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ОглавлениеIntroduction: Of Tunnels and Theaters
It is true: there is a tony mall there now. In Montevideo, Uruguay, the very walls that once formed El Penal de Punta Carretas, where, for decades, political prisoners were held without trial and executed, now harbor Punta Carretas Shopping, featuring a Nike Shop, a Swarovski, an Adidas, a Burger King, and, apparently, a women’s clothing shop called “Tits.” Eighty years ago, across the street at 2529 Calle Solano García, there stood a zinc-roofed warehouse that a small family of Italian immigrants—Gino Gatti, Primina Romano, and their child—had turned into a coal-dealer’s shop in the spring of 1929, hanging up a sign: “Carbonería El Buen Trato” (fig. 1). It is from the back of this shop that a fifty-meter-long tunnel was dug, over the course of a year and a half, into the prison bathroom, enabling a number of anarchist prisoners to escape from Punta Carretas in August 1931 (fig. 2). The policemen who discovered the tunnel later on could not help but admire its construction: no crude crawlway, it had a vaulted ceiling that could accommodate a standing adult of average height. It was well ventilated, electrically lit, and rigged with a system of alarm bells.
Fig. 1: The “Buen Trato” charcoal shop.
Fig. 2: Gino Gatti’s tunnel.
At a certain point along the route of this tunnel, it intersects with another tunnel that also runs under the floors of Punta Carretas, this one dating from 1971, when over one hundred Tupamaro guerrillas made their prison break. When they broke through into the old tunnel, they recognized it for what it was—they had read the accounts. “My eyes will never forget,” one of the escapees later wrote, “the clearly visible traces of their tools crossed with ours at the summit of the vault.” In a small ceremony, they planted a sign there: “AQUÍ SE CRUZAN DOS GENERACIONES, DOS IDEOLOGÍAS Y UN MISMO DESTINO: LA LIBERTAD [At this place there was a crossing of two generations, two ideologies, and one destiny: freedom].”1
This crossing of ways and destinos does indeed invite contrasts as well as comparisons, and not only contrasts of generation and ideology. Whereas the first prison break was accomplished from the outside, the second was dug from within.2 The Tupamaros, who called their movement one of “national liberation,” were overwhelmingly Uruguayan in origin, while the anarchists were of diverse national origins—Italian, Catalan, Argentinean, German. Their movement, a “vast rhizomal network,” was in no small part the byproduct of an age of expansion, a creature of the telegraph line, the railway, and the steamship, carried by flows of immigration.3 Arriving always before (or after) its time, in the words of Sandra Jeppesen, it had “no real permanent space of its own”; it subsisted in a state of perpetual motion. The Gatti family participated in this circulation on many different levels: not only were they multiple immigrants (Gino, for instance, first emigrated to Argentina in 1923 before making his way to Uruguay), they also seem to have been engaged in illegal border-crossing almost as a kind of profession. Archival records testify to governments’ ever-frustrated, ever-renewed attempts to locate and fix the address of this family, tracking it from one address to another, from one name to another. The Italian embassy in Buenos Aires reported to Rome that Gino, later dubbed “El Ingeniero [The Engineer]” for his tunneling prowess, had “a small motor boat that … provides for the transfer of their fellow anarchists as well as for smuggling operations.”4
Tunnels belong to this theme of mobility. A tunnel is a means of escape to la libertad—transitory, not a home, not a destino. But El Ingeniero built his tunnel as if it were meant to last. Was this not a little more than merely practical? Gatti may have been a logistical genius, but he seems to have had a lyrical streak; he described his friend’s very life as “a true epic poem.” What kind of space, then, was his tunnel: logistical or lyrical?
The very being of a tunnel, to a sufficiently lyrical eye, could seem to be a paradox, a contradiction in terms: a subterranean structure erected by destruction, built by sheer subtraction, the negation of solidity itself. Mikhail Bakunin used the figure of the tunnel to evoke the manner in which radical “spirit” survives underneath the world’s crushing weight: “the spirit of revolution is not subdued, it has only sunk into itself in order soon to reveal itself again as an affirmative, creative principle, and right now it is burrowing—if I may avail myself of this expression of Hegel’s—like a mole under the earth.” Well said, old Bakunin.5 To live mole-wise, to live tunneling, is to make the very means of escape one’s home.
If you can imagine living this way, then you can imagine what this book is about: anarchist resistance culture. My intention, in this book, is to examine the ways in which anarchist politics have historically found aesthetic expression in the form of a “culture of resistance,” is to some extent unique. It is hardly unheard of, in my corner of the academic world, to utter the word “resistance” in such close connection with the word “culture”; for some, the two terms have become synonymous, so that instances of “culture” as innocuous as playing a video game or wearing a T-shirt can be taken to be instances of “resistant” behavior, making the phrase “resistance culture” almost redundant. Furthermore, what if the word resistance, modifying culture, implies that only some forms of culture, and not others, are authentically subversive or threatening to the established order of things, i.e., “resistant”? This is what I mean; I am interested in what makes the difference between innocuous or conservative moments in culture and those that potentially or actually defy, disturb, and challenge the given.
Though I am not the first to speak of a “culture of resistance” or “resistance culture,” the currency of these terms hasn’t fixed their meanings. Some of the ambiguity probably derives from the ambiguity of the word “culture” itself, which, as Raymond Williams points out, has come to mean both the special kinds of “works and practices,” supposedly distinct and separate from everyday life, that we call “art and learning,” and the more amorphous notion of “a particular way of life.”6 Thus, for instance, Vivian Schelling speaks of “cultures of resistance” in the plural, defining these as “more subtle and everyday practices of opposition to domination” by contrast with “systematic and confrontational forms of struggle.”7 James C. Scott, similarly, describes a “culture of resistance” as the sharing of the “risk” entailed in individual acts of resistance by an entire community aligned against an external source of oppression.8 For Robert M. Press, a “culture of resistance” is “greater than the sum of the acts of resistance”: it “involves a change of thinking … a decision to no longer accept authoritarian rule in daily life, not just at the top … but at all levels.”9 Writers from Stanley Aronowitz to Dinesh D’Souza use the term “culture of resistance” or “resistance culture” to refer to an informal climate of recalcitrance and opposition created by marginalized people unable to revolt openly—slaves in the fields, working-class students in the classroom, workers in fast-food restaurants.10 In odd cases, it serves to describe the behavior of rather privileged subjects, e.g., doctors or businessmen, defending their group interests against external imperatives; usually, however, it is used to characterize the behavior of poor, especially black people, either to appreciate their creativity and agency in the face of overwhelming institutional forces or to decry their stubborn refusal to respond to the well-meant interventions of teachers, social workers, and other supposed agents of change.11
In all of these formulations, the word “culture” serves to qualify the concept of “resistance,” to indicate forms of resistance that are, on the one hand, relatively atmospheric, even vaporous—not formalized or embodied in any visible institutions, perhaps not even conscious or coherent—and on the other hand, not merely sporadic or fleeting but generalized, communal, habitual, and entrenched. In any case, the sense of the word “culture” that is evoked is that of “a way of life” rather than specific “works and practices.” Occasionally, however, one encounters references to “resistance culture” in something more like the artifactual sense: American hip-hop, a particularly subversive film, “an alternative news network” are given as instances. The last of these is specifically described as “a tool for changing attitudes, raising public awareness and relaying the views of the movement to a wider public … to mobilize concerned citizens not normally involved in action protests.”12 During South Africa’s transition to postapartheid, the term “resistance culture” is used synonymously with “écriture engagée” or “protest” theater, the kind of cultural artifact produced specifically and consciously as the expression of an organized resistance movement (in the words of Albie Sachs, “art … seen as an instrument of struggle”).13 This is far closer to the sense I intend, with two crucial differences.
