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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

What is the attitude of Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia or the United States upon this or that question?

Such a query you often hear, and perhaps you stop to wonder how it is when the collective opinion of any one country cannot be known in a short time, that there can be such a thing as a German attitude, an English or an American attitude, or who has a right to determine upon this or that as our attitude.

Well, it is evident that in domestic affairs, that is to say in national affairs, we as a people can take time to deliberate and choose our path; and it is just as evident that in international affairs we cannot always do so. “It is the unexpected that happens”, and we must have some means of meeting emergencies that will not wait. Hence a free people is least free, theoretically, when it has to do with the claims of treaties and international law, for it cannot take time to consider and decide upon all the facts; nay, even legislatures may interfere seriously with the proper discharge of such duties; so that in actual practice, even the most democratic nations have found it best to entrust the management of foreign affairs, or in other words, the preservation of their national equilibrium, to a Premier, Chancellor or Foreign Secretary, who is generally the ablest statesman that the country can afford.

This officer, with slightly differing functions, is known in our country as the Secretary of State, and he presides over the State Department. Probably there is no office under our Constitution that requires greater sagacity, greater breadth of intellectual grasp and practical training than this one of Secretary of State, and the fact that it has been held by such men as Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, James Madison, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, William H. Seward and James G. Blaine is sufficient evidence of its importance.

It was intended at first that the cabinet officers should be as nearly equal as possible, and the salaries were fixed and remain the same to this day; but in the nature of the case they could not remain of equal importance, for the Department of State is more intimately associated with the President than any other. Washington would not allow foreign ministers to address him—they must reach him properly through the State Department,—hence, if for no other reason, it is easy to see how the Secretary of State assumed an official dignity that does not belong to the other cabinet officers.

Let us see how he stands related to the general government. Suppose we assume the attitude of an intelligent foreigner, looking at the “Great Republic” from the outside, and trying to discover into whose hands the logical working out of the Constitution has placed the real power.

It has been said^[1] that we will at length discover that in all ordinary times of peace the government is practically in the hands of six men, namely,—

 the President and two men whom he appoints—

 the Secretary of State, and

 the Secretary of the Treasury;

 the Speaker and two men whom he appoints—

 the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, and

 the Chairman of the Committee of Appropriations.

Of these six, one-half are concerned with the finances of the government; and of the other half, one is the Chief Executive, another may be called the chief legislative factor, while the third is our official representative to the rest of the world. This practical division of the functions of government does not seem to agree very well with the more theoretical division into legislative, executive and judicial. In other words, finance has assumed an importance it was not intended to have, just as was observed concerning the Secretary of State.

It may seem rather strange to speak of one of our officials as the chief social functionary in our governmental machinery, but we have such a one, and he is no other than the Secretary of State. The office of functionary host for the government might be supposed to belong naturally to the President, who is spared this duty, however, owing to the multiplicity of others that are unavoidable. Consequently the Secretary of State, because of the breadth of the field of his operations, bringing him into touch with representatives of other nations as well as the principal statesmen of our own, and because, moreover, diplomacy’s natural atmosphere has always been that of society, must “keep open house”, as it were, for the Republic. This alone would be a sufficient burden for any one man, but it is expected that the Assistant Secretaries of State shall share it with him. Thus our Secretary maintains the only semblance of a court that will be tolerated by our “fierce democracie”, and even for this we do not contribute a cent of support, though around it and through it operate vast interests, both national and international. It is a manifest injustice to these officials that we do not provide for such legitimate expenses as must necessarily occur on these semi-official, semi-social occasions.

Now let us see what is the scope of the State Department, for it is much more than a foreign office, though that is its principle function. It embraces the duties which in other countries are given to the Keeper of the Seal, the Minister of Justice, etc., such as—

 (1) keeping, promulgating and publishing the laws,

 (2) custody of the Great Seal,

 (3) preservation of the Government Archives, and

 (4) charge of all official relations between the general Government and the several States.

Its scope is more particularly indicated by the bureaus into which it is divided, namely,—

 the Bureau of Indexes and Archives;

 the Bureau of Accounts of the State Department;

 the Bureau of Rolls and Library;

 the Bureau of Appointments;

 the Bureau of Statistics, or Foreign Commerce;

 the Consular Bureau;

 the Diplomatic Bureau.

Each of these bureaus is presided over by a chief, and at the head of them all is the chief clerk, who is “the executive officer of the Department of State under the direction of the Secretary.”

