Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.6) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 20

Оглавление

“1. We demand the unification of all Germans into Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples.

“2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.”

But probably clearer than that is the statement contained in Hitler’s speech at Munich on the 15th of March 1939; and the Tribunal will find one of the references to that on Page 40 at the middle of the page. It begins:

“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish the Treaty of Versailles. It is absolutely nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today that I had not announced this program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish chatter of emigrees these gentlemen should have read, merely once, what I have written, that is written a thousand times.”

It is futile nonsense for foreigners to raise that point. It would be still more futile for Hitler’s Foreign Minister to suggest that he was ignorant of the aggressive designs of the policy. But I remind the Tribunal that the acceptance of force as a means of solving international problems and achieving the objectives of Hitler’s foreign policy must have been known to anyone as closely in touch with Hitler as the Defendant Von Neurath; and I remind the Tribunal simply by reference to the passages from Mein Kampf, which were quoted by my friend Major Elwyn Jones, especially those toward the end of the book, Pages 552, 553, and 554.

So that the Prosecution say that by the acceptance of this foreign policy the Defendant Von Neurath assisted and promoted the accession to power of the Nazi Party.

The third broad point is that in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs this defendant directed the international aspects of the first phase of the Nazi conspiracy, the consolidation of control in preparation for war.

As I have already indicated, from his close connection with Hitler this defendant must have known the cardinal points of Hitler’s policy leading up to the outbreak of the World War, as outlined in retrospect by Hitler in his speech to his military leaders on the 23rd of November 1939.

This policy had two facets: internally, the establishment of rigid control; externally, the program to release Germany from its international ties. The external program had four points: 1) Secession from the Disarmament Conference; 2) the order to re-arm Germany; 3) the introduction of compulsory military services; and 4) the remilitarization of the Rhineland.

If the Tribunal will look at Page 35 in the document book, at the end of the first paragraph they will find these points very briefly set out, and perhaps I might just read that passage. It is Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23—about 10 lines before the break:

“I had to reorganize everything, beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: To release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole country, especially in the west.”

Now, these are summarized in four points. The Defendant Von Neurath participated directly and personally in accomplishing each of these four aspects of Hitler’s foreign policy, at the same time officially proclaiming that these measures did not constitute steps toward aggression.

The first is a matter of history. When Germany left the Disarmament Conference this defendant sent telegrams dated the 14th of October 1933, to the President of the conference—and that will be found in Dokumente Der Deutschen Politik, on Page 94 of the first volume for that year. Similarly this defendant made the announcement of Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations on the 21st of October 1933. That again will be found in the official documents. These are referred to in the transcript of the proceedings of the Trial, and I remind the Tribunal of the complementary documents of military preparation, which of course were read and which are Documents C-140, Exhibit USA-51, the 25th of October 1933, and C-153, Exhibit USA-43, the 12th of May 1934. These have already been read and I merely collect them for the memory and assistance of the Tribunal.

The second point—the rearmament of Germany: When this defendant was Foreign Minister, on the 9th of March 1935, the German Government officially announced the establishment of the German Air Force. That is Document TC-44, Exhibit GB-11, already referred to. On the 21st of May 1935 Hitler announced a purported unilateral repudiation of the Naval, Military, and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which, of course, involved a similar purported unilateral repudiation of the same clauses of the Treaty for the Restoration of Friendly Relations with the United States, and that will be found in Document 2288-PS, Exhibit USA-38, which again has already been read. On the same day the Reich Cabinet, of which this defendant was a member, enacted the secret Reich Defense Law creating the office of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, afterwards designated by the Wehrmacht armament expert as “the cornerstone of German rearmament.” The reference to the law is Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, a letter of Von Blomberg dated the 24th of June 1935, enclosing this law, which is already before the Tribunal; and the reference to the comment on the importance of the law is Document 2353-PS, Exhibit USA-35. Some of that has already been read, but if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 52 where that appears, they will find an extract and I might just give the Tribunal the last sentence:

“The new regulations were stipulated in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to be promulgated only in case of war but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law . . . fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.”

The third point is the introduction of compulsory military service. On the 16th of March 1935 this defendant signed the law for the organization of the Armed Forces which provided for universal military service and anticipated a vastly expanded German army. This was described by the Defendant Keitel as the real start of the large scale rearmament program which followed. I will give the official reference in the Reichsgesetzblatt, year 1935, Volume I, Part 1, Page 369; and the references in the transcript are 411 (Volume II, Page 305), 454, and 455 (Volume II, Page 340).

