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Overview: This dialogue is one of the most difficult of all Plato’s body of work to understand. It has confused and confounded philosophy pundits for centuries. Perhaps the concepts behind it are no longer an active part of the human experience. Even Aristotle, Plato’s most famous pupil, refuted Plato’s Theory of Forms.

The dialogue, Parmenides, is presented as an account of a meeting thrice removed. The initial meeting takes place at Pythodorous’ house. Here, Zeno reads his new book on Unity and Plurality in the presence of Parmenides, Socrates and a young man named Aristotle, who is not the philosopher we know. Rather, he is the one who later in life became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after the Peloponnesian Wars. The venerable Parmenides is sixty-five years old and Zeno, his protege, is forty years old; both are from the city of Elea. Socrates is twenty and Aristotle is younger still. The book under discussion, the “Theories of Unity and Plurality” is now lost to us. The discussion was memorized by Pythodorous, who then recited it to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato. In turn, Antiphon has memorized it and then recites it to Cephalus for the present dialogue.

In this dialogue, Parmenides rather than the usual Socrates, who is described as young and not mature enough, is Plato’s spokesman. Here, Plato describes his Theory of Forms. Zeno has argued that, if there are many things, then all of them will be both alike (similar) and unalike (different), but such a condition is an impossible contradiction. This uncertainty disappears if one separates, on the one hand the Form of sensible things, from, on the other hand, both the Forms of alike and unalike things. So the same things can be both alike and unalike by being both in the Forms of alikeness and unalikeness. Here is a brief description of Forms: A chair is a Form but there are wooden chairs, leather chairs, metal chairs, four-legged chairs, and three-legged chairs. In one sense these types of chairs are all unalike, while in a contrary sense they still are alike, as they all are chairs, objects used to sit upon. Parmenides points out that Socrates has made the distinction between Forms and Sensibles. Socrates says that he can recognize mathematical, ethical, and aesthetic Forms such as Unity, Plurality, Goodness, and Beauty. However he is unsure about the Forms of Man, Fire and Water and those of objects such as hair, mud and dirt. Socrates is brushed aside by Parmenides as being too immature to understand.

The discussion continues with several arguments put forward with regards to the concept of Forms in Unity and in Plurality. For example, existence in a single Form for, Largeness or Smallness. Such categories suggest that each Form is a thought existing in a soul. If this placement is correct, then a thought must be considered as something that is a Form. The argument changes as Forms are taken to be patterns in nature. Later, Parmenides says that Forms exist only in their relationship to each other. Socrates is unable to follow all these arguments, but Parmenides brushes him aside and blames his lack of understanding on his immaturity.

The second part of the dialogue presents Aristotle as Parmenides’ interlocutor. The two of them consider the subject, “if oneness is.” If one has no beginning, center, or end, then oneness is part of all being and vice-versa. Now, if oneness is not a separate entity then it participates in everything different from an entity. So everything is partially one.

Scholars over the years have been unable to satisfactorily characterize this dialogue. No credible understanding is available, though the topic of Forms as the theory of Unity was very dear to Plato.

Cephalus arrives in Athens from his home in Clazomanae, and meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus asks Cephalus if there is any thing he can do for him. Cephalus answers that the real reason he made the trip was to ask for a favor from him. They talk about Antiphon, who had met a friend of Zeno’s called Pythodorous. Pythodorous can recite from memory the discussion Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle once had, as he had heard it many times from Pythodorous and now Antiphon can also recite it from memory. Cephalus says that he would like to hear about that discussion. Adeimantus replies that this request should not be difficult to fulfill, and they all walk to nearby Antiphon’s house. After some initial hesitation Antiphon agrees to the request.

