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Introduction

“On the Old Saw: That may be right in theory but it wont work in practice” was published in 1793 in the Berlinische Monatsschrift.¹ Because of the issues it deals with, its style, and its place of publication, the essay is regarded as one of Kant’s “popular works,” as distinguished from his technical works on epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. This distinction may suggest that the popular essays are only of historical interest, dealing with problems unique to the 18th Century. But if one considers the issues discussed—freedom of the press, the need for world government, the limits of political obedience—the essays are as relevant as today’s headlines. The distinction may also lead one to think that his technical works have little bearing on his views on popular issues, and that Kant’s discussion of general issues sheds no light on his philosophical position. A reading of “On the Old Saw” should correct this misunderstanding, for here Kant attempts to show how his moral and political theories provide useful principles for effecting political reform. In addition, his discussion of issues like the “right to revolution” helps clarify features of his moral theory and his general approach to philosophical problems.

Kant here discusses the relationship between theory and practice from the standpoints, first, of a person faced with making moral decisions; next, of the statesman who must govern and the citizen concerned about the limits of political obedience; and finally of the individual who desires to know how he ought to act to realize a world government. And he attempts to show that the only course open to rational men is to act on the basis of Kant’s moral and political principles that are valid both in theory and in practice.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

To understand Kant’s conception of the relationship between theory and practice, we must clarify his views on the function of philosophy. Kant does not believe that philosophy is a purely theoretical activity whose aim is an intellectual comprehension of reality. While admitting that man is a rational animal who seeks to understand the world, the motivation to understand is, for Kant, rooted in the fact that man has to act. Unlike the other animals who simply respond to their natural desires and follow their natural inclinations, men are conscious of their impulses and aware of their conflicting and changing desires and inclination. This awareness causes a man to ask which inclination he ought to act upon or which desire to pursue, or whether to act on his inclinations or desires at all. Men have to decide how they are going to live their lives; they must make hard choices between alternative courses of action which they believe are open to them. On what basis are they to make these decisions? What sorts of principles or guides to action should they use? As Kant sees it, philosophy is directly relevant to the way in which a man conducts his life, particularly in those situations where the will plays a determining role.

Men want to know what principles they ought to use in making decisions. They are asking for a theory to guide their action. A theory, according to Kant, is a set of principles which specifies procedures to follow to achieve certain ends. It is, in a significant sense, a guide to action. Practice is the accomplishment of an end which, Kant claims, “is thought to follow certain generally conceived principles of procedure.”² For Kant, practice is rational and purposeful action, involving an awareness of the end one wishes to achieve, and the realization that this end can be accomplished by means of some specified procedure.

One thing Kant attempts to show in all his writings is the role of theory in all distinctively human activities. To him, the role of theory is not only crucial in understanding moral and political behavior; it is also indispensable if we are to give an adequate account of our attempts to understand the world.

The natural sciences are those disciplines which provide insight into nature. The success of science is due largely to reliance on the experimental method, which involves the careful observation of nature. While Kant agrees that we must observe nature to gain understanding, observation alone, he insists, is not sufficient to gain understanding. For Kant, the significant discovery made by the proponents of the experimental method is not that we must observe nature to discover its laws; it is that observation is blind unless guided by theory. Accidental or random observations of nature never yield insight. Scientific observation is controlled and selective: it proceeds by means of carefully thought-out experiments designed in conformity with the principles of a theory. Theory tells one what to look for, and experiments are designed to yield observations which confirm a theory or require its modification or rejection. The relationship of the scientist to the natural order is not that of a ‘pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say”, but that of a “judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated.” ³

Although for Kant a crucial test of any theory is its capacity to guide action in fruitful ways, and, accordingly, any theory is, in an important sense, grounded in experience, it would be wrong to assume that Kant believed the basic principles underlying the scientific investigation of nature to be generalizations from experience. Kant agreed with the empiricists that experience is the proper starting point for the construction of meaningful theories. But he opposed their assumption that if you start from experience, you must interpret the principles by which we render experience intelligible as empirical generalizations which future experience may falsify. Kant has two reasons for rejecting this conception of the basic principles of explanation; first, that it fails to accord with the status we ascribe to them; second, that if we conceive the basic principles as generalizations which may be false, we question the reliability of both our scientific and our ordinary knowledge of the world, and the possibility of any investigation of nature. The sciences, Kant believed, do provide knowledge of the natural order, and he was convinced that there is something wrong with any philosophical position which denies this. To him, one important task of philosophy is to elucidate and justify those principles used by scientists and ordinary men to understand the world.

