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With the end of the siege of Tournai both armies were free, the one for unfettered assault, the other to defend itself behind the lines as best it might.

To make a frontal attack upon Villars’ lines at any point was justly thought impossible after the past experience which Eugene and Marlborough had of their strength. A different plan was determined on. Mons, with its little garrison, should be invested, and the mass of the army should, on that extreme right of the French position, attempt to break through the old lines of the Trouille and invade France.

Coincidently with the first negotiations for the capitulation of the citadel of Tournai, this new plan was entered upon. Lord Orkney, with the grenadiers of the army and between 2000 and 3000 mounted men, was sent off on the march to the south-east just as the first negotiations of Marlborough with Surville were opened. With this mobile force Orkney attempted to pass the Haine at St. Ghislain. He all but surprised that point at one o’clock of the dark September night, but the French posts were just in time. He was beaten off, and had to cross the river higher up upon the eastern side of Mons, at Havre.

The little check was not without its importance. It meant that the rapid forward march of his vanguard had failed to force that extreme extension of the French line, which was called “The Line of the Trouille” from the name of the small river that falls into the Haine near Mons. In point of time—which is everything in defensive warfare—the success of the defence at St. Ghislain meant that all action by the allies was retarded for pretty well a week. Meanwhile, the weather had turned to persistent and harassing rain, the allied army, “toiling through a sea of mud,”6 had not invested Mons even upon the eastern side until the evening of the 7th of September. On the same day Villars took advantage of a natural feature, stronger for purposes of defence than the line of the Trouille. This feature was the belt of forest-land which lies south and a little west of Mons, between that town and Bavai. He strengthened such forces as he had on the line of the Trouille (the little posts which had checked the first advance upon Mons, as I have said), concentrated the whole army just behind and west of the forest barrier, and watching the two gaps of that barrier, whose importance will be explained in a moment, he lay, upon the morning of Sunday, September the 8th, in a line which stretched from the river Haine at Montreuil to the bridge of Athis behind the woods; keeping watch upon his right in case he should have to move the line down south suddenly to meet an attack. As Villars so lay, he was in the position of a man who may be attacked through one of two doors in a wall. Such a man would stand between the two doors, watching both, and ready to spring upon that one which might be attacked, and attempt to defend it. The wall was the wall of wood, the two doors were the opening by Boussu and the other narrow opening which is distinguished by the name of Aulnois, the principal village at its mouth. It was this last which was to prove in the event the battlefield.

All this I must make plainer and elaborate in what follows, and close this section by a mere statement of the manœuvring for position.

Sketch Map showing the Lines of Woods behind Mons,

with the two gaps of Boussu and Aulnois.

Villars lying, as I have said, with his right at Athis, his left on the river Haine at Montreuil, Marlborough countered him by bringing the main of his forces over the Trouille7 so that they lay from Quevy to Quaregnon.

Eugene brought up his half, and drew it up as an extension of the Duke of Marlborough’s line, and by the evening of the Sunday and on the morning of the Monday, all the troops who were at Tournai having been meanwhile called up, the allied army lay opposite the second or southern of the two openings in the forest wall. Villars during the Sunday shifted somewhat to the left or the south in the course of the day to face the new position of his enemy. It was evident upon that Monday morning the 9th of September that the action, when it was forced, would be in the second and southernmost of the two gaps. On that same Monday morning Villars brought the whole of his army still further south and was now right in front of the allies and barring the gap of Aulnois. By ten o’clock the centre of the French forces was drawn up in front of the hamlet of Malplaquet, by noon it had marched forward not quite a mile, stretched from wood to wood, and awaited the onslaught. A few ineffective cannon-shots were exchanged, but the expected attack was not delivered. Vastly to the advantage of the French and to the inexplicable prejudice of the allies Marlborough and Eugene wasted all that Monday and all the Tuesday following: the result we shall see when we come to the battle, for Villars used every moment of his respite to entrench and fortify without ceasing.

With the drawing up of the French army across the gap, however, ends the manœuvring for position, and under the title of “The Preliminaries of the Battle” I will next describe the arrival of Boufflers—a moral advantage not to be despised—the terrain, the French defences, and the full effect of the unexpected delay upon the part of the allies.