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A delegation of the Cherokees, with John Ross at their head, was quartered in Washington during the greater part of the winter of 1832—'33, bringing to bear in behalf of their nation every possible influence upon both Congress and the Executive. A voluminous correspondence was conducted between them and the War Department upon the subject of their proposed removal. In a communication on the 28th of January, 1833, they ask leave to say that, notwithstanding the various perplexities which the Cherokee people had experienced under the course of policy pursued toward them, they were yet unshaken in their objections to a removal west of the Mississippi River. On the question of their rights and the justice of their cause, their minds were equally unchangeable. They were, however, fully sensible that justice and weakness could not control the array of oppressive power, and that in the calamitous effects of such power, already witnessed, they could not fail to foresee with equal clearness that a removal to the west would be followed in a few years by consequences no less fatal.

They therefore suggested for the consideration of the President, whether it would not be practicable for the Government to satisfy the claims of Georgia by granting to those of her citizens who had in the lotteries of that State drawn lots of land within Cherokee limits other lands of the United States lying within the Territories and States of the Union, or in some other way.

The President urges their assent to removal.—The Secretary of War, in replying for the President (February 2,1833), was unable to see that any practicable plan could be adopted by which the reversionary rights held under the State of Georgia could be purchased upon such terms as would justify the Government in entering into a stipulation to that effect. Nor would it at all remove the difficulties and embarrassments of their condition. They would still be subject to the laws of Georgia, surrounded by white settlements and exposed to all those evils which had always attended the Indian race when placed in immediate contact with the white population. It was only by removing from these surroundings that they could expect to avoid the fate which had already swept away so many Indian tribes.

Reply of John Ross.—Ross retorted, in a communication couched in diplomatic language, that it was with great diffidence and deep regret he felt constrained to say, that in this scheme of Indian removal he could see more of expediency and policy to get rid of the Cherokees than to perpetuate their race upon any permanent, fundamental principle. If the doctrine that Indian tribes could not exist contiguous to a white population should prevail, and they should be compelled to remove west of the States and Territories of this republic, what was to prevent a similar removal of them from there for the same reason?

Without securing any promises of relief, and without reaching any definite understanding with the executive authorities of the Government, the delegation left for their homes in March, 1833. They agreed, however, to lay before their national council in the ensuing May a proposition made to them by the President, offering to pay them $2,500,000 in goods for their lands, with the proviso that they should remove themselves at their own expense.392 This proposition, it is hardly necessary to remark, was not favorably considered by the council, though the Secretary of War designated393 Mr. Benjamin F. Curry to attend the meeting and urge its acceptance.

Alleged attempted bribery of John Ross.—In this connection a story having been given currency that the Government had offered Chief Ross a bribe, provided he would secure the conclusion of a treaty of cession and removal, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied it as being "utterly without foundation, and one of those vile expedients that unprincipled men sometimes practice to accomplish an evil purpose," and as being "too incredible to do much injury."394 While this story was perhaps without solid foundation in fact, its improbability would possibly have been more evident but for the fact that only five years earlier the Secretary of War had appointed secret agents and authorized them to expend $2,000 in bribing the chiefs for this very purpose, and had made his action in this respect a matter of public record.