Antiphon tells them that at the time of the discussion, Parmenides was about sixty-five years old, Zeno was about forty, and Socrates was twenty. All three gathered to hear about Zeno’s book, The Theories of Unity and Plurality. They also had the namesake of Aristotle in their company, the youngest of them all; the man, who later in life, after Athens lost the war with Sparta, became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens. Parmenides was initially outside the room when Zeno started to read his book out loud but joined them later. After Zeno finished reading his book, Socrates asked him to repeat his first argument. Then he asked Zeno what he means when he says that things that are many must be both alike and unalike. Socrates states that such a classification is impossible because things that are unalike cannot be things that are like each other, nor can things that are alike be unalike. Socrates asks Zeno whether he had misunderstood his statements. Parmenides intervenes, observing that actually Zeno is saying the same thing that Socrates had previously said, only changing it around a little. Parmenides adds that Socrates, had said before, that all is one, and he gives an excellent proof for that proposition. Zeno says that this proof is not sufficient and gives several proofs of his own. Hence, Parmenides argues that with one thing being “oneness” and the other “not many,” they both in essence mean the same thing. Socrates then asks if there is a Form that is itself-byitself. A thing is itself-by-itself if it is separate from other things. If that is the case, then itself, means apart and on its own. In another sense itself-by-itself also means responsible for its own being, independent of other things. Thus, itself means because of itself and that there is one Form, itself-by-itself of likeness, with an opposite Form for what unalike is. Therefore, of the things called many they get a share of both alikeness and unalikeness. Socrates adds that it would not be astonishing if he says he is both one thing and many things at the same time: When I want to show that I am many, I point out that my right side is different from my left side and that I have upper and lower parts. On the other hand, when I want to show that I am one, I note that I am one of the seven of us now present in this room. This analysis shows that I am both one and many. Hence, both of you apparently mean practically the same thing, but it appears that what you have said is not understood by some of us.

Zeno claims that the book is in defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who make fun of it, as many absurdities result from the argument “if it is one”. Socrates tells Zeno that he accepts this point, but then asks if there is a Form itself-by-itself of alikeness, a Form that is apart on its own. Also another Form opposite to this, which is what unalike is. He further asks how what is called “many” can get a share of these entities. When Socrates finishes his question, Parmenides praises him for his understanding. Parmenides also distinguishes certain Forms being separate, which also separate the things that partake of them with alikeness itself being something separate. Parmenides asks him if there is a Form, itself-by-itself, of the Just, the Beautiful, the Good and other such things. Socrates replies in the affirmative. Then Parmenides asks about human beings and whether there is a separate Form for them or for all those others similar to them? He extends this question and asks whether there is a Form itself of Human Being, or of Fire, or of Water? Socrates replies that he doubts that such a Form exists or that he would talk about Form in this context in the same way.

Parmenides further asks about things that at first may seem absurd, such as hair, mud, or dust. Does Socrates doubt whether there are separate Forms for each of these? Socrates replies that he has no such doubts. He adds that these Forms are just as we see them, if it is not so, he avers that he might fall into a pit of nonsense. Parmenides responds that this interpretation is correct, but, because Socrates is still young, he will take notice of it when he is older and will consider nothing beneath his notice. Parmenides then asks Socrates whether he still believes that there are certain Forms that derive their names from having a share of alikeness, for example the Form of the Large by getting a share of Largeness, and the Beautiful Form by getting a share of Beauty? To this question Socrates replies in the affirmative. Parmenides adds that all characteristics are what they are in relation to the controlled and have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. It is by people partaking of these that they get their various names.

All those present are confounded by this discussion and ask Parmenides to go through the whole of his argument again, so as to explain his theories. After much hesitation Parmenides eventually agrees to do so. The group selects the youngest amongst them, Aristotle, to be his interlocutor.

Parmenides starts by declaring that, if an object is one, then one can not be many. Aristotle agrees with this hypothesis. Parmenides continues, saying that, if this is so, then there cannot be a part of the object nor can the object be whole, a conclusion that Aristotle questions. Parmenides then poses the query, if a part is a part of the whole, then what is a whole? He answers his own question. It would be something from which no part is missing. Therefore, in any case, the one thing would be composed of parts, both if it is whole and/or if it is composed of parts. Aristotle agrees with this definition. Parmenides then says that in both cases the one would be many rather than one. Aristotle also agrees with this definition. Parmenides adds that nonetheless, it must not be many but one. Therefore if one is to be one, then it can be neither whole nor have parts. If it does not have parts, then it cannot either have a beginning nor an end nor a middle, as these would be parts. Furthermore, a beginning and an end are limits, so as it can have neither, such an object would be unlimited. Therefore, it would be without shape, as it is neither round nor straight. This then also means that it would be nowhere.

In a similar manner Parmenides continues this line of argument over the supposition “if oneness is” for a considerable time. Parmenides attempts to sum up the argument by saying that “if oneness does not exist,” then things other than the one do exist. Others things will not be one and surely they will not be many unalike, since oneness would be present in things that are many. If none of these is one, he continues, they are all nothing, so they also cannot be many. If oneness is not present in others, they are neither many nor one. Neither are they one of many. They do not belong to any Form as they have no parts. So if oneness does not exist, none of the alike can be one or many, since without oneness it is impossible to conceive of many. Therefore, if oneness is not, otherness neither is, nor is conceived to be one or many. Hence they are neither alike nor unalike. To sum up, “if one does not exist, then nothing does.”