Читать книгу General Richard Montgomery and the American Revolution - Hal T. Shelton - Страница 11

When first a soldier . . . I stood in arms. Then, in Britannia’s cause. I drew my sword, and charg’d the rival Gaul.¹

Having borne a share in all the labour of our American wars, and the reduction of Canada. Little did he foresee the scenes which that land had still in reserve for him! Little did those generous Americans, who then stood by his side, think they were assisting to subdue a country, which would one day be held up over us a greater scourge in the hands of friends, than ever it was in the hands of enemies!²

The nagging imperial rivalry between Great Britain and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led ultimately to the Seven Years’ War between these two contending national powers as they struggled for world supremacy. Although global in overall scope, the part of the military conflict that occurred in North America became known as the French and Indian wars. This belligerency represented a series of protracted colonial wars between the British army, augmented by provincial militia, and French troops, assisted by their Indian allies.

Competing British and French claims in the Ohio Valley on the colonial western frontier touched off the final confrontation for control of the continent. In 1747, a group of prominent Virginians organized the Ohio Company of Virginia for the purpose of land speculation and fur trading.

Two years later, the company was able to influence the British government to grant it some two hundred thousand acres in the Ohio Valley.

The French, viewing the British initiative as a direct challenge to their own claims and designs in the region, retaliated by building two forts on the upper Ohio River and increasing their presence in the disputed area. In 1753, Virginia Gov. Robert Dinwiddie sent a twenty-one-year-old militia officer, Maj. George Washington, to protest the French intrusion into territory that the British claimed as part of the Virginia colony. The French spurned Washington’s diplomatic grievance when he presented it to the military authorities at Fort Le Boeuf (near the present-day site of Erie, Pennsylvania).

The British-French contention then focused on a strategic geographic area identified by the Forks of the Ohio (near present-day Pittsburgh). During January 1754, a Virginia militia company began work on a stronghold there. On April 17, 1754, a larger French force captured the half-completed stockade and then built Fort Duquesne on the site. The Virginia assembly countered by raising an independent regiment and sending a small expedition under Washington against the French. In May 1754, the young officer (now a militia lieutenant colonel) routed a French patrol and killed its commander. Expecting an attack from the main French military establishment at Fort Duquesne, Washington retreated and hastily constructed Fort Necessity while waiting for the rest of the regiment to join him. On July 3, 1754, a superior French and Indian force attacked Fort Necessity, forcing Washington to surrender his untenable position the next day. This action gave France temporary control of the entire Ohio region.

When news of Washington’s defeat reached London, the British government sent Gen. Edward Braddock to America with the mission of defending Britain’s claims. On July 9, 1755, Braddock was leading his army of some fourteen hundred British regulars and seven hundred colonial militiamen in an advance on Fort Duquesne when attacked by a nine-hundred-man force of French and Indians. Braddock’s humiliating rout, which cost him his life, was one of the worst military disasters in British history and underscored the depths that English fortunes had plunged in the struggle against France in North America.³

In May 1756, the Seven Years’ War formally began in Europe, with Britain and Prussia pitted against France, Austria, Sweden, and some German states. Spain would join the French alliance later. During this period, Britain suffered frustration and disappointment in its military strategy against France. After William Pitt became prime minister in 1758, British prospects in the conflict began to improve. Pitt, who recognized the value of Canada and the American western frontier to the British war effort, sent a well-organized military task force to the colonies to turn around the situation. Montgomery’s 17th Regiment was included in this army upon which Britain pinned its hopes.

The orders for his regiment to be part of the invasion force must have been a welcome change for young Montgomery. Since he accounted for just one of nine ensigns (the lowest-ranking officer in the army) assigned to the unit, he was eager for an opportunity to distinguish himself. At this point in his life, Montgomery represented a loyal and proud member of His Majesty’s armed forces, sworn to protect the British dominion. Advancement through the ranks measured success in his chosen profession of arms, and the aspiring officer knew that military recognition and promotion were attained much more rapidly in wartime. Like all junior officers, he trusted that enthusiasm and fortitude would overcome his lack of experience in the pending hostilities.⁴

Montgomery also regarded the mission as a grateful break in the tedium of routine garrison duty. Since joining the unit, his days had been filled with endless drill and practice as the regiment simulated battlefield tactics during peacetime. This was the opportunity to employ these skills for their intended purpose. Braddock’s debacle had raised questions by some detractors over the British army’s readiness to fight the French and Indians in America, but Montgomery and his comrades maintained confidence in their abilities. The British officer corps held no doubt about the effectiveness of its military doctrine and training against any enemy. After all, the renowned reputation of the British army had been established throughout the world as it helped to win an empire upon which the “sun never set.” So, Montgomery received the news that his regiment would participate in the forthcoming operation with great expectation and even exhilaration.

