Оглавление
Jaime Luciano Balmes. Fundamental Philosophy (Vol. 1&2)
Fundamental Philosophy (Vol. 1&2)
Table of Contents
Volume 1
Table of Contents
BOOK FIRST
CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE AND UTILITY OF THE QUESTION OF CERTAINTY
CHAPTER II. TRUE STATE OF THE QUESTION
CHAPTER III. CERTAINTY OF THE HUMAN RACE, AND PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
CHAPTER IV. EXISTENCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE ABSOLUTE INTELLECTUAL ORDER
CHAPTER V. TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE HUMAN INTELLECTUAL ORDER CANNOT EMANATE FROM THE SENSES
CHAPTER VI. TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE.—INSUFFICIENCY OF REAL TRUTHS
CHAPTER VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ME CANNOT PRODUCE TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE
CHAPTER VIII. UNIVERSAL IDENTITY
CHAPTER IX. UNIVERSAL IDENTITY—CONTINUED
CHAPTER X. PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: MONADS OF LEIBNITZ
CHAPTER XI. PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION EXAMINED
CHAPTER XII. IMMEDIATE INTELLIGIBILITY
CHAPTER XIII. REPRESENTATION OF CAUSALITY AND IDEALITY
CHAPTER XIV. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IN THE IDEAL ORDER
CHAPTER XV. THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF ALL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.—MEANS OF PERCEIVING TRUTH
CHAPTER XVI. CONFUSION OF IDEAS IN DISPUTES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
CHAPTER XVII. THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE.—DESCARTES' PRINCIPLE
CHAPTER XVIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF DESCARTES, CONTINUED.—HIS METHOD
CHAPTER XIX. VALUE OF THE PRINCIPLE. I THINK: ITS—ANALYSIS
CHAPTER XX. TRUE SENSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.—KANT'S OPINION
CHAPTER XXI. DOES THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION MERIT THE TITLE OF FUNDAMENTAL; AND IF SO, IN WHAT SENSE?
FIRST PROPOSITION
SECOND PROPOSITION
THIRD PROPOSITION
FOURTH PROPOSITION
FIFTH PROPOSITION
SIXTH PROPOSITION
CHAPTER XXII. THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE
CHAPTER XXIII. THE CRITERION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
FIRST PROPOSITION
SECOND PROPOSITION
THIRD PROPOSITION
FOURTH PROPOSITION
FIFTH PROPOSITION
CHAPTER XXIV. THE CRITERION OF EVIDENCE
CHAPTER XXV. THE OBJECTIVE VALUE OF IDEAS
CHAPTER XXVI. CAN ALL COGNITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY?
CHAPTER XXVII. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT
CHAPTER XXVIII. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT
CHAPTER XXIX. ARE THERE TRUE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN THE SENSE OF KANT?
CHAPTER XXX. VICO'S CRITERION
CHAPTER XXXI. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT
CHAPTER XXXII. THE CRITERION OF COMMON SENSE
CHAPTER XXXIII. ERROR OF LAMENNAIS ON COMMON CONSENT
CHAPTER XXXIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
BOOK SECOND. ON SENSATION
CHAPTER I. SENSATION IN ITSELF
CHAPTER II. MATTER IS INCAPABLE OF SENSATION
CHAPTER III. SLEEP AND WAKING
CHAPTER IV. RELATION OF SENSATIONS TO AN EXTERNAL WORLD
CHAPTER V. AN IDEALIST HYPOTHESIS
CHAPTER VI. IS THE EXTERNAL AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF SENSATIONS A FREE CAUSE?
CHAPTER VII. ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVENESS OF SENSATIONS
CHAPTER VIII. SENSATION OF EXTENSION
CHAPTER IX. OBJECTIVENESS OF THE SENSATION OF EXTENSION
CHAPTER X. FORCE OF TOUCH TO MAKE SENSATIONS OBJECTIVE
CHAPTER XI. INFERIORITY OF TOUCH COMPARED WITH OTHER SENSES
CHAPTER XII. CAN SIGHT ALONE GIVE US THE IDEA OF A SURFACE?
CHAPTER XIII. CHESELDEN'S BLIND MAN
CHAPTER XIV. CAN SIGHT GIVE US THE IDEA OF A SOLID?
