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As part of the negotiations, Japan demanded that China cede several pieces of territory to Japan. China should also recognize Korea’s dependence on Japan and pay war reparations. Li Hongzhang was given the right to decide whether to agree to these terms.53 The Emperor and high ministers discussed giving up land, though they did not agree.54 They sent word to Qing’s de facto paramount leader, Cixi; however, they received no reply. Li was left to decide by himself.55 In March, 1895, the Chinese and Japanese delegates met in Shimonoseki. The Japanese said that their conditions included, 1) Japan’s occupation of Dagu, Tianjin, and Shanhaiguan; 2) Japan’s management of the railroad connecting Tianjin and Shanhaiguan; and 3) China’s commitment to pay all war expenses during the truce. Li argued that the Japanese were too greedy and decided not to go through with the negotiations. Unexpectedly, a ronin (i.e., an impoverished Japanese samurai) attempted to assassinate Li, which resulted in him being seriously wounded. The global media was in an uproar. Worrying about foreign powers intervening, the Japanese government approved a 21-day truce. However, the truce was not applicable to Taiwan and Penghu 澎 湖. In the beginning of April, Japan told Li, who was still injured, that peace was based on the fulfillment of China’s recognition of Japan’s full control of Korea; the cession of Taiwan, Penghu, and Liaodong Peninsula to Japan; and China’s payment of reparations of 200,000,000 taels of silver to Japan. Li wrote a long letter, attempting to persuade Japan to change its demands. However, he was unsuccessful and the Japanese repeatedly threatened to attack Beijing. On April 10, Japan issued an ultimatum to Li, demanding an answer to its demands. Li sent a telegram to Emperor Guangxu, telling him that he could not do anything about the situation. Seven days later, Li signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki giving Japan what it desired, land, money,56 and various privileges in China.

Japan had long since decided to take Taiwan from China. The Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, wanted Japan to occupy Taiwan by force and then compel China to cede it to Japan. He even prepared a detailed program whereby Japan would capture Weihai and destroy Qing’s Northern Fleet, while sending troops to Taiwan.57 The Japanese media went crazy, wanting China to permanently cede Taiwan to Japan. Fuzuzawa Yukichi, the father of Japan’s modern education system, said that Japan should annex the whole of northeast China and turn Lüshun into east Asia’s Gibraltar. They should make Dalian into China’s northern Hong Kong, occupy Shandong and Taiwan, and demand billions of silver dollars in compensation.58 Before the peace talks, Japan had already decided to seize Taiwan. During negotiations, Ito Hirobumi kept quiet about the Japanese troops advancing on Taiwan. Li Hongzhang however, said that Taiwanese residents would never bow to the Japanese invaders.59 The Japanese Prime Minister responded by saying that his government and, in particular, his army would be able to handle the situation.60

By coercing China into signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan inflicted much humiliation on China. Chinese society was taken aback and many called for Li Hongzhang, who signed this treaty, to be executed. Li returned to Tianjin, saying his life had been ruined.61 Emperor Guangxu was close to approving the treaty and a large number of members of the royal house, high governors, and imperial officials wrote memoranda to the throne in an attempt to stop him.62 Five imperial officials, all of whom were from Taiwan, issued a joint statement, expressing their strongest condemnation of the treaty, saying that Taiwanese residents would rather die rather than submit to the Japanese.63 They became known as the Five Righteous Men of Taiwan.64 Chinese media, such as Shanghai News (Shun Pao申报), also published a series of editorials denouncing the treaty. Kang Youwei 康有为 (1858–1927), who was later the architect of the 1898 Hundred Days’ Reform, mobilized 1,300 Examination candidates to protest against the treaty, and also recommended that Qing stop ceding territory, relocate its capital, and fight to the last.

