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Table of Contents

ONTARIO—Comparison of the rival squadrons—-Chauncy takes York and Fort George—Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake—Chauncy sails—Yeo's partial victory off Niagara—-Indecisive action off the Genesee—Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives him the command of the lake—ERIE—Perry's success in creating a fleet—His victory—CHAMPLAIN—Loss of the Growler and Eagle—Summary.

ONTARIO.

Winter had almost completely stopped preparations on the American side. Bad weather put an end to all communication with Albany or New York, and so prevented the transit of stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the men, for the cold and exposure so thinned them out that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the ranks filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed, and there was no chance of prize-money. The British government had the great advantage of being able to move its sailors where it pleased, while in the American service, at that period, the men enlisted for particular ships, and the only way to get them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither. 212 However, the work went on in spite of interruptions. Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely owing to the energy and capacity of the head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as much as any naval officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario), the Madison was equipped, a small despatch sloop, The Lady of the Lake prepared, and a large new ship, the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots.

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British commander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships to be built, and they were begun; but he committed the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston and the other in York, at the opposite end of the lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, having proved himself so incompetent, was removed; and in the beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo arrived, to act as commander-in-chief of the naval forces, together with four captains, eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 picked seamen, sent out by the home government especially for service on the Canada lakes. 213

The comparative force of the two fleets or squadrons it is hard to estimate. I have already spoken of the difficulty in finding out what guns were mounted on any given ship at a particular time, and it is even more perplexing with the crews. A schooner would make one cruise with but thirty hands; on the next it would appear with fifty, a number of militia having volunteered as marines. Finding the militia rather a nuisance, they would be sent ashore, and on her third cruise the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontier seamen in their place. It was the same with the larger vessels. The Madison might at one time have her full complement of 200 men; a month's sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 150 effectives. The Pike's crew of 300 men at one time would shortly afterward be less by a third in consequence of a draft of sailors being sent to the upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to be perfectly accurate; but, making a comparison of the various authorities from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the following tables of the forces may be given as very nearly correct. In broadside force I count every pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots.

This is not materially different from James' account (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 114 guns, 1,193 men, and 2,121 tons. The Lady of the Lake, however, was never intended for anything but a despatch boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were both lost before Chauncy actually came into collision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order to compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2,265 tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,230 pounds.

This differs but slightly from James, who gives Yeo 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,374 pounds, but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court-martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official accounts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, convict him of very much underrating the force in men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can be safely assumed that he has underestimated the force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squadrons with what it really was, we can correct his account of Yeo's tonnage.

The above figures would apparently make the two squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95 men more, and throwing at a broadside 144 pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do not by any means show all the truth. The Americans greatly excelled in the number and calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at one discharge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds of carronade metal; while the British only threw from their long guns 180 pounds, and from their carronades 1,194. This unequal distribution of metal was very much in favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The Pike, with her 15 long 24's in battery was an overmatch for any one of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same relation to them that the Confiance, at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. She should certainly have been a match for the Wolfe and Melville together, and the Madison and Oneida for the Royal George and Sydney Smith. In fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to have been an overmatch for the four heaviest of the British squadron, although these possessed the nominal superiority. And in ordinary cases the eight remaining American gun-vessels would certainly seem to be an overmatch for the two British schooners, but it is just here that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes in. When the water was very smooth and the wind light, the long 32's and 24's of the Americans could play havoc with the British schooners, at a distance which would render the carronades of the latter useless. But the latter were built for war, possessed quarters and were good cruisers, while Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, without quarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy metal that whenever it blew at all hard they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting, and ceased to be capable even of defending themselves. When Sir James Yeo captured two of them he would not let them cruise with his other vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun-boats, in which capacity they were serving when recaptured; this is a tolerable test of their value compared to their opponents. Another disadvantage that Chauncy had to contend with, was the difference in the speed of the various vessels. The Pike and Madison were fast, weatherly ships; but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going free, and could hardly be persuaded to beat to windward at all. In this respect Yeo was much better off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, with quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough to be able to act with uniformity and not needing to pay much regard to the weather. His force could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. Enough wind to make a good working breeze for his larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors de combat: and in weather that suited the latter, the former could not move about at all. When speed became necessary the two ships left the brig hopelessly behind, and either had to do without her, or else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners sailed quite as slowly; and finally it was found out that the only way to get all the vessels into action at once was to have one half the fleet tow the other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the command of the lake when, if it came on to blow, the commodore had to put into port under penalty of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before his eyes. These conflicting considerations render it hard to pass judgment; but on the whole it would seem as if Chauncy was the superior in force, for even if his schooners were not counted, his three square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the four square-rigged British vessels, and the two British schooners would not have counted very much in such a conflict. In calm weather he was certainly the superior. This only solves one of the points in which the official letters of the two commanders differ: after every meeting each one insists that he was inferior in force, that the weather suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, and got the worst of it; all of which will be considered further on.

In order to settle toward which side the balance of success inclined, we must remember that there were two things the combatants were trying to do viz.:

(1) To damage the enemy directly by capturing or destroying his vessels. This was the only object we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, but on the lakes it was subordinated to:—

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which invaluable assistance could be rendered to the army. The most thorough way of accomplishing this, of course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron; but it could also be done by building ships too powerful for him to face, or by beating him in some engagement which, although not destroying his fleet, would force him to go into port. If one side was stronger, then the weaker party by skillful manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest satisfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed; for, as long as one squadron was not undisputed master it could not be of much assistance in transporting troops attacking forts, or otherwise helping the military.

