Читать книгу A Brief History of Modern Philosophy - Harald Høffding - Страница 7

Burckhardt, in his famous treatise, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, characterizes the Italian renaissance as the discovery of man. The historical conditions led to the emancipation of the individual. Man was no longer estimated from the mere viewpoint of his relationship to the Church or to his guild. He now became the subject of specialized interest and study. The discovery of ancient literature and art likewise contributed to this end. Man found a distinct form of culture outside the Church, with laws and ideals of its own. This expansion of the horizon furnished the opportunity for comparative study. In the north Protestantism, with its emphasis on personal experience and its insistence that civil life is independent of the Church, showed a similar tendency. In this way it became possible even here to develop both a theoretical and a practical interest in things which are purely human. Hence, both in the north and in the south, we find a number of interesting movements in the realm of the mental sciences during the period of the Renaissance.

1. Pietro Pomponazzi's little book, De immortalitate animæ (1515), may be regarded as an introduction to the philosophy of the Renaissance. Pomponazzi was born at Mantua in 1462, served with great distinction in the capacity of teacher of philosophy in Padua and Bologna, and died in the latter city in 1525. His friendship with ​Cardinal Bembo, who enjoyed the favor of Pope Leo X, saved him from persecution; but his book was burnt by the inquisition. His philosophic significance is due to his theory that the various forms and gradations of soul-life constitute a continuous natural series, and that ethics is self-explanatory. In opposition to the ecclesiastical Aristotelians he shows that the immortality of the soul is incapable of philosophic proof. Even in its highest forms soul-life is dependent on material conditions and its existence after the dissolution of the body cannot be demonstrated. There is no occasion moreover to criticize this conclusion on ethical grounds. On the contrary, man is obliged as well as capable of doing good without the hope of immortality; virtue is its own reward. This is the conclusion of the philosophy which is based on natural reason. But, according to Pomponazzi, the will may transcend reason: man can believe things which he is incapable of proving; faith proceeds from will, from personal impulse. By means of this separation between reason and will, between knowledge and faith, Pomponazzi conformed his theory with the authorized doctrines of the Church. He resorted to the same expedient in reconciling the reality of the human will with divine omnipotence. The Church rejected this distinction.