CHAPTER XV. SIGHT AND MOTION
CHAPTER XVI. POSSIBILITY OF OTHER SENSES
CHAPTER XVII. EXISTENCE OF NEW SENSES
CHAPTER XVIII. SOLUTION OF LAMENNAIS' OBJECTION
BOOK THIRD. EXTENSION AND SPACE
CHAPTER I. EXTENSION INSEPARABLE FROM THE IDEA OF BODY
CHAPTER II. EXTENSION NOT PERCEPTIBLE AS THE DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF SENSATIONS
CHAPTER III. SCIENTIFIC FRUITFULNESS OF THE IDEA OF EXTENSION
FIRST PROPOSITION
SECOND PROPOSITION
THIRD PROPOSITION
FOURTH PROPOSITION
CHAPTER IV. REALITY OF EXTENSION
CHAPTER V. GEOMETRICAL EXACTNESS REALIZED IN NATURE
CHAPTER VI. REMARKS ON EXTENSION
CHAPTER VII. SPACE.—NOTHING
CHAPTER VIII. DESCARTES AND LEIBNITZ ON SPACE
CHAPTER IX. OPINION OF THOSE WHO ATTRIBUTE TO SPACE A NATURE DISTINCT FROM BODIES
CHAPTER X. OPINION OF THOSE WHO HOLD SPACE TO BE THE IMMENSITY OF GOD
CHAPTER XI. FENELON'S OPINION
CHAPTER XII. WHAT SPACE CONSISTS IN
CHAPTER XIII. NEW DIFFICULTIES
CHAPTER XIV. ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE
CHAPTER XV. ILLUSION OF FIXED POINTS IN SPACE
CHAPTER XVI. OBSERVATIONS ON KANT'S OPINION
CHAPTER XVII. INABILITY OF KANT'S DOCTRINE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE
CHAPTER XVIII. THE PROBLEM OF SENSIBLE EXPERIENCE
CHAPTER XIX. EXTENSION ABSTRACTED FROM PHENOMENA
CHAPTER XX. ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDES?
CHAPTER XXI. PURE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE EXTENDED WORLD
CHAPTER XXII. INFINITE DIVISIBILITY
CHAPTER XXIII. UNEXTENDED POINTS
CHAPTER XXIV. A CONJECTURE ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL NOTION OF EXTENSION
CHAPTER XXV. HARMONY OF THE REAL, PHENOMENAL, AND IDEAL ORDERS
CHAPTER XXVI. CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONS OF THE REAL ORDER TO THE PHENOMENAL
CHAPTER XXVII. WHETHER EVERY THING MUST BE IN SOME PLACE
CHAPTER XXVIII. CONTINGENCY OF CORPOREAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER XXIX. SOLUTION OF TWO DIFFICULTIES
CHAPTER XXX. PASSIVE SENSIBILITY
CHAPTER XXXI. POSSIBILITY OF A GREATER SPHERE IN ACTIVE SENSIBILITY
CHAPTER XXXII. POSSIBILITY OF THE PENETRATION OF BODIES
CHAPTER XXXIII. A TRIUMPH OF RELIGION IN THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER XXXIV. CONCLUSION AND SUMMING UP
NOTES TO BOOK FIRST
NOTE TO BOOK SECOND
NOTES TO BOOK THIRD
FOOTNOTES:
Volume 2
Table of Contents
BOOK FOURTH
CHAPTER I. CURSORY VIEW OF SENSISM
CHAPTER II. CONDILLAC'S STATUE
CHAPTER III. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GEOMETRICAL IDEAS AND THE SENSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH ACCOMPANY THEM
CHAPTER IV. THE IDEA AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT
CHAPTER V. COMPARISON OF GEOMETRICAL WITH NON-GEOMETRICAL IDEAS
CHAPTER VI. IN WHAT THE GEOMETRICAL IDEA CONSISTS; AND WHAT ARE ITS RELATIONS WITH SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER VII. THE ACTING INTELLECT OF THE ARISTOTELIANS
CHAPTER VIII. KANT AND THE ARISTOTELIANS
CHAPTER IX. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE VALUE OF PURE IDEAS
CHAPTER X. SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER XI. TWO COGNITIONS: INTUITIVE AND DISCURSIVE
CHAPTER XII. THE SENSISM OF KANT
CHAPTER XIII. EXISTENCE OF PURE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION
CHAPTER XIV. VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS.—ABSTRACTION MADE FROM INTELLECTUAL INTUITION
CHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE VALUE OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS
CHAPTER XVI. VALUE OF PRINCIPLES, INDEPENDENTLY OF SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER XVII. RELATIONS OF INTUITION WITH THE RANK OF THE PERCEPTIVE BEING
CHAPTER XVIII. ASPIRATIONS OF THE HUMAN SOUL
CHAPTER XIX. ELEMENTS AND VARIETY OF THE CHARACTERS OF SENSIBLE REPRESENTATION
CHAPTER XX. INTERMEDIATE REPRESENTATIONS BETWEEN SENSIBLE INTUITION AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT
CHAPTER XXI. DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE IDEAS
CHAPTER XXII. LIMITS OF OUR INTUITION
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE NECESSITY INVOLVED IN IDEAS
CHAPTER XXIV. EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSAL REASON
CHAPTER XXV. IN WHAT DOES UNIVERSAL REASON CONSIST?