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by being the first to begin operations. They were building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sackett's Harbor; the British were building two new ships, each about two thirds the force of the Pike, one at Toronto (then called York), one at Kingston. Before these were built the two fleets were just on a par; the destruction of the Pike would give the British the supremacy; the destruction of either of the British ships, provided the Pike were saved, would give the Americans the supremacy. Both sides had already committed faults. The Americans had left Sackett's Harbor so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited attack, while the British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but had done little for York, and, moreover, ought not to have divided their forces by building ships in different places.

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made sail with the Madison, Lieutenant-Commander Elliott, floating his own broad pennant, Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, Hamilton, Lieutenant McPherson, Scourge, Mr. Osgood, Tompkins, Lieutenant Brown, Conquest, Lieutenant Pettigrew, Growler, Mr. Mix, Julia, Mr. Trant, Asp, Lieutenant Smith, Pert, Lieutenant Adams, American, Lieutenant Chauncy, Ontario, Mr. Stevens, Lady of the Lake, Mr. Hinn, and Raven, transport, having on board General Dearborn and 1700 troops, to attack York, which was garrisoned by about 700 British regulars and Canadian militia under Major-General Sheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and the Gloucester 10-gun brig was in port; the guns of both vessels were used in defence of the port. The fleet arrived before York early on April 27th, and the debarkation began at about 8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the fort under a heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from their long guns; while the troops went ashore under the command of Brigadier-General Pike. The boats were blown to leeward by the strong east wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed the troops under cover of the grape thrown by the vessels. The schooners now beat up to within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, and opened heavily upon it, while at the same time General Pike and the main body of the troops on shore moved forward to the assault, using their bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian militia, outnumbered three to one (including the American sailors) and with no very good defensive works, of course had to give way, having lost heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An explosion immediately afterward killed or wounded 250 of the victors, including General Pike. The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, including midshipmen Haifield and Thompson, and 8 wounded; 214 and of the army, 215 14 killed and 32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, including 40 by the explosion; 216 together with 50 Canadians and Indians, making a total of 180, besides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was burned, her guns taken away, and the Gloucester sailed back to Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and naval stores were destroyed, and much more shipped to the Harbor. The great fault that the British had committed was in letting the defences of so important a place remain so poor, and the force in it so small. It was impossible to resist very long when Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet in position. On the other hand, the Americans did the work in good style; the schooners were finely handled, firing with great precision and completely covering the troops, who, in turn, were disembarked and brought into action very handsomely.

After being detained in York a week by bad weather the squadron got out, and for the next fortnight was employed in conveying troops and stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined to make an attack on Fort George, where the British General Vincent was stationed with from 1,000 217 to 1,800 218 regulars, 600 militia, and about 100 Indians. The American troops numbered about 4,500, practically under the command of Colonel Scott. On May 26th Commodore Chauncy carefully reconnoitred the place to be attacked, and in the night made soundings along the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct the small vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 A.M. on the 27th the signal was made to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the Madison, and the other troops on the Oneida, the Lady of the Lake, and in batteaux, many of which had been captured at York. The Julia, Growler, and Ontario moved in and attacked a battery near the light-house, opening a cross-fire which silenced it. The troops were to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a battery of one long 24, managed by Canadian militia. The Conquest and Tompkins swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun spiked, and then opened on the British. "The American ships with their heavy discharges of round and grape too well succeeded in thinning the British ranks." 219 Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Captain Perry and Colonel Scott dashed in, completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directed point-blank at the foe by the Hamilton, Scourge, and Asp. "The fire from the American shipping committed dreadful havoc among the British, and rendered their efforts to oppose the landing of the enemy ineffectual." 220 Colonel Scott's troops, thus protected, made good their landing and met the British regulars; but the latter were so terribly cut up by the tremendous discharges of grape and canister from the schooners, that in spite of their gallantry and discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing up and abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and two wounded 221; seventeen soldiers were killed and forty-five wounded 222; making the total American loss sixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and 262 "wounded and missing," 223 in addition to about forty Canadians and Indians hors de combat and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in this very brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly more than a fifth of the loss in killed and wounded that the assailed did; which must be attributed to the care with which Chauncy had reconnoitred the ground and prepared the attack, the excellent handling of the schooners, and the exceedingly destructive nature of their fire. The British batteries were very weak, and, moreover, badly served. Their regular troops fought excellently; it was impossible for them to stand against the fire of the schooners, which should have been engaged by the batteries on shore; and they were too weak in numbers to permit the American army to land and then attack it when away from the boats. The Americans were greatly superior in force, and yet deserve very much credit for achieving their object so quickly, with such slight loss to themselves, and at such a heavy cost to the foe. The effect of the victory was most important, the British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and leaving the river in complete possession of the Americans for the time being. This offered the opportunity for despatching Captain Perry up above the falls to take out one captured brig (the Caledonia) and four purchased schooners, which had been lying in the river unable to get past the British batteries into Lake Erie. These five vessels were now carried into that lake, being tracked up against the current by oxen, to become a most important addition to the American force upon it.