On February 3, 1757, the British government issued orders for the 17th Regiment to march from its garrison at Galway to Cork in Ireland to prepare for overseas deployment. Brig. Gen. Edward Richbell commanded the regiment when Montgomery joined, but he died on February 24, 1757. Richbell’s successor, Col. John Forbes, led the unit during its initial activity. Six other Irish regiments joined the 17th at Cork to await passage abroad.⁵

All of the units designated for the expedition were foot (infantry) regiments—the backbone of the British army organization. A number of companies made up each regiment, including a company of grenadiers and a light-infantry company. Grenadiers represented the tallest and strongest men in the army, originally selected because they could throw a grenade, or hand bomb, farther than ordinary troops. By this time, none of them actually carried grenades, but they stood out for their physical strength and endurance. The light-infantry troops possessed similar attributes. They could march faster and farther while carrying less supplies than common soldiers. Separate ranger troops, who were specially trained in raiding tactics, were also included in the organization. These three units, then, formed the elite contingent of the army.

The standard-issue individual weapon of foot soldiers was a flintlock musket that weighed twelve pounds and measured four feet nine inches in length. Its nickname, “Brown Bess,” came from the color of the walnut stock. King George I introduced the weapon into the British army in the early 1700s. A thin-bodied triangular-shaped bayonet, fitted to the muzzle, added another fourteen inches and two pounds to the weapon, and might have been its most important component. The musket fired a lead ball three quarters of an inch in diameter (.75 caliber) and weighing one and a half ounces—considerable stopping power even by modern standards.

Yet, the range and accuracy of the musket presented a problem. Because the musket was designed to be loaded expeditiously by its muzzle using a ramrod, the clearance between the bore and the lead ball was not close. This caused much of the propelling power from the exploding powder charge to escape around the ball when the weapon discharged. The muzzle-loading characteristic of the musket limited its maximum effective range from fifty to one hundred yards. Because the musket had a smooth bore, it imparted very little guidance to the ball once it was shot out of the barrel. This unstable trajectory resulted in a relatively inaccurate weapon.

Consequently, the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore musket dictated the tactics that the soldiers armed with it used. Its inaccuracy was reflected in the British manual of arms. There was no command to “aim.” Instead, men were ordered to “level muskets” before firing. To compensate for the lack of accuracy from individual weapons, battlefield maneuvers stressed compact formations from which a wall of massed musket fire could be presented to the enemy. Foot soldiers usually deployed into battle lines three ranks deep. The musket’s restricted range also forced combat into an encounter at close quarters. Trained troops could perform the dozen steps involved in loading and shooting their weapons to lay down a steady two to four rounds per minute. This time-consuming reloading left soldiers vulnerable to return fire and promoted hand-to-hand combat. A volley from the muskets followed immediately by a bayonet charge was the logical battlefield tactic when forces converged in short-range engagements. The shock of cold steel was usually the moment of truth for opposing eighteenth-century field armies. Battles were won or lost by how well foot soldiers stood up to this physical and psychological trial.⁶

Artillery battalions were highly specialized units that employed cannons in an attempt to give depth to the battlefield by concentrating long-range firepower on enemy troop staging areas or dueling with opposing artillery positions. However, cannons lacked effectiveness during close infantry clashes because of their erratic accuracy and the possibility of inflicting friendly casualties. Supply and transportation difficulties persisted, because cannons consumed huge amounts of shot and powder and were ponderous to move. Thus, most cannonry was employed during more deliberate siege warfare.⁷ Military planners left British cavalry regiments in the British Isles, where they engaged in ceremonial and internal security tasks. Heavily forested terrain in the North American theater of operations led British strategists to regard it as unsuitable for the use of cavalry tactics. Also, support demands of mounted troops were much more costly to a field command than those of foot soldiers. Maintenance of horses required extensive forage, which created a drain on supply efforts. To conserve shipboard space, higher headquarters even ordered the Irish foot regiments to dispose of their baggage horses before they set sail.⁸

