Читать книгу The Narrative of a Blockade-Runner - J. R. Wilkinson - Страница 10

Table of Contents

Ordered to New Orleans.—The Naval Fleet there.—The "River Defence" Squadron.—The iron clad "Louisiana."—Difficulty in managing the Fleet.—Going down the River.—Want of concert.—Admiral Farragut.—Our crew.

I was ordered to report to Commodore Whittle, commanding the naval station at New Orleans, for duty afloat. A powerful fleet of ships of war and bomb vessels, under the command of Commodore (afterwards Admiral) Farragut, was then assembling at the mouth of the Mississippi, for an attack upon New Orleans, in which a large land force under Gen. Butler (afterwards called the Beast) was to coöperate. The citizens were under the impression that the place was impregnable. Gen. Duncan, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, below the city, was considered one of the best artillerists in the service; and the land defence was intrusted to Gen. Lovell, with a well appointed force under his command. The people of that gay city were occupied as usual in business and pleasure, and continued unconscious of their peril up to the very time when the Federal fleet passed the forts. But the condition of affairs, so far as naval defence was concerned, was lamentable. The regular C. S. naval fleet consisted of the Louisiana (Captain McIntosh) and carrying the flag of Commodore Mitchell; the steamer McRae (Captain Huger), carrying six light 32-pounders and nine-inch pivot gun; the steamer Jackson (Captain Renshaw), with two pivoted smooth bore 32-pounders; the small ironplated "Ram" Manassas (Captain Warley), carrying one 32-pounder carronade in the bow; and two launches, each carrying a howitzer and a crew of twenty men. There were also present, at the time the passage was forced by the U. S. fleet, two Louisiana State gunboats, viz., the "Governor Moore," Captain Kennon, carrying two 32-pounder rifled guns, and the "General Quitman," with a similar battery. These were converted sea steamers, with pine and cotton barricades to protect the more vulnerable part of their machinery. All of the above vessels, with the exception of the Louisiana and Manassas, were too slightly built for war purposes. The unarmed steamboats, "Mozier," placed under Commodore Mitchell's command. In addition to the above force, there were six steamers carrying from one to two guns each, constituting what was called the "River Defence Squadron," under the command of Captain Stevenson. These vessels' boilers and machinery were protected by heavy timber barricades, filled in with compressed cotton; and they were prepared with bar-iron casing around their bows to act as "Rams."

The Louisiana was pierced for twelve guns rifled six-inch; and eight-inch shell guns, three in the bow, three in each broadside, and three in the stern. Her armor consisted of railroad-iron bars securely bolted upon the sides and ends of the long covered box built upon her nearly submerged hull. These sides and ends sloped at an angle of about forty-five degrees; around the upper deck was a stout bulwark about five feet high, and iron plated inside, to resist grape shot, and afford a protection to the sharp-shooters stationed there in action.

The propelling power consisted of huge wheels, boxed up in the centre of the vessel; and a propeller on each quarter. A more powerful and efficient iron-clad called the Mississippi had just been launched from the stocks, but the passage of the forts was effected before her battery could be put on board.

After a few days' service on board the Jackson, I was ordered on board the Louisiana (as executive officer) then lying alongside the "levee" at New Orleans. Her battery was not mounted; and the mechanics were at work upon her unfinished armor and machinery. Much was to be done, and with the most limited facilities; but many obstacles had been surmounted and affairs were progressing favorably, when we received orders from Commodore Whittle to proceed down the river as far as the forts. Our wheels were in working order; but a great deal was to be done to the propellers, and the crew were still engaged in mounting the guns. But Commodore Whittle, though cognizant of our condition, was compelled against his judgment, to yield to the urgent telegrams of General Duncan to send the Louisiana down the river. We had been unable to man the ship with sailors; for although many of this class belonged to the various volunteer companies around New Orleans, their commanding officers were not disposed to part with them; nor were the "jack tars" themselves willing to exchange camp life for the discipline and subordination of the naval service. Our regular crew being too small to man the battery, we gladly accepted the services of the "Crescent Artillery," a fine volunteer company raised in New Orleans. Two river steamboats were assigned to the Louisiana for the purpose of towage, if necessary, and for the accommodation of the mechanics who were still at work on board.

