Читать книгу Paul Among the Gentiles: A "Radical" Reading of Romans - Jacob P. B. Mortensen - Страница 40

According to Theon, προσωποποιία includes cases where one invents the ἦθος (the character; by means of words) of a known person (πρόσωπον), and also of cases where one invents both the ἦθος and the person.1 This means that an author could use the device of προσωποποιία for an already known and famous person (as in the Heroides), or the author could invent a fictive person with a consistent character, for example, a certain type of person (for instance a Laconian, an Attic, or a jewishish Gentile). As stated above, προσωποποιία concerns actual speech. However, both Theon and Quintilian state that we are justified in inventing either the character (ἦθος) or the person of the one who actually delivers a ‘speech-in-character’. This means that before the ‘actual’ speech-in-character takes place, the author is allowed to invent and describe the person, for instance through a narrative or an address by another person. This helps the reader to more clearly perceive the character of the invented person. Quintilian writes:

A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero’s opinion [De Or. 25.85] demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιία. This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory. By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons. Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities and peoples (populique) may find a voice.2

This excerpt raises at least three important points. First, what Quintilian argues is a direct extension of Theon’s guidelines in the Progymnasmata. There is no sense in arguing that, since Institutio Oratia was a third level curriculum and the Progymnasmata was a second level curriculum, they differ in their guidelines on προσωποποιία. On the contrary, from what we know about ancient literate education3 the second level curriculum would be completely incorporated into the third level, which would involve a more elaborate and technical presentation. So what we find in the Progymnasmata could (potentially) be further illuminated through the Institutio Oratia, but could not be used to question the account in the Progymnasmata.

The second point is that Quintilian explicitly states that the gods, the dead, a city, or an entire people can find a voice through προσωποποιία. This means that Paul would not merely be justified in his use of προσωποποιία in his presentation of a dialogue with an imaginary Gentile who represents all the Gentiles who want to become or appear Jewish (or jewishish). He would actually be precisely following the literary guidelines for using προσωποποιία in a discourse, that is, a textbook example. The characterization of this jewishish Gentile would match the actual ones Paul had met throughout his mission and committed himself to as a (Jewish) apostle to the Gentiles, and probably also the ones he had read about in other contemporary Jewish literature (for instance, Wisdom of Solomon or Joseph and Aseneth), and the LXX (e.g. Gen 18–20). Hence, it would make perfect sense that Paul knew exactly how to characterize this kind of person, and could guide him through the difficulties and pitfalls of affiliating himself with Judaism and the Jewish Messiah.

The third point raised by the foregoing quotation is that the quotation from Quintilian confirms that dialogical features should be considered forms of προσωποποιία. This would have implications for the significance of Paul’s possible application of the dialogical diatribe. If an author presents a dialogue with a consistent characterization, it should be considered a form of προσωποποιία. And Quintilian firmly emphasizes that in the discourse, what the character says must be plausible. Also, the variety of forms of προσωποποιία presented by Quintilian clearly testifies to the fact that not only should the first-person speech in Rom 7:7–25 be considered speech-in-character (even though it obviously is actual ‘speech-in-character’), but also the apostrophe in 2:1ff., and the dialogue in 3:1–9, 3:27–4:2, and further on. Quintilian places all the kinds of speech involving imaginary interlocutors under the heading of προσωποποιία. Thus, according to Quintilian’s categories, almost all the dialogical techniques characteristic of the so-called diatribe would be types of προσωποποιία. To further substantiate this point, Quintilian treats ‘apostrophe’ together with, or as a sub-element of, προσωποποιία in Institutio Oratia 9.2.38. Consequently, to state that Paul initiates an apostrophe in 2:1 based on the personification of the pretentious (Gentile) person in 1:18–32 would be to state that Paul applies προσωποποιία in 2:1ff. Thus, the line between diatribe and προσωποποιία is barely definable.

Quintilian further elaborates on the device of impersonation with more specific examples of dialogue. He writes:

There are some authorities who restrict the term impersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of διαλόγους, which some [Cornific. Op. cit. iv.43 and 52] translate by the Latin sermocinatio. For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term [i.e. προσωποποιία], since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it.4

Quintilian explicitly states that he considers imaginary conversations or dialogues to be forms of προσωποποιία. This means that we are more than justified in arguing that Paul’s presentation of dialogical material should be considered forms of προσωποποιία. And because we cannot imagine a speech without also imagining a person to utter it, we must be sure to construct and characterize this person thoroughly. In the end of his description of προσωποποιία, Quintilian writes:

We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases, ‘At this point someone will interpose’, or ‘Someone will say’. Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker… This involves a mixture of figures, since to impersonation we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times, impersonation takes on the form of narrative. Thus, we find indirect speeches in the historians…5