First, the anarchist conception of “resistance” is—with all due respect to the astounding trials undergone by the South African anti-apartheid movement—something different and broader, aimed not only at one particular oppressive regime but at all forms of domination and hierarchy, whether these are constituted through the formal institutions of violence and property or the infinity of informal power relations through which we form our sense of ourselves and our world. Anarchist “resistance,” declares Georges Yvetot (1868–1942), encompasses
all the popular movements, all the ambitions of the people to revolt against tyrannies, whatever their source, against all the tyrannies and all the entities in the names of which they are exercised: God, Truth, Homeland, Honor, Universal Suffrage, Labor, Property, Church, State, Law, Dictatorship, Justice, General Interest, Peace, Law, Culture, Humanity, Progress, etc.… Resistance must be a way of understanding our role in an entire society based on social inequality.14
To be an anarchist, in a place and time that is like any part of the world in the twentieth century, is to deny the legitimacy of almost every feature of that world: its nation-states, its religions, its pretense of representational government, its organization of production and consumption, its patriarchal customs, its warped ideals—etc., etc.: there is almost no end to the things one is “against,” to the point that one continually risks slipping into an entirely negative and reactive self-definition (anti-capitalist, anti-statist, anti-clerical, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, anti-authoritarian, anti-sexist…).15 When an “entire society,” i.e., almost everything around you, seemingly to the smallest detail, reflects assumptions contrary to your most deeply held convictions about what the world is and can be—namely, the assumption that hierarchy, domination, violence, and injustice are the natural, necessary, and permanent characters of existence—then merely to persevere in imagining and acting on the assumption of the possibility of another kind of world is in itself a monumental and continual effort of resistance.
At one end of the tunnel is a prison (or a mall). At the other end is a little theater in which a humble spectacle is staged for the benefit of the public: a simulation of law-abiding commerce (El Buen Trato—literally, “The Good Deal”!) and normal family life (the “Gatti Family”). A farce, perhaps? In light of such theatricality, it might come as no surprise to learn from certain websites dedicated to anarchist history that the famed playwright, Armand Gatti, was the child of this couple.16 It makes a further kind of perverse sense that Gatti fils should become known, decades later, for his experimental work with prisoners. An ex-prisoner himself—having been arrested and thrown into a Nazi labor camp as a young French Resistance fighter—he, like Gatti père, had learned to escape. Like his father before him, Armand Gatti became an anarchist.17
The themes of imprisonment and escape are, indeed, of fundamental importance in Armand Gatti’s works, including his screenplay for the film L’Enclos (1961) and the plays L’Enfant-Rat (1960), Le deuxième existence du camp de Tatenberg (1962), Chant public devant deux chaises éléctriques (1964), Chroniques d’une planète provisoire (1967), Le labyrinthe (1981), Ulrike Meinhof (1986), Les 7 possibilités du train 713 en partance d’Auschwitz (1987), Le Combat du jour et de la nuit dans la maison d’arrêt de Fleury-Mérogis (1989), and Le chant d’amour des alphabets d’Auschwitz (1989). One of the experiences that first marked out this thematic trajectory took place in the courtyard of the labor camp in which the young Gatti was interned. There, one day, he saw another prisoner, who had been subjected to three months solitary confinement, emerge into the courtyard for the first time, dancing strangely and singing the alphabet. Gatti immediately understood this “danse alphabétique,” later written into one of his theatrical pieces, as a means of mental survival and escape: “That day … the war had been won.”18 Gatti resisted his jailers and torturers by writing poems in his head and reciting in lieu of answering questions—“buil[ding] up a defensive linguistic barrier around himself,” as his biographer Dorothy Knowles observes.19
In dramaturgical workshops with prisoners, Gatti puts this hard-earned knowledge to use, leading them through exercises designed to trace the histories that have imprisoned them and to allow them to reimagine themselves as something other than prisoners.20 The aim of Armand Gatti’s theater, “becoming conscious of what one is, of one’s own possibilities, to the profoundest measure,” is quite continuous with the aim of Gino Gatti’s engineering.
There is only one problem with this analogy-via-genealogy between the two Gattis: if the analogy is true, the genealogy is false. The father of the playwright born Dante Sauveur Armand Gatti in 1924 was indeed an Italian immigrant anarchist, but in 1929–1931, he was not in Montevideo but in Monaco, having previously sought work in Chicago; named Auguste Gatti, he was a street sweeper, not an engineer, and his wife, Letizia Luzana, gave birth to her son, the future playwright, in Monaco,21 half the world away from Gino Gatti, Primina Romano, and their daughter. In fact, “Gino Gatti” was merely the nom de guerre of a man identified by Argentine police as “José Baldi”—in Italian, Giuseppe.22
Given the spurious nature of the paternity claim in re Gatti, we might ask: what is the meaning of this misidentification? It seems a particularly odd mistake, after all, given the general indifference toward questions of pedigree in the anarchist tradition.23 If it has any occult or unconscious significance, perhaps it is in the fact of the peculiar affinity between these two persons, falsely linked by a name, truly linked by the analogy between their actions.24 There is, in short, a strange kind of family resemblance, an affinity or analogy.
What makes the tunnel of Punta Carretas such an apt analogue for this culture is the nature of the fundamental problem to which the culture constitutes a strategic response. Let me explain this by way of another brief anecdote. In his memoirs, Abraham Frumkin (1872–1946) recounts how a fellow Yiddish-speaking anarchist, Moshe, once asked the Russian gentile anarchist Kropotkin the rather rabbinical question: “Tsi meg an anarkhist hobn a bank-bikhl [Can one be an anarchist and save money in the bank at the same time]?”).