We cast off from the "levee" on Sunday, April the 20th. It was a bright day, and a large concourse was assembled to witness our departure. Steam had been got up, and as our big wheels were set in motion in the rapid current of the Mississippi, torrents of water rushed through the crevices in the bulkheads and deluged the gun deck, while the Louisiana drifted helplessly down the river, feeling the effect of the wheels no more sensibly than if they were a pair of sculling oars. "Facilis descensus Averno; sed revocare gradum, hoc opus, hic labor est." The aptness of the quotation will be appreciated by the reader who is in at the death of the Louisiana. We accomplished our object of getting down to the forts about seventy miles below the city, thanks to the current and our two transports; but our artillerists were in a shabby plight while trying to work the guns knee-deep in water.

Securing the Louisiana by hawsers to the left bank of the river near Fort St. Philip, on the morning of the 21st, we continued our labors upon the machinery and on the battery. The bombardment of the forts had been in progress for several days and nights, and the shells from the fleet were thrown with beautiful and destructive precision (some of them occasionally falling in close proximity to the Louisiana,) while the bomb vessels themselves were beyond the range of the fort's guns. The naval officers were quite sure that an attempt would soon be made by Admiral Farragut to force the passage, and that so far as the naval strength was concerned, it was apparent our means were inadequate to prevent it.

Commodore Mitchell, on our arrival below, had delivered to Captain Stevenson written orders from General Lovell requiring him to place all the "River Defence Squadron" under the Commodore's orders. Captain S., on receiving these instructions, addressed a written communication to Commodore Mitchell, to the effect that all of the officers and crew under his command had entered the service with the distinct understanding that they were not to be placed under the command of naval officers; and that, while willing to coöperate with our forces, he would receive no orders from the Commodore nor allow any vessel under his command to do so; reserving to himself the right of obeying or disobeying any orders the Commodore might issue. With this assumption of absolute independence, Commodore Mitchell's position was extremely embarrassing, but he did all that was then in his power. Not knowing at what moment an attack would be made, he endeavored to agree with Captain Stevenson upon a plan of coöperation; and he states in his official report made after the action that Captain Stevenson "seemed disposed zealously to second these objects in many respects."

A few days previous to the action, I had been sent down the river to communicate, under a flag of truce, with one of the ships of the squadron; and in the course of conversation with my old friend Captain DeCamp, the officer in command of a division of the fleet had been informed by him that they could force the obstructions across the river whenever they pleased, and intended doing so when they were ready. The interview took place in his cabin; and although I indignantly repudiated the idea, I could not help feeling how confidently I would stake life and reputation upon the issue if our situations were reversed. I had noticed many familiar faces among the officers and crew as I passed along the deck a few moments before. Every one was at his station; the guns cast loose for action; and it was in the nature of things, that I should contrast this gallant man of war and all this efficiency and discipline with the iron bound box and crew of "horse marines" which I had just left. But it was in no spirit of depreciation of the gallantry of my comrades, for I was quite sure that they would stand to their guns. The wretched "bowl of Gotham" which had no efficient motive power, and which could not even be got under way, when anchored, without slipping the chain cable, caused the misgivings. It is no disparagement to the prowess of the U. S. fleet which passed the forts, to assert, that they never could have successfully opposed our forces; but the battle was won quite as effectually when they succeeded in passing beyond the range of the guns of the forts and the "Louisiana."

After our official business was closed, DeC. and I began to talk of the war; and he expressed the opinions then entertained, beyond a doubt, by a majority of U. S. army and naval officers. They believed it to be the intention of the Government to bring the seceding States back into the Union, with their rights and institutions unimpaired. Since then a little leaven has leavened the whole lump, and the former doctrine of the extreme abolitionists has long become the creed of the dominant party. But some facts should be borne in mind by those who denounce slavery as the sum of all villanies; for instance, that the slave code of Massachusetts was the earliest in America; the cruelest in its provisions and has never been formally repealed; that the Plymouth settlers, according to history, maintained "that the white man might own and sell the negro and his offspring forever;" that Mr. Quincy, a representative from Massachusetts during the war of 1812, threatened the House of Congress that the North would secede "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must" unless their demands for peace were acceded to; and lastly that the abolitionists of a later age denounced the Constitution and canonized John Brown for committing a number of murders and endeavoring to incite servile insurrection in time of peace. Truly "tempora mutantur," etc.