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at the west end of the lake the Wolfe, 24, was launched and equipped at Kingston, making the British force on the lake superior to that of the Americans. Immediately Sir George Prevost, and Sir James Lucas Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of the land and water forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the General Pike, 28, thus securing to themselves the superiority for the rest of the season. Accordingly they embarked on May 27th, in the Wolfe, Royal George, Moira, Prince Regent, Simco, and Seneca, with a large number of gun-boats, barges, and batteaux; and on the next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19 boats transporting troops to Sackett's Harbor, under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them captured; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing up the total number of regulars there to 500 men, General Brown having been summoned to take the chief command. About 400 militia also came in, but were of no earthly service. There were, however, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who could be relied on. The defences were miserably inadequate, consisting of a battery of one long gun and a block-house.

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars landed, being covered by the gun-boats under Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their ground in and around the block-house. "At this point the further energies of the [British] troops became unavailing. The [American] block-house and stockade could not be carried by assault nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them; the fire of the gun-boats proved insufficient to attain that end; light and adverse winds continued, and our larger vessels were still far off." 224 The British reëmbarked precipitately. The American loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 wounded; that of the British to 52 killed and 211 wounded, 225 most of the latter being taken prisoners. During the fight some of the frightened Americans set fire to the store-houses, the Pike and the Gloucester; the former were consumed, but the flames were extinguished before they did any damage to either of the vessels. This attack differed especially from those on Fort George and York, in that the attacking force was relatively much weaker; still it ought to have been successful. But Sir George could not compare as a leader with Col. Scott or Gen. Pike; and Sir James did not handle the gun-boats by any means as well as the Americans did their schooners in similar attacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, and vice versa; but in reality neither seems to have done particularly well. At any rate the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British.

The British squadron returned to Kingston, and Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came down the lake and went into port about June 2d. So far the Americans had had all the success, and had controlled the lake; but now Yeo's force was too formidable to be encountered until the Pike was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into his hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of course with the Pike soon to be built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be of but short duration; but he used his time most actively. He sailed from Kingston on the 3d of June, to coöperate with the British army at the head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going to the Americans. On the 8th he discovered a small camp of the latter near Forty Mile Creek, and attacked it with the Beresford, Sydney Smith, and gun-boats, obliging the Americans to leave their camp, while their equipages, provisions, stores, and batteaux fell into the hands of the British, whose troops occupied the post, thus assisting in the series of engagements which ended in the humiliating repulse of General Wilkinson's expedition into Canada. On the 13th two schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans were captured, and on the 16th a depot of provisions at the Genesee River shared the same fate. On the 19th a party of British soldiers were landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th having done good service in assisting the land forces. 226 As a small compensation, on the 18th of the same month the Lady of the Lake, Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner Lady Murray, containing 1 ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with stores and ammunition. 227

During the early part of July neither squadron put out in force; although on the first of the month Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it was discovered. Meanwhile the Americans were building a new schooner, the Sylph, and the formidable corvette Pike was made ready to sail by July 21st. On the same day the entire American squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, and reached Niagara on the 27th. Here Col. Scott and some of his regulars were embarked, and on the 30th a descent was made upon York, where 11 transports were destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some ammunition carried off, and the barracks burned. On the 3d of August the troops were disembarked at the Niagara, and 111 officers and men were sent up to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squadron much deranged 150 militia were subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they proved of no assistance (beyond swelling the number of men Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia from 70 individuals to 80), and were again landed.

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the two fleets for the first time came in sight of one another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British six miles to windward, in the W. N. W. Chauncy's squadron contained one corvette, one ship sloop, one brig sloop, and ten schooners, manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a broadside 1,390 lbs. of shot, nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's included two ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two schooners, manned by 770 men, and throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs., but 180 being from long guns. But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy's had none; and, moreover, his vessels could all sail and manoeuvre together, while, as already remarked, one half of the American fleet spent a large part of its time towing the other half. The Pike would at ordinary range be a match for the Wolfe and Melville together; yet in actual weight of metal she threw less than the former ship alone. In calm weather the long guns of the American schooners gave them a great advantage; in rough weather they could not be used at all. Still, on the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was advancing to attack a superior fleet.

All through the day of the 7th the wind blew light and variable, and the two squadrons went through a series of manoeuvres, nominally to bring on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the other it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeuvres were; each captain says the other avoided him and that he made all sail in chase. At any rate it was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in.

That night the wind came out squally; and about 1 A.M. on the morning of the 8th a heavy gust struck the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing them to careen over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foundered, but 16 men escaping,—which accident did not open a particularly cheerful prospect to the remainder of the schooners. Chauncy's force was, by this accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's, having perhaps a hundred more men, 228 and throwing 144 lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through the two succeeding days the same manoeuvring went on; the question as to which avoided the fight is simply one of veracity between the two commanders, and of course each side, to the end of time, will believe its own leader. But it is not of the least consequence, as neither accomplished any thing.