There is one easy way to interpret this anecdote. For Karen Rosenberg, it merely serves as one more demonstration that “anarchism is a sect,” i.e., “a religious … cult of self-sacrifice.”25 Here is one of the most tediously repeated commonplaces about anarchism: i.e., that the counter-cultures or “counter-communities” formed by anarchists bear a strong resemblance to religious communities, e.g., the sixteenth-century Anabaptists or the medieval Cathars (the more exotic, the better; few think to compare them to the church down the block from us).26 While this claim is regularly made by writers hostile towards anarchism, with the assumption that such a resemblance is either proof of anarchism’s backwardness (“religion” standing here for all that is antithetical to rational modernity) or incoherence (since anarchists most often claim to be opposed to religion), it is also frequently abetted by anarchists themselves, who are not slow to admit a kinship with history’s heretics, prophets, and iconoclasts.27 Among the Yiddish-speaking (and atheist) anarchists of turn-of-the-century London, for instance, the German gentile anarchist Rudolf Rocker was jokingly referred to as “our rabbi.” (In a more pointed spirit, Paris anarchists of the fin-de-siècle referred to Jean Grave as “the Pope of the Rue Mouffetard.”)28
It would be easy to make a Jewish joke out of poor Moshe, but the laugh would not be worth enough to put in a bank-bikhl. What this episode indicates, I would argue, is not the emptiness of Moshe’s pretensions to revolutionary modernity (see, he’s just another superstitious old Jew, afraid of breaking a commandment!) or the incoherence of his will to break with an authoritarian world (see, the would-be anarchist craves authority!), but the deep affinity between the anarchist experience and the Jewish experience of diaspora as galut (exile). In exile, continual pressure to assimilate, alternating with cycles of persecution forcing Jews to publicly abjure their religion, confronted Jews with the horror of self-estrangement. It is to this experience of alienation that Joseph S. Bloch traced the origins of the Kol Nidrei—the eerie, wailing niggun sung each year on the Day of Atonement pleading with God to pardon us for breaking our own strongest vows, fragmenting our very selves.29 For an anarchist to simply continue to exist in a radically false world, a world that requires participation in a violent and unequal economy of money and power—this, too, is a profound experience of self-exile.
Blaine McKinley speaks of this experience in terms of a “dilemma of vocation.” Since “an anarchist could not live a consistent life in America” or anywhere else where conditions of statism and capitalism prevailed, and insofar as the hallmark of anarchist ethics is the refusal to distinguish between ends and means or principles and practices, to be an anarchist is almost always to live in an intolerable moral bind.30 As the anarcho-communist Luigi Galleani (1861–1931) put it: “By accepting a wage, by paying rent for a house, we, with all our proclaimed revolutionary and anarchist aspirations, recognize and legitimate capital … in the most tangible and painful way.”31 The individualist anarchist Albert Libertad (1875–1908) perhaps stated the problem most forcefully in his declaration that “Every day we commit suicide partially”:
I commit suicide when I devote, to hours of absorbing work, an amount of energy which I am not able to recapture, or when I engage in work which I know to be useless.…
I commit suicide whenever I consent to obey oppressive men or measures.
I commit suicide whenever I convey to another individual, by the act of voting, the right to govern me for four years.…
Complete suicide is nothing but the final act of total inability to react against the environment.
These acts, of which I have spoken of as partial suicides, are not therefore less truly suicidal. It is because I lack the power to react against society, that I inhabit a place without light and air, that I do not eat in accordance with my hunger or my taste, that I am a soldier or a voter, that I subject my love to laws or to compulsion.32
At every turn, the anarchist is compelled to endorse a universe of values that is the antithesis of her own, to cancel herself out—a kind of ongoing moral suicide.
Anarchists and Jews are of course not the only people to suffer such alienation, which is to some extent the common fate of all who are marked as marginal or radical. What is unique about our case is not only the extent of our disagreement with the world as it is given to us (defining our being by way of a longer list of things-to-be-against) but its unmediated intensity. For a Marxist, for instance, the desire for another world, however palpable, is supposed to be subject to the dialectic of history: capitalism will die of its own contradictions. No such consolation is available for anarchists—not even, as is often asserted, the consolation of a pure “human nature” that is bound to shine forth again once the dross of history is washed away.33 On the contrary, this romantic myth is vigorously denied by every major statement of anarchist theory, beginning with the excoriation of Rousseau by Proudhon and Bakunin alike.34 It is no more a question of substituting biology for history than it is of substituting history for morality. The moral question—how to live?—is left quite bare, and confronts us in all its force.
The main body of the cultural production to emerge from the anarchist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I contend, can best be understood as a response to this question—not quite a “solution” or an “answer” so much as a way of living with the problem for as long as it lasts, a means of inhabiting history until it stops hurting. Anarchists practice culture as a means of mental and moral survival in a world from which they are fundamentally alienated. Stated positively—well, it is hard to do better than the anarchist poet Kaneko Mitsuharu (1895–1975): “To oppose is to live. / To oppose is to get a grip on the very self.”35
This immediately risks being mistaken for some other kind of theory about the relation between anarchist politics and anarchist culture. One of these is the notion of cultural rebellion as a substitute for the political kind. David Weir, for instance, argues that we can read the history of anarchism as follows: whereas anarchists were on the losing side of every revolution from 1871 to 1939, their politics translated nicely into the aesthetic realm, where it came to mean a kind of individualist stance, a willful refusal to make sense to a mass audience—in other words, what came to be known simply as “modernism.” In short, Weir suggests, “anarchism succeeded culturally where it failed politically.”36 Of course, the same half-full glass might look completely empty if viewed from a slightly more politically engaged perspective than Weir’s. Even if anarchist impulses might be said to have migrated successfully into the domain of art, and even if they produced there practices that resisted the capitalist imperative to produce mass-market cultural commodities, this still amounted to a kind of capitalism-by-other-means, a contest for the “accumulation of symbolic capital,” which could later be traded in for the economic variety, making modern art into a kind of luxury good that would testify to the owner’s social status.37 Whether or not these modernist works eschewed symbolism entirely—even an ultra-abstractionist work such as Kasimir Malevich’s Black Square became a kind of symbol of the artist’s supreme will not to symbolize—they also ran the risk of becoming privatized surrogates for political refusal, something one turned to in place of collective action, a “compensation and palliative,” as John Zerzan (b. 1943) bluntly puts it, for what cannot be realized in “life.”38
This is all as may be. However, the kind of anarchist-inspired cultural production that formed the kernel of modernism—the Cubist abstractions of a Pablo Picasso or the conceptual music of a John Cage, for instance—was never very deeply embedded in any real community of anarchists. It was never firmly connected to an anarcho-syndicalist organization such as the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) or the revolutionary syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),39 for instance, which sponsored and produced very different forms of art, e.g., the strikingly symbolic mass poster art of Manuel Monleón Burgos (1904–1976) or the satirical folk songs of Joe Hill (1879–1915). The modernist aesthetic studied by Weir and others, in its rejection of representation and narrative, actually has little in common with the aesthetics favored by most anarchists. The demands made on art by the residents of a bohemia, however politicized they may have been at times, were not quite the same as those made by the broader constituencies of what was, at its height, an international working-class movement.40
What anarchists did demand from art, by and large, was what they demanded from all the forms and moments of their political lives: i.e., that it should, as much as possible, embody the idea in the act, the principle in the practice, the end in the means. If anarchism is “prefigurative politics,” striving to make the desired future visible in and through one’s actions in the present, then anarchist resistance culture had to somehow prefigure a world of freedom and equality.