Here, Quintilian identifies various ways to begin a speech-in-character. He states that we need not explicitly mention who the speaker is, when a speaker enters the discourse. The characterization follows from the consistency of the speaker, and we are also justified in using narrative to create the impersonation. This means that the discourse furnishes information that will inform us of the speaker’s character, and also when this specific character speaks, because of the consistency of the characterization. This is grounded in Quintilian’s remark, ‘At times impersonation takes the form of narrative’.6 So it is not only possible to have προσωποποιία in a narrative form, it is a textbook example specifically described in the rhetorical handbooks on rhetoric. And, as may be inferred from both Theon and Quintilian’s work, it is possible to discuss something by way of προσωποποιία or through prosopopoistic features. So even the narrative discourse of Rom 1:18–32, which develops into an apostrophe (2:1) and a dialogue (3:1), only to come full circle in 7:7–8:2 as an actual ‘speech-in-character’, could be considered part of the προσωποποιία.

If we turn to Romans for a while, to apply our recently gathered insights, it is evident from the opening narrative description of the Gentiles in 1:18–32, and the continuous apostrophe/dialogue between Paul and the fictive Gentile (2:1ff.), that concerns about characterization inform and mould Romans throughout: what Paul does in the letter is to play with the interlocutor’s mythico-religious and ethnic past in a conversation about what it means to be a jewishish Gentile who believes in the Jewish Messiah and affiliates himself with Judaism and ethnic Israelites. The character Paul presents throughout Romans is motivated by, reacts to, and builds on existing, stereotypical personifications, both literary and actual. Paul is familiar with the stereotypical Gentile from the Old Testament literature (and other contemporary Jewish literature), but he also had personal experiences with Gentiles as their apostle, even though he did not actually know the ones who lived in Rome. However, he knew their concerns and problems, and he identified an occasion in the Roman congregation in which he wanted to intervene. Thus, the fictive Gentile interlocutor, presented through προσωποποιία, effectively represents a figure familiar to Jews at the time of Paul. By complementing, reiterating, and recontextualizing the larger body of texts and experiences that animate this figure, Paul manages to present a consistent and uniform characterization of a jewishish Gentile. And this character perfectly matches the various queries and questions throughout the discourse of Romans.

The Gentile Paul portrays does not appear in a literary vacuum. Paul is careful to construct a ‘thick description’ of this person’s character. The person has a past (e.g. 1:18–32; 6:17–22; 7:9–13), a future (e.g. 7:24–8:8; 12:1–2), and a present (1:18–32; 2:1–11:36). Paul makes sure to characterize a variety of aspects and concerns of this person/figure: his emotional status (7:7–8:2), his ethico-religious habitus (2:1–24), his kinship concerns (4:1–25; 8:12–17), his status concerns (3:1–31), and his national and eschatological concerns (9:1–11:36). Paul also offers some in-depth considerations pertaining to the actions and motivations of this person. This person is not condemned just for criticizing others, but for criticizing others even though he does the same things (2:1ff.). This person’s actions are not just any acts that one might choose to criticize. They pertain to certain and specified acts. Paul uses the demonstrative pronoun, τοιοῦτος to connect the characterization of the person in 2:1ff. to the specific condemnation of the Gentiles in 1:18–32. Verse 32 refers to the list of things that characterize idol worshippers with the expression οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες. But these idol worshippers not only do such things (αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν), they also agree with ‘those who do them’ (τοῖς πράσσουσιν). Paul deliberately extends this kind of characterization in 2:1–6, where he describes the person who does these things, yet considers himself superior to his fellow idolaters: ‘You do the same things’ (τὰ αὐτὰ πράσσεις). This person ought to know that God condemns ‘those who do such things’ (τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας), so Paul can repeat the accusation in 2:3: ‘Do you think, sir, that when you judge those who do such things (τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας) and you (yourself) do the exact same things (ποιῶν αὐτά)…’ Consequently, what this consistent, ‘thick’, and thought-through use of designators testifies to is a thoroughly composed character, consistent in both mind and actions, even though he presents himself differently.

Paul continues the foregoing kind of reasoning in 2:21ff., but this time he repeats the actual accusations, instead of using the demonstrative pronoun. In 2:17, he lists all the apparent advantages of the person in question, but in 2:21 he turns the tables on him. The person who teaches others will not teach himself (διδάσκων ἕτερον σεαυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις); the person who preaches against stealing, steals (μὴ κλέπτειν κλέπτεις); the person who forbids adultery, commits adultery (μὴ μοιχεύειν μοιχεύεις) and so forth. Consequently, the character, the identity, and the actions of this ‘animated persona’ are apparent and distinct right from the outset, because Paul presents him in a consistent and thorough manner. Paul constructs and develops this persona in direct continuation of the people who do the things specified in 1:18–32. The character Paul constructs from 2:1 onwards, based on the preceding verses is not just any or every person. It is specifically someone who might know the truth about God. And these designations and character descriptions are re-activated throughout the discourse (e.g. 5:6–10; 6:17–22), because they echo the Gentile, jewishish, God-fearing identity.