The river obstructions, above alluded to, consisted of a line of sunken vessels, and of heavy pieces of timber chained together, and extending from bank to bank. A few days before the attack was made, General Duncan was speaking rather confidently of his barricade, when Warley remarked, "General, if I commanded a fleet below, and my commission lay above your obstructions, I would come up and get it." Most of us belonging to that little naval fleet, knew that Admiral Farragut would dare to attempt what any man would; and for my own part, I had not forgotten that while I was under his command during the Mexican War, he had proposed to Commodore Perry, then commanding the Gulf Squadron, and urged upon him, the enterprise of capturing the strong fort of San Juan de Ulloa at Vera Cruz by boarding. Ladders were to be constructed and triced up along the attacking ships' masts; and the ships to be towed along side the walls by the steamers of the squadron. Here was a much grander prize to be fought for; and every day of delay was strengthening his adversaries. It was the general belief, indeed, at the time, that the admiral was in daily communication with the city by means of spies; and the public indignation was so deeply roused against Mr. T—t, the constructor of the Mississippi, ("a Northern man with Southern principles") who failed from time to time in launching that vessel as he had appointed to do, that he was in danger of "Lynch law"; and it is at least a singular coincidence that the naval attack was made immediately after that powerful vessel was launched, and before the guns could be put on board. But the idea of any collusion between Mr. T—t and the enemy, or of treachery on the part of the former, was never entertained, I believe, except by a few bigoted zealots, blinded by hate and passion against every one born north of the Potomac.

This class, which ought to have acted more fairly, found many followers among the multitude; from which little charity or justice can ever be expected. Nearly 1900 years ago the "plebes," influenced by their leaders, demanded the release of a robber and murderer and crucified the Saviour of mankind; and history further informs us that 500 years before that era, a Greek citizen could be banished without special trial, accusation, or defence; and that Aristides was sent into exile because people were tired of hearing him always called "the Just." Social ostracism will continue to exist till the millennium. The gentlemen of northern birth who were so unfortunate as to occupy prominent positions during the war, were mercilessly held up to scorn and distrust, if they failed to come up to the public expectation. In truth, they occupied trying positions; being regarded by many as aliens and mercenaries. "Mens conscia recti" will support us under many trials; but it does not furnish armor of proof against the "poor man's scorn, the proud man's contumely."

The interval between the 21st and 24th of April was occupied by Commodore Mitchell in organizing the force under his command, and in endeavoring to arrange some concert of action with the "River Defence" gunboats.

On board the Louisiana every effort was made to complete the works upon the propellers, and in mounting the battery, on which the mechanics worked night and day. Our "Crescent artillery;" a detachment of artillery from the forts under Lieutenant Dixon; and Captain Ryan's company of Sharp-shooters supplied the deficiencies in our crew. The Commodore was unsuccessful in his efforts to induce Captain Stevenson to employ one of his gunboats below the obstructions at night, to watch the U. S. fleet; and we had no vessel suitable for that purpose; the only one which would have answered (the Jackson) having been sent, with one of the launches, to watch the U. S. land forces near the Quarantine station, five miles above us. The only launch which remained to us was sent, by the Commodore's orders, below the obstructions every night, but the officer in command afterwards proved either a traitor or a coward, failing to make the concerted signal upon the approach of the fleet, and never reporting himself on board the Louisiana afterwards.

General Duncan urged upon the Commodore, the first or second day after our arrival below, to take a new position with the Louisiana at the river bank just below Fort St. Philip, and under cover of its guns, from whence she might open fire with effect upon the mortar fleet. The Commodore declined the proposition, and his action was sustained in a consultation with all the commanding officers of the C. S. naval forces present, on the grounds, "first, that the battery of the Louisiana was not in a condition for service;" "second, that the completion of the propeller and other mechanical work in progress, was indispensable to the efficiency of the vessel, and that it would be interrupted if she were placed under fire;" and third, "that placing the Louisiana in a position to receive the fire of the enemy, before her own battery could be served with effect, would be improperly hazarding, not only her own safety, but the security of the passage between the forts on which rested the possession of New Orleans."[3]

But on the afternoon of the 23d the work had so far progressed as to encourage the belief that the vessel might be moved to the point proposed, and the Commodore, after making a reconnoissance, had decided to do so, and notified General Duncan of this intention. Captain Stevenson was to assist with two of his gunboats which were especially well adapted to this purpose.

Commodore Mitchell, in his official report to the C. S. Secretary of the Navy, intimates that "he fully appreciated and admitted the importance of the proposed change of position for the Louisiana," but contends that "the state of the battery, independent of other weighty reasons, was sufficient to prevent its being made previous to the engagement of the 24th." One of these consists in the fact, that owing to the peculiar construction of the Louisiana's port-holes, her guns could not be elevated more than five degrees. The mortar fleet would have been beyond their range.