The seven Irish regiments embarked upon transport vessels at Cork on May 5 for the convoy to North America. These troop ships arrived at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in early July 1757. The French stronghold at Louisbourg on Cape Breton in the Gulf of St. Lawrence emerged as the vital military objective of the British forces. Only after the capture of this fortress could a British offensive be safely sent further up the St. Lawrence River to strike at the heart of New France. The amphibious assault and seizure of Louisbourg, which had been hardened against attack by extensive defensive preparations, hinged on establishing a clear superiority in land and sea forces. By late 1757, this prerequisite military buildup had not yet taken place. The British fleet at Halifax remained inferior to the French naval squadrons that retained command of the sea around Louisbourg.⁹

Meanwhile, the 17th and other regiments, deployed from both Ireland and England, made use of the time to practice maneuvers that would be employed during the projected confrontation. The combined British force occupied winter quarters at Halifax that year. Command and staff personnel changes also occurred during this interim period. Colonel Forbes became adjutant general of the general staff, leaving Lt. Col. Arthur Morris as acting commander of the 17th Regiment.¹⁰

While allowing the Royal Navy to concentrate more of its fleet in North American waters, the British expeditionary force under Gen. James Abercromby finalized its invasion plans. The strategy to be undertaken in America contained three campaigns. First, Gen. Jeffery Amherst with fourteen thousand British regular troops and two thousand provincial soldiers would besiege Louisbourg. Concurrently, Abercromby, aided by Gen. George Howe with ten thousand regulars and twenty thousand provincials, would advance upon Ticonderoga and Crown Point and push forward if possible to Montreal and Quebec. Additionally, nineteen hundred regulars and five thousand provincials were to repair Braddock’s loss and wrest Fort Duquesne from the French. Forbes, who received a promotion to brigadier general, led this last operation.¹¹

By the spring of 1758, the British had amassed enough military resources to put their war plan into action. The French garrison at Louisbourg numbered three thousand regulars and some five hundred Swiss mercenaries, Canadians, and Indians. In addition, six ships of the line and five frigates in the harbor guarded the fortress. The British force at Halifax, consisting of eleven regular and two provincial regiments totaling 13,142 troops, was over three times greater than that of the French in Louisbourg. The Royal Navy component amounted to twenty-three ships of the line and thirteen frigates.¹²

An imposing fleet of 155 warships and troop transports put to sea from Halifax on the evening of May 28, 1758. By June 2, the British armada reached an anchorage about seven miles from Louisbourg, but five days of dense fog and stormy weather frustrated subsequent plans to land. Finally, at daybreak on June 8, the warships commenced firing on the French emplacements. Fifteen minutes later, landing craft filled with British soldiers rowed for shore. Selected landing areas lay from one to three miles from the fortified city. However, French troops had prepared defensive positions to cover these likely disembarking locations and were waiting for the British invasion. The defenders held their fire until the boats were well within range; then they opened up a withering fusillade as the invaders neared the beach.¹³

Although the soldiers accompanying Montgomery in the assault craft were anxious to return fire and ready bayonets in preparation for landing, he enforced the standing orders: “No man fire his piece from out of the boat . . . bayonets are fixed in a moment after the men are landed.” A raging surf capsized some boats, drowning a number of soldiers before they could reach shore. Montgomery and his troops managed to land amid the pounding waves and incoming fire. As fast as the men got out of the boat, Montgomery deployed them into formation and marched forward to secure the landing area. Having failed to thwart the amphibious assault, the French outer defense fought a withdrawal action back to the safety of the Louisbourg fortress. Montgomery’s unit and the rest of the British force pursued the retreating troops until they reached a point just outside the range of the fort’s cannons. There, they prepared for a siege of the city.¹⁴

Because of continuing bad weather and heavy swells, it was June 16 before provisions for the besieging troops could be landed. Although it was possible to get some artillery ashore on June 18, intermittent bad weather continued for an extended period and hampered the siege buildup. As weather conditions improved, the British were able to bring up and emplace guns to bombard the fortress city. Under this fire cover, Montgomery urged his men on in the back-breaking task of digging trenches and building breastworks, as the British troops pushed forward a series of entrenchments in an ever-tightening ring around the city. At the same time, Montgomery had to keep his soldiers vigilant of French troops attempting to escape the encirclement.¹⁵

On July 9, a French force of about six hundred troops attempted a desperate breakout through the siege lines. The sortie struck at the grenadier company of the 17th Regiment, killing its captain and wounding a lieutenant. Raiders killed or wounded several other grenadiers before they were driven back to the city, leaving twenty French troops killed and about eighty wounded or captured. The enemy sent out a flag of truce so that they could claim their dead. After this was accomplished, the cannonading resumed. The vigor with which the British repulsed their bid for relief dampened any further plans by the French to force the siege. In addition, the British fleet stationed in the bay prevented any possibility of the besieged fortress receiving reinforcements from the sea. From the French point of view, the situation was hopeless. On July 26, 1758, the French governor agreed to an unconditional surrender of Louisbourg.¹⁶

