Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.5) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 7

“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

“1. What do we consider as murder? Is the Foreign Office in agreement with point 3b?

“2. How should the procedure be carried out? a. By the people? b. By the authorities?

“3. How can we guarantee that the procedure will not be also carried out against other enemy aviators?

“4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?”—Signed—“Jodl.”

It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this defendant and the Foreign Office were fully in on these breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there were breaches of the laws and usages of war, is shown by the next document, which is 728-PS, which I now put in as GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is specifically stated in the next Document 740-PS, which I put in as GB-153. I do not think this Document 728-PS has been read before, and therefore, again, I would like to read just one or two passages in it. It begins:

“In spite of the obvious objections, based on international law and foreign policy, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.

“In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the SD.

“I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the facts involving punishment, according to points 1 through 4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since the death will have occurred before a German official becomes concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.

“II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the SD, including subsequent publication, would be feasible only if Germany would at the same time openly repudiate the commitments of international law, at present in force and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police and is delivered to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel, he has acquired by this very fact the legal status of a prisoner of war.

“The Prisoner-of-War Agreement of 27 July 1929 established definite rules for the prosecution and sentencing of prisoners of war and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only 3 months after the Protecting Power has been notified of the sentence. In Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement.

“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected enemy fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner-of-war status, that is, that immediately upon capture they be told that they are not considered prisoners of war but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over prisoners of war, hence not go to a prisoner-of-war camp, but that they be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts, and that they be tried in summary proceedings. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of prisoner of war by transfer to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel.

“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility of Germany’s being accused of violation of existing treaties or even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us to follow a clearly defined course, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case.”

I do not want to take this in detail, but I ask the Tribunal to look at the first sentence of Section III:

“It follows from the above that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: the deterrence of enemy aviators, is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers directing the fire of their weapons upon the civilian population must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore.”

I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal, but that shows quite clearly the defendant’s point of view. If the Tribunal would look at the next document, it is stated at the beginning of the second paragraph:

“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft. . . .”

That is the position as to the treatment of aviators, where there is, in my suggestion, a completely cold-blooded and deliberate adoption of a procedure evading international law.

The second section is the destruction of the peoples in Europe. With regard to Poland, again I want scrupulously to avoid going into details; but I remind the Tribunal of the evidence of the Witness Lahousen, which appears in the transcript, Pages 618 and 619 (Volume II, Pages 448-449) on the 30th of November of last year, and on Pages 713 to 716 (Volume III, Pages 20-25), when he was cross-examined on the 1st of December.

Secondly, Bohemia and Moravia: On the 16th of March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, concerning the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. That is already in as Exhibit GB-8, Document TC-51. The effect of that was to place the Reich Protector in a remarkable position of supremacy under the Führer. The only part which I would like the Tribunal to have in mind is Article 5 and Subarticle 2:

“2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich.

“3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.

“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich and, in cases of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest.

“5. The promulgation of laws, decrees, and other legal provisions and the execution of administrative measures and legal judgments shall be suspended if the Reich Protector enters an objection.”

As a result of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were appointed; and then there were committed the various crimes which will be detailed by my Soviet colleague.

Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands on the 18th of May 1940, a decree of the Führer was signed by Ribbentrop concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands, and that—Document 639-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-154, Section 1—says:

“The Occupied Netherlands Territories shall be administered by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories . . . the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.

“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.”

On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner—the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—promulgated such orders as that of the 4th of July 1940, dealing with the confiscation of property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich; and tentative arrangements were made for the resettlement of the Dutch population. But all this will also be dealt with fully by my French colleagues.

I simply for the moment put in as a matter of reference the general order of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, which is GB-155, the document being 2921-PS. I do not intend to read it. I have summarized the effect of it and it will be dealt with more fully by my French colleagues.

I want the Tribunal to appreciate, with regard to these two matters, Bohemia and the Netherlands, that the charge against this defendant is laying the basis and procuring the governmental structure under which the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity were directed.

I should also put in formally Exhibit GB-156, the discussion on the question of the Dutch population, which is contained in Document 1520-PS. Again I have explained it generally and I do not want to occupy time by reading it in full now.

Then coming to the Jews: In December 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department. The report of Mr. Kennedy is Document L-205, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-157. If I might read to the Tribunal the second paragraph, which concerns this point:

“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his conversation with Von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany, without exception, were pickpockets, murderers, and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from illegal operations with them. There was in fact nothing that it could or would do.”

That succinct statement of this defendant’s views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office, which is numbered 3358-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-158. I do not want to read the whole of that document because it is excessively dreary; it is also an excessively clear indication of the defendant’s views on the treatment of Jews. But if the Tribunal would look at, first of all, Page 3—it is headed, “The Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in the Year 1938”; after the four divisions the document goes on to say:

“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater Germany,’ since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938.”

That is elaborated. If the Tribunal will turn over to Page 4 at the beginning of the second paragraph, they will see the first sentence:

“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all the Jews living in Reich territory.”

Then that is developed at great length through a large number of pages. The conclusion which is—if the Tribunal would turn to the foot of Page 7 and examine it—it goes on this way:

“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German Lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence, would be only temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be a future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish Minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations.”

The Tribunal will appreciate that this document was circulated by the defendant’s ministry, widely circulated to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous people before the war, on the 25th of January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently the anti-Semitism of the defendant went from—I was going to say from strength to strength, if that is the correct term, or at any rate from exaggeration to exaggeration, for in June 1944 the Defendant Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish congress to be held in Kraków on the 11th of July 1944. The honorary members were to be Von Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank—I think the Defendant Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway, et cetera, in order to give an international aspect to the congress. However, the military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the congress which had lost its significance by virtue of the landings in Normandy.

That is contained in Document 1752-PS, GB-159. At the foot of Page 1 the Tribunal will see the following had been entered as honorary members: Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. So that there is no doubt that this defendant was behind the program against the Jews which resulted in the placing of them in concentration camps with anyone else who opposed the Nazi way of life; and it is submitted that he must, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government, have known what was going on in the country and in the camps. One who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority cannot, I submit to anyone who has had any ministerial experience, suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out.

That is the evidence on the third allegation and it is submitted that by the evidence which I have recapitulated to the Tribunal the three allegations are proved.

With regard to the second, Hitler’s own words were:

“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, was of great help to me by virtue of his accurate and audacious judgment and admirably clever treatment of all problems of foreign policy.”

During the course of the war this defendant was in close liaison with the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, in his embassies and legations abroad, information which was required and at times participated, as I have shown, in the planning of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

It is submitted that all the allegations which I read from Appendix A of the Indictment are completely proved against this defendant. I want, if the Tribunal will allow me, to add only one fact on behalf of the British Delegation. In the preparation of these briefs we have received great assistance from certain of our American colleagues; and I should like to thank once, but nonetheless heartily, on behalf of us all, Dr. Kempner’s staff: Captains Auchincloss, Claggett, and Stoll, Lieutenants Felton and Heller, and Mr. Lachmann for the great help they have been to us.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.