On the 10th the same tedious evolutions were continued, but at 7 P.M. the two squadrons were tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the breeze being fresh from the S. W. Commodore Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from behind and to windward, in single column, on the same tack. Commodore Chauncy's weather line was formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Asp, Ontario, and American, in that order, and the lee line of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and Conquest. Chauncy formed his weather line of the smaller vessels, directing them, when the British should engage, to edge away and form to leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir James would follow them down. At 11 the weather line opened fire at very long range; at 11.15 it was returned, and the action became general and harmless; at 11.30 the weather line bore up and passed to leeward, except the Julia and Growler, which tacked. The British ships kept their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; while Commodore Chauncy's lee line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the Julia and Growler." 229 Of course, the enemy did not come down, and the Julia and Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual broadside at the other ships, and tacked after the Growler and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners, meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were overtaken, and, after making a fruitless effort to run the gauntlet through the enemy's squadron by putting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's account is simple: "Came within gunshot of Pike and Madison, when they immediately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and made all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their schooners astern, which we captured." 230 The British had acted faultlessly, and the honor and profit gained by the encounter rested entirely with them. On the contrary, neither Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage.

Cooper says that the line of battle was "singularly well adapted to draw the enemy down," and "admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." In the first place it is an open question whether the enemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he advanced boldly enough. The formation may have been ingenious, but it was the reverse of advantageous. It would have been far better to have had the strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners, with their long guns, to leeward, where they would not be exposed to capture by any accident happening to them. Moreover, it does not speak well for the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders should have directly disobeyed orders. And when the two schooners did tack, and it was evident that Sir James would cut them off, it was an extraordinary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two points * * * to lead the enemy from the Growler and Julia." It is certainly a novel principle, that if part of a force is surrounded the true way to rescue it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would have been placed between two fires, and it would have been impossible for him to capture the schooners. As it was, the British commander had attacked a superior force in weather that just suited it, and yet had captured two of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond a few shot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in no way decisive. All next day, the 11th, the fleets were in sight of one another, the British to windward, but neither attempted to renew the engagement. The wind grew heavier, and the villainous little American schooners showed such strong tendencies to upset, that two had to run into Niagara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake to Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks, and that same evening proceeded up the lake again.

The advantage in this action had been entirely with the British, but it is simple nonsense to say, as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive predominance, which we maintained until the end of the war." 231 This "decisive" battle left the Americans just as much in command of the lake as the British; and even this very questionable "predominance" lasted but six weeks, after which the British squadron was blockaded in port most of the time. The action has a parallel in that fought on the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve.232 The two fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured two ships, when both sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other the next day without either renewing the action. "A victory therefore it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor a 'brilliant' victory." 233 This is exactly the criticism that should be passed on Sir James Lucas Yeo's action of the 10th of August.

From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets were on the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his letters his surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid of meeting him "though so much superior in force." The facts are of course difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; and that the party to leeward generally made off. The Americans had been re-inforced by the Sylph schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically her armament would make her formidable; but practically her guns were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she was converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.

On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range, in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; the Americans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one midshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay. One of their brigs, the Melville, received a shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns had to be run in on one side and out on the other. Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay. 234 James says that "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet; but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended." This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his account is supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, 235 which says: "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully avoided doing." In other words Yeo did not steer for but away from Chauncy. Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it is only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not. Of course in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a great advantage. He had present 10 vessels; the Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy told but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was much disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so much superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellous admission of how little able he was to make good use of even what he had. He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close action. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (not a carronade being fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long 18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpable incompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie—substitute all his long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long 12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of shot. The odds were thus more than two to one against the British in any case; and their commander's lack of resource made them still greater. But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results.

The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When the squadrons were still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, with their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and edged down toward them, the Pike ahead, towing the Asp; the Tompkins, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next; the Madison next, being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the Sylph, with another schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, Commodore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain William Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line. They opened with their starboard guns as soon as they came round. When the Pike was a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of the British line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre.

The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph, neither having cast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and Tompkins. The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But already the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's main-top-mast and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he could on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail after her. The retreat of the commodore was most ably covered by the Royal George, under Captain Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on the lake. He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes. The Madison and Sylph, having the schooners in tow, could not overtake the British ships, though the Sylph opened a distant fire; the Pike kept on after them, but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished, 236 when the enemy were running into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape would have been impossible. The Tompkins had lost her foremast, and the Pike her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowsprit and main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not be used. Among the British ships, the Wolfe lost her main-top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the Royal George her foretop-mast; both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to the report of the British officers captured in the transports a few days afterward.