The Bureau of Indexes and Archives is a sort of postoffice and recorder’s office combined, for it receives the incoming mail, opens it and classifies it as either diplomatic, consular or miscellaneous, then indexes it so that if necessary it can be readily traced, and then turns over to the Chief Clerk the diplomatic correspondence and the more important consular and miscellaneous correspondence. This the Chief Clerk reads, and the most important is submitted to the Assistant Secretaries of State, while the remainder is turned over to the various bureaus for their attention. Likewise after the Secretary and his Assistants have signified the replies which are to be made to the most important of the mail and have examined and signed the same, it is collected from all the bureaus, and the out-going mail is indexed in another set of books.

The Bureau of Accounts of the State Department classifies its business as follows:

(1) International indemnities, or trust funds. If you are an American citizen living abroad and suffer a loss of property unlawfully, you may expect the loss to be made good through this Bureau of Accounts; that is unless you happen to be a missionary, for Uncle Sam doesn’t always extend, or try to extend, to missionaries the same protection that is enjoyed by other citizens living abroad.

(2) Diplomatic and consular accounts, i. e., the salaries paid to these officers, together with all expenses incidental to the service.

(3) Accounts of the Department proper.

(4) Passports. If you wish to secure passports before going abroad, it must be done through the State Department, as they are issued nowhere else in the United States.

The telegraphic correspondence of the State Department, mostly in cipher, is conducted by this bureau.

The Bureau of Rolls and Library has the custody of the laws and treaties of the United States, together with the Revolutionary archives, etc. Its chief business is the “publication of the laws, treaties, proclamations and executive orders, work which must be performed with the utmost attainable promptness, speed and accuracy”, and its busy time is just after the adjournment of Congress. It is this Bureau that is honored with the custody of the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States. It also has charge of the following:

 The records and papers of the Continental Congress,

 The Washington papers,

 The Madison papers,

 The Jefferson papers,

 The Hamilton papers,

 The Monroe papers,

 The Franklin papers,

 The papers of the Quartermaster General’s Department during the Revolutionary period.

The Bureau of Appointments receives applications and recommendations for office. It issues commissions, exequaturs and warrants of extradition—terms to be explained in connection with the consular service.

It also has charge of the Great Seal of the United States, a symbol of authority which has been carefully guarded by one faithful man for nearly fifty-three years.

The Bureau of Statistics, or of Foreign Commerce as it is now called, takes charge of the data gathered all over the world by the consular service. Whatever is of immediate importance is published without delay in the “Advance Sheets” of the Consular Reports, and these are distributed to boards of trade, the press and elsewhere. This prompt distribution of valuable information was begun in January, 1898, and since that time the American system of Consular Reports is freely acknowledged the best in the world.

The Consular Bureau is charged with correspondence with the consular service. The variety of this correspondence cannot be guessed by those unfamiliar with the Consular Reports, but its extent may be inferred from the fact that out of 1,000 officers in this service, perhaps half of them correspond with the Department. In addition to the above, this bureau has much to do by way of interview with consular officers coming and going. Moreover, this bureau has charge of examinations of applicants, and after a candidate is appointed it furnishes the particular instructions for the position in view. This Bureau must keep itself informed as to the personnel of the service, and must even send inspectors to the various consulates and report thereupon. “Recently”, we are told, “the Chief of the Bureau personally visited over one hundred consulates in Cuba, Mexico, Canada, Europe, India, China, and Japan”.

Last and most important of all, politically, is the Diplomatic Bureau. Its dealings are with our own diplomatic officials at foreign capitals, and with foreign diplomats at Washington. It is chiefly concerned, as we are told, with the “examination, consideration and discussion of diplomatic subjects, such as treaties, claims, questions of international law, and policy, etc.”

So this last sentence is the only tantalizing peep we are allowed to have within the sanctuary of the State Department. This Bureau with which the Secretary and his three Assistants are chiefly concerned shares its secrets with very few. The expediency of observing secrecy in international politics was noticed before; but there is another side to the question which most of us see and perhaps some of us talk about, and that is the point in negotiations at which the government may take the public into its confidence.

For the public feels, and has a right to feel, that it has a proprietary interest in public affairs. More than this, it is in an unhealthy state when it doesn’t feel such an interest. The public, at least the enlightened public, knows that secrecy is apt to be troublesome anywhere, especially in government. It knows of many a historic instance of corruption fostered by secrecy, of intrigue, cabal, plot and counterplot, until the whole fabric of the state became vitiated. The public,—that is, the American public,—may have some reason to dread secrecy in local government, for many an alderman wants nothing better than to be let alone, and many a “convention boss” with a few “ring” associates would prefer to “fix the ticket” without any inspection by the public whom he expects in a few days to browbeat into supporting it.

