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Оглавление1.
J. Cheryl Exum, and David J. A. Clines, The New Literary Criticism and the Hebrew Bible, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 12.
2.
Ellen van Wolde, Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2009).
3.
István Czachesz, Cognitive Science and the New Testament: A New Approach to Early Christian Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). István Czachesz and Risto Uro, eds., Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies (Durham: Acumen, 2013).
4.
Jay Friedenberg and Gordon Silverman, Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Study of Mind (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2012), 3.
5.
Friedenberg and Silverman, Cognitive Science, 2.
6.
Justin L. Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2011), 5.
7.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 5.
8.
Luther Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” in The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. John R. Hinnells (London: Routledge, 2010), 526.
9.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 526.
10.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 527.
11.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 527.
12.
Friedenberg and Silverman, Cognitive Science, 2, 11.
13.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 12.
14.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 16.
15.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 27. Barrett finds this term a little problematic, as an appliance such as a light fixture is hardwired (rigid in place and power source) or not, like a lamp (movable and “unplugable”). “For those of us who think that we think through our brain (or more strongly, that our brain thinks), it is a little odd to say that some cognition is part of our brain circuitry whereas other cognition is not: it is all part of our electrical system. So, the emphasis added by hard-wired just means degree of rigidity, automaticity, or invariance. But this is an issue of degree whereas to be hard-wired (in electrical systems) is a discreet concept—either hard-wired or not.”
16.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 7.
17.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 23.
18.
Marianne Regard, Daria Knoch, Eva Gütling, and Theodor Landis, “Brain Damage and Addictive Behavior: A Neuropsychological and Electroencephalogram Investigation with Pathologic Gamblers,” Cognitive & Behavioral Neurology 16 (2003): 47.
19.
Aya Norenzayan, W. M. Gervais, K. H. Trzesniewski, “Mentalizing Deficits Constrain Belief in a Personal God,” PLoS ONE 7 (2012): 1–8.
20.
D. Havas, A. Glenberg, K. Gutowski, M. Lucarelli, and R. Davidson, “Cosmetic Use of Botulinum Toxin-a Affects Processing of Emotional Language,” Psychological Science 21 (2010): 895.
21.
There are far too many studies to list. For examples, see, Lindsay Bruce and Sarah Lane Ritchie, “The Physicalized Mind and the Gut-Brain Axis: Taking Mental Health Out of Our Heads,” Zygon 53 (2018): 356–374; M. Hasan Mohajeri, Giorgio La Fata, Robert E. Steinert, Peter Weber, “Relationship between the Gut Microbiome and Brain Function,” Nutrition Reviews, 76 (2018): 481–496; Emeran A. Mayer, Rob Knight, Sarkis K. Mazmanian, John F. Cryan, and Kirsten Tillisch, “Gut Microbes and the Brain: Paradigm Shift in Neuroscience,” The Journal of Neuroscience 34 (2014): 15490–15496.
22.
For an overview of the positions regarding mind-body monism and dualism, see John Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
23.
Alvin Goldman, “Theory of Mind,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, eds. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen Stich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 402. While theory of mind researchers are in essential agreement as to the definition of theory of mind, they do have competing theories regarding the way in which mentalizing is accomplished. Goldman (403–409) outlines the three theories. The “theory-theory,” in which intuitive theory of behavior is refined over time with experience and cognitive maturation; the “modularity nativist theory,” in which innate understandings need cognitive maturation; and the “rationalist teleological theory,” in which we calculate events, developing rational expectations based on our perceived evaluation of others’ situations.
24.
Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 141.
25.
Todd Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 77.
26.
For example, see Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’? Reasoning about purpose and design in nature,” Psychological Science 15 (2004): 295–301.
27.
Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 80. Studies have also shown that people are more likely to detect agency in nature when given religious primes. See, Wieteke Nieuwboer, Hein van Schie, and Daniël Wigboldus, “Priming with Religion and Supernatural Agency Enhances the Perception of Intentionality in Natural Phenomena,” Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion 2 (2015): 97–120.
28.
Justin Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2004), 32. Also, Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 78.
29.
Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 81.
30.