As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer published accounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the action was not made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (vol. ii, p. 503): "The action of the 28th of September, 1813, in which Sir James Yeo in the Wolfe had his main- and mizzen-top-masts shot away, and was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster an opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and seamanship which elicited the admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly placed himself between his disabled commodore and a superior enemy." James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, "Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage, kept his favorite distance," which he did because Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken; then James mentions the injuries the Wolfe received, and says that "it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the commodore's' that threw the British in confusion." In other words, it was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring that threw the British into confusion—a very futile distinction. Next he says that "Commodore Chauncy would not venture within carronade range," whereas he was within carronade range of the Wolfe and Royal George, but the latter did not wait for the Madison and Oneida to get within range with their carronades. The rest of his article is taken up with exposing the absurdities of some of the American writings, miscalled histories, which appeared at the close of the war. His criticisms on these are very just, but afford a funny instance of the pot calling the kettle black. This much is clear, that the British were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of the American force was engaged. But in good weather the American force was so superior that being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, had it not been for the claims advanced both by himself and his friends, that on the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The Wolfe made any thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the work to the gallant Mulcaster, in the Royal George, who shares with Lieutenant Finch of the Tompkins most of the glory of the day. The battle, if such it may be called, completely established Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. So Chauncy gained a victory which established his control over the lakes; and, moreover, he gained it by fighting in succession, almost single-handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the victory was only what should have been expected from a superior force. The question is, did Chauncy use his force to the best advantage? And it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore up it was a great mistake not to cast off the schooners which were being towed. They were small craft, not of much use in the fight, and they entirely prevented the Madison from taking any part in the contest, and kept the Sylph at a great distance; and by keeping the Asp in tow the Pike, which sailed faster than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them. Had she left the Asp behind and run in to engage the Royal George she could have mastered, or at any rate disabled, her; and had the swift Madison cast off her tow she could also have taken an effective part in the engagement. If the Pike could put the British to flight almost single-handed, how much more could she not have done when assisted by the Madison and Oneida? The cardinal error, however, was made in discontinuing the chase. The British were in an almost open roadstead, from which they could not possibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind would come up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy and to attack him at a more suitable time. But he utterly failed in this last; and had the American squadron cast off their tows and gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been able to destroy or capture the entire British force before a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have done well to keep in mind the old adage, so peculiarly applicable to naval affairs: "L'audace! toujours l'audace! et encore l'audace!" Whether the fault was his or that of his subordinates, it is certain that while the victory of the 28th of September definitely settled the supremacy of the lake in favor of the Americans, yet this victory was by no means so decided as it should have been, taking into account his superiority in force and advantage in position, and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted till the evening of the 31st. There was no longer any apprehension of molestation from the British, so the troop transports were sent down the lake by themselves, while the squadron remained to watch Yeo. On Oct. 2d he was chased, but escaped by his better sailing; and next day false information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him and passed down the lake, and he accordingly made sail in the direction of his supposed flight. On the 5th, at 3 P.M., while near the False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, which proved to be British gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops. All sails was made after them; one was burned, another escaped, and five were captured, the Mary, Drummond, Lady Gore, Confiance, and Hamilton, 237—the two latter being the rechristened Julia and Growler. Each gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and they had aboard in all 264 men, including seven naval (three royal and four provincial) and ten military officers. These prisoners stated that in the action of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had lost very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded there by Chauncy for most of the time; on Nov. 10th he came out and was at once chased back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy was able to convert his small schooners into transports. On the 17th these transports were used to convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison from the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The duty of transporting troops and stores went on till the 27th, when every thing had been accomplished; and a day or two afterward navigation closed.

As between the Americans and British, the success of the season was greatly in favor of the former. They had uncontested control over the lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to Nov. 29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only held it from June 3d to July 21st, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sept. 28th, for 69 days, the two sides were contending for the mastery. York and Fort George had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's Harbor was repulsed. The Americans lost but two schooners, both of which were recaptured; while the British had one 24-gun-ship nearly ready for launching destroyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses, stores, etc., was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army for over twice the length of time Yeo's could (107 days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the respective merits of the two commanders. We had shown so much more energy than the Anglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the year we had overtaken them in the building race, and the two fleets were about equally formidable. The Madison and Oneida were not quite a match for the Royal George and Sydney Smith (opposing 12 32-pound and 8 24-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12, 1 68-pound and 13 32-pound carronades); and our ten gun-schooners would hardly be considered very much of an overmatch for the Melville, Motra, and Beresford. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have permitted the Americans, when the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway over the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster to the British land forces. It would certainly have been better to risk a battle with equal forces, than to wait till each fleet received an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's squadron the superior by just about the superiority of the Pike to the Wolfe. Again, Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse before Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee river he showed a marked lack of resource; and in the action of the 28th of September (popularly called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of his retreat) he evinced an amount of caution that verged toward timidity, in allowing the entire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the Royal George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. On the other hand, he gave able co-operation to the army while he possessed control of the lake; he made a most gallant and successful attack on a superior force on the 10th of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skilful manoeuvring he prevented this same superior force from acquiring the uncontested mastery. It was no disgrace to be subsequently blockaded; but it is very ludicrous in his admirers to think that he came out first best.

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance to the army all the while that he had control of the water; his attacks on York and Fort George were managed with consummate skill and success, and on the 28th of September he practically defeated the opposing force with his own ship alone. Nevertheless he can by no means be said to have done the best he could with the materials he had. His stronger fleet was kept two months in check by a weaker British fleet. When he first encountered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have inflicted such a check upon him as would at least have confined him to port and given the Americans immediate superiority on the lake; instead of which he suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat, which allowed the British to contest the supremacy with him for six weeks longer. On the 28th of September, when he only gained a rather barren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution that prevented him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry on that day commanded the American fleet there would have been hardly a British ship left on Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; and the balance of success inclined to the side of the Americans only because they showed greater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders on both sides being very nearly equal.