Casualties during the entire campaign were small. Final British army losses amounted to three officers and forty-seven other ranks killed (all but twelve drowned), five lieutenants and fifty-five men wounded. Of these figures, the 17th Regiment had one captain, one corporal, and ten privates killed; one captain, one lieutenant, one sergeant, one drummer, and thirty-one privates wounded. British navy losses added eleven men killed, four officers and forty-eight men wounded. The French claimed their total casualties to be 114 killed or wounded.¹⁷

Although annalists would record the assault and siege as a relatively limited affair in terms of casualty statistics, it had a more personal meaning to the participants. The conflict presented a life or death struggle for the soldiers who suffered through it, whatever its scope. Montgomery’s first taste of combat was a gut-wrenching experience. He witnessed the sickening sight of men being maimed and slaughtered. He felt the cold fear of his own life being placed in imminent peril. Yet, he sensed that he had been entrusted with a noble mission of serving king and country, and he carried out his duties in the midst of danger.

Montgomery also learned that soldiers would normally carry out their orders and perform functions for which they had been trained, even under fire and exposure to injury or death, if properly motivated. An officer on the battlefield had to lead the troops, not merely direct them, to earn their confidence and willingness to follow. As a junior officer, he personally influenced a small number of men that represented only a fraction of the overall operation. Still, he understood that if he accomplished his assignment well, this segment combined with other integral parts of the whole effort completed in like manner could ultimately add up to a total success.

The effectiveness with which Montgomery discharged his duties at Louisbourg caught the attention of General Amherst. Rather than resorting to showy battlefield heroics to call attention to his actions, the young ensign demonstrated a quiet but unmistakable competence during combat. Thus, he proved himself to be a solid officer who could be depended upon to carry out his assigned tasks. As a result, Montgomery received a promotion to lieutenant, effective July 10, 1758.

The protracted siege of Louisbourg had occupied too much time for the expedition to continue against Quebec that summer. Nevertheless, Montgomery and his fellow British soldiers had gained some valuable combat experience. Montgomery also acquired some practical knowledge of conducting siege warfare that he would draw upon at a later date.

While the British army enjoyed a successful investment of Louisbourg, Abercromby’s campaign met with dashed hopes. Gen. George Howe was killed on July 6, 1758, in a preliminary skirmish near Fort Ticonderoga (called Fort Carillon by the French who occupied it). Two days later, Abercromby with fifteen thousand men mounted his main attack on the fort defended by Gen. Louis Montcalm and thirty-six hundred troops. The ill-planned frontal assault resulted in the British soldiers being cut to pieces before they could breach the fort’s perimeter. Abercromby lost 1,944 men while inflicting only 377 casualties on the French.¹⁸

In August 1758, the 17th and several other regiments embarked from Louisbourg and sailed to Boston. After arriving there, the regiment marched to join and bolster Abercromby’s expeditionary force in upper New York. The soldiers, awaiting deployment the next year, occupied winter quarters near Lake George. Morale of the surviving troops that fought under Abercromby had plummeted. This feeling of bitter disappointment, however, mingled with the optimistic outlook of the 17th Regiment fresh from victory, and overall esprit improved.¹⁹

On November 9, 1758, the British government recalled Abercromby and replaced him with Amherst as commander in chief. The capture of Fort Duquesne by Forbes’s expedition on November 25, 1758, dissipated some of the disgrace inflicted on the British army by Abercromby’s ineptitude. British authorities renamed this strategic location Pittsburgh in honor of the prime minister, William Pitt. Forbes, who had been ill for some time, died in the spring of 1759.²⁰

Military authorities now devised a three-pronged offensive to force a French capitulation in Canada. Gen. James Wolfe, who had distinguished himself at Louisbourg and assumed command of that expedition upon the departure of Amherst, would take Quebec by leading nine thousand soldiers up the St. Lawrence River; a second column of two thousand British regulars would seal off a French retreat westward by a thrust through Niagara; and Amherst with seven thousand men would capture Ticonderoga and Crown Point.²¹

