Читать книгу A Methodical System of Universal Law - Johann Gottlieb Heineccius - Страница 17
ОглавлениеOf the rule of human actions, and the true principle of the law of nature.
SECTION LX
Of what nature or kind the rule of human action must be.
Such, we have already seen, is the nature of our free actions, that they must have a rule to direct them (§4); there we likewise shewed that a rule could not serve the purposes of a rule, if it be not streight or right, certain, evident, and invariable, and have external as well as internal obligation. Let us now enquire a little more accurately what this rule is which hath all these properties essential to a rule for human, free, moral actions.*<41>
SECTION LXI
The rule of human actions is not to be found in us, but without us.
The rule of human actions must either be within us or without us. If it be within us, it can be none other but either our own will, or our understanding and conscience. But neither of these faculties is always right, neither of them is always certain, neither of them is always the same and invariable; wherefore neither any of them, nor both of them together, can be the rule of human actions; whence it follows that the rule of human actions is not to be found in ourselves; but if there be any such, it must be without us.
SECTION LXII
It is to be found in the will of God.
Now without us exist other created beings, and likewise a God, the author of all things which exist. But since we are enquiring after a rule of human actions, carrying with it an external obligation (§9) and made known or promulgated to all mankind by right reason (§11); and since external obligation consists in the will of some being, whose authority we acknowledge (§9), there being no other whose authority we are obliged more strictly to acknowledge than the infinitely perfect and blessed God (§10); and seeing he alone can promulgate any thing to us by right reason, of which he is the author, it follows, by necessary consequence, that the will of God must be the rule of human actions, and the principle or source of all natural obligation, and of all virtue.*<42>
SECTION LXIII
The will of God is a right, certain, and constant rule.
That this rule is right cannot be doubted, since an infinitely perfect Being cannot will what is not perfectly good and right: it must be a certain rule, since reason discovers it to all men; and it must be unvariable, because the will of God can no more change, or be changed, than God himself, or right reason, by which it is discoverable. Finally, it must be obligatory, since God hath the justest claim and title to our obedience; and men have no reason or right to decline his authority, and cannot indeed if they would. Hence at the same time it is evident, that every will of God is not the rule of human actions, but his obligatory will only.*
SECTION LXIV
This rule may be called a law with regard to mankind.
Since therefore the obligatory will of God, which we have shewn to be the only rule of human actions, is his will with respect to the actions of his rational creatures, as to acting or forbearing to act (§63); it is evident, that this rule, considered with relation to man, may properly be called a divine law, because it is the will of the supreme Being, commanding or forbidding certain actions with rewards and penalties (§9). But because there are other laws of <43> God to mankind which are made known by revelation, and are therefore called positive, those which are known to man by natural reason, are justly denominated natural; and according as they either command, prohibit, or permit, they are with good reason divided into affirmative, negative, or permissive.
SECTION LXV
The explication of the divine justice may be deduced from the divine will.
Now since this divine will, or divine natural law, is the source and principle of all justice (§63), it follows that every action, not only human, but divine, which is conformable to this divine will, is just; and therefore it is objected, without any reason, against this doctrine, that there could not be any such thing as divine justice, were there no other principle or source of the law besides the divine will.*<44>
SECTION LXVI
The difference between the rule of divine and the rule of human justice, in what does it consist?
Herein chiefly lies the difference between divine and human justice, that with regard to the former there is no law or co-action; whereas the latter includes in it a respect to a law, and external obligation or co-action (§65 & §64). Wherefore the divine will, as it is a rule of action to men, carries with it a commination of some evil or punishment to transgressors; tho’ that punishment be not, as in human laws, defined and ascertained, but be, for the greater part, indefinite, and reserved to God himself, to be inflicted according to his wisdom and justice.*<45>
SECTION LXVII
That we may apply this rule, there must be some principle or criterion by which it may be known or ascertained.
But since it cannot be doubted that there is no other rule of human actions but the will or law of God (§63), it is to be enquired how we may come to the certain knowledge of this law. But since it is universally acknowledged to be promulgated to all men by right reason (§11), and since right reason is our faculty of reasoning, by which we deduce truths from other truths by a chain of consequences (§15), it is obvious that there must be some truth or proposition, from which what is agreeable to the will of God, and therefore just, may be ascertained by necessary consequence. There must then be some universal principle of science with regard to the law of nature.*
SECTION LXVIII
This principle must be true, evident, and adequate.