The sociologist Howard J. Ehrlich offers us what could be a helpful handle on this notion of anarchist culture as prefigurative when he speaks of a “revolutionary transfer culture,” i.e., “that agglomeration of ideas and practices that guide people in making the trip from the society here to the good society there in the future.”41 The metaphor of “transfer” is misleading, however, if it makes us imagine this process as something too easy; in the age of globalization, after all, a “trip” is inevitably only a matter of hours at most. Particularly during periods of intense repression, committed anarchists were not always convinced that rapid change was imminent: “Not for a hundred, not for five hundred years, perhaps, will the principles of anarchy triumph,” Emma Goldman (1869–1940) surmised.42 Nor was the revolution she wanted only a matter of overthrowing the State or abolishing Capital; a “transvaluation not only of social, but also of human values,” encompassing “every phase of life,—individual, as well as the collective; the internal, as well as the external phases,” was not necessarily to be imagined on the Jacobin model of a single, swift transformation.43 Traveling, movement, mobility are all appropriate images, except insofar as they foreground the endpoint, the destino. While anarchists generally think of their aspirations in terms of “revolution,” the journey—“walk[ing] toward anarchy,” as Errico Malatesta (1853–1932) put it—is at least as important as the goal.44
How could anarchists maintain such a pitch of activity, such an optimism of the will, in the face of such pessimism of the intellect? As prefigurative politics, anarchism can entail a paradoxically pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of arriving at a revolutionary moment: a certain historical amor fati or “anarcho-fatalism.” Francis Dupuis-Déri notes precisely such an indifference toward “the revolution” as event among contemporary anarchist activists. Instead of deferring desires into a utopian future seen as imminent, anarchist activists seek to make their desires as immanent as possible—to demand more from their relationships, from the process of political activity, from their everyday lives.45 While Dupuis-Déri attributes contemporary anarcho-fatalism in part to a realistic reckoning of the poor prospects for a classical “revolution” in the relatively affluent and stable global North, such an orientation is hardly a recent phenomenon; we find it clearly and forcefully theorized in the writings of Gustav Landauer (1870–1919), anarchist martyr of the abortive German revolution of 1919.
In Die Revolution, written in 1911 and reissued on the eve of the actual event itself, Landauer took up Proudhon’s suggestion that “there is a permanent revolution in history,” reinterpreting history in terms of a continuity of revolutionary energies—sometimes forced “underground,” at other times erupting into the open air.46 In this interpretation, revolution becomes not a historically and geographically isolated event but a more nebulous process that only occasionally condenses into decisive moments—“evolution preceding revolution,” as Elisée Reclus put it, “and revolution preceding a new evolution, which is in turn the mother of future revolutions.”47 This takes the logic of revolution far from the scientific pretensions of historical materialism. Indeed, where Marx rebuked Bakunin for looking to “willpower” and not “economic conditions” as the source of revolution, for Landauer, it is precisely will and desire, social emotions, that are the primary revolutionary forces: revolution is “possible at all times, if enough people want it”:48
Little is to be expected from external conditions, and people think too much about the environment, the future, the others, separating means and ends too much, as if an end could be attained in this way. Too often you think that if the end is glorious, dubious means must also be justified. But only the moment exists for us; do not sacrifice the reality to the chimera! If you seek the right life, live it now; you make it difficult by seeking it outside yourselves, in the future, and for the sake of this beautiful future you fill your present with ugliness.… If the glory and the kingdom of God on earth should ever come for the world, for the masses, for people and nations, can it come in any way other than by the fact that one immediately begins to do what is right?49
If we can await nothing from “external conditions,” we must demand everything from ourselves, from within. This inward turn, however, is not to be understood as a subjective substitute for social action (like one of the “revolutions from within” peddled by pop psychologists); it is a fully social and material attempt to come to grips with the world. Like Gatti’s tunnel, it is a “line of flight”—“not a leap into another realm,” Todd May explains, but “a production within the realm of that from which it takes flight.”50 In short, this is a matter of resistance, of finding ways, “at every instant,” to “withdraw from injustice.”51 In the words of Landauer’s essay, “Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft [Through Separation to Community],” it is out of a profound sense of responsibility to others that anarchists seek “to leave these people,” to keep “our own company and our own lives”; “Away from the state, as far as we can get! Away from goods and commerce! Away from the philistines! Let us … form a small community in joy and activity.”52 Landauer’s conception of anarchism as exodus, striving toward “community” precisely “through separation,” illuminates the purpose of anarchist resistance culture: to enable us, while remaining within the world of domination and hierarchy, to escape from it.
Something like Ehrlich‘s “transfer culture” or Landauer’s “community through separation” is carried by the Italian Autonomists’ concept of “exodus.” Exodus, a process of “engaged withdrawal” from authoritarian institutions, which is at the same time the “founding” of a new community, was partly inspired by observations of U.S. black nationalism, which used the image of the passage out of Egypt “to change circumstances without [anyone] shifting one millimetre in space.”53 Indeed, from the perspective of exodus, the question of whether the emancipated future is imminent or remote is beside the point:
The motivating force of the sticking together and the unity—the “being together”—of that group that was on its way (“in movement”) toward the Promised Land, toward the collective dimension of its own emancipation, was probably more the unidimensionality of the desert, its immobility and immutability, than any hopes for the approach of some eventual future goal.54
Anarchist resistance culture is a way of living in transit through this desert. The resistance culture of the anti-apartheid movement had not only a specific target but a destino, a Promised Land, an end. Anarchist resistance is not mainly defined by its end; it is a middle, a means.