Qiu Fengjia 丘逢甲 asked Tang Jingsong 唐景崧, then Qing’s Taiwan governor, to tell the throne, on behalf of Taiwan’s residents, that they would fight the Japanese invaders to the end. Qiu and others sincerely hoped that Tang would stay in Taiwan and lead the resistance to Japan. The Treaty of Shimonoseki came into effect on May 8, 1895. Taiwan decided to save itself by founding a government that was independent of the rising colonial Japanese empire; at same time, they remained loyal to Qing.65 17 days later, the People’s Republic of Taiwan (台湾民主国, PRT) was founded and called Yongqing 永清 (literally, perpetually loyal to Qing). Tang was chosen as the president; Liu Yongfu, the war hero of the Sino-French War, was the commander-in-chief; and Qiu was the leader of the militias. This new government expressed their loyalty to Emperor Guangxu. Considering, the fact that Taiwan would soon be colonized by the Japanese, the founding of PRT was a valiant effort to defend Taiwan and China’s national sovereignty. In this sense, PRT could be regarded as the starting point for modern China’s resistance to Japanese aggression. On June 2, Taiwan was formally handed over to Kabayama Sukenori 桦山资纪, the first Japanese governor of Taiwan. Taiwan continued to be one of Japan’s colonies until 1945. Japan sent its elite troops, the Konoe Shidan (the Imperial Guard), to suppress popular resistance.

This troop was divided into two groups. One was headed by the governor and the other by one of the princes.66 Soon the Japanese captured Taibei (Taipei), where the new colonial master of Taiwan received his inauguration.

With the exception of Liu Yongfu, many leaders of the resistance, such as Tang Jingsong and Qiu Fengjia, left Taiwan. The local militias constituted the main force fighting against the Japanese army. Wu Tangxing 吴汤兴, Jiang Shaozu 姜绍祖, and Xu Xiang 徐骧 (1858–1895) were the best-known fighters. Liu Yongfu was hailed as the leader of resistance. At that time, there were 26,000 or so fighters against Japan in Tainan 台 南.67 Japan took more than fifty days to take Xinzhu, a key city in northwestern Taiwan. Liu’s Seven-Star Corps, renowned for its combat effectiveness, ambushed the Japanese army when they were crossing a river and inflicted heavy casualties. The fiercest battle took place at Baguashan, Zhanghua 彰化, where the army fought hand to hand with the enemy. Finally, one of the Japanese generals was hacked to death and all the soldiers of the Seven-Star Corps died in battle. Xu Xiang fought his way out and retreated to Tainan. Liu brought in a huge number of troops to retake Zhanghua; however, because of lack of armaments, his plan failed. By the end of September, the number of Japanese troops increased to more than 40,000. In early October, Liu’s troops almost ran out of ammunition and food. Despite these privations, they fearlessly defended Jiayi 嘉义 and Tainan. During a battle, Liu’s troops annihilated more than 700 hundred of the enemy and seriously wounded a Japanese prince, who died soon afterwards. In defence of Tainan, Xu Xiang led troops composed mainly of the Gaoshan people. More than 20,000 soldiers all fought to the death against the Japanese army. Xu was the most experienced fighter against the Japanese and vowed to fight to the death for the land.68 Fulfilling his vow, Xu died a glorious death in Xinzhu. Japan spent half a year taking over Taiwan with a huge army of more than 50,000 men, including the elite Imperial Guard, 26,000 servants, and most of its warships. More than 10,841 Japanese lost their lives, four times the casualties of the nine-month war prior to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Japan brutally repressed the people of Taiwan and imposed colonial rule on them. The laws promulgated by the Japanese government allowed the governor of Taiwan to act as a tyrant. He was given a monopoly over the military, legislative, administrative, and judicial powers. In November, a draconian law was enacted, whereby the ruler could imprison and execute whoever resisted the colonial authorities. According to statistics, in four years, more than 11,900 Taiwanese were brutally executed by this regime.69 In 1911, Liang Qichao (1873–1929), visited Taiwan, still under Japanese colonial rule, and concluded that there was all was void but the god-like Sotoku (governor).70

