Читать книгу An Experiment with Time - J. W. Dunne - Страница 6

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Now, although it is scientifically indisputable that the brain, regarded as a purely physical piece of mechanism, cannot create, unassisted and out of nothingness, any of those vivid psychical appearances we call 'colour', 'sound', 'taste', etc., it may be taken as experimentally established that these phenomena do not come into existence unless accompanied by some stimulation of the corresponding sense organs. Moreover, they vary in character according to the character of the sense organ involved: lights and colours accompany activities of the optic nerves; sounds are associated with the existence of ears; tastes with palates. The psychical phenomena are different where the sensory organizations are different. Colour experiences in man range from violet to deep red, according to the wave-lengths of the electro-magnetic rays impinging upon the eye. If that wave-length be further slightly increased, the associated psychical experience is one of heat alone. But we know that, with a very little modification of the sensitive optical elements involved, those heat experiences would be accompanied by experiences of a visible infra-red colour.

Thus, the physical brain, though it cannot create such sensory appearances, is a prime factor in their characterization, and, for that reason, an important factor in whatever process it may be that causes them to appear.

The situation, thus far, is usually summed up in the cautious statement that these particular kinds of psychical phenomena, on the one hand, and their corresponding sense-organ stimulations, on the other, invariably accompany one another, or run, so to say, on parallel tracks in Time. This, be it noted, is never advanced as an 'explanation': it is merely supposed to be a simple way in which the facts can be announced without dragging in the various metaphysical creeds favoured by the various announcers.

Psychoneural Parallelism.

The assumption that this 'parallelism' of psychical and neural (nervous) events extends to all observable thought-experience—that there is no observable psychical activity without some corresponding activity of brain—is called 'Psychoneural Parallelism'; the activity in either class being referred to as the 'correlate' of that in the other.

The accumulated evidence in favour of this view is practically overwhelming. Hard thinking induces brain fatigue; drugs which poison the brain interfere with our reasoning processes; brain deterioration affects our ability to form new memories. Above all, 'concussion' of the brain appears to destroy all memory of the events which immediately preceded the accident—indeed, it is by the failure of the patient to remember what led up to that accident that the physician diagnoses concussion. This provides us with almost indisputable evidence that the means of remembering are 'brain-traces' which require a little time for their assured establishment.

That such brain-traces (insulated paths formed by the passage of nervous currents) do, in fact, exist, is very probable; and, moreover, it has been shown that the greater the ability of the individual to perform associative thinking, the more numerous and the more complex in their ramifications are the brain paths in question.

Observer.

We have now arrived within introductory range of that very meek-spirited creature known to modern science as the 'Observer'. It is a permanent obstacle in the path of our search for external reality that we can never entirely get rid of this individual. Picture the universe how we may, the picture remains of our making. On the other hand, it is, probably, equally true that, paint the picture how we will, we have to do it with the paints provided. But there is no reason why either of these limitations should invalidate the result regarded as a map by which we may safely set our course. Moreover, we can test it in that respect; and experience has shown that, thus tested, it proves reliable. Therein lies the justification of our search for knowledge.

The general procedure in every science is to begin by the accurate tabulating of differences in what is observed. If we subsequently discover that these differences are due to the character or actions of the observer, we can note that such is the explanation of the difference and draft our science accordingly; but that addition to our knowledge does not invalidate our previous analysis of the differences as observed.

All sciences deal only with a standard observer, unless the contrary is explicitly stated; and psychology is no exception to this rule. Its observer is assumed to be any normally constituted individual.

Now, it must be admitted that the tenets of psychoneural parallelism are not very encouraging to this 'observer'. For they suggest that, when the brain-workings come to an end, the psychical phenomena cease likewise from troubling. Moreover, the scientific procedure of pushing the observer as far back as possible—so as to get as much as possible of the picture into the category of that which is observed—tends to reduce him to the level of a helpless onlooker with no more capacity for interference than has a member of a cinema audience the ability to alter the course of the story developing before him on the screen. Nor is there much more comfort to be obtained from a study of the various metaphysical interpretations (none of them offer an explanation) of this parallelism of Mind and Body. Idealist and Realist may dispute hotly as to precisely how far the observer colours, so to say, the phenomena which he observes; but decisions arrived at in that respect need not suggest that he has any power of changing either the colouring he confers or the thing perceived as thus coloured—much less the ability to continue observing when there is no longer any brain activity to be observed.

Animism.

In this connection, however, we must recognize the existence of a small but very vigorous group of philosophers known as 'Animists'. In this twentieth century the leading exponent of Animism is indubitably Professor William McDougall, whose book, Body and Mind, sets out the arguments for and against the theory with scrupulous fairness. Indeed, I cannot call to mind anyone who has stated the case against Animism with such devastating force.

Animism holds that the observer is anything but a nonentity. He is no 'conscious automaton'. He may, indeed, stand right outside the pictured universe; but he is a 'soul', with powers of intervention which enable him to alter the course of observed events—a mind which not only reads the brain, but which employs it as a tool. Much as the owner of an automatic piano may either listen to its playing or play on it himself.

The inference is that this observer can survive the destruction of that brain which he observes. As for his intervention, there is no insuperable objection to that from the physical side. McDougall quotes and suggests various ways in which intervention could be effected without adding to or subtracting from the amount of energy in the nervous system.

The man-in-the-street is always at a loss to understand why the great majority of men of science are so coldly opposed to the idea of a 'soul'. The religious man in particular cannot comprehend why his arguments should arouse not merely opposition, but bitter contempt. Yet the reason is not far to seek. It is not that the idea is attributed to man's inordinate conceit (though this is sometimes done by the unreflecting); for, all said and done, a navvy who can walk into a public-house and order a pot of beer is an infinitely more wonderful thing than is the biggest lump of cooling mud that ever swam in the skies. But there can be no reasonable doubt that the idea of a soul must have first arisen in the mind of primitive man as the result of observation of his dreams. Ignorant as he was, he could have come to no other conclusion but that, in dreams, he left his sleeping body in one universe and went wandering off into another. It is considered that, but for that savage, the idea of such a thing as a 'soul' would never have even occurred to mankind; so that arguments subsequently introduced to bolster up a case thus tainted at its source can have no claim to anyone's serious attention.