“Neuromania” claims to provide a neurologically based answer for everything; it is marked by the use of cognitive science research but often makes sensational claims or is implicitly affected by Cartesian dualism. For an example of the debunking of neuromania, see Gregory Hickok, The Myth of Mirror Neurons: The Real Neuroscience of Communication and Cognition (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014). Also, L. Mudrik and U. Maoz, “‘Me & My Brain: ’ Exposing Neuroscience’s Closet Dualism,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 27 (2014): 211–221.
31.
Patrick Colm Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3.
32.
Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature, 1.
33.
Lisa Zunshine, “Introduction,” in Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010): 3.
34.
Zunshine, “Introduction,” 9–10.
35.
Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature, 3. The comment by Pinker was made in an interview, in which he said: “We may be seeing a coming together of the humanities and the science of human nature. They’ve been long separated because of post-modernism and modernism. But now graduate students are grumbling in emails and in conference hallways about being locked out of the job market unless they perpetuate postmodernist gobbledygook, and how they’re eager for new ideas from the sciences that could invigorate the humanities within universities, which are, by anyone’s account, in trouble. Also connoisseurs and appreciators of art are getting sick of the umpteenth exhibit on the female body featuring mangled body parts, or ironic allusions to commercial culture that are supposed to shake people out of their bourgeois complacency but that are really no more insightful than an ad parody in Mad magazine or on Saturday Night Live.” Edge.org. “A Biological Understanding of Human Nature: A Talk with Steven Pinker.” Accessed March 14, 2017. www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker_blank/pinker_blank_print.html.
36.
Peter Mendelsund, What We See When We Read: A Phenomenology (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 9. The reference is from William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: H. Holt, 1918), 224. “The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks.”
37.
Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal, xiv.
38.
Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal, 153.
39.
Maryanne Wolf, Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2010), 16.
40.
Ellen Spolsky, The Work of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, and Complexity (London: Routledge, 2017), viii.
41.
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 1–3.
42.
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 167.
43.
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 170.
44.
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 171.
45.
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 149.
46.
David Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 2
47.
Lisa Zunshine, “Introduction to Cognitive Literary Studies,” in Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.
48.
Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind, 2.
49.
Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind, 7.
50.
E. Thomas Lawson, “Cognition,” in Guide to the Study of Religion, eds. Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (London: Cassell, 2000), 81.
51.
Luther H. Martin, “Past Minds: Evolution, Cognition, and Biblical Studies,” in Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, eds. István Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013): 18. Referencing E. Thomas Lawson, “Cognitive Constraints on Imagining Other Worlds.” SciFi in the Mind’s Eye: Reading science through science fiction (Chicago: Open Court, 2007).
52.
Martin, “Past Minds,” 18.
53.
Helen De Cruz, A Natural History of Natural Theology: The Cognitive Science of Theology and Philosophy of Religion (Boston: MIT, 2015), 14–15.
54.
De Cruz, Natural History,13.
55.
De Cruz, Natural History, 12.
56.
De Cruz, Natural History,14–15.
57.
De Cruz, Natural History, 13.
58.
Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 11.
59.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition” 528.
60.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 529.
61.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 529.
62.
Justin Barrett, “Cognitive Science of Religion: What is it and why is it?” Religion Compass 1 (2007): 768.
63.
Barrett, “Why is it?,” 769.
64.
Barrett, “Why is it?,” 769.
65.
E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Luther Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 529–530; Also, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, “The Cognitive Science of Religion,” in Evolution, Religion & Cognitive Science, eds. Fraser Watts and Leon Turner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 21–37.
66.
E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, “The cognitive representation of religious ritual form: A theory of participants’ competence with religious ritual systems,” Current Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion (2002): 157.
67.
Lawson and McCauley, Rethinking Religion, 87.
68.
Lawson and McCauley, as do others, require here that religious actions have some relationship to a superhuman agent. Not all scholars share this view. Lawson and McCauley acknowledge this and write that if it is the case that a religious action can be done without a relationship to a superhuman agent, then their model is no longer a model applicable to all rituals, but applicable to all rituals that have a relationship to a superhuman agent. Previously, they used the term “culturally-posited superhuman agent,” but they have changed this to a “counter-intuitive superhuman agent,” or superhuman agent. Robert McCauley and Thomas Lawson, “Cognition, religious ritual and archaeology,” in The Archaeology of Ritual, Evangelos Kyriakidis, ed. (Los Angeles: UCLA), 209–254.