The fourth point was the remilitarization of the Rhineland. The Rhineland was reoccupied on the 7th of March 1936. I remind the Tribunal of the two complementary documents: 2289-PS, Exhibit USA-56, the announcement of this action by Hitler; and C-139, Exhibit USA-53, which is the “Operation Schulung,” giving the military action which was to be given if necessary. Again the reference to the transcript is Page 458 to Page 464 (Volume II, Pages 342 to 347). These were the acts for which the defendant shared responsibility because of his position and because of the steps which he took; but a little later he summed up his views on the actions detailed above in a speech before Germans abroad made on the 29th of August 1937, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as it appears in Das Archiv, 1937, at Page 650. But I quote a short portion of it that appears on Page 72 of the document book:

“The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign policy by which the fetters of the Versailles Treaty were forced, the freedom to arm regained, and the sovereignty of the whole nation re-established. We have really again become master in our own house and we have created the means of power to remain henceforth that way for all times. . . . The world should have seen from . . . Hitler’s deeds and words that his aims are not aggressive.”

The world, of course, had not the advantage of seeing these various complementary documents of military preparation which I have had the opportunity of putting before the Tribunal.

The next section—and the next point against this defendant—is that both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of the inner circle of the Führer’s advisers on foreign political matters, this defendant participated in the political planning and preparation for acts of aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations.

If I might first put the defendant’s policy in a sentence, I would say that it can be summarized as breaking one treaty only at a time. He himself put it—if I may say so—slightly more pompously but to the same effect in a speech before the Academy of German Law on the 30th of October 1937, which appears in Das Archiv, October 1937, Page 921, and which the Tribunal will find in the document book on Page 73. The underlining (italics) is mine:

“In recognition of these elementary facts the Reich Cabinet has always interceded in favor of treating every concrete international problem within the scope of methods especially suited to it; not to complicate it unnecessarily by involvement with other problems; and, as long as problems between only two powers are concerned, to choose the direct way for an immediate understanding between these two powers. We are in a position to state that this method has fully proved itself good not only in the German interest, but also in the general interest.”

The only country whose interests are not mentioned are the other parties to the various treaties that were dealt with in that way; and the working out of that policy can readily be shown by looking at the tabulated form of the actions of this defendant when he was Foreign Minister or during the term of his immediate successor when the defendant still was purported to have influence.

In 1935 the action was directed against the Western Powers. That action was the rearmament of Germany. When that was going on another country had to be reassured. At that time it was Austria, with the support of Italy—which Austria still had up to 1935. And so you get the fraudulent assurance, the essence of the technique, in that case given by Hitler, on the 21st of May 1935. And that is shown clearly to be false, by the documents which Mr. Alderman put in—I give the general reference to the transcript on Pages 534 to 545 (Volume II, Pages 388 to 398). Then, in 1936, you still have the action necessary against the Western Powers in the occupation of the Rhineland. You still have a fraudulent assurance to Austria in the treaty of the 11th of July of that year; and that is shown to be fraudulent by the letters from the Defendant Von Papen, Exhibits USA-64 (Document 2247-PS) and 67 (Document 2246-PS), to one of which my friend Major Barrington has just referred.

Then in 1937 and 1938 you move on a step and the action is directed against Austria. We know what that action was. It was absorption, planned, at any rate finally, at the meeting on the 5th of November 1937; and action taken on the 11th of March 1938.

Reassurance had to be given to the Western Powers, so you have the assurance to Belgium on the 13th of October 1937, which was dealt with by my friend Mr. Roberts. The Tribunal will find the references in Pages 1100 to 1126 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307) of the transcript.

We move forward a year and the object of the aggressive action becomes Czechoslovakia. Or I should say we move forward 6 months to a year. There you have the Sudetenland obtained in September; the absorption of the whole of Bohemia and Moravia on the 15th of March 1939.

Then it was necessary to reassure Poland; so an assurance to Poland is given by Hitler on the 20th of February 1938, and repeated up to the 26th of September 1938. The falsity of that assurance was shown over and over again in Colonel Griffith-Jones’ speech on Poland, which the Tribunal will find in the transcript at Pages 966 to 1060 (Volume II, Pages 195 to 261).

Then finally, when they want the action as directed against Poland in the next year for its conquest, assurance must be given to Russia, and so a non-aggression pact is entered into on the 23rd of August 1939, as shown by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 1160 to 1216 (Volume III, Pages 328 to 366).