The belief that the principles we use to organize our experience are empirical generalizations rests, Kant believed, on the assumption that the real is identical with the observable, that the observable is identical with the phenomenal given, and that the phenomenal given is or reduces to the content of sense perception. These assumptions underlie an empiricism which explains knowledge, moral experience, and other forms of human behavior in terms of the phenomenal given.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to show the failure of empiricism to explain human knowledge. While the empiricist admits that we use certain principles to organize our experience, he holds that they are principles which future experience may falsify. He assumes that we can render experience intelligible without the use of these principles. Kant attempts to show that what the empiricist conceives as empirical generalizations are necessary conditions for the possibility of any kind of experience which we can render intelligible to ourselves. If Kant is correct, these principles cannot be falsified by future experience, for they must be presupposed as the conditions for having that experience. If we are to explain human knowledge, whether the kind with which science provides us or the basic perceptual knowledge which we all have of the world, then Kant insists we must grant the necessity of principles which cannot be understood as empirical generalizations.

Kant also claims that in scientific investigation and in our moral thinking we use certain high order theoretical notions which guide and direct our action. He uses the word “Ideas” for these notions, a word borrowed from Plato.⁴ Like Plato’s, Kant’s Ideas are notions for which experience cannot provide an instance. But unlike Plato, Kant ascribes no metaphysical reality to Ideas. He interprets them as conceptions of goals which direct action in systematic ways. The conception of nature as the product of design is an Idea. Although it is not something we can know, either through experience or by logical demonstration, it is conducive to scientific investigation to think of nature in this way, for it is to conceive the natural order as an intelligible system. It stimulates the scientist to seek out order, which leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown connections statable in mechanical terms.

Ideas play an important role in our moral thinking, but not in stimulating us to discover connections in the world. We possess, Kant claims, conceptions of moral goals which ought to be actualized. As such, they are ends which men are obliged to realize through their efforts. Just as knowledge is an achievement dependent on the labor of scientists, so the realization of moral goals depends on what men do. For example, Kant claims that we are obliged to create a just civil state, and, he maintains, we have an idea of the characteristics of this state which tell us what we must do to realize it. But, Kant insists, whether the Idea is actualized depends not on the power of the Idea but on the action of individual men.⁵

Although Kant insists on the importance of theory in decision making, theory, he is aware, is not enough. One cannot become a successful scientist by mastering the proper principles for investigating nature, nor a skillful statesman by having at one’s command sound political rules. Judgment is also required, which, for Kant, is the ability to determine “whether something … stand[s] under a given rule.” ⁶ While theory can be taught, judgment is a “natural gift,” ⁷ a peculiar talent which can be practiced only.⁸ Since there are no rules to guide or direct judgment, no theory can be developed to the point where decision making becomes a mechanical affair. While a theory provides principles which instruct us how to act in a given situation, there are no rules which tell us that a situation is an instance of a rule. Determining this requires judgment, and since judgment is an ability which all men do not have, progress in science and the realization of certain ideals depends as much on men of sound judgment as on sound theories.⁹

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN ETHICS

Just as Kant’s epistemological views are clarified by contrasting them with those of the empiricist, so is his moral theory. He believed that the empiricist bias as to what experience reveals makes it impossible for the empiricist to account adequately for our moral experience, and, accordingly, leads him to construct a false moral theory. The empiricist holds that to understand morality, we must begin with what experience tells us about human nature and the values men seek. If we are to construct a moral theory that is a reliable guide to action, then, the empiricist insists, it must be consistent with these facts.

