Читать книгу Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records - Helen Dortch Longstreet - Страница 7

R. E. Lee

But for the benefit of the present​—​of the young, the busy, who have neither time nor inclination to study the records, and for that sentiment that is increasingly shaped by the public press,​—​for these and other reasons it appears fitting that in this hour historical truth should have a spokesman on the Gettysburg contentions. In the absence of one more able to speak, this little story of the truth is written. The writer belongs to a generation that has come up since the gloom of Appomattox closed the drama of the great “Lost Cause” of American history​—​a generation that seeks the truth, unwarped and undistorted by passion, and can face the truth.

In the prosecution of my researches for the origin of the extraordinary calumnies aimed at General Longstreet’s honor as a soldier, two most significant facts have continually pressed upon my attention.

First, not one word appears to have been published openly accusing him of disobedience at Gettysburg until the man who could forever have silenced all criticism was in his grave​—​until the knightly soul of Robert Edward Lee had passed into eternity.

Second, General Longstreet’s operations on the field of Gettysburg were above the suspicion of reproach until he came under the political ban in the South, for meeting in the proper spirit, as he saw it, the requirements of good citizenship in the observance of his Appomattox parole, and, after the removal of his political disabilities, for having accepted office at the hands of a Republican President who happened to be his old West Point comrade,​—​Grant.

Then the storm broke. He was heralded as traitor, deserter of his people, deserter of Democracy, etc. In the fury of this onslaught originated the cruel slander that he had disobeyed Lee’s most vital orders, causing the loss of the Gettysburg battle and the ultimate fall of the Confederate cause. Most singularly, this strange discovery was not made until some years after the battle and General Lee’s death. Thereafter for two decades the South was sedulously taught to believe that the Federal victory was wholly the fortuitous outcome of the culpable disobedience of General Longstreet.

The sectional complaint that he deserted “Democracy” is about as relevant and truthful as the assertion that he lost Gettysburg. He was a West Pointer, a professional soldier. He had never cast a ballot before the Civil War; he had no politics. Its passions and prejudices had no dwelling-place in his mind. The war was over, and he quietly accepted the result, fraternizing with all Americans. It was no great crime.

But the peculiar circumstances favored an opportunity to make Longstreet the long-desired scape-goat for Gettysburg. There was an ulterior and deeper purpose, however, than merely besmirching his military record. Short-sighted partisans seemingly argued that the disparagement of Longstreet was necessary to save the military reputation of Lee. But Lee’s great fame needed no such sacrifice.

The outrageous charges against Longstreet have been wholly disproved. Much of the partisan rancor that once pursued him has died out. Many of the more intelligent Southerners have been long convinced that he was the victim of a great wrong.

It was unworthy of Major-General John B. Gordon, once of the army of Northern Virginia, to revive this dead controversy. He simply reiterates the old charges in full, produces no evidence in their support, and gratuitously endorses a false and cruel verdict. His contribution is of no historical value. It carries inherent evidence that General Gordon made no critical examination of the documentary history of Gettysburg. He assumes to render a verdict on the say-so of others.

Gordon’s unsupported assertions would require no attention but for one fact. Both South and North there is a widespread impression that Gordon was a conspicuous figure at Gettysburg. This is erroneous. He was merely a brigade commander there, stationed five miles from Longstreet. It is not certain that he personally saw either Lee or Longstreet while the army was in Pennsylvania.

In his official report Gordon uses this language regarding the operations of his own small command at Gettysburg when the heaviest fighting was going on, finely showing the scope of his opportunities for observation:

“The movements during the succeeding days of the battle, July 2 and 3, I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention.”

It is but just to Gordon, however, to say that in his subordinate capacity at the head of one of the thirty-seven brigades of infantry comprising Lee’s army, he performed excellent service on the first day’s battle. But in estimating his value as a personal witness, the foregoing undisputed facts must be taken into consideration. His testimony is obviously of the hearsay kind. In fact, as will be observed from his own admission, it is no more than his own personal conclusions, wholly deduced from the assertions of others, based on an assumed state of facts which did not exist.