Taiwan under Japanese rule was no more than a police state. Within a period of two months—September and October, 1895—795 Japanese police officers were sent to Taiwan and installed at all levels71 (see table below).72

	Number of Police Agencies	Number of Police Officers	Number of Patrolling Inspectors
1896	17 Police Departments 31 Sub-Departments 15 Police Stations	\	\
1899	\	228	4,061
1901	\	173 296 alternate officers	3,469 1,734 alternate inspectors

Japan installed not only rigid laws put also sought to control the Taiwanese people’s thoughts. For the people, there was no distinction between the government and the police.73

It is generally believed that the Treaty of Shimonoseki marked China’s degeneration into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. Before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, the Western powers could not tell who would emerge the winner. China’s extremely poor performance in the war demonstrated its weakness and its proud status in Asia was gone forever. The rising Japanese empire overshadowed all others in Asia; however, it presented difficulties for the colonialists’ partition of China. A spokesperson of the Western colonialists said China was merely the “sick man of the Far East,”74 and on his deathbed, even openly discussing how to carve up China and grab its riches.75 The competition between the imperial powers for China lay at the core of Far Eastern internal relations and largely meant that China would not get the chance to rise again.

1 See: Chapter 71 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao 筹办夷务始末 (咸丰朝) (The management of foreign affairs in its entirety: The Reign of Emperor Xianfeng), 18; Chapter 4 of Xianfeng chao chouban yiwu shimo buyi 咸丰朝筹办夷务始末补遗 (A supplement to Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao), Part One, p. 680.

2 See: Chapter 71 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao, p. 28.

3 See: Liu Danian, Zhongguo jindaishigao, p. 117.

4 See: Vol. 7 of Zeng Guofan quanji, pp. 84–85.

5 Zhao Erxun 赵 尔 巽 et al., Qing shi gao 清 史 稿 [A draft history of Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1977), vol. 38, pp. 11686–11687.

6 See: Vol. 3 of Taiping Tianguo shiliao congbian jianji 太平天国史料丛编简辑 [Selected primary sources in relation to Taiping Tianguo] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1962), p. 411.

7 See: Vol. 3 of Zeng Guofan quanji, p. 186.

8 See: Gu Tinglong 顾 廷 龙 and Dai Yi 戴 逸 eds., Li Hongzhang quanji [Complete works of Li Hongzhang] (Hefei: Anhui Educational Publishing House, 2007), vol. 29, p. 218.

9 See: Chapter 25 of Chouban yiwu shibo: Tongzhi Chao (The management of foreign affairs in its entirety: The Reign of Emperor Tongzhi), pp. 1–2.

10 See: Vol. 10 of Qing Guangxu chao Zhong Ri jiaoshe shiliao 清光绪朝中日交涉史料 [Primary sources in relation to the Sino-Japanese relations in the reign of Emperor Guangxu] (Beijing: The Palace Museum, 1932), p. 2.

11 Wang Tao 王韬, Taoyuan wenlu waibian 弢园文录外编 [Supplement to Collected Works of Wang Tao] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1959), p. 22, p. 23.

12 See: Zhongguo shixue hui, Wuxu bianfa 戊戌变法 [Hundred Days’ Reform] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1957), vol. 1, p. 40.

13 See: Ma Jianzhong 马建忠, Shike zhai jiyan 适可斋记言 [Writings in the Appropriateness Pavilion] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1960), p. 9.

14 See: Feng Guifen 冯桂芬 and Ma Jianzhong, Cai xixue yi—Feng Guifen Ma Jianzhong ji 采西学议——冯桂芬马建忠集 [On learning from the West: Selected writings of Feng Guifen and Ma Jianzhong] (Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 47.

15 See: Zhongguo shixue hui, Yangwu yundong 洋 务 运 动 [The Self-Strengthening Movement] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1961), vol. 1, p. 504.

