Читать книгу Maverick Africans - Hermann Giliomee - Страница 7

The emotional debate about South Africa’s past of colonialism and apartheid draws heavily on the assumption that our history differs little from that of other Western colonies. Where, similarly to South Africa, the land was forcibly taken from an indigenous population that was decimated or completely marginalised. Any comparative study of colonialism would, however, reveal features that have made South Africa exceptional.1

South Africa’s uniqueness starts with the position of women of European descent, which is discussed in chapter 1. It is a topic that has received scant attention in the historiography despite its fundamental importance. In most other halfway or refreshment stations, like the Dutch trading posts in the Far East, European men cohabited with or married slave women or women from the indigenous population. As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention and the father of the Eurasian. This was the pattern at the Cape in the first four or five decades after the establishment of a settlement in 1652.

But in the ranks of the parties of French Huguenots who arrived in the late 1680s were many fecund girls. Increasingly a pattern of racial endogamy developed at the Cape among the burghers. Under Roman-Dutch law women enjoyed an exceptional position. The universal community of property was the basis of matrimonial property rights, with each party’s portion merging into the common property. A surviving partner inherited half the estate and each child regardless of sex inherited an equal portion of the rest. Further strengthening the position of women was the fact that the Dutch Reformed Church allowed divorce, including on grounds of adultery.

It was not the Calvinist conception of an exclusive calling that was decisive in shaping the racial character of the Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape but rather the determination of European women to live as Europeans and as Christians in a slave society. A case study of the Stellenbosch district in the eighteenth century shows that women became confirmed members of the church in great numbers well before the men. They would insist that a suitor of any of their daughters become a member of the church too. As a church of slave owners, the DRC made no special effort to challenge slavery or to promote racial equality within its congregations.

The relatively strong position of women had profound consequences. It was one of the major reasons for the development of an endogamous white community, for the decision of many frontier farmers to leave the colony on what came to be called the Great Trek, and for the heroic struggle of the bittereinders during the Anglo-Boer War. In the 1890s the novelist Olive Schreiner painted a remarkable picture of the ‘Boer woman’. She noted that the Boer woman on the farm had already attained what the ‘women’s movement’ in Britain was then striving towards, namely to stand beside her man as his full co-labourer, and hence as his equal. Referring to Roman-Dutch law, she stated: ‘The fiction of common possession of all material goods … is not a fiction but a reality among the Boers, and justly so, seeing that the female as often as the male contributes to the original household stock.’2

Schreiner argued that the Boer woman had no intention of becoming a ‘drone of society’ like upper-class women in Europe, leading a parasitic life in which she was ‘fed, clothed and sustained by the labours of others for the mere performance of her animal sex function’, while employing other women to raise her children. There was no mental chasm between the Boer woman and her male comrade, Schreiner concluded; she instead enjoyed a position of ‘intellectual equality with her male companion, a condition which seems to constitute the highest ideal in the human sexual world’.3

Chapter 2 deals with the different frontiers opened up by the Afrikaner trekboers and the Voortrekkers. In these frontier zones a new society was formed from a combination of the indigenous population, European settlers and slaves from both Asia and other parts of Africa. The history of the frontier was marked not only by dispossession and discrimination but also by economic growth and social development. The trekboers and the trekkers kept cattle just as the Khoikhoi and Bantu-speaking Africans did. Because their economies were compatible, the different communities did not try to wipe each other out but sought to find ways in which they could coexist. Unlike other colonies settled by Europeans, the indigenous population here was not decimated but instead grew strongly.

A quick look at the populations of Australia and the United States demonstrates the different patterns of development. In Australia the aboriginal population today is about half a million strong and forms just under three per cent of the population. In the US there were by 1890 about 248 000 Native Americans (0,4 per cent of the total population). By 2010 they formed just under one per cent of a total of 309 million people.

By contrast, in 1910 Africans in South Africa numbered just over 4 million and formed about two-thirds of the total population of 6 million, while there were 1,2 million whites, representing about one-fifth of the country’s population. The African population would grow to 12,6 million by 1951 and to 45 million by 2018, when they formed nearly four-fifths of the country’s population.