Nicolo da Machiavelli introduced the naturalistic method of investigation into politics and ethics in the same manner as Pomponazzi had revived the naturalistic psychology and ethics of genuine Aristotelianism. Descended from an old Florentine family (b. 1469), he entered the diplomatic service of the republican government of his native city which furnished him a splendid opportunity for studying men and affairs. After the fall of the Republic (1512) he joined the Medici, which brought him the ​profound contempt of his fellow citizens, who refused to accept his services after the republican government was again restored. He died in 1527.—Political interest made him a thinker. The misfortunes of Italy and its consequent conditions inspired him with a desire to restore its ancient spirit and power. Why should we imitate the splendid arts of the ancients and neglect their splendid deeds? But the sole possibility of accomplishing anything great requires us to press forward to the realization of great ideals without scruple! There are passages (especially in his Principe) in which Machiavelli seems to regard the ideal which a man proposes as an indifferent matter, if he only pursues it unscrupulously and energetically. But in the background of his thought there was constantly but a single ideal; the unity and the greatness of Italy. He regarded everything right which would contribute towards the realization of this ideal. Finding the Italians of his age lacking in a proper appreciation of greatness, he attributes it to the softening influence of the Church and of Christianity. In his Discorsi (Dissertations on the first ten books of Livy) he draws comparisons between the mind of antiquity and that of his own age, thus laying the foundation for a comparative ethics which was highly unfavorable to the modern period. Honor, magnanimity and physical prowess are not sufficiently appreciated now, and this is due to the fact that Christianity places the ideal of humanity in a transcendent world. To Machievelli it is perfectly clear that these attributes possess more than secondary value, they are intrinsically meritorious. Machiavelli reveals the true spirit of the Renaissance both by the purely human ideal which he presents to his fellow countrymen, as well as by his emulation of power for its own sake. ​The spirit of the Renaissance was likewise manifest in France. Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), a French nobleman, spent his life in his private castle in the neighborhood of Bordeaux, far removed from the great movements agitating his age, devoting himself to literary pursuits. His interest in a purely naturalistic interpretation of human life, as he knew it from travel, books and above all from introspection, reveals his thoroughly modern spirit. At the beginning of his essays (which appeared 1580-1588) he remarks; je sus moy-mesme le sujet de mon livre. Closer study however reveals the fact that it is the way in which nature manifests itself in his own life that ready appeals to him. Nature, the great Mother of us all, reveals herself in a distinctively unique manner in every individual. Every human being has his forme maistresse, his ruling passion. It is this interest that accounts for Montaigne's own personal observations as well as for his thorough study of ancient literature. His enthusiasm for nature and his insight into the multiplicity of individual peculiarities cause him to revolt against all dogmatism, both the rationalistic and the theological. He opposes them both on the ground of the inexhaustible wealth of experience, which neither the faith of reason nor of dogma can satisfy. Our investigations constantly lead to the discovery of a greater number of differences and variations and thus increase the difficulty of reducing them to general laws. And we must remember, furthermore, that our knowledge of the objective world is through sense perception, and that the sense organs as a matter of fact only reveal their own state, not the real nature of objects. And finally, if we attempt to form a conception of Deity, we imagine Him in human form, just as animals would conceive Him in ​animal form, and we presume that this whole universe was created and is preserved for the welfare of man alone.—But Montaigne is not a sceptic. There are two fundamental ideas, vitally related to each other, to which he firmly holds, viz. the idea of the variety of individual peculiarities, and the idea of the eternity of nature revealing itself in every natural event.

Luis Vives (born in Valencia 1492, died in Brügge 1542), a Spanish scholar, whose contributions to philology and pedagogy have likewise been of great importance, became the forerunner of modern empirical psychology through his book De anima vita (1538). He insists that experience must be the foundation of all knowledge and, true to this principle, he holds that our chief concern is not to know what the soul is, but to know how it acts. He therefore undertakes to emancipate psychology from metaphysics and theology. He follows the descriptive rather than the analytic and explanatory method. His description of the various psychical phenomena, especially of the emotions, still retains its interest. He regards the soul and the vital principle as identical, and he constantly seeks to combine physiology, as he understands it from the works of Galen, with his psychology. He holds however that, whilst the souls of plants and of animals (the principle of organic life and of sensory experience) evolve from matter, God creates the human soul. The proof of the divine origin of the soul consists of the fact that man is never satisfied with the sensible and finite, but is forever striving to realize the infinite.

Two years after the appearance of Vives' work, Philip Melanchthon (1495-1560), the reformer and "Preceptor of Gemany," published his Liber de anima, a book which made a profound impression upon Protestantism. He ​follows Aristotle and theology more closely than Vives and his book is therefore of less importance for the history of psychology than that of Vives. Melanchthon's mild conception of human nature, contrasting sharply with that of Luther and the Lutheran zealots, had a wholesome influence however. His theory of the "natural light" shows this clearly: there are a number of ideas implanted in us by God, hence innate (notitiæ nobiscum nascentes), and these form the basis of all thought and of all value-judgments. This "natural light" was darkened by the Fall which necessitated the giving of the law at Sinai. The content of the ten commandments however is the same as the "natural light." It follows therefore that ethics may be founded on human nature (naturalistically). But it is powerless to quicken the life of the spirit and give peace. (Philosophiæ moralis epitome.)