Granting that we haven’t been watchful enough as to local politics, how is it nationally? How about the Department of State—for that alone is the place where secrecy is justifiable?

It was said by an authority on American diplomacy about fifteen years ago that “there is scarcely a country, even Russia or Germany, where so little is known by the public of the negotiations carried on at any one time by the Secretary of State”. What did this indicate? the efficiency of our government as a negotiating machine? Did it indicate an indifference of our people to their welfare? Well, however it may have been at that time, it is certain that there has been a growing and insistent demand during the present decade that negotiations shall be revealed at the earliest possible moment. Public opinion has even been known to dictate foreign policy—nay, more, to reverse it after it had once been determined upon by the State Department, as in the case of the notorious “Queen Lil”. Indeed, this instance in our diplomatic history shows very satisfactorily that no administration can stand or ought to stand against the overwhelming volume of enlightened public opinion raised against an unpopular measure or a distrusted service. The public is bound to know whenever it can, and when it can not it is bound to guess, and its guessing may be more disturbing to foreign negotiations than a knowledge of the facts. Thus, while it may not always be able to determine the course of negotiations, it is always in its power to seriously affect them and ultimately to overthrow them.

But such cases as that of the Hawaiian queen are rare, and the American public fortunately has seldom had reason to apprehend that state affairs were being grossly mismanaged. Perhaps, on the other hand, it has needed at times to be cautioned against over-insistence upon its right to news—a vulgar itching for a sensational stimulant. Perhaps it has needed the reminder that it “had its say”, directly or indirectly, in the choice of officers, and that having chosen them, it should, as a rule, reserve criticism until election time returns; for between an eternal “nagging” of public officials and a profound indifference to public affairs there isn’t much to choose. The New England town-meeting has often been justly commended for cultivating an interest in public affairs; but, on the other hand, it frequently sets up its select-men merely to be targets of abuse. No nation and no community can have, or deserves to have, the best possible government when its officials are subjected to a perpetual cross fire of criticism.

The Secretary of State should have as free a hand as possible in the great game of world politics, for the state being a gigantic business firm, must, like all such firms, keep its business to itself.

It has long been a standing objection to federal governments such as ours that they are “weak in the conduct of foreign affairs”, the imputation being that they are weak because the Secretary of State lacks the initiative afforded by a more centralized government. But, as a matter of fact, the same official in England, France, Italy, or Spain, is more likely to be called upon for the progress of foreign negotiations than in our own country.

But the Constitution does not grant the Secretary, that is to say, the Executive, entire freedom in foreign affairs, for it explicitly states that “the President shall have power, by and with the consent and advice of the Senate, to make treaties ... to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,” etc. However, this restraint is not always irksome, and it may sometimes prove salutary. It is always a measure of assurance to the people that the administration will not commit the government to an unwise policy; and more than this, it is an assurance to a power with which we may be dealing that the result of the negotiations is not likely to be repudiated by the people when the chief executive is backed by the legislature.

The Senate entrusts its diplomatic functions, except in the ratification of treaties and the approval of the appointments of ambassadors, to its Committee on Foreign Affairs. This Committee leaves the initiative in diplomacy to the State Department, taking care, nevertheless, to keep track of any negotiations that may be pending. Whenever the Senate wishes to know the progress of negotiations it passes resolutions calling for them, the Chief Clerk of the Department gets them ready, and the Senate then meets in closed session during their consideration. Thus diplomatic business is fairly well guarded and at the same time a reassuring degree of legislative oversight is maintained. To be sure, we hear more or less criticism of Senate control, which in the nature of the case must mean a sacrifice of expediency, yet it remains to be seen whether or not our system is too cumbersome for prompt, prudent and adroit statesmanship when brought into closer rivalry with Europe.