It is a tunnel.
I have constructed this book as an exploration of anarchist cultural resistance work in just some of the genres or media that have been historically most important to the movement. It may be that in doing so, I am paying too much respect to an artifactual conception of “culture.” The goal cannot be to secure equal bragging rights (Armand Gatti is the anarchist Brecht!55); in any case, such boasting would be ill considered, as competing for symbolic capital in the cultural marketplace is not in keeping with the anarchist spirit. Instead, I hope to make these artifacts speak of the ways of being in the world that they have helped to construct.
The organizing device of genre or medium allows us (dangerously) extravagant scope for comparison. The best studies of anarchist cultural resistance have been fairly narrowly bounded by place and period, reflecting the assumption that these will be the dimensions most salient to interpretation.56 While there is much to be said for this kind of attention to the local conditions and contexts within and against which acts of cultural production take on meaning, it may also simply reflect the biases built into academic publishing, which increasingly pays lip service to “interdisciplinary” research without ever ceasing to impose disciplinary categories. As a massively transnational, migratory phenomenon, the anarchist movement fails to comply with the compartmentalization of knowledge; it is at least worth asking whether, as anarchist ideas traveled from France to China, from China to Korea, from Russia to Brazil, from Germany to the U.S., and so on, anything did remain constant. Given the variety of historical and cultural conditions in which anarchists made their homes, whatever elements of anarchist culture might have been carried from city to city or from generation to generation, anarchist works of culture might have tended to take on the colors of each time and place. Given the fundamental situation in which anarchists of every place and time have found themselves—the empire of State and Capital, the universal prison-house, the changeless desert—anarchist works of culture might have converged substantially in their evolution.
Here, then, are the primary questions animating this book: How has anarchist resistance, global both in its aspirations and in its movements, been translated into the local vernacular of particular cultures and historical situations, adapted to the constraints of the genres and media available? Is there anything uniquely or consistently anarchist about the variety of cultural forms that some seven generations of anarchist men and women have happened to create?
I could stop there if I wanted to preserve the illusion of scholarly detachment, but it is really too late for that; I must be counted among the many researchers who have gotten too close to the material. I came of age in the suburban and semi-rural U.S. after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the heyday of TINA (There Is No Alternative), when, after more than half a century of consolidation, the dominant model of life—roughly speaking, the one I was surrounded by, like a 360° diorama—had come to seem all but inescapable. It has been breathtaking and disorienting to witness, over the past decade, the reemergence of something like concerted opposition to that model, an opposition that has worn many names—“anticapitalism,” “horizontalism,” “Zapatismo,” “altermondialisme,” “alternative globalization movement,” “autonomous movement,” “movement of movements”—and occasionally, that of “the new anarchism.”57 From the perspective of these new times, in which those reigning structures seem to have once again entered a real crisis, I want to seek the intersection of new lines of flight with old ones.58 Where might our tunnels intersect and diverge? In other words: what lessons, if any, can be taken from this history for any future anarchist cultural resistance?
A quick note, before we go on, about the nomenclature of anarchist history: many historiographers are wont to distinguish between what they call “classical anarchism” (vaguely after the title of George Crowder’s Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin (1991), and the “new anarchism” that is said to have emerged, as if sprung fully grown from a god’s head, in the period after the end of the Cold War, making its real public debut in Seattle in 1999. Classical anarchism, supposedly founded on the thought of this handful of philosopher-founders, has been the subject of many philosophical critiques (e.g., Saul Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan), which suffer from many kinds of reductionism, not least that of reducing anarchism to the history of a few thinkers’ thoughts, but also making a fairly reductive representation of those thoughts, and all but completely ignoring developments taking place after the end of the Spanish Civil War. More cannily, the late John Moore suggested that we should distinguish between “first-wave” and “second-wave” anarchisms, the second wave appearing only after the Second World War, with its finest moment being defined by the May ’68 events; the intellectual stars of this constellation would include the situationist and post-situationist thinkers, and perhaps also the autonomous movements of Italy and Germany, as well as the new Zapatismo. Daniel Colson has suggested a three-part model:
The first period is that of its appearance as a current in political philosophy.… During this period—from the beginning of the 1840s to the creation, twenty-five years later, of the International Workingmens’ Association/Association Internationale des Travailleurs (IWA/AIT)—anarchism does not exist as an effective political current, identifiable in organizations, groups, or symbols in public demonstrations.
Fig. 3: Cover for Ricardo Flores Magón’s play, “Tierra y Libertad” (1917).
This first period, then, can be thought of as a period of ideological gestation, a process fomented by some—but not all—of the founding figures of “classical anarchism” (Proudhon and Bakunin, but not Godwin or Kropotkin; Colson also cites Joseph Déjacque [1821–1864], Max Stirner [1806–1856], and Ernest Coeuderoy [1825–1862]). Yet even without organizations adequate to its ambitions, anarchism is not thinkable without relation to “the transformations and the explosive situation of Europe in the middle of the 19th century, and more particularly to the events and the revolutionary movements of 1848.” Moreover, while “its reality is mainly philosophical and journalistic,” these are “thoroughly blended into the theoretical and political ferment of the time as to the material and social upheavals which Europe was experiencing”—e.g., Proudhon’s ties to the Lyons mutuellistes, Bakunin’s experience of the uprising in Berlin.
Colson’s second period elaborates upon “this practical dimension of the anarchist idea”:
It crystallizes in London, in 1864, with the creation of the First International, and disappears rather precisely in Barcelona, in May 1937, when … the republican State and the Communist International put an end to the Spanish and Catalan revolutionary movements. It is of considerable duration, lasting a little more than seven decades—involving around five or six generations of workers—and it comprises a great number of specific moments or modes of being.
Here, we encounter not only individual thinkers like Kropotkin but a host of tinkerers not counted in the ranks of political philosophers. Their experiments and experiences range from
the anti-authoritarian First International of 1871 to 1881, the attentats and attempts at insurrectionary “propaganda by the deed” at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, French “revolutionary syndicalism,” illegalism, Argentinian “forism,” Spanish “anarcho-syndicalism,” etc.
Also present in this period but absent from the register of philosophy are the great anarchist rhetors, from Pietro Gori to Emma Goldman, whose cultural work, as Nathan Jun and Kathy Ferguson have convincingly argued, has been denied a fair reckoning by academic histories for which practice is the reading-off of theories first thought by thinkers.