According to the empiricist, what makes an action morally praiseworthy is that it promotes some value which men seek. Experience, he maintains, reveals that happiness is what all men consciously seek, and that men understand the relationship between happiness and those means most conducive to its achievement. Since the task of ethics is to determine what men ought to do, this determination is an empirical enterprise. The job of the moral philosopher is to tell men what they ought to do, which is to inform them of those actions causally instrumental in attaining happiness. Ethics reduces to a set of rules which prescribe those actions most likely to promote human happiness.

Although, for Kant, we must turn to experience to discover both what men desire and those actions most conducive to achieving it, experience, he insists, shows us not how men ought to act, but only how they ought to act if they want to achieve certain ends. While what the empiricist tells us is interesting, Kant insists that it has nothing to do with morality. Kant maintains that they have overlooked crucial features of our moral experience. One feature is what Kant calls the “fact of moral obligation.” Everyone, he insists, recognizes the clear difference between doing something because one wants to do it and doing it because he recognizes that he ought to do it. The experienced conflict between the two is just as much a fact about men as is the desire for happiness—and, Kant claims, it is a fact which the empiricist fails to explain. In addition, Kant insists that everyone acknowledges that the only actions deserving moral praise are those one performs because he recognizes that he ought to do them. That a person has performed what is considered a right action is not sufficient for saying that he acted morally. Something more is required, namely that he had the right reason for doing what he did. Kant claims that common sense reflection, when uncorrupted by the dialectics of philosophers, informs us that the feeling of moral obligation is distinct from the desire for happiness, and that the moral worth of a persons action is measured by his intention to do what he ought to do, and not by the supposed consequences of that action.¹⁰

The common man, Kant believed, knows what is right and what is wrong; he does not need the philosopher to tell him what he ought to do. Rather than providing us with moral rules, the moral philosopher is to explicate the principle or principles we use to determine how we ought to act, and to defend them against those who claim that morality reduces to a conflict between desires.¹¹ In addition, the moral philosopher must show that there are no sound arguments against the conditions for moral action. Given the relationship Kant believes holds between our common moral thinking, and the principles of his moral theory, it is hardly surprising that he is anxious to counter the charge that his theory will not work in practice.

In Part I of the essay Kant replies to the claim that there is a conflict between what his moral theory demands and what we can do in practice. The claim rests on three objections raised by Christian Garve.¹² Although attention will be restricted to the objections, these are not the only features of Part I worthy of attention.¹³

The first objection ¹⁴ is that Kant’s moral theory requires, as a condition for acting morally, that one renounce the desire for happiness. Since we naturally seek happiness, his theory requires one to act contrary to his nature.¹⁵ This persistent objection ¹⁶ rests on a basic misunderstanding of Kant’s theory. Kant’s theory does not require one to renounce the desire for happiness. Kant replies that one “cannot do so, nor can any other finite rational being.” ¹⁷ What is required is that we not make the desire for happiness the or a condition for acting morally. In deciding what I ought to do, it is not a relevant consideration. But this is not to say that one must renounce it.

The second objection is to Kant’s claim that I ought to do my duty simply because I recognize it as my duty. For Garve, it is “incomprehensible … how any man can be conscious of having achieved complete detachment from his desire for happiness, and thus having performed his duty quite unselfishly.” ¹⁸ If, he reasons, I cannot know that I have acted for no other reason than that I recognized it as my duty, it makes no sense to say that I ought to act in this way. Nothing, Kant replies, follows from Garve’s claim. Kant not only admits that “no man can ever be conscious with certainty of having performed his duty quite unselfishly” ¹⁹ but that it may be that no one either has or will do his duty. But, Kant observes, this does not show that I cannot do what is required of me. I may have done my duty for no other reason than that I recognized it as my duty, even though I am not certain of this. My being uncertain as to whether something was the reason for my action is consistent with the fact that it was. As long as it is not impossible for me to do what is required, I can do what I am obliged to do.