The doctrine of the natural light was taken up enthusiastically by the Reformed provinces and applied most rigorously, especially with reference to the idea of authority and of the state. John Althaus (Althusius, 1557-1638), the Burgomaster of Emden, made this theory the basis of his idea of popular sovereignty in his Politica methodice digesta (1603). Even before him, Jean Bodin (in La republique, 1577) had conceived and elaborated the idea that sovereignty is indivisible and can exist in but a single place in the state. Althaus now teaches that it always belongs to the people. Rulers come and go, but the people constitute the permanent foundation of the state. They are the source of all authority because it is their welfare that constitutes the cause and purpose of the existence of the state. As a matter of history the sovereignty of the people is revealed in the first place by the fact that in most states there are a number of officers ​exercising governmental control by virtue of their appointment by the people, and, in the second place, by the fact that the people terminate the government of tyrannical princes by revolution. From the viewpoint of philosophy, on the other hand, the theory of popular sovereignty is demonstrated by the fact that either an expressed or tacit contract (pacturn expressurn vel taciturn) underlies the origin and perpetuity of the state; it is by virtue of such contract that the people institute organized society and submit themselves to governmental authority. Athaus therefore maintains that the purpose of this contract can be nothing else than the welfare of the people. He seems to construe this contract more in the form of a directive idea than as an historic fact. The state is simply the most comprehensive community; its antecedents being the narrower circles of the family, the neighborhood and the corporation.

The appearance of Hugo Grotius’ De Jure belli et pacis (1625) marks an epoch in the sphere of jurisprudence and political theory. Born at Delft in 1583, his great learning in the field of jurisprudence and of theology attracted attention early in life. Politically he belonged to the aristocratic and liberal theological party of Oberbarnevelt. He was rescued from the imprisonment into which he was cast after the fall of Oberbarnevelt by his wife's cunnning. Thereafter he lived in Paris, and finally received the appointment of ambassador to Sweden (1645). Grotius makes war his starting point and requires how it may be abolished. There are four kinds of war between states— between an individual and the state—between different individuals—between the state and the individual. 1. When states declare war they have no right to abrogate the rights of the individual and the obligations of humanity. ​War must be conducted for the sake of peace, and hence not in such a way as to make peace impossible. It is through this principle that Grotius became the founder of the modern theory of popular sovereignty. 2. When the individual declares war against the state it is an act of rebellion, and, in evident opposition to Althaus, Grotius denies the right of the people to revolt. 3. War between individuals, in a well-regulated state, is limited to justifiable self-defense. 4. War of the state against the individual takes the form of punishment. The state's right to punish must not be construed as the right of expiation. Punishment is justified only in case the pain imposed on the individual contains the possibility of greater good both to the individual himself and to the community.—In all of these various contingencies the authority of the law is independent of theological grounds. It proceeds from human nature (ex principiis homini internis). Human beings congregate and are led to organize societies under the influence of a native social impulse (appetitus societatis); but the constitution of society presupposes certain principles of government—above all the inviolability of every promise—and the people therefore pledge themselves to the observance of these rules either by expressed or tacit contract. The obligation to keep promises, according to Grotius, rests upon a primitive promise. In direct opposition to Althaus, Grotius holds that the people—i. e. after they have constituted society on the basis of the primitive contract—can renounce its sovereignty absolutely because it confers it on a prince or corporation. His theory of the relation of the state to religion, on the other hand, is more liberal than that of the strictly confessional Althaus: The only requirement which the state can make ​of its subjects is the acceptance of general religious ideas (the unity of Deity, predestination).

3. The general religious ideas which Grotius has in mind, and which even Melanchthon accepted, were elaborated by a series of thinkers in more or less direct opposition to the confessional conception. Similar ideas had already been expressed during the period of the older Italian Renaissance (especially in the Platonic Academy at Florence). Jean Bodin (a Frenchman learned in law, d. 1596), previously mentioned, in his remarkable work called the Dialogue of Seven Men (Colloquium Heptaplomeres) describes a conversation between men whose religious viewpoints were widely at variance. Two of the men, defending natural religion—one of them dogmatically, the other more critically—engage in controversy with a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a Jew, and a Mohammedan. According to Bodin, true religion consists in the purified soul turning to God, the infinite essence. This religion can be exercised within any of the various religions, and the seven men therefore separate in charity and peace.