For there is no doubt that for good or for ill we are entering upon a degree of activity in world politics such as we have never known heretofore. Consequently it becomes a matter of the highest necessity that our whole diplomatic machinery be in a condition to afford the greatest utility. Diplomacy in these modern times is said to be the art of maintaining peace; but it sometimes implies a rivalry, nevertheless, which is far from pacific. We should remember, therefore, that European diplomats have behind them the advantage of many years of study of their great problems from their own standpoint and the judgment of men of the greatest sagacity upon intricacies of long standing, and that most of them have governments more centralized than our own. It means a great deal to be able to quote in support of a position the weight of an authority like Metternich, Cavour, Bismarck, Gortschakoff, Richelieu, Grotius or Canning. But if anyone thinks that America is putting herself in a fair way to be worsted in this greatest of fields of intellectual battle, let him read the history of American diplomacy and let him study the part she has recently played in the world drama. If he thinks she is taking this greater part without adequate prestige, let him but observe the flattering attention she is now receiving, the coquetry for her favor and the dread of her rivalry to be observed in every quarter.

The State Department, therefore, may be expected to meet its new obligation successfully, provided it is allowed to act without too much interruption by people or legislature, and provided that the same wise discretion is observed in the choice of its chief officer that has usually been exercised.

It may not be out of place to mention here another provision which lies outside of the province of the State Department but affects its usefulness, nevertheless. A well-known case which occurred in Louisiana a few years ago, illustrates the point. A number of Italians, members of a band called the Mafia, were killed by a mob, and as a consequence loud complaints came from the Italian people, and many bitter criticisms were urged against a government which must needs leave the administration of justice for aliens within its borders to any locality where prejudice was evidently high. Our government could only give assurances of a satisfactory settlement of the matter; but it was humiliating to feel the powerlessness of the United States to take the administration of justice in a case involving foreigners out of the hands of the State of Louisiana and into its own. Such cases have happened more than once in our history, and the fact that they are liable to occur at any time is a standing menace to our peace, and will be so until the proper legislation is enacted. This is an acknowledged weakness in our government, a source of annoyance and humiliation to every patriotic American, and of embarrassment to the State Department. One cannot do better in view of such a defect and our comparative indifference to it, than to quote the warning comment of James Bryce: “As it is, that which might prove to a European nation a mortal disease is here nothing worse than a teasing ailment. This is why Americans submit, not merely patiently but hopefully, to the defects of their government. The vessel may not be any better built or formed or rigged than are those which carry the fortunes of the great nations of Europe. She is certainly not better navigated. But for the present at least,—it may not always be so,—she sails upon a summer sea.”

We have been considering the State Department thus far with respect to its relation to the general government, its chief officer, its division into the various bureaus and some general remarks upon its most distinctive feature, the Diplomatic Bureau. There remain several minor topics to be briefly presented, leaving until the next lecture the method of choosing men for the consular and diplomatic service, a subject which might profitably be considered here.

The Department has varied in its scope somewhat from time to time, now enlarging its domain as the country grew, and greater needs developed, and now surrendering some of its functions to other departments, mainly the Department of the Interior. It was first known before the outbreak of the Revolution as the “Committee of Secret Correspondence”, with Benjamin Franklin at its head. Next it was known (1777) as the “Committee for Foreign Affairs”, and its first Secretary, Thomas Paine, was dismissed for making an official matter public. Next (1789) it was known as the Department for Foreign Affairs, and finally as the Department of State, with Thomas Jefferson as the Secretary. The Patent Office originated under this Department, but in 1849, when the Department of the Interior was organized, it was formally transferred to that department. In the same way the Census Bureau was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1850. Likewise, until the organization of the Department of the Interior, the affairs of the Territories remained under the Department of State.

One important functionary not mentioned among the bureaus is the Solicitor. This officer is detailed from the Department of Justice to “examine claims by or against foreign governments” and to advise upon points of international law involved in treaties, protocols, etc. The Solicitor is not subject, in the discharge of his duties, to the direction of the Attorney General.

Besides the regular business of this department, and in addition to the work of the Diplomatic Service, there are a number of bureaus and foreign commissions appointed for purposes more or less temporary, many of which require diplomatic ability of the highest order and others technical skill and knowledge. There are at present under commission the following:

(1) Bureau of the American Republics, with a Director, a Secretary, five translators, an Editor of the Monthly Bulletin, a Chief Clerk and a Chief of the Division of Information.

(2) Intercontinental Railway Commission, four members.

(3) United States and Mexican Water Boundary Commission, three American and three Mexican members.

(4) Nicaragua Canal Commission, three members.

(5) Commission to the Paris Exposition of 1900, three members.

(6) Reciprocity Commission, a special Commissioner, a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary and a Messenger.

(7) Consular Board of Examiners, under Executive Order of Sept. 20, 1895, three members.