LAKE ERIE

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed command of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at once began creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfully with the foe. As already said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the Somers, Tigress, and Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippe. These at first were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George and retreat of the British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get them out, tracking them up against the current by the most arduous labor. They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun brigs were being constructed under the directions of the indefatigable captain. Three other schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but had a bar on which there was less than seven feet of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointed commander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was having built at Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded Perry's force, and as the brigs could not cross the bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in his presence. He kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d of August he disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward every thing; and on the 4th, at 2 P.M., one brig, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of the bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the bar by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations. The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped out of them. By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew too much water. It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up every thing, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This duty occupied the whole night." 238

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 A.M. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with the schooners and then drew off. The Niagara crossed without difficulty. There were still not enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The squadron sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready. After cruising about some time the Ohio was sent down the lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On the 9th of September Captain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions that he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior force opposed. On the 10th of September his squadron was discovered from the mast-head of the Lawrence in the northwest. Before going into details of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly, they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builder Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the dimensions of the American ships. The Lawrence and Niagara measured 480 tons apiece. The Caledonia, brig, was about the size of the Hunter, or 180 tons. The Tigress, Somers, and Scorpion were subsequently captured by the foe and were then said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario. The Ariel was about the size of the Hamilton; the Porcupine and Trippe about the size of the Asp and Pert. As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete account of those on board his squadron. He has also given a complete account of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if any thing, underestimates them. At least Emmons in his "History" gives the Trippe a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24; and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says (but I do not know on what authority) that the Caledonia had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives her 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the Somers had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds with that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 32 on the Trippe, while Barclay reverses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews. James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men." They were just as much picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In vol. xiv, p. 566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize-monies owing to each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand total of 532 men, including 136 on the Lawrence and 155 on the Niagara, 45 of whom were volunteers—frontiersmen. Deducting these we get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may be that some of the men whose names were down on the prize list had been so sick that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yarnall testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that there were but 131 men and boys of every description on board the Lawrence in the action; and the Niagara was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the Lawrence were fit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabitants; 158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell which of the two former heads include the last); and 329 were officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of the total number, there were on the day of action, according to Perry's report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the Lawrence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502," but I have not been able to find out the original authority. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813, states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance (178) captured; and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting the Detroit, and we know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came up from the Dover, James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences" some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut. Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, there testified that he had on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together," of whom "16 came up from the Dover three days before." James, on p. 284, says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these 16 gives us 126 (almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieutenant Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more men on account of being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24 men more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt 15, and Chippeway 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of British sailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we could add 21. This would make a grand total of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. This number is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, says that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded. Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore the same proportion to their whole number as in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty that there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number, though I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point of very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at long range, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handle the sails and guns, did not much matter. The following statement of the comparative force must therefore be very nearly accurate:

During the action, however, the Lawrence and Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one of the carronades on the engaged side, making a broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long guns.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 lbs., of which 195 were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than two to one. The chief fault to be found in the various American accounts is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says: "Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly the advantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not. The tonnage of the fleets is not so very important; the above tables are probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to tell exactly the number of men in the two crews. Barclay almost certainly had more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihood some of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectives was most probably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle was fought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range, this, as already said, does not much matter. The Niagara might be considered a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia for the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainly very greatly superior in force.

At daylight on Sept. 10th Barclay's squadron was discovered in the N. W., and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to the N. E., giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light. Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W in the following order: Chippeway, _Master's Mate J. Campbell; Detroit, Captain R. H. Barclay; Hunter, Lieutenant G. Bignall; Queen Charlotte, Captain R. Finnis; Lady Prevost, Lieutenant Edward Buchan; and Little Belt, by whom commanded is not said. Perry came down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the Ariel, Lieut. John H. Packet, and Scorpion, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the weather bow of the Lawrence, Captain O. H. Perry; next came the Caledonia, Lieut. Daniel Turner; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; Somers, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin; Porcupine, Acting Master George Serrat; Tigress, Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, and Trippe, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup. 239

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadron approached the enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes. At 11.45 the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a second which went crashing through the Lawrence, and was replied to by the Scorpion's long 32. At 11.55 the Lawrence, having shifted her port bow-chaser, opened with both the long 12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, but the shot from the latter all fell short. At the same time the action became general on both sides, though the rearmost American vessels were almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out of range of the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Lawrence was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy.