Bodin’s book was in circulation for a long time in nothing but manuscript copies. In 1624, however, the English diplomat, Herbert of Cherbury, published his book De veritate, which remained the text book of natural religion for a long number of years. Cherbury takes issue with those on the one hand who regard confessional faith as superior to rational knowledge, and seek to inculcate such faith by threats of future punishment, and those on the other hand who pretend to depend wholly on the rational understanding, together with those who would derive everything from sense experience, conceiving the soul as a blank tablet (tabula Rasa). He holds that there ​is an immediate, instinctive sense which guides all men to the acceptance of certain truths (notitiæ communes). This sense is the natural product of the instinct of self-preservation, which is another instance of the operation of divine predestination. The following propositions are instinctive truths of this order: Two contradictory propositions cannot both he true; There is a first cause of all things; No one should do anything towards another which he would be unwilling to suffer in return. According to Cherbury, even natural religion rests on an instinctive foundation, an inner revelation experienced by every human soul. The evidences of this revelation consist of the fact that we have capacities and impulses which finite objects fail to satisfy. The following five propositions contain the essence of all religion: There is a Supreme Being; This Being must be worshipped; The truest worship consists of virtuous living and a pious disposition; Atonement for sin must be made by penitence; There are rewards and punishments after the present life. Questions which go beyond these five propositions need give us no concern.

Jacob Böhme (1575-1624), the Gorlitz cobbler, and the profoundest religious thinker of this period, does not intend to oppose positive religion, as is the case with Bodin and Cherbury. He means to be a good Lutheran. He simply wishes to furnish a philosophy which will harmonize with Protestantism. Although a mere artisan, the influence of mysticism and natural science gave rise to grave doubts in Böhme’s mind. He accepted the Copernican astronomy. He could no longer regard the earth as the center of the universe. But must it not follow therefore that man is but a negligible quantity in the universe, and is it not true that the great world ​processes must take their course regardless of the fate of man? Notwithstanding all this, if we should still presume to maintain our faith in God as the author of the universe, what shall we say in explanation of the evil, strife and suffering which everywhere abounds? After profound spiritual struggles Böhme discovered answers to these questions which he published in his Morgenröte im Aufgang (1612). His thought moves in majestic symbols drawn from the Bible and the chemistry or alchemy of his time. He is however fully aware that these symbols can express the pure thought relations but very imperfectly. He was also well aware of the fact that his ideas went beyond the theology of the church. But he stoutly denied the charge that his ideas were heathen. “I write like a philosopher, not like a heathen!” He meets the first doubt with the idea of the presence of God’s power and nature in everything—in the human body as well as in the stellar spheres, and the latter must therefore be possessed of a kind of life—in human souls and throughout infinite space. As a matter of fact our bodies reveal the same elements as are found in the other objects of nature. In objective nature the divine activity is veiled; but in the mind of man it is clearly conscious. It follows therefore that we possess what is highest within ourselves and there is no need that we should seek it beyond the stars. He solves the second doubt with the idea that man must assume an original multiplicity within the divine unity, on the ground that multiplicity cannot be derived from unity, and moreover because opposition and difference are necessary conditions of consciousness: “A being incapable of experiencing contrasts could never become conscious of its own existence.” But multiplicity and contrast furnish the possibility of disharmony, ​of strife and evil. The origin of evil is explained by the fact that a single element of Deity strives to become the whole Deity. This accounts for the profound conflict and the intense suffering in the world through which man and nature are to fight their way through to peace. In this conflict God is not far off: it is indeed his own inner conflict. “Everyone whose heart is filled with love and who leads a compassionate and sweet tempered life, fighting against evil and pressing through the wrath of God into the light, lives with God and is of one mind with God. God requires no other service.”