CHAPTER XXVI. REMARKS ON THE REAL FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY
CHAPTER XXVII. INDIVIDUAL AND INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA EXPLAINED BY THE UNIVERSAL SUBSISTING REASON
CHAPTER XXVIII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO IDEAS
CHAPTER XXIX. ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND IDEAS
CHAPTER XXX. INNATE IDEAS
BOOK FIFTH. IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER I. IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER II. SIMPLICITY AND INDETERMINATENESS OF THE IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER III. SUBSTANTIVE AND COPULATIVE BEING
CHAPTER IV. BEING, THE OBJECT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, IS NOT THE POSSIBLE, INASMUCH AS POSSIBLE
CHAPTER V. A DIFFICULTY SOLVED
CHAPTER VI. IN WHAT SENSE THE IDEA OF BEING IS THE FORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER VII. ALL SCIENCE IS FOUNDED IN THE POSTULATE OF EXISTENCE
CHAPTER VIII. THE FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY, AND THE CONDITION OF ITS EXISTENCE
CHAPTER IX. IDEA OF NEGATION
CHAPTER X. IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY
CHAPTER XI. ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER XII. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
CHAPTER XIII. KANT'S OPINION OF REALITY AND NEGATION
CHAPTER XIV. RECAPITULATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE IDEA OF BEING
BOOK SIXTH. UNITY AND NUMBER
CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA OF UNITY
CHAPTER II. WHAT IS UNITY
CHAPTER III. UNITY AND SIMPLICITY
CHAPTER IV. ORIGIN OF THE TENDENCY OF OUR MIND TO UNITY
CHAPTER V. GENERATION OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER
CHAPTER VI. CONNECTION OF THE IDEAS OF NUMBER WITH THEIR SIGNS
CHAPTER VII. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER IN ITSELF AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH SIGNS
BOOK SEVENTH. ON TIME
CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF THE SUBJECT
CHAPTER II. IS TIME THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT?
CHAPTER III. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE
CHAPTER IV. DEFINITION OF TIME
CHAPTER V. TIME IS NOTHING ABSOLUTE
CHAPTER VI. DIFFICULTIES IN THE EXPLANATION OF VELOCITY
CHAPTER VII. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF SUCCESSION
CHAPTER VIII. WHAT IS CO-EXISTENCE?
CHAPTER IX. PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE
CHAPTER X. APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING DOCTRINE TO SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
CHAPTER XI. THE ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF TIME CONFIRMS ITS RESEMBLANCE TO THE IDEA OF SPACE
CHAPTER XII. RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME TO EXPERIENCE
CHAPTER XIII. KANT'S OPINION
CHAPTER XIV. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY AND OF THE NECESSITY OF THE IDEA OF TIME
CHAPTER XV. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES
CHAPTER XVI. PURE IDEAL TIME AND EMPYRICAL TIME
CHAPTER XVII. RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION
CHAPTER XVIII. SUMMING UP
CHAPTER XIX. A GLANCE AT THE IDEAS OF SPACE, NUMBER, AND TIME
BOOK EIGHTH. THE INFINITE
CHAPTER I. TRANSITORY VIEW OF THE ACTUAL STATE OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER II. IMPORTANCE AND ANOMALY OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER III. HAVE WE THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE?