In his recent publication, “Reminiscences of the Civil War,” Gordon says,​—​

“It now seems certain that impartial military critics, after thorough investigation, will consider the following facts established:

“First, that General Lee distinctly ordered Longstreet to attack early on the morning of the second day, and if Longstreet had done so two of the largest corps of Meade’s army would not have been in the fight; but Longstreet delayed the fight until four o’clock in the afternoon, and thus lost his opportunity of occupying Little Round Top, the key of the position, which he might have done in the morning without firing a shot or losing a man.”

It is competent to point out that Longstreet’s orders from General Lee were “to move around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy’s left.” In short, he was “to attack up the Emmitsburg road,” as all the authorities agree. He therefore could not well “occupy” Little Round Top up the Emmitsburg road, because it was but a fraction less than a mile to the east of that road. It is as clear as noonday that Lee had no thought at first, if ever, that Little Round Top was the “key to the position.” Lee merely contemplated driving the enemy from some high ground on the Emmitsburg road from which the “more elevated ground” of Cemetery Hill in its rear, more than a mile to the northward of Little Round Top, could be subsequently assailed.

Lee’s luminous report of the battle, dated July 31, 1863, only four weeks after, has escaped Gordon’s notice, or has been conveniently ignored by him. It is found at page 305 et seq., of Part II., Vol. XXVII., of the printed War Records, easily accessible to everybody. At page 308, Lee’s report:

“… In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to carry this position. … After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. … The battle ceased at dark.”

The “desired ground” captured was that held by Sickles’s Federal Third Corps,​—​the celebrated peach-orchard, wheat-field, and adjacent high ground, from which Cemetery Hill was next day assailed by the Confederate artillery as a prelude to Pickett’s infantry assault.

It was the “crest of the ridge,” not the Round Top, that Lee wished to assail. His eye from the first appears to have been steadily fixed upon the Federal centre. That is why he ordered the “attack up the Emmitsburg road.”

Longstreet’s official report is very explicit on this point. It was written July 27, 1863. On page 358 of the same book he says,​—​

“I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy’s left.”

Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson, then of Hill’s corps, also makes this definite statement:

“Shortly after the line had been formed, I received notice that Lieutenant-General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him towards Gettysburg.”

Just here it is pertinent to say that General Longstreet had the afternoon previous, and again that morning, suggested to General Lee the more promising plan of a movement by the Confederate right to interpose between the Federals and their capital, and thus compel General Meade to give battle at a disadvantage. On this point General Longstreet uses the following language in a newspaper publicationB more than a quarter of a century ago:

“When I overtook General Lee at five o’clock that afternoon [July 1], he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said, ‘If the enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him.’ I replied: ‘If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him​—​a good reason in my judgment for not doing so.’ I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade and put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select. … I called his attention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as to force him to attack us, and suggested that even if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were in themselves of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a hundred men to us. That Meade’s army, not its position, was our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals he could whip them in detail. I reminded him that if the Federals were there in the morning it would be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out of reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when ‘the hunt was up,’ and threatened his superb equipoise. … When I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed that he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made.”

But General Lee persisted in the direct attack “up the Emmitsburg road.” Hood, deployed on Longstreet’s extreme right, at once perceived that the true direction was by flank against the southern slopes of Big Round Top. He delayed the advance to advise of the discovery he had made. Soon the positive order came back: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” He still hesitated and repeated the suggestion. Again it was reiterated: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” Then the troops moved to the attack. There was no alternative. Lee’s orders were imperative, and made after he had personally examined the enemy’s position. Longstreet was ordered to attack a specific position “up the Emmitsburg road,” which was not Little Round Top, as assumed by Gordon. This point is particularly elaborated because in it lies the “milk in the cocoanut” of the charges against Longstreet. Without consulting the records Gordon has merely followed the lead of some of General Lee’s biographers, notably Fitzhugh Lee, who asserts that his illustrious uncle “expected Longstreet to seize Little Round Top on the 2d of July.” The records clearly show that nothing was farther from General Lee’s thoughts.

After the war it was discovered that a very early attack on Little Round Top would perhaps have found it undefended, hence the afterthought that General Longstreet was ordered to attack at sunrise. But whatever the hour Longstreet was ordered to attack, it was most certainly not Little Round Top that was made his objective.