Colson imagines anarchism’s “third period”—somewhat inaccurately, I will argue—as emerging after a near total eclipse, a historical blackout stretching from the beginning of the Second World War to the opening of the Sixties. The return of anti-authoritarian thought and practice carries an “eruptive force” proportional to the optimism of that historical moment, but is marked by some discontinuity with the traditions and organizations established in the second period, together with the new predominance of Marxist, Freudian, and Nietzschean thought. The result: a revival of anarchism in several guises, from the Dutch Provos and Kabouters to the French Situationists and Italian Autonomists, from poststructuralism to eco-anarchism and anarcha-feminism. In every case, the new anarchism presented an idea which “was not new, but which, having been forgotten, then appeared as an astounding innovation.”59 And here it is, then, that we find an astonishing and unforeseen crossing between generations, ideologies, and destinies. Well dug, old mole—well dug indeed.
A final note about limitations: inevitably, this book suffers from them. Because it relies so heavily on original translations of previously untranslated literary and scholarly works (victims of the general oblivion to which anarchist history has been consigned), it reflects the uneven distribution of my linguistic skills: I am capable enough as a reader of French, able to muddle through Spanish and Portuguese, far worse in other European languages, and barely capable of deciphering anything else. This means that while I can do some justice to the anarchist cultures of Western Europe and the Americas, I can offer only a glimpse of the anarchist cultures of Eastern Europe and Asia (and a blurry picture of the terrifically important Yiddish and Italian contributions). Sometimes, as in chapters 3–5 of Part II (“Speaking to Others: Anarchist Poetry, Song, and Public Voice”), although I am describing a global phenomenon (anarchist poets’ shift away from public, rhetorical modes of address), my attention is focused on one or two particular cases (mainly those of the United States and Britain). Despite my comparative ambitions, I have given more attention to the second period than to either the first or third. Even if scholarly coverage of punk vastly exceeds that given to Pouget or the Cinéma du Peuple, it has received unforgivably short shrift here. Important thinkers, movements, and events have gone unmentioned. So much for the panoptical promise. Mainly, what I hope to show, however incompletely and indirectly, is what I have been astonished to discover: how much more there is to be seen.
There is a McDonalds, a Lancôme, an Urban Outfitters. One and a half thousand employees go to work at the building formerly known as El Penal de Punta Carretas; a million consumers flow through every month.60 Where is their tunnel for escape?
1 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Uruguay), Actas Tupamaras (Rosario, Argentina: Cucaña Ediciones, 2003), 252.
2 Victoria Ruetalo, “From Penal Institution to Shopping Mecca: The Economics of Memory and the Case of Punta Carretas,” Cultural Critique 68 (Winter 2008): 51.
3 Benedict Anderson, Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (London: Verso, 2005), 3–4.
4 Osvaldo Bayer, Severino di Giovanni: el idealista de la violencia (Buenos Aires : Editorial Legasa, 1989), 387n26 (note: all translations are mine unless otherwise noted).
5 Mikhail Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchism, trans. and ed. Sam Dolgoff (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1980), 56. This is a double allusion, and it begs for some context. Bakunin is alluding to Hegel, who was alluding to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Act I, Scene V: “Spirit often seems to have forgotten and lost itself, but inwardly opposed to itself, it is inwardly working ever forward (as when Hamlet says of the ghost of his father, ‘Well said, old mole! canst work i’ the ground so fast?’), until grown strong in itself it bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the sun, its Notion, so that the earth crumbles away” (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol III, trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and Frances H. Simson [London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co, 1896], 546–547). Marx, of course, uses the same image in his Eighteenth Brumaire: describing the “purgatory” of the 1848 revolution in France and the rise to power of Louis Bonaparte, he imagined that this, too, might be a preliminary to a final burst of “destruction”: “When the revolution shall have accomplished this second part of its preliminary programme, Europe will jump up from her seat to exclaim: ‘Well hast thou grubbed, old mole!’” (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. Daniel De Leon [Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1913], 141–142). Commentators generally miss the fact that Bakunin’s allusion to Hegel’s “mole in the earth,” appearing in his 1842 essay, “Die Reaktion in Deutschland,” precedes Marx’s by almost a decade.
6 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 90.
7 Vivian Schelling, “‘The People’s Radio’ of Vila Nossa Senhora Aparecida: Alternative Communication and Cultures of Resistance in Brazil,” in Culture and Global Change, eds. Tracey Skelton and Tim Allen (London: Routledge, 1999), 171.
8 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 35.
9 Robert M. Press, Peaceful Resistance: Advancing Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 35.
10 Stanley Aronowitz, “Introduction,” in Paul E. Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), xii; Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society (New York: Free Press, 1995), 99; Jennifer Parker Talwar, Fast Food, Fast Track: Immigrants, Big Business, and the American Dream (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 116.
11 Francis T. Cullen, review of Prescription For Profit: How Doctors Defraud Medicaid, in Contemporary Sociology 23.3 (May 1994): 419; Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 114; Margaret Washington Creel, A Peculiar People: Slave Religion and Community-Culture Among the Gullahs (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 10; Phil Frances Carspecken, “The Hidden History of Praxis Theory Within Critical Ethnography and the Criticalism/Postmodernism Problematic,” in Ethnography and Schools: Qualitative Approaches to the Study of Education, eds. Yali Zou and Enrique T. Trueba (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 66.
12 Geneva Smitherman, “‘The Chain Remain the Same’: Communicative Practices in the Hip Hop Nation,” Journal of Black Studies 28.1 (Sept. 1997): 7; Paul Routledge, “The Imagineering of Resistance: Pollok Free State and the Practice of Postmodern Politics,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22.3 (1997): 363; Tracey Skelton, “Jamaican Yardies on British Television: Dominant Representations, Spaces for Resistance?” in Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance, ed. Joanne P. Sharp (London: Routledge, 2000), 196.
13 Rob Nixon, “Aftermaths,” Transition 72 (1996): 64; Ian Steadman, “Theater beyond Apartheid,” Research in African Literatures 22.3 (Autumn 1991): 77; Zoë Wicomb, “Culture Beyond Color?” Transition 60 (1993): 29; Albie Sachs, “Preparing Ourselves for Freedom,” in Writing South Africa: Literature, Apartheid, and Democracy 1970–1995, eds. Derek Attridge and Rosemary Jane Jolly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 239.
14 Georges Yvetot, “Résistance,” in Encyclopédie anarchiste, ed. Sébastien Faure (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1934), 2344, emphases mine.
15 Daniel Colson, Petit lexique philosophique de l’anarchisme de Proudhon à Deleuze (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2001), 33.
16 Cathy Ytak and Eric Coulaud, “26 janvier,” Ephéméride Anarchiste, http://ytak.club.fr/janvier26.html#gattia and “18 mars,” http://ytak.club.fr/mars18.html#evasion; David Brown, “January 26,” The Daily Bleed, 1997, http://www.eskimo.com/~recall/bleed/0126.htm.