4. The effort to attain a natural, purely humanistic conception likewise affected the logic of the Renaissance, as well as the psychology, ethics and philosophy of religion. The scholastic logic, by which is meant the logic of the middle ages, was primarily the servant of theology and of jurisprudence; it was adapted to the single purpose of drawing valid conclusions from the presuppositions established by authority. But an effort was now being made to discover the relation which exists between logical rules and natural, spontaneous, informal thought. It was with this end in view that Pierre de la Ramee (Petrus Ramus) attacked the Aristotelian logic (Institutiones Logiciæ, 1554, French Ed. 1555). He was the son of a charcoal burner (born in northern France 1515), and it was by sheer dint of his thirst for knowledge and his indefatigable energy that he forged to the front and enjoyed a most successful career as a teacher in the College of France. Being a Protestant, he fell a victim to the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s night (1572). Ramus called attention to the fact that the earliest philosophers had no formal logic, and that the spontaneous functions of thought are not confined to these men, but that they ​can be studied in the mathematicians, the statesmen, the orators, and the poets as well. These observations however still failed to lead Ramus to the founding of a psychology of thought. As a Humanist, he rejoices in the fact that the classical authors could be of service to logic. His own treatment however does not get much beyond the theory of inference, in which he differs but little from Aristotle. A controversy between the Ramists and the Scholastics arose at this time—enlisting France, England, Germany and the North—which contributed greatly to the development of freedom of thought.

Franz Sanchez (1562-1632), a Spaniard, professor of medicine and philosophy at Montpelier and Toulouse, felt the need of substituting a new method for the scholastic logic. He expresses his dissatisfaction with the existing state of knowledge in his book Quod nihil scitur (1581). The further he presses his investigations the greater are the number of difficulties which he finds. Owing to the mutual interdependence of all things, and the infinitude of the universe, he has but little hope of attaining certainty in knowledge. He insists on observation and experiment however, and takes as his motto; Go to the facts themselves. But the ultimate ground of certainty is nevertheless within the human mind itself: no external knowledge can equal the certainty which I have of my own states and actions. On the other hand however this immediate certainty of inner experience is far inferior to the knowledge of external objects in point of clearness and precision.

Bacon’s enthusiastic optimism concerning the future prospects of science presents a sharp contrast to the pessimism of Sanchez. He hoped for great things and devised magnificent plans. He anticipated great ​advancement in culture which was to be brought about by the mastery of the forces of nature through the aid of natural science, a study which ancient and mediæval thinkers had contemned. The aim and purpose of science is the enrichment of human life by means of new discoveries. Bacon nevertheless bestows high praise on the love of contemplation (contemplatio rerum): the vision of light is far more glorious than all the various uses of light. These sublime hopes furnish an insight into Bacon’s personal character and his method of doing things. He justified the use of every available means in acquiring the conditions without which he thought his scientific plans impossible, on the plea of their necessity to the realization of his great purposes.

Francis Bacon of Verulam was born of an excellent family in 1561. In order to acquire the influence and the wealth which he regarded as necessary to his purposes, he threw himself into politics and gradually rose to prominent positions; finally attaining to the office of Lord Chancellor. But he gained this promotion by dishonorable compromises with the despotic caprice of Elizabeth and James the First. Under the charge of bribery and the violation of the law, parliament deposed him in 1621. His last years were spent in retirement engaged in scientific pursuits. He died in 1626. His political activities had not prevented him from continuing his studies and the production of important works. The tragedy of his life consisted in the fact that ulterior demands claimed his attention to so great an extent that not only his real purpose but even his personal character had to suffer under it.

Bacon describes himself as a herald (buccinator) who announces the approach of the new era without ​participating in it himself. He insists on quitting fruitless speculation and introducing the method of experience, induction, in every department of knowledge,—in the mental sciences as well as in the natural sciences. In the Novum Organon (1620) he examines the reasons why the sciences are inadequate and describes the inductive method. In the De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623) he presents a sketch of the actual state of the sciences and proceeds to show, frequently in a most brilliant manner, the gaps which still remain to be filled.