Every principle of science must be true, evident, and adequate; wherefore the principle of science, with respect to natural law, must be true; lest being false or fictitious, the conclusions inferred from it be such likewise: it must be evident, and that not only in this sense, that it is intelligible to the literate; but universally, to the unlearned as well as the learned, all being equally under obligation to <46> conform themselves to the law of nature. In fine, it must be adequate, or of such an extent, as to include in it all the duties of men and citizens, not Christians only, but those also who have not the benefit of divine revelation.†
SECTION LXIX
Whence this principle is not to be found in the sanctity of God.
Therefore we must not expect to find this principle of the law of nature in the conformity of our actions to the sanctity of God: for tho’ the proposition should be granted to be true, yet it is not evident enough, nor of such a nature, as that all the duties of men and citizens can be inferred and proved from it.*
SECTION LXX
Nor in the justice and injustice of actions considered in themselves.
Nor is this a sufficient principle, “that what is in its own nature just is to be done, and what is in its own nature unjust is not to be done.” For tho’ we have already admitted, that certain actions are <47> in their own nature good, and others evil, and that man is therefore obliged to perform the one, and to avoid the other, by an intrinsic obligation (§8); yet an action antecedently to, or independently of a law, is not just (§7); not to add that this principle is not evident enough, nor that all human offices are not deducible from it.†
SECTION LXXI
Nor in the consent of all nations.
None, I think, will rashly go into the opinion of those learned men, who held the consent of all nations, or of all the more civilized nations, to be the principle of natural law. For it is not true, that what all nations agree in, is also conformable to the divine will;* nor is this universal consent evident to all, since it must be collected from various testimonies of authors, antient and modern; nor is it sufficiently adequate to point out all duties.*.<48>
SECTION LXXII
Nor in the seven precepts of Noah.
But as those who endeavour to establish the law of nature and nations from the consent of nations, not only lay down a false, unevident, and unadequate principle; but likewise go out of the question into one of another kind, while they derive the law of nature not from nature itself, but from the traditions or opinions of nations: so the opinion of those who have attempted to deduce the law of nature and nations from the precepts given to Noah, labours under the same defects, as hath been sufficiently proved (§16).
SECTION LXXIII
Nor in the right of all to all things, or in the study of external peace.
What shall we then say of the whole philosophy of Hobbes1 in his books de Cive, or his Leviathan? when he asserts the right of every man in a state of nature to all things, he affirms a proposition which is neither true, nor evident, nor adequate, since the duties of men to God and themselves cannot be deduced from that principle; yea, while he goes about in <49> that manner, pretending to establish the law of nature, he really subverts it, as Hen. Cocei.2 def. de jure omnium in omnia, has shewn. Hence it is plain what we are to think of this other principle, viz. “that external peace is to be sought and studied if it can be obtained, and if not, force and war must be called to our aid.” For here likewise Hobbes lurks behind a curtain.*
SECTION LXXIV
Nor in the state of integrity.
That principle laid down by Val. Alberti3 professor of divinity and philosophy at Leipsic, hath a specious shew of truth and piety, viz. a state of integrity. But Puffend. Specim. controv. 4. 12. and Thomas. jurisp. divin. 4. 40 & seq. have proved it to be false. And granting it to be true, that whatever is agreeable to a state of primitive integrity, is truly of the law of nature; yet how unevident this principle must be, not only to Pagans, but even to Christians, is manifest. Further, since the laws of citizenship, of war, of contracts, and many others, for which there was not place in that most happy state, cannot be deduced from the idea of it, who can call this principle adequate?*<50>
SECTION LXXV
Nor in sociability.
Grotius, Puffendorf, and several antients, were wonderfully pleased with the principle of sociability; nor can it be denied, as we have afterwards expressly proved, that men are so framed that they must live socially: but that this is not the true, evident, and adequate principle of the law of nature, hath been already demonstrated by the learned and worthy Sam. de Coccius de principio juris nat. diss. 1. qu. 2. §9.4 I shall only add this one thing, that many of our duties to God, and to ourselves, would take place, even tho’ man lived solitary, and without society in the world.*<51>
SECTION LXXVI
Nor in the order of nature, and such like hypotheses.
Other principles of natural law are highly boasted of by others; such as the order of nature, which the Creator intends in his works; the interest of mankind; a moral Theocracy, and other such like principles.† But it is agreed to by all, that these principles are not evident or adequate; and some of them indeed cannot be admitted without some cautions and restrictions.
SECTION LXXVII
The will of God intends our happiness.
But to give the opinion, which, upon a mature examination of this subject, appears to me the most solid, first of all I would observe, that God being infinitely wise and good, cannot will any thing else with relation to mankind but their happiness. For being perfect, he stands in no need of any thing; and therefore men, who of all the beings within our cognizance, alone are capable of felicity, were not created by him <52> for his own advantage, but that he might render them capable of true happiness.*
SECTION LXXVIII
To this the will of God obliges us.