16 Xue Fucheng 薛福成, Xu Fucheng xuanji 薛福成选集 [Selected writings of Xue Fucheng] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987), p. 22.

17 See: Cai xixue yi—Feng Guifen Ma Jianzhong ji, p. 84.

18 Ibid., p. 125, p. 134.

19 Ma Jianzhong, Shike zhai jiyan, p. 77, p. 79.

20 See: Zhao Jing 赵婧 and Yi Menghong 易梦虹, eds., Zhongguo jindai jingji six-iang ziliao xuanji 中国近代经济思想资料选辑 [Economic thoughts in the modern China: A selection] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1982), vol. 2, p. 84.

21 See: Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 301, p. 22.

22 Ma Jianzhong, Shike zhai jiyan, p. 31.

23 See: Xinjiang tuzhi 新疆图志 (An illustrated annals of Xinjiang), Chapter 54, the 2nd part of Jiaoshe 交涉 (Foreign relations), p. 2.

24 Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang 李国强, “Lun Maguan tiaoyue yu Diaoyudao wenti 论《马关条约》与钓鱼岛问题” (The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyudao Issue), Renmin ribao 人民日报 (The People’s Daily), 8 May, 2013, p. 9.

25 See: Zhang Zhiyong 张志勇, Hede yu wan Qing Zhong Ying guanxi 赫德与晚清中英关系 [Rober Hart and Sino-Britain relations in the late Qing] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2012), p. 76.

26 Ibid., p. 51.

27 For Li Hongzhang’s argument, see: Vol. 33 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 228.

28 See: Vol. 3 of Qing ji waijiao shiliao 清季外交史料 [Primary resources in relation to the late Qing’s foreign policies] (Changsha: Hunan Normal University Press, 2015), p. 809.

29 Ibid., vol. 45, p. 14.

30 “Shelun: Lun Zhongguo muxia qingxing weiyou yizhan 社论: 论中国目下情形惟有一 战” (China has no alternative but to fight under such circumstances), Shun Pao 申 报 (Shen Pao, or Shanghai News), 17 July, 1884.

31 See: “Sir H. Parkes to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell,” in Correspondence Respecting the State of Affairs in China, p. 38.

32 Liu Danian, Zhongguo jindaishigao, p. 351.

33 Wang Lixin 王 立 新, Meiguo chuanjiaoshi yu wan Qing Zhongguo xiandaihua 美 国传教士与晚清中国现代化 [American missionaries and the late Qing’s pursuit of modernity] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1997), p. 18.

34 Gu Changsheng 顾长声, Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo 传教士与近代中国 [Missionaries and the modern China] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1981), p. 118.

35 Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, Wan Qing jiao’an jishi 晚清教案纪事 [Annals of incidents involving the Christian missionaries] (Beijing: The Oriental Press, 1990), p. 109.

36 For this letter, see: Vol. 5 of Qing mo jiao’an 清 末 教 案 [Incidents involving the Christian missionaries in the late Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2000), p. 31.

37 See: Vol. 11 of Zeng Guofan quanji, p. 509.

38 See: Ibid., vol. 12, p. 83; vol, p. 31, p. 405.

39 See: Chapter 79 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Tongzhi chao, p. 3198.

40 For the statistics, see: Fan Baichuan 樊百川, Qing ji de yangwu xinzheng 清季的洋务 新 政 [The Self-Strengthening Movement in the late Qing] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2003), p. 22.

41 Ibid.

42 See: Zhang Haipeng, “Shijiu shiji Zhong Ri liangguo zaoqi xiandaihua bijiao yanjiu 19世纪中日两国早期现代化比较研究” (Tentatively pursuing modernity in nineteenth-century China and Japan: A comparative reexamination), in Zhang Haipeng, Zhongguo jindai-shi jiben wenti yanjiu 中国近代史基本问题研究 [Basic questions with respect to modern Chinese history] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2013), p. 355.