Montgomery and the 17th Regiment were attached to Amherst’s expedition under the reorganization. On May 6, 1759, the regiment combined with the other expeditionary units then assembling near Albany. After extensive preparations, the troops advanced up the Hudson River toward Ticonderoga. Montgomery exhorted his troops to be watchful for an ambush during the treacherous march through the New York wilderness. His concern was confirmed three days after their departure when a band of thirty Indians surprised a hapless party of twelve men of the 17th, killing one lieutenant, one sergeant, and two men, and wounding three others. Arriving at Lake George, the soldiers erected a fort and procured boats to convey them through the waterway. When the British approached Ticonderoga on July 24, they were met by initial stiff resistance from the French. Yet a short time later, the enemy withdrew its main body of twenty-five hundred men to concentrate its defense at Crown Point, leaving a four-hundred-troop rear garrison. After reaching Ticonderoga, the British expedition laid siege to the fort.²²

While conducting normal siege operations, Montgomery noticed an uneasiness in his men that all soldiers in combat experience from time to time, particularly at night when diminished visibility stimulates the imagination. So, he took precautions to ensure that his men followed the general order specifying no firing at night, but receiving any enemy with the bayonet. The significance of this practice became evident one evening when a false alarm occurred and a British company of light-infantry began indiscriminate firing into the dark. Other soldiers in the siege line joined the errant shooting, resulting in the death of an officer and the wounding of several men from the 17th Regiment.²³

On July 26, the French garrison at Ticonderoga blew up the fort and retreated to Crown Point. The total British loss at the taking of Ticonderoga was one colonel, one lieutenant, and fifteen privates killed, and about fifty wounded. Of this number, the 17th had two killed and eight wounded. The expedition resumed its advancement northward. However, the French destroyed and abandoned Crown Point before the British could reach it. Montgomery and other members of the expedition spent the next two months reconstructing the works at Crown Point, establishing control of Lake Champlain, and building a road to the Connecticut River. The next objective was Isle aux Noix, some 120 miles down the lake where the French had retired, but the late season interrupted this operation. When cold weather arrived in October, the troops at Crown Point went into winter quarters. Gen. Robert Monckton assumed command of the 17th Regiment in October 1759, officially replacing the deceased Forbes.²⁴

In the meantime, the other two expeditions were progressing as planned. Fort Niagara surrendered to the British on July 24, 1759. Troops under Wolfe were closing on the French stronghold at Quebec. Montgomery’s oldest brother, Capt. Alexander Montgomery, served in the 43d Regiment, which was included in Wolfe’s expedition. Unfortunately, some researchers have confused Richard Montgomery with Alexander Montgomery in an incident during the Quebec campaign. Lt. Malcolm Fraser of the 78th Regiment asserted that on August 23, 1759, his detachment was brought under the command of Captain Montgomery for an attack on a village in the vicinity of St. Joachim. In his journal, Fraser stated: “There were several of the enemy killed and wounded, and a few prisoners taken, all of whom the barbarous Captain Montgomery, who commanded us, ordered to be butchered in a most inhuman and cruel manner . . . one shot and the other knocked down with a tomahawk and both scalped in my absence.”²⁵

Fraser’s outrage over the event is curious in one respect: scalping was not an uncommon practice during the war. One of the earlier instances of its usage was when Col. George Washington sent the scalp of a French officer taken by Indians to Virginia’s Governor Dinwiddie in March or April 1756. Because the French had greater Indian allies, they probably were more involved in this practice than the British. However, both sides condoned this savage behavior and encouraged their Indian confederates in the brutality by offering them scalp bounties. The guerrilla or irregular nature of the war contributed to the general acceptance of this atrocious form of combat. Wolfe addressed the issue by signing an order on July 27, 1759, stating that “the general strictly forbids the inhuman practice of scalping, except when the enemy are Indians or Canadians dressed like Indians.” Warranted or not, Montgomery’s brother gained the name of “Black” Montgomery because of the wartime affair.²⁶

Wolfe’s force continued to descend upon Quebec and on September 18, 1759, overcame the French defenders there. Both Wolfe and Montcalm, who was in command at the fortress-like city, lost their lives during the contest.

Montgomery continued to rise steadily through the officer ranks. On May 15, 1760, the commanding officer appointed him regimental adjutant, an assignment reserved for the most promising lieutenant in the unit.

