Читать книгу Deliberative Democracy - Ian O'Flynn - Страница 11

While there is no single, universally agreed definition of ‘deliberative democracy’, the elements Cohen highlights in his essay have, since its publication, remained central to the definitional question in deliberative theory. As such, his definition provides a set of essential reference points for anyone interested in the development of the theory of deliberative democracy.

Cohen begins by telling us that, roughly, a deliberative democracy is ‘an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members’ (1989, 21). That definition is clearly circular, since it defines deliberative democracy in terms of the deliberation of its members. To a person who does not already know what ‘deliberative democracy’ is, the definition says nothing. However, he soon tells us that the ‘notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens’. Moreover, citizens in such an order ‘share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation’ (1989, 21).

There are at least two important themes here, one of which we have already touched upon, the other of which we have not. The first theme concerns democratic justification, or what we referred to earlier as democratic legitimacy. In a deliberative conception of democracy, a decision is legitimate if it is reached through a process of public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. The second theme concerns the vital role of institutions in the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Cohen is clear throughout his essay that meaningful, sustained deliberation about important matters of law and public policy, including fundamental constitutional matters, is unlikely to occur without the right institutional support. Both themes have preoccupied deliberative theorists ever since, and we will return to them frequently throughout this book.

In order to flesh out his account of this ‘intuitive ideal’, Cohen proceeds in two steps. First, he offers us a detailed definition of what he understands deliberative democracy to be – a definition that he refers to as the ‘formal conception’ (1989, 21). Second, he describes an ‘ideal deliberative procedure’ that is intended to give us some sense of how the formal conception might operate in practice. Essentially, the ideal deliberative procedure is a list of conditions that deliberative institutions should aim to satisfy, so far as possible (1989, 22–3). Since the ideas and concepts contained in these two steps remain central to discussions about the nature of deliberative democracy, they are worth setting down exactly as Cohen himself presents them (1989, 21).

The formal conception, then, has five main features:

 D1 A deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, whose members expect it to continue into the indefinite future.

 D2 The members of the association share … the view that the appropriate terms of association provide a framework for or are the results of their deliberation. They share, that is, a commitment to coordinating their activities within institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that they arrive at through their deliberation. For them, free deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy.

 D3 A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members have diverse preferences, convictions and ideals concerning the conduct of their own lives. While sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice (D2), they also have divergent aims, and do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions or ideals is mandatory.

 D4 Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative procedures as the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that the terms of their association not merely be the results of their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such. They prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and outcomes are evident to ones in which the connections are less clear.

 D5 The members recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, i.e. the capacities required for entering into a public exchange of reasons and for acting on the result of such public reasoning.

On the formal conception, then, ‘free deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy’. However, free deliberation among equals itself requires appropriately ordered institutions. Why is that? Partly the answer is that those who are committed to deliberative democracy will want to see that commitment embodied in the rules and procedures by which political questions are decided (D2 and D4). But partly the answer is that deliberative democracy is meant to persist over time (D1). To persist over time, there must be settled rules governing how competing views (D3) are assessed, and those rules must be both widely known and broadly acceptable to its members (D5). But which rules exactly? The ‘ideal deliberative procedure’ seeks to answer this question. It does not offer a full-blown institutional account (as we will see in Chapter 2, others have had far more to say on this issue), but it does identify in broad terms the conditions that any such account would need to satisfy. These conditions are as follows (Cohen 1989, 22–3):

 I1 Ideal deliberation is free in that it satisfies two conditions. First, the participants regard themselves as bound only by the results of their deliberation and by the preconditions for that deliberation. Their consideration of proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements. Second, the participants suppose that … the fact that a certain decision is arrived at through their deliberation [is] a sufficient reason for complying with it.

 I2 Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties to it are required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them or criticizing them. They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal. … The deliberative conception emphasizes that collective choices should be made in a deliberative way, and not only that those choices should have a desirable fit with the preferences of citizens.

 I3 In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively equal. … Everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process. Each can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals. And each has an equal voice in the decision. The participants are substantively equal in that the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation …

 I4 Finally, ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals. Even under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule. The fact that it may so conclude does not, however, eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice and forms that aggregate non-deliberative preferences. … [T]he results of voting among those who are committed to finding reasons that are persuasive to all are likely to differ from the results of an aggregation that proceeds in the absence of this commitment.

To all of this, Cohen adds a further important condition: institutions that seek to mirror the ideal deliberative procedure should encourage a focus on the common good. Of course, the idea of the common good – that is, a good that is common to an entire society rather than to some particular section of it – is contentious (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 68). For some, the idea is not just vague and imprecise, but is also open to political manipulation (see Dahl 1989, ch. 20). Yet for Cohen, the hallmark of a common good is its being ‘acceptable to all who share the commitment to deliberation’ (1989, 23). So long as our decision procedures are deliberative – so long as they conform to the ideal deliberative procedure – the decisions that result have a good claim to be in the common good (cf. O’Flynn 2010).

In summary, then, Cohen thinks that an ideal deliberative procedure would treat people as free and equal, oblige them to give reasons for their views, emphasise the importance of the common good, and facilitate consensus. As I indicated above, these four criteria have remained central to the definitional question in deliberative theory ever since. Deliberative theorists disagree about how they should be specified (they are, after all, highly abstract). But they also disagree about whether or to what degree each criterion is necessary or desirable. In a nutshell, contrasting definitions have contested these ideas. Of course, there have been some attempts to assess the field and settle the matter of definition (e.g., Curato et al. 2017). But since deliberative democracy is, in the first instance, a normative theory – a theory that is at bottom evaluative – the worry is that these attempts may be read as little more than an attempt to impose a singular view.

In the next chapter, we will examine these deliberative differences in more detail.