43 For a more detailed discussion about Yoshida Shoin and Fukuzawa Yukichi, see: Mizuno Akira 水野明, “Riben qinlue Zhongguo sixiang de yanzheng 日本侵略中国思想的验 证” (An investigation of Japan’s conceptions of invading China), Kang Ri zhanzheng yan-jiu 抗日战争研究 (Journal of China’s Resistance Against Japan), no. 1 (1995), pp. 195–204.

44 See: Ogawa Mataji 小川又次, Qing guo zhengtao fanglüe 清国征讨方略 (The general plan of conquering China), ibid., pp. 207–218.

45 Kiyoshi Inoue 井上清, trans. Institute of History (Tianjin), Riben lishi 日本历史 [History of Japan] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1974), vol. 3, p. 668. For the English translation of the Japanese Emperor’s words, see: Nihonggi 日 本 纪: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697, trans. William George Aston (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited, 1896), p. 131.

46 See: Qi Qizhang ed., Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao congkan xubian: Zhong Ri zhanzheng 中国近代史资料丛刊续编: 中日战争 [A sequel to Primary Sources regarding the Modern Chinese History: The First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1993), vol. 6, p. 123, p. 132. It is based on two pieces of Munakata Kotaro’s diary. A full Chinese translation of this spy’s diary is now available; see: Munakata Kotaro 宗方小太郎, trans. Gan Huijie 甘慧洁, Zongfang Xiaotailang riji 宗方小太郎日记 [The Diary of Munakata Kotaro: 1887–1923] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2017), vols, pp. 1–3.

47 For a detailed discussion of this embezzlement, see: Chen Xiansong 陈 先 松, “Xiujian Yihehuan nuoyong ‘haifang jingfei’ shiliao jiedu 修建颐和园挪用 ‘海防经费’ 史料解读” (Reexamining the primary sources regarding the embezzlement of naval funds for building the Summer Palace), in Zhang Haipeng et al., eds., Jiawu zhanzheng de bainian huigu—Jiawu zhanzheng 120 zhounian xueshu lunwen xuanbian 甲午战争的百年回顾—甲午战争120周年学术论文选编 [Rethinking the War: Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2014), p. 42.

48 Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng shi 甲午战争史 [History of the First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990), pp. 126–127.

49 For a much more detailed description of this battle, see: Ibid., revised edition (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2005), pp. 116–144.

50 See: Vol. 25 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 103.

51 For the Lüshun Massacre, see: Guan Jie 关捷, “Ri jun Lüshun tusha yanjiu 日军旅顺屠 杀 研 究” (An investigation of the Lüshun Massacre perpetrated by the Japanese army), in Zhang Haipeng et al., eds., Di’er jie jin bainian Zhong Ri guanxishi guoji yantao hui lunwen ji 第二届近百年中日关系史国际研讨会论文集 [Symposium on the Sino-Japanese relations in the last century] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1995), pp. 3–10.

52 Mutsu Munemitsu 陆奥宗光, trans. Yi Sheshi 伊舍石, Jianjian lu 蹇蹇录 [Kenkenroku] (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1963), p. 63.

53 For the appointment of Li Hongzhang, see: Zhongguo shixue hui and Shao Xunzheng 邵循正eds., Zhong Ri zhanzheng 中日战争 [The First Sino-Japanese War] (Shanghai: New Knowledge Press, 1956), vol. 3, p. 470.

54 See: Weng Tonghe 翁同龢, Weng Tonghe riji 翁同龢日记 [The diary of Weng Tonghe] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1997), vol. 5, p. 2782.

55 See: Vol. 16 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 31.

56 For the war indemnity, see: Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng peikuan wenti kaoshi 甲午战争赔款问题考实” (A textual investigation of the war indemnity ensuing from the First Sino-Japanese War), in Jiawu zhanzheng de bainian huigu, p. 729; Jiang Liwen 蒋立文, “Jiawu zhanzheng peikuan shu’e wenti zai tantao 甲午战争赔款数额再探讨” (Reexamination of the amount of money paid by China to Japan as war reparations), ibid., pp. 730–754.