Success of the British offensive triad cleared the way for the final stage in the conquest of Canada. The major French opposition that persisted was concentrated in Montreal, which subsequently became the target for a climactic strike by the three British expeditions poised at Quebec, Lake Ontario, and Lake Champlain. The 17th Regiment formed part of the Lake Champlain division. It set out from Crown Point on August 11, 1760, and captured the intermediate objectives of Isle aux Noix and Fort Chambly before arriving at Montreal. There it merged with the other two divisions in a fine example of strategic concentration to threaten the last French bastion of resistance. As the British troops enveloped the vicinity, refugees crowded into the city, Canadian militiamen deserted, and the twenty-four hundred French regulars found themselves greatly outnumbered. The French commander, realizing that he was unable to withstand the opposing forces, unconditionally surrendered Montreal on September 8, 1760. With this capitulation, all of Canada passed to the British.²⁷

From Montreal, Montgomery and his regiment marched to New York during the summer of 1761, and encamped on Staten Island. After conquering Canada, the British government formulated a plan to subdue the French in the West Indies. Plans called for an expedition to be assembled in Barbados and placed under the command of Monckton, who had received a promotion to major general on February 20, 1761. Having been designated as part of the operation, the 17th Regiment, mustering 488 men, sailed from New York on November 19, 1761. After arriving at Barbados on December 24, the regiment joined other units from North America and different garrisons in the West Indies. The combined army numbered thirteen thousand troops accompanied by a large naval flotilla, including transports, frigates, and sixteen ships of the line. This invasion force departed Barbados on January 5, 1762, proceeding toward the initial objective of the campaign—Martinique, an island colonized by the French in 1635.²⁸

Even though the British strove to maintain secrecy with their planning and mobilization, the French in Martinique received warning of an intended attack on that island, and took measures to strongly oppose any attempted assault. The French command readied a defense in depth, augmenting natural barriers of steep and rugged terrain with fortified outposts and redoubts that extended over the entire island. In the middle of January 1762, the British forces, including Lieutenant Montgomery and the 17th Regiment, landed on Martinique and established a beachhead. At daybreak on January 24, they opened the main offensive against stout resistance. The enemy’s outlying works were eventually stormed one by one, and survivors fled to the citadel at Fort Royal, the island’s capital. Losses of British troops in these actions amounted to 33 officers and 350 men killed or wounded. Included in these figures, the 17th Regiment had one captain wounded; three rank and file killed and sixteen wounded.

By the first of February, the British had closed around and were ready to launch an onslaught on Fort Royal itself. Reduction of several batteries on the heights overlooking the fortress cost the British another 150 casualties, but only one man from the 17th Regiment. On February 3, the French commander, observing the extensive preparations by His Majesty’s troops to force the city, now judged it prudent to surrender the fort. It consisted of about 800 regulars and militia, as 150 men were killed or wounded during the siege.

Nine days more sufficed to consolidate the British hold on the rest of the island. On February 12, after suffering over a thousand casualties, the French governor-general agreed to surrender Martinique to the British. General Monckton summed up the conduct of his troops during the campaign in one of his dispatches: “The difficulties they had to encounter, in the attack of an enemy, possessed of every advantage of art and nature, were great, and their perseverance in surmounting these obstacles furnishes a noble example of British spirit.” After the capture of Martinique, threatened garrisons on the other main islands of the French West Indies—Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—submitted to the British without hostilities.²⁹

Fearing that a British victory in the global conflict would jeopardize its New World possessions, Spain belatedly entered the contest in 1761, allied with France. Now that Britain had overcome France in North America and the West Indies, the British ministry decided to avail itself of the large amassment of troops then in the Caribbean area by attacking the Spaniards, as they had the French, in some of their principal settlements. Havana, Cuba, was an important Spanish seaport at this time. Since all Spanish commerce in Mexico and South America funneled through there, to take Havana would sever the lifeline between Spain and its great colonial empire. Therefore, the British resolved to start their Spanish West Indies campaign with Havana. General Monckton returned to New York, to which the British government had appointed him governor before the Martinique campaign. Gen. George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle, assumed command of the new expedition. Once again, the 17th Regiment would see combat—this time as a component of Keppel’s eleven-thousand-troop expedition.

On May 6, 1762, the military command rewarded Montgomery’s exceptional service by promoting him to captain and giving him one of the ten companies in the 17th Regiment to lead. As company commander, the new captain would be accountable for the activities and welfare of some seventy-five men assigned to his unit. During the upcoming battles, the lives of these men would depend on the correctness and timeliness of his decisions. Although Montgomery realized the heavy responsibility, he was self-assured in his abilities and welcomed the opportunity to live up to the confidence his superiors had placed in him.