Decimation of the indigenous population, as happened in countries like Australia and the US, only occurred in South Africa in the north-eastern divisions of the Cape Colony at the end of the eighteenth century. Here a relentless battle was waged between burghers (later called Afrikaners) and Bushmen (later called San). Records show that burgher commandos killed 2 480 Bushmen and indentured 654 of them, while Bushmen captured 19 161 cattle and 84 094 sheep from the colonists and killed 276 of their herdsmen. In the final years of the century the Sneeuwberg was considered to be in a state of perpetual warfare.

A remarkable figure now appeared among the frontier burghers. He was Field-Commandant J.P. van der Walt, who in 1793 settled in a division largely abandoned after Bushman attacks. He received a free hand from the government ‘to eradicate and extirpate the robbers’.4 Initially, he did not question commandos shooting as many Bushmen as possible and forcing their women and children to return with the colonists to work on their farms.

Five years later, however, Van der Walt changed his views. The commandos had been unable to prevent the Bushmen from staging attacks along a broad swathe of country, as a result of which many burghers abandoned their farms. Van der Walt now asked the landdrost to refuse permission for commandos to attack the Bushmen and capture their children since ‘the burghers would also give their all if they were robbed of their children’.5 Under Van der Walt’s leadership the burghers in his division donated 283 sheep and supplies of tobacco and beads to the local Bushman clans to induce them to live peacefully on land of their own. The veldwachtmeesters of Mid-Roggeveld and Hantam also collected sheep and other gifts to hand over to the raiders to persuade them to stop stealing. In 1809 a British officer, Colonel Richard Collins, noted how pleasing it was ‘to observe the anxiety evinced by the farmers of the north-eastern districts to preserve peace with that people [the Bushmen] rather by conciliation than by terror’.6 During the 1820s the landdrost Andries Stockenström and the missionary James Clarke expressed similar sentiments.7

On the eastern frontier government attempts at enforcing territorial separation between the colonists and Xhosa were undermined because so many farmers insisted on retaining the services of their Xhosa herdsmen and on trading with the Xhosa beyond the colonial boundary.

In the meantime, a community of wine and wheat farmers had begun to prosper in the western Cape. While the economy of Cape Town was based on trade, that of the rural Cape, west and south of the first mountain ranges, was based mainly on wine and wheat production on land given out as freehold farms. Production expanded steadily: between 1720 and 1790 the number of vines increased more than fourfold, the wheat crop trebled, and the average net value of cultivators’ estates grew nearly threefold. Historians have used the term ‘gentry’ to describe the stratum of wealthy plantation owners and reasonably well-off farmers that emerged in the western Cape so as to distinguish them from the great majority of hard-working yeoman farmers in the rest of the colony.

Chapter 3 discusses the development of a white community in South Africa which from the early nineteenth century increasingly called themselves Afrikaners. Among them were the western Cape gentry, who by second half of the eighteenth century had amassed sufficient wealth to engage in conspicuous consumption. Large houses built in the ‘Cape Dutch’ style were a splendid example of this. By the 1780s visitors began to comment on signs of affluence and prosperity on several farms in the south-western Cape. Houses were filled with elegant furniture and the tables were decked with silverware and served by tidily clothed slaves.

In this respect the history of South Africa was not fundamentally dissimilar to that of the American colonies founded at roughly the same time. But the Cape was different in that it was ruled by a commercial company which looked at everything from the perspective of its own interests. Even when the burghers were consulted, the Company considered its own interests as of paramount importance. In the eighteenth century, however, the burghers rejected the Company’s plan to replace the importation of slaves with subsidised white immigration from Europe. They wanted to have as much land as possible available for their children so that they could also engage in extensive farming.

In the society that developed at the Cape, members of the gentry preferred to intermarry, but the shortage of European women made this impossible, so instead they married across class lines. Burghers of all classes attended the four churches in the rural western Cape (Stellenbosch, Paarl, Roodezand and Swart­land). Both wealthy and poor burghers participated in the same militia exercises and rode out on commando together. So, too, the extension of credit helped to tie the burghers to one another. In the absence of banks, the gentry granted credit on an extensive scale to the middling and poor burghers.8

The other part of the community was commonly known as ‘Boers’ but some observers also called them Afrikaners. They lived in the interior beyond the first mountain ranges, where a form of community developed in the course of the eighteenth century that was quite different from that in the south-western Cape. C.W. de Kiewiet, a truly exceptional historian, describes the origin of the trekboers of the interior well: ‘In the long quietude of the eighteenth century the Boer race was born.’

Unlike the Dutch- or Afrikaans-speaking white community of the south-western Cape, ‘they had left the current of European life and lost the economic habits of the nations from which they had sprung … They had the nomad’s appetite for space and possessed the hardness and courage of men of the saddle who watched their flocks and hunted their meat … Their life gave them a tenacity of purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the keenest self-respect.’ But their tenacity could develop into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, and their self-respect into suspicion of foreigners and contempt for their inferiors.9

By the mid-1830s the Afrikaner farmers of the eastern frontier had come to realise that on their own they would not be able to defeat and push back the Xhosa. Only the British army was capable of defeating and subjugating the Xhosa chiefdoms. In what became known as the Great Trek, the Afrikaner farmers of the eastern frontier pulled up their roots and outflanked the Xhosa, moving into the thinly populated central interior of South Africa. They settled in areas that would become known as the Free State and Transvaal. The model of land settlement adopted here was the loan farm system of the Cape Colony of the eighteenth century. This did not embrace the English system of exclusive, private property rights but rather encouraged a farmer to attract white and black employees to help him look after his cattle and defend his farm.

As a result of a decision by the British government to retreat from direct control of the interior beyond the Cape borders, two republics were established here: the South African Republic, or Transvaal (1852), and the Republic of the Orange Free State (1854). The two republics experienced different paths of development. In the so-called British Sovereignty, which existed between 1848 and 1854 prior to the establishment of the Free State, British farmers who moved there tended to appeal to the British imperial state to back up their land claims, provide roads, create markets, and subordinate the local Africans. On the other hand, many Afrikaners in the territory attached no priority to creating a state, much less a British colonial state. Nor did they want a firm border separating white-occupied territory from black-occupied or a severing of contact with or expulsion of the Sotho; some indeed made their living by exchanging Sotho wheat for lead and gunpowder. They did not mind asking the Sotho leader Moshoeshoe for papers ratifying their land claims.

In his book Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order, Tim Keegan notes that Richard Southey, the highest British official in the territory, admitted that burghers in the contested area along the Caledon River in the east preferred the rule of the Sotho chief Moshoeshoe to that of the British government. Southey’s appeals to the burghers ‘to put down the common enemy of the white man’ went unheeded. Josias Hoffman, who would become the first Free State president, objected to a plan to expel some 3 000 Sotho from the Caledon River Valley. ‘The natives will not consent to remove and will revenge such unjust treatment,’ he wrote and added: ‘If Southey thinks that he can bind the Boers to the British government by giving them all the land, he is mistaken and knows neither the Boers nor the natives.’10

Within three decades of its establishment in 1854, the Republic of the Orange Free State achieved a remarkable degree of stability. This can be attributed to its agrarian character, its relatively homogeneous electorate, and the absence of large concentrations of wealth. English-speakers and the few Germans who dominated commercial and professional life in the towns had a leavening effect. There was no xenophobia, and even in the 1890s the state welcomed foreign settlers. The Free State combined republicanism with an inclusive sense of nationhood, similar to that espoused by the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape. It was, as Lord Bryce, the British constitutional expert, remarked, in many ways ‘an ideal commonwealth’.11

But at the same time it was not a modern, liberal order. There were no political parties and only whites could vote. As the great liberal historian Leonard Thompson once commented, if the Free State had not been dragged into the war between the Transvaal and Britain in 1899, racial exclusion might well have been phased out in the Free State. In his testimony before the South African Native Affairs Commission (1903–5) C.H. Wessels, who had served as chairman of the Free State Volksraad, advocated extending the vote to intelligent coloured people and to black property-owners.12