(8) Joint High Commission, six members besides a Secretary and a Messenger.

(9) International Tribunal of Egypt, three members.

(10) Dispatch Agents, three; at New York, San Francisco and London, England, respectively.

Such, then, is the State Department to-day. Is it likely to assume a greater importance in the future? That may well be, for though it may lose still other functions besides those it has already parted with, there will always remain the one characteristic class of business known as foreign relations, and this seems likely to increase in volume and interest. It is possible that it may yet become the department through which the influence of the Executive shall reach the dependencies, when the necessity for military occupation shall have gone by.

Now, before throwing the subject open for discussion, I wish to refer you for further information to the publications with which the State Department has kindly furnished me and from which I have gathered most of the data that I have given you. Among the most interesting and instructive of its publications are the “Historical Papers”, previously mentioned, its works on “international law, diplomacy, and the laws of foreign nations”, the “Consular Regulations”, “Consular Reports” and various editions of “State Papers”, “Messages and Documents” and the “Report of the Committee on the Conduct of Business in the Executive Departments”. The subject is now open for question or discussion.

After some moments’ silence the Professor remarked—“I should have said at the proper time that there is a House Committee for Foreign Affairs, as well as a Senate Committee. However, it has no diplomatic functions—it merely serves as an auditing committee.”

Q. “How much does the Secretary of State get a year?”

A. “$8,000. It was once raised to $10,000 and the very next year it was reduced to $8,000.”

Q. “And on that salary he ‘keeps open house’, as you say, for the Republic?”

“Just so.”

“Humph!”

“But, Professor”, said a wise-looking man near the platform, “I suppose you think it is good policy to stick to our traditional simplicity? What’s the use of so much entertaining? Is that a necessary part of government?”

“Well”, said the Professor, “I would say that our traditional simplicity is all right as an ideal, provided we don’t make a religion out of it. Hospitality is also a good ideal to keep before the people,—international courtesy, if you please,—and perhaps there is as much virtue in the one as in the other. At any rate, if there were no other reason, no self-respecting nation would allow its representatives abroad to receive every courtesy and not make an equal endeavor to return the courtesy. Now, entertaining costs money, and there is no government appropriation for any such purpose, thanks to our democratic ideals, and as was shown before, the burden of it falls on the Secretary of State, which is unjust; for it is well known that the salaries we pay our national officers are ridiculously small when compared with those of other nations. Some measures should be taken, apparently, to meet this legitimate expenditure. Have I answered your question?”

“Yes, but I think just the same as I did before.”

“Exactly.”

“Professor,” said another man, “you have spoken of the Secretary of State as if he were responsible for our foreign policy; but do you not mean that the President is responsible?”

“The Secretary is responsible to the President and the President to the people”, said the Professor; “that is to say, the Secretary is responsible potentially and the President officially. If they were to differ in opinion, why, of course, that of the President would prevail.”

“Do you not think that our Secretary of State should be elected by Congress, in some such way as the Premier and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is elected in England?”

“No, not by any means. Foreign affairs belong essentially to the executive, not the legislative branch of government. France, in my opinion, is particularly unfortunate in that its Foreign Secretary is chosen by the President and the Premier, but is responsible to the legislature. In Germany, according to the constitution, ‘the Emperor represents the Empire internationally’. He can even ‘declare war if it is defensive, make peace, enter into treaties with other nations, and appoint and receive ambassadors’. Hence, you see, as between Germany and the rest of the world, the Kaiser can almost say, ‘I am the State’; which, if the Kaiser is infallible, is a very fine thing. But to return to your question, it is not quite exact to say that in Great Britain the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is elected by and responsible to Parliament. He is not always the Premier as he is at present; besides, you must remember that with us the Cabinet is an advisory board to the executive, while in Great Britain, the Cabinet virtually is the executive. Hence, no good analogy can be drawn.”

“Do I understand, Professor, that in your opinion, our system compares favorably with the corresponding systems of other countries?”

“That is certainly my opinion. The Senate oversight—the only feature that is severely criticized—may at times be troublesome and costly, but it is a valuable check and can not be dispensed with safely. After all, the great advantage enjoyed by American diplomacy is that we are more able than any other nation to act the part of the umpire, or peacemaker. This follows not only from our geographical position, but from the fact that at the very beginning we were free to choose advanced ethical positions because we were not tied to precedents.”

As there seemed to be no further questions, the audience was dismissed.