69.
Barrett, “Why is it,” 4. See also Dan Sperber, La Contagion des idées: théorie naturaliste de la culture (Paris: O. Jacob, 1996).
70.
Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 51. Pyysiäinen, “The Cognitive Science of Religion,” 22.
71.
Petri Luomanen, “How Religions Remember: Memory theories in biblical studies and in the cognitive study of religion,” in Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, edited by István Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 24–26.
72.
Barrett, “Why is it?,” 4.
73.
E.g., Ara Norenzayan, Scott Atran, Jason Faulkner, and Mark Schaller, “Memory and Mystery: The cultural selection of minimally counterintuitive narratives,” Cognitive science 30 (2006): 531–553.
74.
István Czachesz, “Rethinking Biblical Transmission: Insights from the cognitive neuroscience of memory,” in Mind, Morality and Magic, eds. István Czachesz and Risto Uro (London: Routledge, 2014), 58–59.
75.
Norenzayan et al., “Memory and Mystery,” 537.
76.
Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2004), 16.
77.
Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 18.
78.
Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 66.
79.
Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 66.
80.
István Czachesz, New Testament, 9. See also István Czachesz, “The Gospels and Cognitive Science,” in Learned Antiquity: Scholarship and Society in the Near-East, the Greco-Roman World, and the Early Medieval West, ed. Alasdair A. MacDonald, Michael W. Twomey, and Gerrit J. Reinink (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 25–36.
81.
István Czachesz and Risto Uro, “The Cognitive Science of Religion; A New Alternative in Biblical Studies,” in Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, eds. István Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 13.
82.
Czachesz and Uro, “A New Alternative,” 5.
83.
A list of significant research centers with information on each can be found at iacsr.com/csr-links/centres-programmes. Examples are: The Centre for Anthropology and Mind, Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology (Oxford); Religion, Cognition, and Culture Research Unit in the Department of the Study of Religion (Aarhus University); Centre for Human Evolution, Cognition, and Culture (University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University); International Cognition & Culture Institute (London School of Economics); Institute of Cognition and Culture (Queen’s University, Belfast); Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture (Emory University); and Institute for the Biocultural Study of Religion (Boston).
84.
Robert N. McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson, Bringing Ritual to Mind: Psychological Foundations of Cultural Forms (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18–27.
85.
Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 97.
86.
Kimmo Ketola, “A Cognitive Approach to Ritual Systems in First-Century Judaism,” in Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science, eds. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, and Risto Uro (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 105.
87.
Ketola, “Cognitive Approach to Ritual Systems,” 106.
88.
For similar examples, see Tamás Biró, “Is Judaism Boring? On the lack of counterintuitive agents in Jewish rituals,” in Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, eds. István Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 120–143. Also, Jutta Jokiranta, “Ritual System in the Qumran Movement: Frequency, boredom, and balance,” in Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, eds. István Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 144–163.
89.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 108.
90.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 109.
91.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 110.
92.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 110–111.
93.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 112.
94.
Ketola, “Ritual System,” 110–111.
95.
Risto Uro, Ritual and Christian Beginnings: A Socio-Cognitive Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 86.
96.
Uro, Ritual and Christian Beginnings, 89. cf. Luke 3:12; John 3:26.
97.
Uro, Ritual and Christian Beginnings, 78.
98.
Uro, Ritual and Christian Beginnings, 91.
99.
Uro, Ritual and Christian Beginnings, 92.
100.
Risto Uro, “Gnostic Rituals from a Cognitive Perspective,” in Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science, eds. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, and Risto Uro (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 127.
101.
Uro, “Gnostic Rituals,” 127–128.
102.
Uro, “Gnostic Rituals,” 127–128. The Valentinians, for example, appeared to have some success because of ritual innovation that provides imagistic rituals such as the participation in the “mirrored bridal chamber,” which reflects a celestial bridal chamber. Moreover, it seems that the Valentinians may have introduced what Irenaeus and Tertullian refer to as magic tricks into the liturgy to increase arousal.
103.
Luther Martin, “The Promise of Biblical Studies,” Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science, eds. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, and Risto Uro (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 49.