Unlike the Free State, the republic between the Vaal and Limpopo was for all practical purposes a failed state until Paul Kruger became president. Leading by personal courage, strong conviction and passionate oratory, Kruger spread the message that without republican independence the Transvaal Afrikaners could not survive as a people with their own language, beliefs and livelihood. But Transvaal leaders prized the Republic’s control over its own destiny much more than pan-Afrikaner unity. One progressive opponent of Kruger, Schalk Burger, chairman of the first Volksraad, declared that ‘the word Africander should be interpreted as Transvaler. Everyone from beyond the borders of the Republic must be viewed as a stranger, no matter if he came from the Free State, the colony, England, or Holland.’13

Few would have predicted at the time of Union in 1910 that the colonial Afrikaners of the Cape and ex-republican Afrikaners would come together in a formidable nationalist movement that dominated South African politics until 1994. It was not Calvinism or racism that was decisive in the formation of Afrikaner nationalism but the Westminster-style electoral system, which favoured the largest ethnic group in the electorate.

Chapter 3 analyses the earliest manifestations of nationalism among the Afrikaner. The literature on this topic was long dominated by F.A. van Jaarsveld, who in his book The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism (1961) argued that its first manifestation was the revolt of the burghers of Transvaal against British annexation in 1880–1 and the expressions of solidarity by Afrikaners in the Orange Free State and Cape Colony. But this response was short-lived. No structures of co-operation were put in place and, after the discovery of gold on the Witwaters­rand in the mid-1880s, economic competition between the Transvaal and the Cape eroded the feelings of solidarity among Afrikaners across South Africa.

Chapter 3 argues that it was the establishment of Afrikaner financial institutions in the western Cape, in particular the Stellenbosch District Bank, that provided the spur for the earliest manifestations of Afrikaner nationalism. It is significant that the decision to establish Nasionale Pers took place in the home of the manager of the District Bank. Nasionale Pers (now Naspers) has been publishing De Burger (later Die Burger) since 1915. Almost exactly a century later it was the biggest company in Africa measured in terms of market capitalisation.

During the twentieth century the mines and industries replaced agriculture as the dominant sectors of the economy. While other colonies also had rich mineral resources, there was nothing that could be compared to the vast mineral wealth of the Witwatersrand. The discovery of gold transformed South Africa. But much of South Africa’s gold ore is low-grade. Because it was sold at a low, fixed price it could only be mined by very cheap labour. Furthermore, low-grade land, together with poor and uncertain rainfall, was responsible for many of the problems in agriculture.

Despite the deposits of gold, South Africa’s economic development remained stagnant until the early 1930s. In 1931 Jan Hofmeyr, who would soon become minister of finance, wrote that it was an illusion to believe that South Africa was a rich country with vast mineral resources and boundless agricultural possibilities. The gold mines, the only reliable source of foreign exchange, were a wasting asset, the manufacturing sector was sluggish, and agriculture was ‘no easy oyster for man’s opening’. The country was in a race against time to provide food and work for a rapidly growing population.

Hofmeyr warned that the future of ‘white civilisation’ was at risk if the country failed to develop a modern manufacturing sector speedily. He concluded that ‘from the shadow that these things bring … South Africa in our day does not find it easy to escape’.14 In a despairing mood Jan Smuts, leader of the South African Party, wrote: ‘There has never been such a test to our economic civilization, and it is still a question whether we can pull through without serious challenge to our spiritual heritage.’15 But a sudden jump in the gold price would put South Africa on a quite different level of growth and development.

It was at this point, in the year 1929 to be precise, that the word ‘apartheid’ appeared in print for the first time. This occurred in a pamphlet reporting on a conference held in Kroonstad to discuss ways in which the Dutch Reformed Church could intensify its efforts to promote Christianity among Africans. The DRC’s dilemma was that it was then lagging far behind other churches in this field. DRC leaders were keen to expand the church’s work among Africans but they also knew that a steady flow of African members into existing congregations would cause major tensions. The church tried to deal with this by accepting what Richard Elphick calls ‘the equality of believers’ while rejecting the equality of all individuals regardless of colour in secular life.

As chapter 4 explains, it was in fact a decision by the DRC in 1857 condoning segregated worship that set the Afrikaner churches and the Afrikaner community on this road. Hence in explaining how apartheid became part of the South African political system, we need to consider not so much what the National Party did to the Afrikaner churches but what these churches did to the NP. Chapter 4 considers the ecclesiastical origins of apartheid policy in detail.