17 Dorothy Knowles, “Armand Gatti’s Two Theatres: ‘Théâtre Institutionnel’ and ‘Théâtre d’Intervention,’” French Studies 49.1 (1995): 52.
18 Jean-Jacques Van Vlasselaer, “Music, Memory, and the Holocaust: Viktor Ullmann, the Ultimate Witness,” in Building History: The Shoah in Art, Memory, and Myth, ed. Peter M. Daly (New York: P. Lang, 2001), 180; Armand Gatti, Œuvres théâtrales, ed. Michel Séonnet (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1991), 1174.
19 Dorothy Knowles, Armand Gatti in the Theatre: Wild Duck against the Wind (London: Athlone Press, 1989), 5–6.
20 Dorothy Knowles, “Armand Gatti’s Theatre of Social Experiment, 1989–1991,” New Theatre Quarterly 8.30 (1992): 124–125.
21 Knowles, Armand Gatti in the Theatre, 2.
22 Osvaldo Bayer, Los anarquistas expropiadores, Simón Radowitzky, y otros ensayos (Coyhaique, Argentina: Sombraysén Editores, 2008), 387n26.
23 This indifference could be said to derive from the very nature of the anarchist tradition qua tradition. For all the diversity of Marxist thinkers and parties, all claim a theoretical pedigree with Marx and Engels at its head. Anarchism, on the contrary, enjoys a plurality of origins—a source of scorn for its critics, for whom it appears as a “political illegitimate,” in the words of a popular turn-of-the-century tract on the Anarchist Peril: “there appear to be several ‘fathers’.… Some cast the blame on Proudhon; others on Max Stirner; a third section makes Josiah Warren responsible; while yet others lay the crime at the door of Bakounine … [or] Kropotkin” (W.C. Hart, Confessions of an Anarchist [London: E. Grant Richards, 1906], 171n). More vexing yet, since even Proudhon, in coining the word “anarchist” in its positive sense, was only appropriating an existing word (heretofore merely an epithet used to bastardize one’s political opponents), and since the content given to this word came from already-existing workers’ movements (such as the Mutuellistes of Lyon, after whom Proudhon spoke of “mutualism” as the economic system proper to anarchism) and social tendencies (Kropotkin traces anarchist practices of “mutual aid” back to human prehistory and prehuman natural history), even these “fathers” cannot be said to be the absolute originators of anything. We wear our bastardy with pride.
24 On the importance of the concepts of “affinity” and “analogy” to anarchist thought, see Colson, Petit lexique, 20–21 and 24–26.
25 Karen Rosenberg, “The Cult of Self-Sacrifice in Yiddish Anarchism and Saul Yanovsky’s The First Years of Jewish Libertarian Socialism,” in Yiddish and the Left, eds. Gennady Estraĭkh and Mikhail Krutikov (Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre, 2001), 179, 181.
26 I borrow the term from Sharif Gemie, “Counter-Community: An Aspect of Anarchist Political Culture,” Journal of Contemporary History 29 (April 1994): 349–367.
27 For classic examples of the anarchism-as-quasi-religious-atavism argument, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 74–92, or Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), 225. For classic anarchist denunciations of religion, see Bakunin’s God and the State (New York: Dover, 1970) or Peggy Kornegger’s “The Spirituality Ripoff,” in The Second Wave 4.3 (1975): 12–18. For an acknowledgment of affinities with religious antecedents on the part of atheist anarchists, see, for instance, Gustav Landauer’s paean to medieval Christianity in Die Revolution (Revolution and Other Writings [Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010], 127–137), or Peter Kropotkin’s nod to several centuries’ worth of heresies and millenialist movements in Ethics, trans. Louis S. Friedland and Joseph R. Piroshnikoff (New York, London: The Dial Press, 1924), 133–134. Paul-François Tremlett’s “On the Formation and Function of the Category ‘Religion’ In Anarchist Writing,” in Culture and Religion 5.3 (2004): 367–381, provides what may be the best analysis of these discrepancies in the treatment. Demetrio Castro Alfín (“Anarquismo y protestantismo: Reflexiones sobre un viejo argumento,” Studia historica: Historia contemporánea 16 [1998]: 197–220) reconsiders this old historiographic chestnut in the Spanish context.
28 Sam Dreen qtd. in W.J. Fishman, East End Jewish Radicals, 1875–1914 (London: Duckworth, in association with the Acton Society Trust, 1975), 254; Jean Maitron, Le Mouvement Anarchiste En France (Paris: F. Maspero, 1975), 1.145.
29 Isaac Klein, A Guide to Jewish Religious Practice (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1979), 213. Bloch’s hypothesis is disputed, since the Kol Nidrei seems to predate Bloch’s history, but whatever its origins, the significance of the song in Jewish life was certainly cemented by experiences of persecution, all the more so after Bloch’s 1917 interpretation, in the wake of the Shoah. See also Margaret Olin, “Graven Images on Video?,” in Complex Identities: Jewish Consciousness and Modern Art, eds. Matthew Baigell and Milly Heyd (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 47.
30 Blaine McKinley, “‘The Quagmires of Necessity’: American Anarchists and Dilemmas of Vocation,” American Quarterly 34.5 (Winter 1982): 507.
31 Luigi Galleani, The Principle of Organization, trans. Wolfi Landstreicher (Cascadia: Pirate Press Portland, 2006), 4. In a contemporary echo, Laura Portwood-Stacer observes that among anarchists today, “everyone can be called out at some point for not living up to anarchist principles,” since—no less than 1925—“to live in contemporary society is to be complicit with capitalism and other forms of exploitation” (130).
32 Albert Libertad, “The Joy of Life,” in Man! An Anthology of Anarchist Ideas, Essays, Poetry and Commentaries, ed. Marcus Graham (London: Cienfuegos Press, 1974), 355–356. Cf. Alexandra Myrial (a.k.a. Alexandra David-Néel, 1868–1969), in Pour la Vie (1901): “Obedience is death. Each instant man submits to an alien will is an instant cut off from his life” (13).
33 The notion that anarchists were anarchists because they believed in the existence of a good human nature, repressed by social institutions such as the State, that merely awaited expression, is really a durable misreading that survives in spite of many concerted attempts to puncture it, perpetuated by political scientists, philosophers, and historians alike. See, for instance, Dave Morland’s “Anarchism, Human Nature and History: Lessons for the Future” (in Twenty-First Century Anarchism, eds. Jon Purkis and James Bowen [UK: Cassell, 1997], 8–23), David Hartley’s “Communitarian Anarchism and Human Nature” (in Anarchist Studies 3.2 [1995]: 145–164), and my own Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2006), 56–60.