If a man would understand nature correctly, he must first of all reduce himself to a blank tablet. No one can enter the kingdom of nature except as a little child. But we are all hindered to a greater or less degree by various illusions, both native and acquired (Idola mentis). These may be divided into four classes. The first class, having its origin in human nature, is common to all mankind (Idola tribus). This is why we are constantly disposed to regard things from the viewpoint of their relation and their similarity to ourselves, rather than from the viewpoint of their true place in the general order of the universe—ex analogia hominis instead of ex analogia universi. We assume a greater degree of order and simplicity in things than the facts justify. We discover teleologic causes in nature because our own actions reveal such causes. The second class rests on individual peculiarity (Idola specus; every one interprets nature from the viewpoint of his own cave). This accounts for the fact that some minds are more impressed by the differences of things, whilst others are disposed to emphasize their resemblances. Some are constantly striving to analyze and reduce things to their elements; others are engrossed with ​totalities. The third class is due to the influence of language upon thought (Idola fori). The formulation of words is governed by the needs of practical life, but exact thought frequently requires distinctions and combinations which differ widely from those of common speech. In certain cases there is a superabundance of words, in others there are too few. The fourth class (Idola theatri) is ascribed to the influence of traditional theories.

We must get rid of all these illusions. Bacon makes no attempt to show how this may be accomplished. The conception of the idola tribus contains a profound problem which Bacon failed to see, a problem however which acquired vast importance at a later period; we are obliged in every case to interpret reality from the human standpoint (ex analogia hominis); but in that case the question arises as to how our knowledge of the world can possess objective validity.

Bacon takes exception to the prevalent method of induction on the ground of its being limited to positive cases (as an induction per enumerationem simplicem). He insists that we must likewise take note of results in cases where the phenomenon under consideration is absent. He demands furthermore that we investigate the modifications of phenomena under varying conditions. After sufficient material has been gathered by these methods—and in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the confused mass of facts (for, citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione)—it is necessary to formulate a tentative hypothesis and examine the cases which seem to establish or refute the hypothesis. Bacon’s method is therefore not a pure induction. He has a presentiment of the profound mutual dependence of induction and deduction. ​His depreciation of the quantitative method however prevents him from attaining the true method of natural science as we find it in his contemporaries, Kepler and Galileo.

According to Bacon, the method of induction gives us an insight into the “Forms” of things. The Baconian “Forms,” from one point of view, bear a close resemblance to the Platonic ideas, and from another they are analogous to the laws of natural science. The latter conception he frequently emphasizes very strongly. He says, e.g. “If the Forms are not regarded as principles of activity, they are nothing more than fictions of the human mind.” Generally speaking, Bacon occupies a unique position in the transition from the ancient and scholastic world view to that of the modern period. This is clearly manifest in his effort to acquire a mechanical theory of nature. We never understand an object until we are in position to explain its origin, and the genetic processes of nature are brought about by means of minute variations (per minima) which elude our senses. But science uncovers the secret process (latens processus) and thus reveals the inherent relation and continuity of events. We do not discover, e.g. that the “Form” of heat is motion through! sense perception; nor do the senses reveal the fact that the sum total of matter remains constant throughout all the changes of nature.

Bacon makes a sharp distinction between science and religion. The former rests upon sense perception, the latter upon supernatural inspiration. In philosophy the first principles must be submitted to the test of induction; in religion, on the other hand, the first principles are established by authority. Reverence towards God increases in direct proportion to the absurdity and ​incredibility of the divine mysteries accepted. Bacon however believes in the possibility of a purely natural theology. The very uniformity of natural causation reveals the existence of deity.

In ethics Bacon makes a distinction between the theory of the moral idea (de exemplari) and the theory of the development of the will (de cultura anima). The former he finds thoroughly elaborated by the ancients; but the latter has received but very little attention hitherto.