The expedition, accompanied by 24 ships of the line, 22 frigates, and 150 transports, set sail from Martinique on May 6, 1762. Shortly after the armada dropped anchor off Havana on June 6, twelve ships of the line raced to the mouth of Havana Harbor to bottle up the Spanish fleet. The city was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Occupation troops numbered seventeen thousand regulars and militiamen. In addition, nine thousand armed sailors and marines were stationed on the twelve warships in the harbor. The Spanish deliberately sank three of these ships when the British squadron arrived to block their entrance into the harbor. On June 7, the British army landed unopposed approximately seven miles from Havana.

Shortly thereafter, the army divided into five brigades. The 17th Regiment, including Montgomery’s company, would take part in the siege and capture of Moro Fort. This fortress was the key position of the extensive works that protected the city and was considered by the Spanish to be impregnable. On July 4, the British batteries opened fire with forty-seven guns that had been dragged across a rough, rocky shoreline. Battleships outside the harbor, with a total of 220 cannons, kept up a continuous bombardment. The Spanish answered with their own artillery, driving away the British ships. Nevertheless, the British land batteries eventually managed to silence all the Spanish guns but two. On July 30, Montgomery and his men, together with the other troops of the brigade, captured Moro Fort by storm. The British force could now bear down on the last defenses of the city. At this point, the Spanish governor-general saw that further resistance would be useless and surrendered. On August 13, 1762, the Cross of St. George flew over the Governor’s Palace —the British had seized Havana and Cuba.³⁰

The successful struggle of more than two months against a superior force defending fortifications that they deemed invincible was a glorious campaign for the British army. The triumph, however, exacted a heavy toll. British troop casualties totaled 520 men killed or dead from wounds received in battle, including the 17th Regiment figures of one sergeant and five men killed, two officers and two men wounded. However, the appalling statistic was the multitude of British soldiers who perished from disease—forty-seven hundred, or almost half of the expedition. The 17th Regiment fared much better, which might be attributed to its leaders— only losing four sergeants and twenty-two men to sickness.³¹

The tropical Cuban climate in the middle of summer took a deadly toll on the unacclimated British troops. The expedition executed its campaign under a relentlessly burning sun when there had been no rain for fourteen days. A scarcity of water compounded the problem. Because there was no fresh water source in the area of operations, drinking water had to be brought from a great distance, resulting in a precarious supply for the troops. One participant described how “excessive thirst soon caused the tongue to swell, extend itself outside the lips, and become black as in a state of mortification; then the whole frame became prey to the most excruciating agonies, til death at length intervened, and gave the unhappy sufferer relief.”³²

On August 20, 1762, Montgomery and his regiment left Cuba in three transports and arrived at New York four days later. However, the debilitating effects of the rigorous campaign lingered. A chaplain who served in the operation reflected that “perhaps those were happiest who died and left their bones around Havana, for those who returned home, took with them broken strength, and a languor which lasted to their life’s end.”³³ A surgeon examined members of the regiment after they landed at New York and rendered a medical report to General Amherst: “I have visited the above regiments, and am sorry to inform you of the deplorable situation they are in, . . . with dangerous fevers and fluxes, many of the men are past recovery and the rest so weak, that I fear a long time will elapse before they are again fit for service, . . . nor are the officers in a better condition; several cannot recover, and the greater number of the remainder will, for a long time, be weakly, and unfit to undergo much fatigue.”³⁴

The 17th Regiment and other units that had been involved in the West Indies campaign entered an extensive program of rehabilitation and reorganization while in New York. On February 10, 1763, Britain, France, and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, officially ending the Seven Years’ War. Britain had established its world supremacy with the territorial concessions that it won resulting from the conflict. Except for a few islands off Newfoundland and in the West Indies, France relinquished its New World empire by ceding Britain all of its lands east of the Mississippi, and transferring its claims west of that river and New Orleans to Spain. In return for Cuba, Spain gave Florida to Britain. Thus, Britain prevailed over its rivals for colonial power.