It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within good carronade range, and during that time the action at the head of the line was between the long guns of the Chippeway and Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed almost exclusively at the Lawrence she suffered a great deal. The Caledonia, Niagara, and Somers were meanwhile engaging, at long range, the Hunter and Queen Charlotte, opposing from their long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while from a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 12.20 the Lawrence had worked down to close quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with great fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range. The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same fault the British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the Detroit were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of the Ariel's long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the Detroit exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though they actually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the ship's equipment. Meanwhile the Caledonia came down too, but the Niagara was wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronades or of those of the Queen Charlotte, his antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action; her next in command, Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good, passed the Hunter and joined in the attack on the Lawrence, at close quarters. The Niagara, the most efficient and best-manned of the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action by her captain's misconduct. At the end of the line the fight went on at long range between the Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and Trippe on one side, and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other; the Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although her 12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the long guns of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The Scorpion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of them handled with the most determined courage, were opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the full as bravely. At such close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, the Americans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number of men. But the Lawrence had received such damage in working down as to make the odds against Perry. On each side almost the whole fire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; in consequence the Queen Charlotte was almost disabled, and the Detroit was also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of Lieutenant George Inglis. But on board the Lawrence matters had gone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having made the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for duty when she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were killed or wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a cockpit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water, and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding many men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but kept to the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks, of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline was shot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull was shattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and the guns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry kept up the fight with splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one, the commodore called down through the skylight for one of the surgeon's assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till none were left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?" and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain. A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit would have then struck. Instead, however, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined to win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run down on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though the brig was absolutely without quarters. The Niagara had thus become the next in line astern of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay's line, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the Lawrence, on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far taken very little part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping into a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the three schooners. The Trippe was now very near the Caledonia. The Lawrence, having but 14 sound men left, struck her colors, but could not be taken possession of before the action re-commenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia passing between her and her foes. At 2.45, the schooners having closed up, Perry, in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled that they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists. There could thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the Niagara stood down, and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the Chippeway, Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the starboard ones into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, raking on both sides. Too disabled to tack, the Detroit and Charlotte tried to wear, the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vessels having every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, while on the other side the British vessels were raked by the Caledonia and the schooners so closely that some of their grape shot, passing over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Nothing further could be done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P.M., after three and a quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting. The Chippeway and Little Belt tried to escape, but were overtaken and brought to respectively by the Trippe and Scorpion, the commander of the latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has behaved in the most humane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, but to all the wounded," writes Captain Barclay.

The American squadron had suffered severely, more than two thirds of the loss falling upon the Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being completely beaten in. She had, as already stated, 22 men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, including Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second lieutenant) Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor, Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swartout and Claxton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 25 wounded (almost a fifth of her effectives), including among the latter the second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The Caledonia had 3, the Somers 2, and Trippe 2, men wounded. The Ariel had 1 killed and 3 wounded; the Scorpion 2 killed, including Midshipman Lamb. The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded, of whom 3 died.

The British loss, falling most heavily on the Detroit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed (including Capt. S. J. Garden, R.N., and Captain R. A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rolette, and Bignall): in all 135. The first and second in command on every vessel were killed or wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the defence.

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of upper Canada; in all these respects its importance has not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by it most certainly has been estimated at more than its worth. Most Americans, even the well educated, if asked which was the most glorious victory of the war, would point to this battle. Captain Perry's name is more widely known than that of any other commander. Every school-boy reads about him, if of no other sea-captain; yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull or Macdonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie our seamen displayed great courage and skill; but so did their antagonists. The simple truth is, that, where on both sides the officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to two, could not well help winning. The courage with which the Lawrence was defended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may fairly be called heroic; but equal praise belongs to the men on board the Detroit, who had to discharge the great guns by flashing pistols at the touchholes, and yet made such a terribly effective defence. Courage is only one of the many elements which go to make up the character of a first-class commander; something more than bravery is needed before a leader can be really called great.

There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging of our writers over the victory somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to work the guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water, and largely at long range. The important fact was that though we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much metal again as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our favor it would have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The water was too smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this very smoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable than any of the British vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, that it was to them the defeat was primarily due. The American fleet came into action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly, or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commanders how to keep their places. The Niagara was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her from doing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces by the gun-boats without the chance of replying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have been closer up, and in a position to render more effectual assistance; the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans. Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in this instance not with very good judgment. He says the line-of-battle was highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The weather was peculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, with their long, heavy guns; and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them in the rear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the Lawrence, with her short carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steering for the head of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any thing else. In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilful on both sides, the Detroit's long guns being peculiarly well served; but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first, and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damage done on each side was not equal to the disparity in force. The chief merit of the American commander and his followers was indomitable courage, and determination not to be beaten. This is no slight merit; but it may well be doubted if it would have ensured victory had Barclay's force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong attack; his superior force, whether through his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said, being brought into action in such a manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior force opposed. Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought up its powerful twin-sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists, not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, and almost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed hors de combat. Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth water his gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron. In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards the honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in an equally high degree creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be said that the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in loss reflected rather the most credit on the British. Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances; but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than on the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success in collecting sailors and vessels and in building the two brigs, but above all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them out on the lake. On that occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay; indeed the latter committed an error that the skill and address he subsequently showed could not retrieve. But it will always be a source of surprise that the American public should have so glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have paid comparatively little attention to Macdonough's victory, which really was won against decided odds in ships, men, and metal.

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering; but, aside from the morality of the case, we never can learn how to produce a certain effect unless we know rightly what the causes were that produced a similar effect in times past. Lake Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill can still counteract them. It is amusing to read some of the pamphlets written "in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the writers apparently regarding him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the victory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are stereotyped: Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also fewer men than the foe. This last point is the only one respecting which there is any doubt. Taking sick and well together, the Americans unquestionably had the greatest number in crew; but a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting these they were still, in all probability, more numerous than their foes.

