clubs in the provinces, exercised the most powerful sway in the formation of public opinion, the believers in the royal authority seceded and formed the Constitutional Club, or Club of 1789, which temporarily weakened the power of the Jacobins in Paris. But this secession was entirely sanctioned by the bourgeois classes both in Paris and throughout France, who had the strongest interest in the maintenance of order, and who sent in numerous declarations of their adhesion to the cause of monarchy. Moreover, their chief representatives in arms, the National Guard of Paris, under the command of Lafayette, had soon an opportunity of giving practical proof of this loyal disposition. The Cordeliers Club, which was chiefly influenced by Danton, a lawyer of Paris, who had Mirabeau’s gift of seeing things as they really were, felt it impossible to hush things up. They understood the King’s declaration to mean a declaration of war against the new Constitution; his flight to Varennes they rightly interpreted to show that he was trusting to the intervention of foreign powers to re-establish him in his former position; and they resolved to draw up a petition for his dethronement. This petition was largely the work of Danton and of Brissot, a pamphleteer and journalist, who had been imprisoned in the Bastille, and had imbibed republican notions in America, and a large crowd assembled to sign it on the Champ de Mars. Lafayette determined to disperse this crowd, and the National Guard, under his command, fired on the people, killing several persons. This vigorous measure, which was intended to show the power of the party of order, was followed by vigorous steps against the party for dethronement.

Revision of the Constitution.

The leaders of the Cordeliers were proscribed. Danton and Marat fled to England, and the party of order seemed triumphant. A revision of the Constitution was undertaken, and various reactionary clauses, specially directed against the press, the popular clubs or societies, and the rights of assembly and of petition, were inserted. But this new attitude of the Constituent Assembly had but a slight effect upon France, for the king’s flight had caused the people in general to believe that he was the enemy of their new-born liberties, and a traitor in league with foreign powers to overthrow them.

Effects of the Flight to Varennes.

Manifesto of Padua. 6th July 1791.

The flight to Varennes proved to the people of France, as well as to the monarchs and statesmen of Europe, that Louis XVI. was a prisoner in Paris, and an enemy to the new settlement of the government, as laid down by the Constitution in course of preparation. The Emperor Leopold, as brother of Marie Antoinette, as Holy Roman Emperor and supporter of dynastic legitimacy, as the leading monarch of Europe, decided to intervene. On 6th July 1791 he issued the Manifesto of Padua, in which he invited the sovereigns of Europe to join him in declaring the cause of the King of France to be their own, in exacting that he should be freed from all popular restraint, and in refusing to recognise any constitutional laws as legitimately established in France, except such as might be sanctioned by the King acting in perfect freedom. The English Government paid little or no attention to these requests of Leopold, but the Empress Catherine, and the Kings of Prussia, Spain, and Sweden, for different reasons and in different degrees, heartily accepted Leopold’s views, and armed intervention to carry them into effect was suggested. But Leopold had no desire for war. His policy since his accession had been distinctly in favour of peace. He was a diplomatist, not a soldier, and he desired to frighten France by threats, rather than to fight France for the liberty of Louis XVI. and his family.

Declaration of Pilnitz, 27th Aug. 1791.

Completion of the Constitution.

The sequel to the Manifesto of Padua was a conference at Pilnitz between the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William II. of Prussia, accompanied by their ministers, in August 1791. At this conference the King’s brothers, Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII., who had escaped from France at the time of the flight to Varennes, and the Comte d’Artois, afterwards Charles X., who had fled in July 1789, at the epoch of the capture of the Bastille, were present. They had their own aims to serve. They were disgusted at the weak conduct, as they termed it, of Louis XVI. in yielding so far as he had done to the popular wishes; they desired to undo the whole effect of the Revolution and to restore the Bourbon monarchy in its ancient authority by the arms of the monarchs of Europe. But Leopold did not care about the French princes or the Bourbon monarchy. He cared rather for the safety of his sister, Marie Antoinette, and the maintenance through her of the Franco-Austrian alliance. In the Declaration of Pilnitz, which was signed by the Emperor and the King of Prussia on 27th August 1791, the two sovereigns declared that the situation of the King of France was an object of interest common to all European monarchs, and that they hoped other monarchs would use with them the most efficacious means to put the King of France in a position to lay in perfect liberty the bases of a monarchical government, suited alike to the rights of sovereigns and the happiness of the French nation. Provided that other powers would co-operate with them they were willing to act promptly, and had therefore placed their armies on foot. These threats exasperated but did not terrify the French people. Leopold had no intention of entering upon hostilities, and found a loophole by which to escape from declaring war in the acceptance by Louis XVI. of the completed Constitution on 21st September 1791. He then solemnly withdrew his pretensions to interfere in the internal affairs of France.