The third objection ²⁰ is that in actual practice we are never sure which motive, duty, the desire for happiness, or some other motive or combination of them, actually carried the most weight in determining our action. Duty, it seems, is no clearer guide to action than any other motive, and, for the common man, plays no more important role in his decision making than do other conisderations. Hence, even though Kant’s theory is a guide to action, it is no better than some other theory.

Apart from the insistence that his theory alone is consistent with acting morally, Kant argues that his theory, unlike that which makes happiness the ground of action, provides a reliable guide to action. While his theory informs one immediately of what ought to be done, this, Kant insists, is not true of the opposing one. To decide which action will promote my happiness “always requires a great deal of skill and thought.” “The will thus pursuant to the maxim of happiness,” Kant observes, “vacillates between motivations, wondering what it should resolve upon. For it considers the outcome, and that is most uncertain.” ²¹ But, Kant claims, if one asks “where his duty lies, … he is instantly certain what he must do.” ²²

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Two questions which have been asked as long as men have lived in civil society are (1) Why is a person obliged to obey the existing government? and (2) Under what circumstances, if any, is one justified in disobeying or in overthrowing the government? These questions were asked in Kant’s lifetime, which was marked by the French and American Revolutions, and they are still being raised today. While it is acknowledged that existing governments can force a person to obey, one can ask whether the obligation to obey reduces to the recognition of superior force. Most of us believe that the obligation rests on more than the recognition of the power of governments. Submitting to superior force may be prudent; it is certainly not an obligation. What confers upon governments the authority which most of us believe they have? And under what conditions, if any, can a government lose its authority? Kant deals with these questions in Part II.²³

In answering these above questions, Kant evaluates two influential theories which also provide answers. Each of the rival theories rests upon a conception of human nature, and each provides advice for governing the state. Although Kant rejects both theories, he does not reject everything included in them. In an important sense, his theory is a combination of what he considers the legitimate insights of the two. To understand Kant’s theory, we must briefly characterize each theory and consider Kant’s objections to them. The test Kant uses in evaluating the two is whether they are consistent with the conditions necessary for a stable society and whether they explain why men recognize that they are obliged to obey the government. The theories which Kant evaluates are versions of the Hobbesian and the Lockian theories.

HOBBESIAN THEORY

The Hobbesian explains the origin of civil society and the authority of government in terms of the conception of man as egoistic and anti-social. He explains why men move from the state of nature (a pre-societal condition) into civil society by identifying what causes them to do so. In the state of nature, men are essentially equal; there are no important differences between them. Whatever advantages in strength, intelligence or cunning one has over others is cancelled by advantages others have over him. In addition, since men are selfish and anti-social, they are indifferent to the concerns and interests of others. But to pursue his interests, one must have the power to prevent others from harming him. The consequence of these facts is that misery supremely characterizes the state of nature. Life for everyone is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.

Men move into civil society because reason tells them that peace and tranquility are necessary for pursuing their own interests, and experience shows that this is impossible in the state of nature. It is in the self-interest of men to enter society, and since they are antisocial, this can be accomplished only by submitting to a power capable of ending the state of war. Whenever power is effective, men see the advantage in submitting to it, and the fact that one submits to superior power is interpreted as consent to it. What creates the obligation to obey is submission to the power of government, and what confers upon government its authority is the power to coerce. If a government loses its power, it thereby loses its authority.

For the Hobbesian there can be no circumstances under which one may disobey the government. Any laws which limit the obedience of the subject are never in the true interests of men. Since the absolute power of government is the condition necessary for civil society, there can be no right to disobey or to overthrow the government. There are two reasons men lack these rights. The first is that disobedience is irrational, for if the government falls, men return immediately to the state of nature or that condition which poses the greatest threat to their interests. Disobedience can never make things better; it can only make things worse. The second reason is that nen have no rights. They move into civil society not to protect their rights but to end violence and strife. For this, one gives up his liberty, which, for the Hobbesian, is more a curse than a blessing. The only privileges which men have are those extended by government, and they enjoy them only so long as governments permit.