Months of grueling combat exacted a toll on Montgomery. Years later, Janet Montgomery recalled her husband telling her of the campaign that “the duty was so severe, and he complained that by the heat and severity he lost a fine head of hair.”³⁵ Although his ordeal left him with no permanent health impairment, Montgomery’s outstanding service during the Seven Years’ War sapped much of his vigor. In 1764, his family became concerned about his weakened condition and requested the British government to grant him a leave to return home: “The Relations of Captain Richard Montgomery, of the 17th Regiment of Foot, . . . having represented to me, that the bad State of Health, to which he is reduced by Seven Years Service in America, makes it necessary for him to return to this Kingdom, where His private Affairs also require his Presence.”³⁶ However, Montgomery felt that he could not curtail his duties with the regiment. Several months later, British Army Headquarters in North America replied to the ministry: “Captain Richard Montgomery’s Regiment Being ordered upon Service, he will decline accepting any permission, to absent himself from his Duty at present, but as soon as the Service, for which his Regiment is intended, is over he will have leave to return to England.”³⁷

The service to which the dispatch referred involved hostilities with the Indians, known as Pontiac’s Rebellion. This Ottawa chief had been France’s staunchest ally during the French and Indian War. Angered by the French surrender, Pontiac organized a general uprising of eighteen Indian tribes against the British. In 1763, he denounced the Treaty of Paris and instigated attacks on British outposts throughout the northwestern frontier, overwhelming eight of twelve scattered forts and forcing the evacuation of two more. After an initial surprise assault failed, the British stronghold at Detroit continued as a prime target for subsequent attacks by Indians. On May 12, 1764, the military command placed the 17th Regiment into a newly formed expedition under Col. John Bradstreet with a mission of reinforcing the beleaguered Detroit garrison. After arriving there, Montgomery and his regiment were instrumental in preventing Indians from taking the important location. As a result, the rebellious tribes became discouraged and eventually forced Pontiac to sign a peace treaty in 1766.³⁸ After the crisis at Detroit had passed, Montgomery finally took his leave to return home in 1765. Two years later in July 1777, the 17th Regiment concluded its North American tour of duty and redeployed back to England.

While in Britain, Montgomery gradually recovered his health. He also had time to step back and reflect on the larger meaning of the war. On the one hand, he was justly proud of his military accomplishments and advancement within his chosen field of endeavor. On the other, he encountered the disillusionment that many feel when weighing the consequences of a horrific conflict in its aftermath. After all, Montgomery had beheld at close range the carnage and ruin that empire-building engendered. Thus, he was left torn between these two powerful emotions.

A precipitous impediment to the rate of promotion within the officer corps added to Montgomery’s growing discontent. During wartime, military expansion and personnel casualties allowed rapid battlefield promotions for deserving soldiers. With the onset of peacetime and demobilization, advancement in the British army became bogged down in political and bureaucratic maneuvering. Patronage, once again, reigned over merit as a basis for military preferment. Montgomery had risen from ensign to captain in less than six years. Ten more years would pass while he languished at the rank of captain. Nearing twenty years of total time in service and lacking an influential benefactor, Montgomery considered his prospects for attaining a personally rewarding culmination to the brilliant earlier part of his career.

During the late 1760s, Montgomery became friends with such prominent Whigs as Isaac Barré, Edmund Burke, and Charles James Fox. These political opposition leaders were becoming progressively more outspoken in their criticism of the British ministry. Barré shared a similar experience with Montgomery. He had entered the British army as an ensign in 1746 and later served with great distinction in North America during the Seven Years’ War. Although he rose ultimately to the rank of lieutenant colonel and commanded a regiment, Pitt turned down his next promotion, ending his interest in a military career. Montgomery, Barré, and Burke also were fellow alumni. All three received a liberal education at Trinity College in Dublin, although Barré and Burke had graduated some years before Montgomery. All these factors served to strengthen the intellectual bond among these individuals. They spent many hours together discussing politics while Montgomery was stationed in England. However, Montgomery’s association with Barré, Burke, and Fox garnered him little favor with the politicians who dominated the British government.³⁹

So, Montgomery concluded his remarkable military service in the Seven Years’ War—and beyond. Yet, he remained concerned about his future in the British army and began to question the validity of governmental political policies. This period of fallow service, based on stagnation in rank, would position the unfulfilled, restless war veteran at the crossroads of a major life change.

When a chance to purchase a major’s commission presented itself in 1771, Montgomery eagerly lodged his money. However, a political favorite of Lord North’s ministry procured the majority to which Montgomery felt his services entitled him. Because of his lack of influential political patronage, Montgomery found himself shut out from continued advancement in the British military establishment. On April 6, 1772, the disappointed captain sold his own commission in revulsion to what he regarded as the deprivation of his rightful military promotion.⁴⁰

Now, Montgomery had resentfully quit the British army that he faithfully and ably served for so long. Still a relatively young man at the age of thirty-three, he began looking for new horizons where he could find the opportunities that had eluded him since the end of the Seven Years’ War.