57 Shunpoko Tsuishokai 春亩公追颂会/Kaneko Kentaro 金子坚太郎 ed., Yiteng Bowen zhuan 伊藤博文传 [Ito Hirobumi den, or the life of Ito Hirobumi] (Tokyo: Shunpoko Tsuishokai 春亩公追颂会, 1940), pp. 136–137.

58 藤村道生 (Fujimura Michio), trans. Mi Qingyu 米庆余, Ri Qing zhanzheng日清战争 [Nisshin Senso, or The First Sino-Japanese War] (Shanghai: SH Translation Publishing House, 1981), pp. 133–134.

59 See: Dongxing sanlu东行三录 [Records of the journey to the east] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 1982), p. 245.

60 Ibid., p. 238, p. 245, pp. 252–253.

61 Wu Yong 吴永, Gengzi xishou congtan 庚子西狩丛谈 [Cixi’s 1900 trip to the West] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2009), p. 120.

62 See: Mao Haijian 茅海建, “Gongche shangshu kaozheng bu yi ‘公车上书’考证补 (一)” (Supplement to the textual investigation of the 1895 Joint Petition Against the Treaty of Shimonoseki: Part One), Jindaishi yanjiu, no. 3 (2005), pp. 1–43.

63 For this joint statement, see: Vol. 10 of Qing Guangxu chao Zhong Ri jiaoshe shiliao, pp. 35–36.

64 See: Zhang Haipeng and Tao Wenzhao 陶文钊 eds., Taiwan shigao 台湾史稿 (A draft history of Taiwan) [Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2012], p. 159.

65 Huang Zhaotang 黄昭堂, Taiwan minzhu guo yanjiu 台湾民主国研究 [Exploring the history of the People’s Republic of Taiwan] (Taibei [Taipei]: Qianwei chubanshe, 2006), p. 61.

66 Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng shi, p. 446.

67 Sanbo Honbu 参 谋 本 部 (General Staff Office of Imperial Japanese Army), trans Xu Peixian 许佩贤, Gongtai zhanji 攻台战纪 [Records of capturing Taiwan] (Taibei [Taipei]: Yuanlliu chubangongsi, 1995), p. 396.

68 Lü Shiqiang 吕 实 强, “Yiwei ge Tai qijian Taiwan shenmin suo biaoxian de minzu jingshen 乙未割台期间台湾绅民所表现的民族精神” (The national spirit embodied in the Taiwanese gentry and commoners’ resistance against in the 1895 cession of Taiwan to Japan), in Qi Qizhang and Wang Ruhui eds., Jiawu zhanzheng yu jindai Zhongguo he shi-jie 甲午战争与近代中国和世界 [The First Sino-Japanese War, modern China, and the world] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995), p. 716.

69 Institute of Modern Chinese History (CASS) ed., Riben qian Hua qishi nian 日本侵华 七 十 年 [A seven-decade crime: Japan’s aggression against China] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1992), p. 625.

70 See: Liang Qichao 梁启超, Yinbing shi heji 饮冰室合集 [Complete works of Liang Qichao] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1989), vol. 4, p. 200.

71 Li Li 李理, Ri ju shiqi Taiwan jinghcha zhidu yanjiu 日据时期台湾警察制度研究 (A study of the police system of Taiwan under the rule of Japan) [Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2013], p. 15.

72 For the numbers in the table, see: Ibid., p. 23, p. 34.

73 Chen Kongli 陈孔立ed., Taiwan lishi gangyao 台湾历史纲要 [Taiwan: An historical sketch] (Beijing: Kyushu Press, 1996), p. 340.

74 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London and New York: Macmillan, 1896), p. 66.

75 Ibid., pp. 150–151, p. 195.