Kant agrees with the Hobbesian that a condition necessary for civil society is the power of government to coerce individuals, and that there is no right to disobey or overthrow existing governments. And while Kant insists that, at best, we only have hypotheses as to how and why men formed societies, the one he considers most plausible is similar to that advanced by the Hobbesian.²⁴ As Kant puts it, “universal violence and the resulting distress were finally bound to make a people decide that they would submit to the coercion of public laws … and found a state under a civil constitution.” ²⁵

Despite the points of agreement, Kant opposes the Hobbesian theory. Kant rejects its basic assumption that an historical account of why and how men moved into civil society prescribes what the relationship between men and government ought to be. That one had good reasons for submitting to a superior power does not, in itself, establish that one is obliged to obey that power. For Kant, there is an important distinction between a government having the power to coerce and the right to coerce. While he agrees that having the power is necessary for a viable government, he disagrees that it thereby confers upon a government its authority. To claim that it does is to hold that might makes right.

Since Kant believes that every political theory is a guide to action, what advice does it give? It tells statesman and citizen alike that the only thing which men respect is power, and the question whether a government has the right to coerce is whether it has the power to do so. But, Kant observes, “once we are talking not of right but of power only, the people may try their own power and jeopardize every legal constitution.” ²⁶ If might makes right, the only way in which the citizen can determine whether he is obliged to obey is to test the power of government. The theory offers an open invitation to civil disobedience and revolutionary activity. To adopt the theory is to advocate policies the consequences of which would jeopardize or destroy the civil state.

The Hobbesian fails to see that men are more than egoistic and anti-social creatures who forfeit their liberty for the protection of government. They recognize that they have rights, and they are well aware of the difference between the power and the right to coerce. The theory fails to accord with the conditions necessary for a stable civil society and is also unable to explain why men recognize that they are obliged to obey the government.

THE LOCKIAN THEORY

The Lockian conceives of men as both reasonable and as constrained in their relationships with each other by considerations of morality. While each person pursues his own interests, most of us tend to respect the rights and interests of others. The Lockian therefore does not characterize the state of nature as a condition which drives men into civil society. Why, then, did they make the move? Men form civil societies because they find that the enjoyment of their rights in the state of nature is not as satisfactory as it could be. They find that their rights are sometimes threatened by those who are not constrained by moral considerations. While each man has a right to punish those who interfere with his rights, this is not always possible.²⁷ A related problem is that punishment by the victim may be inequitable, for in the state of nature, the victim is both the judge and the one who administers punishment. Civil society is created to deal with these problems.

The social contract is the instrument by means of which civil society is created. Via the contract, each individual gives up or transfers some of his natural rights (e.g., the right to punish) in exchange for the collective action and protection of a group. On this model, there are two agreements, one by which society is formed, and a second establishing an agency authorized to make and enforce laws.

The proper explanation of the origin of government is not the needs of men but their freely given consent. A man is obliged to obey the government because he has freely assumed that obligation. Whatever authority government has is that which the people give it. While there is an agreement between governed and government, it is more like that between the owner of a business and one who manages it than between equal parties. Since the function of government is to protect the rights of men, government may use its power only to this end. When it protects rights, it is justified in using force, and the obligation to obey is direct and complete. But when government uses its power in ways which do not serve the ends for which it was created or when it threatens the rights of men, it loses its authority. When government exceeds its authority, it harms the people, and the trust is broken. The people then have the right to disobey, to resist, and, if necessary, to overthrow the government. These rights derive from the natural right to protect oneself and to punish those who harm us.

Kant agrees that each individual ‘‘has inalienable rights which he cannot give up,” ²⁸ that each person “is himself entitled to judge” ²⁹ these rights, and that it is the function of government to protect them. He also agrees that the idea of an original contract is the fundament “on which alone a civil and thus consistently legal constitution among men can be based and a community established.” ³⁰ One expects Kant to agree that men have a right to rebel against government if it fails to protect or transgresses these rights. But Kant does not take this step. To understand why we must get clear his interpretation of the relationship between the rights of the individual and the government, which is best understood in terms of his criticisms of the Lockian theory.