With regard to that tabular presentation, one might say, in the Latin tag, res ipsa oquitur. But quite a frank statement from this defendant with regard to the earlier part of that can be found in the account of his conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on the 18th of May 1936, which is on Page 74 of the document book, Document L-150, Exhibit USA-65; and if I might read the first paragraph after the introduction which says that he called on this defendant, Mr. Bullitt remarks:

“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that, until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,’ he said.”

I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, of the conversation referred to by my friend, Major Barrington, a short time ago, between the Defendant Von Papen, as Ambassador, and Mr. Messersmith, which is very much to the same effect.

Then I come to the actual aggression against Austria, and I remind the Tribunal that this defendant was Foreign Minister:

First, during the early Nazi plottings against Austria in 1934. The Tribunal will find these in the transcript at Pages 475 to 489 (Volume II, Pages 352-364), and I remind them generally that that was the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss and the ancillary acts which were afterwards so strongly approved.

Secondly, when the false assurance was given to Austria on the 21st of May 1935, and the fraudulent treaty made on the 11th of July 1936. References to these are Document TC-26, which is Exhibit GB-19, and Document TC-22, which is Exhibit GB-20. The reference in the transcript is at Pages 544 and 545 (Volume II, Page 383).

Third, when the Defendant Von Papen was carrying on his subterranean intrigues in the period from 1935 to 1937. I again give the references so the Tribunal will have it in mind: Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, letter dated 17 May 1935; and Exhibit USA-67, Document 2246-PS, 1 September 1936. The references in the transcript are Pages 492 (Volume II, Pages 363, 364), 516-518 (Volume II, Pages 372-374), 526-545 (Volume II, Pages 378 to 391), and 553-554 (Volume II, Pages 394, 395).

This Defendant Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, at the Hossbach interview on the 5th of November 1937, that the German question could only be solved by force and that his plans were to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia. That is Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, which the Tribunal will find at Page 82. If you will look at the sixth line of Page 82, after the heading, you will see that one of the persons in attendance at this highly confidential meeting was the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath.

Without reading a document which the Tribunal have had referred to them more than once, may I remind the Tribunal that it is on Page 86 that the passage about the conquest of Austria occurs, and if the Tribunal will look after “2:” and “3:” the next sentence is:

“For the improvement of our military-political position, it must be our first aim in every case of warlike entanglement to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards.”

That is developed on the succeeding page. The important point is that this defendant was present at that meeting; and it is impossible for him after that meeting to say that he was not acting except with his eyes completely open and with complete comprehension as to what was intended.

Then the next point. During the actual Anschluss he received a note from the British Ambassador dated the 11th of March 1938. That is Document 3045-PS, Exhibit USA-127. He sent the reply contained in Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128. If I might very briefly remind the Tribunal of the reply, I think all that is necessary—and of course the Tribunal have had this document referred to them before—is at the top of Page 93. I wish to call attention to two obvious untruths.

The Defendant Von Neurath states in the sixth line:

“It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development, especially the assertion, which was spread later by the former Federal Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.”

According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect.

“The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the imminent danger of a bloody Civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.”

Well, as I said, My Lord, these are the two most obvious untruths, and all one can say is that it must have, at any rate, given this defendant a certain macabre sort of humor to write that, when the truth was, as the Tribunal know it from the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Bürckel, which has been put in before the Tribunal as Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, and when they have heard, as they have at length, the transcripts of the Defendant Göring’s telephone conversation with Austria on that day, which is Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, and the entries of the Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 11th, 13th, and 14th of February, which is Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72.

In this abundance of proof of the untruthfulness of these statements the Tribunal may probably think that the most clear and obvious correction is in the transcription of the Defendant Göring’s telephone conversations, which are so amply corroborated by the other documents.

The Prosecution submits that it is inconceivable that this defendant who, according to the Defendant Jodl’s diary—may I ask the Tribunal just to look at Page 116 of the document book, the entry in the Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 10th of March, so that they have this point quite clear? It is the third paragraph, and it says:

“At 1300 hours General Keitel informs Chief of Operational Staff, Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.”

I submit that it is inconceivable when this defendant had taken over the Foreign Office, was dealing with the matter, and as I shall show the Tribunal in a moment, co-operating with the Defendant Göring to suit the susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant of the truth of events and what really was happening as to write that letter in honor and good faith.

His position can be shown equally clearly by the account which is given of him in the affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68. If the Tribunal will look at Page 107 of the document book, I remind them of that entry which exactly describes the action and style of activity of this defendant at this crisis. Two-thirds of the way down the page the paragraph begins:

“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, but more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi program.

“In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna, dated 10 October 1935, I wrote as follows:

“ ‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people, and that they are “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.’ ”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.6)

Подняться наверх