But it is really not a point of much consequence, as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after there are enough hands for those purposes additional ones are not of so much advantage. I have in all my accounts summed up as accurately as possible the contending forces, because it is so customary with British writers to follow James' minute and inaccurate statements, that I thought it best to give every thing exactly; but it was really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impossible to compare forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptional cases, the number of men, after a certain point was reached, made little difference. For example, the Java would fight just as effectually with 377 men, the number James gives her, as with 426, the number I think she really had. Again, my figures make the Wasp slightly superior in force to the Frolic, as she had 25 men the most; but in reality, as the battle was fought under very short sail, and decided purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was not of the least consequence. The Hornet had nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be absurd to say that this gave her much advantage. In both the latter cases, the forces were practically equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds were in favor of the Americans. The exact reverse is the case in the last action of the Constitution. Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men they required, and threw a heavier broadside than their foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds against them were not great, but numbers could not express the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and two small ships to one big one. Again, though in the action on Lake Champlain numbers do show a slight advantage both in weight of metal and number of men on the British side, they do not make the advantage as great as it really was, for they do not show that the British possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which was equal to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as the Constitution was superior to the Cyane and Levant. 240 And on the same principles I think that every fair-minded man must admit the great superiority of Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage was greater in carronades than in long guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us from taking credit for the victory. Almost all the victories gamed by the English over the Dutch in the 17th century were due purely to great superiority in force. The cases have a curious analogy to this lake battle. Perry won with 54 guns against Barclay's 63; but the odds were largely in his favor. Blake won a doubtful victory on the 18th of February, 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men and weight of metal greatly their superior. The English were excellent fighters, but no better than the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that period deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue was won over a very much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard fighting, which resulted in the capture of one vessel! This victory was most exultingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in capturing the Little Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were certainly won against heavy odds by his great genius and the daring skill of the captains who served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as the fighting went, reflected as much honor on the defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who conquered them. Many a much-vaunted victory, both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans. And it must always be remembered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation by whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a nation that our ships were better made and better armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was creditable to them that a few years before their vessels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch ships. 241 It was greatly to our credit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry deserves the highest praise. 242

Before leaving the subject it is worth while making a few observations on the men who composed the crews. James, who despised a Canadian as much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers to be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit the battle to be fought purely by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of the regular army, and Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had a few Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A great many men in each fleet were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these were the especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be doubted if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, used to contests with Indians and whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, and skilful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by good men and on their own waters, the very best possible material. Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by British.

The difference between the American and British seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the lakes what little there was disappeared. A New Englander and an Old Englander differed little enough, but they differed more than a frontiersman born north of the line did from one born south of it. These last two resembled one another more nearly than either did the parent. There had been no long-established naval school on the lakes, and the British sailors that came up there were the best of their kind; so the combatants were really so evenly matched in courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities, as to make it impossible to award the palm to either for these attributes. The dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out expeditions were planned and executed, were as marked on one side as the other. The only un-English element in the contest was the presence among the Canadian English of some of the descendants of the Latin race from whom they had conquered the country. Otherwise the men were equally matched, but the Americans owed their success—for the balance of success was largely on their side—to the fact that their officers had been trained in the best and most practical, although the smallest, navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good as our own, but no better. None of their commanders compare with Macdonough.

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which have given that admiral such renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and Algerian forts is his true title to fame. In his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place on Feb. 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns, 243 and yet with it he captured the Prosperous of 54; which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch fleet. The fact that Blake's battles were generally so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, though inferior in force, superior in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted on the Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale; but whereas Perry left no antagonists to question his claim to victory, Blake's successes were sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almost every instance claiming that they had won, or else that it was a draw. Of course it is absurd to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's flotilla; but the way in which the work was done was very similar. And it must always be remembered that when Perry fought this battle he was but 27 years old; and the commanders of his other vessels were younger still.

CHAMPLAIN.

The commander on this lake at this time was Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had superseded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney Smith,—whose name was a curious commentary on the close inter-relationship of the two contesting peoples. The American naval force now consisted of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each mounting 11 guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun each. Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his two sloops to harass the British gun-boats, which were stationed round the head of Sorel River, the outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he chased three gun-boats into the river, the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort of Isle-aux-noix. A strong British land-force, under Major-General Taylor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream, and joined the three gun-boats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried to beat up the stream, but the current was so strong and the wind so light that no headway could be made. The gun-boats kept out of range of the sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from their long 24's, to which no reply could be made; but the galling fire of the infantry who lined the banks was responded to by showers of grape. After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound shot from one of the galleys struck the Eagle under her starboard quarter, and ripped out a whole plank under water. She sank at once, but it was in such shoal water that she did not settle entirely, and none of the men were drowned. Soon afterward the Growler had her forestay and main-boom shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was also captured. The Growler had 1 killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle 11 wounded; their united crews, including 34 volunteers, amounted to 112 men. The British gun-boats suffered no loss; of the troops on shore three were wounded, one dangerously, by grape. 244 Lieutenant Smith had certainly made a very plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get cooped up in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead against him. It was a very creditable success to the British, and showed the effectiveness of well-handled gun-boats under certain circumstances. The possession of these two sloops gave the command of the lake to the British. Macdonough at once set about building others, but with all his energy the materials at hand were so deficient that he could not get them finished in time. On July 31st, 1,000 British troops, under Col. J. Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler and Eagle) and three gunboats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the barracks and stores both there and at Saranac. For some reason Colonel Murray left so precipitately that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men, who were captured; then he made descents on two or three other places, and returned to the head of the lake by Aug. 3d. Three days afterward, on Aug. 6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the President, Montgomery, and Preble, of 7 guns each, and also six gunboats; which force enabled him to prevent any more plundering expeditions taking place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops when they made an abortive effort to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River on Sept. 21st.

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