CHAPTER IV. THE LIMIT
CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE TO CONTINUOUS QUANTITIES, AND TO DISCRETE QUANTITIES, IN SO FAR AS THESE LAST ARE EXPRESSED IN SERIES
CHAPTER VI. ORIGIN OF THE VAGUENESS AND APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER VII. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER VIII. THE DEFINITION OF INFINITY CONFIRMED BY APPLICATION TO EXTENSION
CHAPTER IX. CONCEPTION OF AN INFINITE NUMBER
CHAPTER X. CONCEPTION OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XI. POSSIBILITY OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XII. SOLUTION OF VARIOUS OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XIII. EXISTENCE OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XIV. POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTUAL INFINITE NUMBER
CHAPTER XV. IDEA OF ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING
CHAPTER XVI. ALL THE REALITY CONTAINED IN INDETERMINATE CONCEPTIONS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD
CHAPTER XVII. ALL THAT IS NOT CONTRADICTORY IN INTUITIVE IDEAS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD
CHAPTER XVIII. INTELLIGENCE AND THE ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING
CHAPTER XIX. SUMMING UP
BOOK NINTH. ON SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER I. NAME AND GENERAL IDEA OF SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER II. APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE TO CORPOREAL OBJECTS
CHAPTER III. DEFINITION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER IV. RELATION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE TO ITS ACCIDENTS
CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATIONS ON CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN ITSELF
CHAPTER VI. SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE HUMAN ME
CHAPTER VII. RELATION OF THE PROPOSITION, I THINK, TO THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ME
CHAPTER VIII. REMARKS ON THE SOUL'S INTUITION OF ITSELF
CHAPTER IX. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENTS PROVING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER X. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT WHICH HE CALLS PARALOGISM OF PERSONALITY
CHAPTER XI. SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER XII. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT PROVING THE SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER XIII. IN WHAT MANNER THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE MAY BE APPLIED TO GOD
CHAPTER XIV. AN IMPORTANT REMARK, AND SUMMARY
CHAPTER XV. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF IDEAS
CHAPTER XVI. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF EXTERNAL FACTS
CHAPTER XVII. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF INTERNAL FACTS
CHAPTER XVIII. FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM
CHAPTER XIX. RELATIONS OF FICHTE'S SYSTEM TO THE DOCTRINES OF KANT
CHAPTER XX. CONTRADICTION OF PANTHEISM TO THE PRIMARY FACTS OF THE HUMAN MIND
CHAPTER XXI. RAPID GLANCES AT THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF PANTHEISTS
BOOK TENTH. NECESSITY AND CAUSALITY
CHAPTER I. NECESSITY
CHAPTER II. THE UNCONDITIONED
CHAPTER III. IMMUTABILITY OF NECESSARY AND UNCONDITIONED BEING
CHAPTER IV. IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT
CHAPTER V. ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY
CHAPTER VI. FORMULA AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY
CHAPTER VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCY
CHAPTER VIII. CAUSALITY IN ITSELF.—INSUFFICIENCY AND ERROR OF SOME EXPLANATIONS
CHAPTER IX. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF TRUE ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY
CHAPTER X. SECONDARY CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XI. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OBSCURITY OF IDEAS IN WHAT RELATES TO CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XII. CAUSALITY OF PURE FORCE OF THE WILL
CHAPTER XIII. ACTIVITY
CHAPTER XIV. POSSIBILITY OF THE ACTIVITY OF BODIES
CHAPTER XV. CONJECTURES AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF CORPOREAL ACTIVITY
CHAPTER XVI. INTERNAL CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XVII. REMARKS ON SPONTANEITY
CHAPTER XVIII. FINAL CAUSALITY;—MORALITY
CHAPTER XIX. VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS OF MORALITY
CHAPTER XX. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE MORAL ORDER
CHAPTER XXI. A GLANCE AT THE WORK
NOTES TO BOOK SEVENTH
ON CHAPTER I
ON CHAPTER IV
NOTE TO BOOK EIGHTH
NOTE TO BOOK NINTH
FOOTNOTES:
