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how to cite this chapterRiascos Mora, A., & Ortega Salas, A. L. (2020). Dinámica del conflicto y del posacuerdo en territorio nariñense. In Á. M. Castillo Burbano & C. A. Guerrero Martínez (comps.), Challenges and alternatives towards peacebuilding: a rural development perspective (Philippe White, Transl.) (pp. 55-66). Bogota: Ediciones UCC & Centro Editorial Uniminuto. (Original title published in 2019). https://dx.doi.org/10.16925/9789587602388

Chapter II

Dynamics of conflict and post-agreement in the Nariñense territory

Amanda Janneth Riascos Mora, Alba Lucy Ortega Salas

Abstract

To build peace, it is important to understand the previous dynamics of the conflict in Colombia, to know the main agreements between the armed group of the Armed Forces and Revolutionaries of Colombia, FARC, and the National Government, and finally, to analyze the post-agreement phase. For this, it is important to theoretically approach the concept of conflict and the different forms of negotiation, and thus, provide the reader with a proper perspective of the post-agreement period in the Nariñense territory.

Keywords: territory, conflict, peace, Nariño.

Resumen

Para construir la paz, es importante comprender cuál ha sido la dinámica del conflicto en Colombia, conocer los principales acuerdos entre el grupo armado Fuerzas Armadas y Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, y el Gobierno Nacional, para finalmente, analizar la fase del posacuerdo. Para ello es importante acercarse teóricamente al concepto de conflicto y las formas de negociación, y así, mostrar al lector una mirada real del posacuerdo en el territorio nariñense.

Palabras clave: territorio, conflicto, paz, Nariño.

Introduction

According to the Nariño Peace Agenda 2013-2015 (United Nations Development Program – UNDP, 2016), it is stated that “The department of Nariño has been one of the most affected by the armed conflict that has ravaged Colombia for decades; more than 400,000 victims, the highest national rate of illicit crop cultivation, among other aspects, make peace not only an option, but a necessity for the people of Nariño” (p. 7). However, after the negotiation of the armed conflict with the FARC-EP, Colombia has set off down a path towards peace that must be built from within the territories. In this sense, it is important that the reality of the post-agreement in the Nariñense territory be understood, allowing for the generation of strategies that lead to the materialization of peace agreements and the true construction of peaceful scenarios.

In order to choose effective and appropriate ways to transform the conflict, it is important to first understand the nature of the conflict in general terms, and then to find ways to identify the particular characteristics of specific conflicts. In this sense, Estanislao Zuleta (2015) in the document “On war”, states:

To fight the war with a remote but real chance of success, it is necessary to begin by recognizing that conflict and hostility are constitutive phenomena of the social bond, such as interdependence itself, and that the notion of a harmonious society is a contradiction in terms. The eradication of conflicts and their dissolution into a warm coexistence is neither an attainable nor desirable goal; neither in personal life –in love and friendship– nor in collective life. On the contrary, it is necessary to build a social and legal space in which conflicts can manifest and develop, without the ‘opposition to the other’ leading to the ‘suppression of the other’; killing him, reducing him to impotence or silencing him.

In this way, the dynamics of post-conflict and post-agreement in the Nariño territory have been proposed with a positive outlook on the conflict, understood from a real environment, capable of producing personal, social and political changes.

The dynamics within the territory

When analyzing the Colombian conflict, it is important to clearly define the situation so as to subsequently help reach a post-agreement period through negotiation, thereby allowing for a true analysis of the reality of the post-agreement in the territory of Nariño.

If we understand the conflict as a difference between two parties or more (Lederach, 1990; Rios, 1997, cited by Tejada, 2008) and that this difference occurs in particular contexts and situations and involves people with their own individual stories, we can understand both the dynamics of the conflict and its solution. Seen from this perspective, conflict is a complex process that implies clearly definable and objective aspects, imbued with a number of subjective aspects, which are often not expressed, are not recognized and, lesser still, perceived as part of the conflict.

Alonso Tejada Zabaleta (2008) mentions that, over the last few years of the conflict resolution process,

the views that one has, socially speaking, on the processes of detection, management and conflict resolution, have changed. First, it is increasingly clear that conflict itself is not negative; in fact, theories that hold the view that conflict is a fundamental part of human nature and that it fundamentally collaborates in its development, are receiving increasing support. The problem, therefore, does not seem to lie in the conflict itself but in the way that it is addressed and resolved.

Particularly in a medium like Colombia, where there is a cultural indoctrination of resolving conflict in a violent and hostile way, without recognizing fundamental human values and significant and positive moral forms, and forgetting assertive forms of solution, it becomes more palpable to train the community in prosocial conflict resolution alternatives.

The problem seems to lie in the conflict resolution methodologies. There are still sectors of educators and institutions in charge of facing the problem, who think that the forming and training of communities should be based on visual and verbal campaigns; these ultimately stereotype the problems and have no real effect.

It seems that the solution to this depends on a complex and integrated process, allowing for real changes to be generated. First, is to accept that one must think in terms of systematic processes (massive, punctual, very short duration campaigns have not shown significant changes); Second, the processes must be directed at people and not at the masses. Third, training must be experiential, continuous, directed, monitored and fed back in such a way that changes can be made in an explicit, adaptive and strengthening way.

In this sense, it can be said that the problem of the conflict in Colombia is not the conflict itself; both legal and illegal groups have apparently laudable interests and ends. However, these interests were not initially resolved by peaceful means and led to violent actions consolidated in history as an armed conflict. This situation has formed implicit cultural tendencies, transmitted from generation to generation, where the conflict itself leads to thoughts of violence and war.

When analyzing the issue of conflict in the department of Nariño, it is important to note that Nariño is located in the south of the country, featuring fertile lands, its characteristic patchwork tapestry of fields, land strategically located on the equator that guarantees a variety of climates with its mountains, coast and Amazonia. It is possible that due to its distance from the center of the country, it has remained one of the most neglected departments by the National Government. The additional factor, of Nariño lying on the border of the country, only serves to exacerbate socio-economic problems and facilitate others such as drug trafficking.

It is a very large territory and access to several of its regions, due to the absence of first-level roads, is complicated. Tertiary road transportation exists and there are schools, although children and teachers are often faced with precarious conditions when travelling to the facilities. There is a notable absence of health institutions, not to mention the lack of job opportunities in the rural sector, especially in a place where the main employers are the municipal Mayor’s office, the health center or the hospital. In these circumstances, the inhabitants of the rural areas of the department have mostly dedicated themselves to agricultural activities, although they lack the means to facilitate the marketing of their products; it is often more profitable for them to simply give away the products of the farm or let them go to waste than take them out to urban centers for commercialization. This absence of the State in many areas of the national territory, has been taken advantage of by illegal armed groups who, in exchange for the cultivation of illicit products, have imposed their own law, offering security to their inhabitants; provided that their mandates are followed of course.

In much of the national territory, the campesino population saw the benefits of illicit crops, which grew in these fertile and forgotten lands, with little investment, without much care, in a short time and, most attractive of all, with good profit margins and with the guarantee of purchase (everything that is produced is sold). That was one of the great errors made by the State; leaving the territory in the hands of illegal groups. After these businesses took force and drug trafficking became one of the country’s biggest problems, the Government then wished to curb the cultivation, processing and commercialization of illicit crops, and recover these territories. It is under these conditions that the conflict transformed into a war between legal and illegal groups, leaving death, poverty, desolation, forced displacement, attacks and massacres in its wake, marking territories as red zones, which then further distanced them from any possibility of progress. Thus, the greatest victims of this were and continue to be the campesinos, the population that has remained at the center of the conflict, a war that has been going on for more than fifty years.

Subsequently, a negotiation period was propitiated, however, before specifying this event, it is appropriate to cite Ogliastri (2001) in the document “How do Colombians negotiate?”, where the author makes a tour of the country analyzing the cultural roots of the negotiation techniques used from the beginning of the conflict. From this, he argues that Colombians are accustomed to resolving conflicts through unilateral actions or by the use of force, as part of the authoritarian culture. The author outlines how Colombians are haggling negotiators; initially asking for a lot to later lower the amount, finding the midpoint between the two. There is also a belief that if the other party wins, you yourself have lost, along with personality traits that lead to the desire to win just for the satisfaction of seeing the opponent lose; a selfishness that prevents seeing midpoints where there are no losers, only winners. Typical of the armed conflict in Colombia, is the use of unilateral action followed by the wait for retaliation, strengthening extreme positions and involving yet more people. This has introduced the same human complexity, loaded with feelings of pain, frustration and irreparable moral damage, to both belligerents of the conflict, as it has to the innocent, including minors, peasants and residents of rural and urban areas. The civilian population has been caught up between the extreme positions, where the problem is solved by the one with the most power. For them, the difference between negotiation and war is not defined; everything is flexible. There are intermediate areas, but ultimately, one believes in winning or losing. This has led to extreme and contradictory behavior during the negotiations, beginning with great kindness and courtesy, but passing on to posturing with personal threats and open conflict, attempting to intimidate the other and force him to accept a way of thinking. These are the “soft” and “hard” versions of traditional negotiation; two sides of the same coin. This form of negotiation clearly demonstrates the selfish nature of human beings when fighting for survival and threatened or intimidated. Often, that struggle to survive has led Colombians to leave material wealth behind and give relevance to simply living, becoming a statistic within the alarmingly large numbers of displaced people. As mentioned by Ogliastri (2001), there is a cultural lack of social responsibility. There is merely a sense of solidarity towards the family and close groups. Nor is individual responsibility assumed in the face of society. It is a world of personalized relationships, where it is better not to get involved, with a frank and cold indifference felt towards the news of the day. With the density of conflict related events, one news story easily overshadows another, but the negative emotions of pain and resentment remain in the victims. In those people most affected by the war, the feeling of “belonging”, of warm and close supporting relations, are part of the survival in this hard, uncertain world, full of urgencies and needs. Ogliastri rightly states that to negotiate, there is a need for conflicting interests, but also an area of mutual convenience where the difference can be resolved.

This area of convenience between the parties –National Government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC– was indeed nurtured in Colombia, leading to a negotiation process that culminated in the signing of the peace treaty, which laid the foundations for peace.

Melo (2016), in the “Resumen del acuerdo de paz” or “Summary of the peace agreement”, in the “Revista de Economía Institucional” or “Journal of Institutional Economics”, summarizes that the document signed on September 26th is primarily an agreement whereby the FARC renounces its project, outlined since 1962 , to come to power through weapons, and agrees to follow the rules of Colombian democracy to pursue its political objectives.

The Government, for its part, renounces the imposition of penalties, on the rebels, defined by criminal law for their political, politically related or other crimes, and will stand by a set of approvals that allow FARC members to act legally in politics: brief approvals that do not imply, as a general rule, the loss of political rights for guerrilla leaders.

In this sense, the success of the agreement reflects the end of the FARC as an armed organization and its transformation into a party that is subject to legal norms and that benefits from some special support to act […].

Finally, although the agreement is based on the idea that the aim of the negotiation is to achieve the abandonment of weapons and the end of the armed conflict, and that the transformation that the country requires must be the result of peaceful political confrontation following democratic rules, it also addresses two other special issues due to the very close relationship they have had with the armed conflict in recent decades: the problem of land and that of drug trafficking.

In this sense the agreement considers:

The renunciation of armed struggle and the participation in democratic politics, amnesty and justice and comprehensive agrarian reform. Mentioning aspects related to drug trafficking, the FARC establishes a commitment to contribute, “effectively” and in a variety of ways, to the definitive solution to this problem. However, there are no specific commitments or clear obligations to provide information on drug processing or commercialization.

The Government is committed to “implementing” “policies and programs” to deal with the corruption caused by drugs, etc. Among other things, it commits to pursuing drug trafficking (p. 109) and money laundering, to controlling inputs, to the seizing of assets (a “new strategy of criminal policy” that includes “coordinating agencies”, a more “efficient use of resources”, the formulation of a new statute “against money laundering and control over the importation and commercialization of inputs for drug production”).

The items of fundamental importance, which simply reiterate current policies, are: the commitment to treat drug consumption as a health issue, which in general terms is already accepted in the country; and the voluntarily eradication of illicit crops, although if this is not achieved or communities oppose, manual eradication may be used. Campesino farmers will not be punished criminally, a policy which is already in place and is part of any sensible drug policy (which should focus on the repression of traffic and prosecution).

Now, after the signing of the aforementioned Peace Agreement, with the post-agreement period reached, the outlook was encouraging, both for Colombians and for the rest of the world. The people of Nariño believed that the war would finally be over, however, we are still very far from that wish becoming a reality. In the territory, the conflict for power, the struggle for the territories, drug trafficking, the illegal economy, all remain the same or stronger than before the Peace Agreement. The FARC did at first leave their weapons, however, non-demobilized ex-combatants formed new groups, which then imposed themselves upon the territory. Social leaders are now being killed for promoting the practice of peaceful coexistence; leaders who fight for the eradication of illicit crops and now give more value to peace and subjective factors that money cannot buy.

An unfiltered look shows there are no significant changes; there is even more violence Children and young people remain without opportunities, levels of education are low, informal employment is commonplace with the illegal economy paying more than the legal one, the culture of ‘conflict resolution being won by the strongest’ continues to generate displacements and the cultivation of illicit crops continues without check.

So, the questions would be: “What failed in the agreement? Where is the effective and lasting peace spoken of by Santos’ government?” One of the underlying problems is drug trafficking. The Government committed itself to “implementing policies and programs” to deal with drug-produced corruption, however, the programs are inefficient. In Nariño, farmers subscribed to the program of substitution, which offered economic benefits for voluntary substitution; the Government guaranteed a period of time with decent wages, as well as capital for new ventures. Unfortunately, the advice and support, as well as the delivery of resources, has not been provided in a timely manner, leading to farmers to wait for the end of the subsidy to re-cultivate. Another factor that has made it impossible to eradicate illegal crops has been due to the advantages they hold over legal crops, for example: the purchase of illegal crops is guaranteed, illegal groups search for the product and reach the farms, no matter how distant they may be; Prices are high and do not fluctuate drastically, therefore, the farmer perceives profits. Additionally, legal crops have a weakness with regards to their commercialization. In Nariño, the campesinos are excellent producers, but they lack processes for the transformation of their produce into value added products. They suffer from price fluctuations, a lack of access routes and the absence of associativity that would facilitate the combining of capacities, thereby strengthening their competitiveness within the sector. It is evident that illicit crops and therefore drug trafficking, are managed by illegal groups that move invisible threads and bring rupture to the social fabric, violence and desolation. On the other hand, in territories where illicit crops are not present, there is evidence of greater social cohesion, security and peace. Even though the rural sector has its share of problems, they are still territories of peace.

Conclusions

The post-agreement in Colombia has not generated the expected impact on the Nariño territory. The presence of illegal groups, the dissent of the FARC and the ELN have truncated the long-awaited peace in this territory.

Policies that favor the rural sector exist, however, the Government has not been able to give dynamism to the policies and this, together with the high corruption rates within the country, are a strong limitation. Regulations are lax and a culture that leads Colombia to believe that ‘rules are there to be broken’ has led to a number of social problems that impede peacebuilding.

Conflict is inherent in the human condition, therefore there is no “post-conflict”. Conflicts are present in every aspect of life; the problem is that there is no culture to resolve them. There is a lack of peaceful negotiation strategies; the belief is that if one party wins, the other loses. This, adds to the distrust and individualism that characterizes the Nariñense, leading to each one entrenching their position.

Peace in Colombia has become a utopia, the cost of war in the country has reached alarming figures that exceed investment in education and health. Nariño requires energizing agreements and the implemention of existing policies that really transform the culture of the territories with opportunities, education and social inclusion.

References

Melo, J. O. (2016).Resumen del acuerdo de paz. Revista de Economía Institucional, 18(35), pp. 319-337. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v18n35.19

Ogliastri, E. (2001). ¿Cómo negocian los colombianos? Bogotá: Alfaomega. Recuperado de https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228387677_Como_negocian_los_Colombianos

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNUD. (2016). Paz desde los territorios, una mirada subregional - Agenda de Paz Nariño 2013-2015. Pasto: Autor. Recuperado de: http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/colombia/docs/Paz/undp-co-MiradaSubregional4-2016.pdf

Tejada Zabaleta, A. (2008). Análise de um modelo integral baseado no paradigma da complexidade para a compreensão, definição, avaliação e aplicação das competências (tesis de doctorado). Instituto de Psicologia, Universidade de são Paulo, São Paulo.

Zuleta, Estanislao. (2015). Sobre la guerra. Revista Universidad de Antioquia, 334. http://aprendeenlinea.udea.edu.co/revistas/index.php/revistaudea/article/view/22402/18546