34 See, for instance, the ridicule heaped by Proudhon on Rousseau’s notion that “Man is born good … but society … depraves him” (System of Economic Contradictions: or, the Philosophy of Misery, trans. Benjamin R. Tucker [Boston: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1888], 404), or Bakunin’s contempt for Rousseau’s conception of “primitive men enjoying absolute liberty only in isolation” (Bakunin on Anarchism, 128).
35 Kaneko Mitsuharu, “Opposition,” trans. Geoffrey Bownas and Anthony Thwaite, in 99 Poems in Translation: An Anthology, ed. Harold Pinter et al. (New York: Grove Press, 1994), 54–55.
36 David Weir, Anarchy and Culture: The Aesthetic Politics of Modernism (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, 1997), 5.
37 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, trans. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 75.
38 John Zerzan, Elements of Refusal (Seattle: Left Bank Books, 1988), 56.
39 The term “revolutionary syndicalism” refers to the radical movement emerging in the 1890s, eclectic as to ideology but firmly internationalist and anti-statist (and harboring a substantial faction of self-defined anarchists), that saw direct action and self-organization through unions (in French, syndicats) as the means proper to workers’ emancipation. The origins of the term “anarcho-syndicalism” (and its cognates) are somewhat cloudy, but it appears to have come into use in the early 1920s, first as an epithet hurled by Communist Party members at syndicalists who resisted the assimilation of their movement, then as a self-description adopted by some of those same syndicalists (David Berry, A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917–1945 (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2009), 152; Mintz,“Guión provisional sobre el anarcosindicalismo,” El Solidario 14 [Fall 2008]: xii–xiii). Anarcho-syndicalists specifically defined the emancipatory goal of revolutionary syndicalism as anarchy (or, in the formulation of the CNT, “libertarian communism”).
40 For a somewhat contrary view, see Allan Antliff’s Anarchist Modernism: Art, Politics, and the First American Avant-Garde (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
41 Howard J. Ehrlich, “How to Get from Here to There: Building Revolutionary Transfer Culture,” in Reinventing Anarchy, Again, ed. Howard J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996), 329.
42 Qtd. in Michelson “A Character Study of Emma Goldman,” Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years, Vol. 1, ed. Candace Falk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 441.
43 Emma Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 259; and Anarchism and Other Essays (New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1910), 56. Similarly, Ruth Kinna has argued that recent poststructuralist interpreters of the anarchist tradition misread Kropotkin’s conception of revolution: “It was not a matter of going to sleep in a statist system one night and waking up in utopia the next morning. Kropotkin believed that revolution was necessary, but it was work in progress as much as a cataclysmic event” (82).
44 Errico Malatesta, “Towards Anarchism,” in Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Vol. 1, ed. Robert Graham (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 506.
45 Francis Dupuis-Déri, “En deuil de révolution? Pensées et pratiques anarcho-fatalistes.” Réfractions 13 (Automne 2004): 139–150.
46 Proudhon, Oeuvres complètes 17 (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1868), 142; Landauer, Revolution, 116, 154.
47 Elisée Reclus, “Evolution, Revolution, and the Anarchist Ideal,” in Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisée Reclus, eds. and trans. John Clark and Camille Martin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 153.
48 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works Vol. 24: Marx and Engels, 1874–83 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989), 518; Gustav Landauer, For Socialism, trans. David J. Parent (St. Louis, MO: Telos Press, 1978), 74.
49 Gustav Landauer, Der Werdende Mensch: Aufsätze über Leben und Schrifttum, ed. Martin Buber (Potsdam: G. Kiepenheuer, 1921), 228.
50 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128.
51 Landauer, Der Werdende Mensch, 228, trans. and emphasis mine.
52 Landauer, Revolution, 94–108.
53 Paolo Virno, “Virtuosity and Revolution: The Political Theory of Exodus,” trans. Ed Emory, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Michael Hardt and Paolo Virno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 196; Andrea Colombo qtd. in Steve Wright, “Confronting the Crisis of ‘Fordism’: Italian Debates Around Social Transition,” http://www.arpnet.it/chaos/steve.htm.
54 Marco Revelli, “Worker Identity in the Factory Desert,” trans. Ed Emory, in Radical Thought in Italy, 118–119. This also recalls Walter Benjamin’s concluding remarks in “Theses on the Philosophy of History”: “We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future.… This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter” (Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn and ed. Hannah Arendt [New York: Schocken Books, 1969], 264).
55 Among those who have thought that Armand Gatti might be the anarchist Brecht, apparently, was Gilles Deleuze (“How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” trans. Melissa McMahon and Charles J. Stivale, in The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Charles J. Stivale [New York: Guilford Press, 1998], 264). Erwin Piscator thought Gatti might be the anarchist Piscator (Knowles, “Armand Gatti’s Two Theatres,” 52). Martin Esslin thinks that the anarchist Brecht is none other than the early Bertolt Brecht (Brecht: A Choice of Evils [London: Eyre Methuen, 1980], 151).
56 See, for instance, Kirwin Shaffer’s Anarchism and Countercultural Politics in Early-Twentieth-Century Cuba (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005); Tom Goyens’s Beer and Revolution: The German Anarchist Movement in New York City, 1880–1914 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Caroline Granier’s Les briseurs de formules: les écrivains anarchistes en France à la fin du XIXe siècle (Coeuvres-et-Valsery: Ressouvenances, 2008); or George McKay’s anthology, DiY Culture: Party & Protest in Nineties Britain (New York: Verso, 1998).
57 See Milstein, “Something Did Start in Quebec City,” in Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches From a Global Movement, ed. Daniel Burton-Rose et al. (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2004), 126–133; Barbara Epstein, “Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement,” Monthly Review 53.4 (2001): 1–14; David Graeber, “For a New Anarchism,” New Left Review 13 (2002): 61–74 and “Occupy and Anarchism’s Gift of Democracy,” Guardian (November 15, 2011).
58 I’m borrowing the concept of “lines of flight” very loosely from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who use it to speak of attempts to flee from imprisoning spaces and systems, particularly by the creation of something new.
59 Daniel Colson, Trois Essais de Philosophie Anarchiste: Islam, Histoire, Monadologie (Paris: Léo Scheer, 2004), 9–29, trans. mine.
60 Silvana Nicola, “Los consumidores iluminan el camino,” El País Digital (June 23, 2006), http://200.40.120.165/Suple/Empresario/06/06/23/elempre_223059.asp.