This being the will of God, that man should aim at and pursue true happiness, and his will being the rule of human free actions, and therefore the source of the law of nature and justice (§62); by consequence whereas, human legislators being themselves indigent in several respects, have their own advantage no less in view than that of their subjects in making laws, God, on the contrary, must have made laws to men solely for their own benefit, and have intended nothing by them but their attainment to true happiness, by conforming themselves to them.†<53>
SECTION LXXIX
That happiness consists in the fruition of good by love; and therefore love is the principle of the law of nature.
If therefore God intend the happiness of mankind, and the law of nature be directed towards it as its end (§78), and true happiness consist in the enjoyment of good, and the absence of evil; the consequence must be, that by the law of nature God must intend that we may attain to the enjoyment of true good, and avoid evil. But since we can only enjoy good by love, hence we infer that God obliges us to love, and that love is the principle of natural law, and, as it were, a compend of it.*
SECTION LXXX
What is love and hatred?
Love in us is the desire of good, joined with delight in its perfection and happiness. Hatred is <54> aversion from evil, joined with satisfaction in its unhappiness; wherefore what we love, we receive pleasure from its perfection and happiness, and we are disposed to promote that perfection and happiness to the utmost of our power. What, on the contrary, we hate, we rather desire its misery than its happiness.
SECTION LXXXI
Love does not give uneasiness.
Since we receive satisfaction from the excellence and happiness of what we love (§80) it is obvious that the lover does not will to give uneasiness to what he loves; nay, he rather suffers pain if any other should attempt any such thing. For because he who gives uneasiness to one, or suffers it to be done without feeling any pain, takes pleasure in another’s unhappiness; but to take delight in the suffering of any one, is the same as to hate (§80); and to love and hate the same object at one and the same time is a contradiction; the consequence is, that it is inconsistent or impossible at the same time to love one, and to hurt him; or to bear his being hurted by another without disturbance and pain.
SECTION LXXXII
Hence the first degree of love, which we call the love of justice.
One may be hurt two ways, either by doing something which makes him more unhappy than he is by nature, or by depriving him of some happiness he is already possessed of. But seeing to do something which conduces to render one more unhappy than he is, is to hurt one; and to dispossess one of something he hath justly acquired, and which contributes to his happiness, is to deny one, or to take from him something that belongs to him; hence it follows, that he violates the law of love in the highest manner who hurts one, and disturbs his possession, or takes it away, and hinders his enjoyment of it; and, on the other hand, the lowest degree of love is to hurt no person, but to render to every one <55> what is due to him, or leave him in the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of what he hath; which degree of love we call the love of justice.*
SECTION LXXXIII
From which there is another very differing degree, which we call the love of humanity and beneficence.
But because a lover receives pleasure from the happiness of him whom he loves (§80), it follows that he renders to him whom he loves chearfully, even that which is not strictly due to him, or his right, if he perceives it to be conducive to his happiness: and this is a more sublime degree of love, which we call love of humanity, or beneficence.* But because we call the capacity of discerning things which are contributive to our own happiness and that of others, prudence or wisdom; it is obvious that this love of humanity or beneficence must have wisdom for its guide and director.*<56>
SECTION LXXXIV
The difference between them in respect of obligation.
Moreover, whereas he who does not observe the love of justice, who hath it not, or does not act conformably to it, is a profligate person; he, on the other hand, who hath not the love of humanity and beneficence, can only be said not to perform the nobler and greater virtues (§82). Now none may be forced to do virtuous actions, but all acts of wickedness may be restrained by punishments (§9). Whence it is plain, that men may be compelled to acts of justice, but not to acts of humanity and beneficence. But when obligation is joined with coaction, it is perfect; when it is not, it is imperfect (§9). We are therefore perfectly obliged to the love of justice, and but imperfectly to the love of humanity and beneficence.*<57>
SECTION LXXXV
Love, how distinguished in respect of its object.
Since love always tends towards good (§80). But whatever we embrace with affection as good, must either be a more perfect being than our selves, equal, or inferior to us, and less excellent. Love of the first kind, we call love of devotion or obedience; love of the second kind, we call love of friendship; and love of the third sort, we call benevolence.
SECTION LXXXVI
What love of devotion is; what love of friendship; and what benevolence?
Love of devotion or obedience, is love towards a more excellent and perfect being, with whose excellence and happiness we are so delighted, that we look upon such a being, as to be honoured and obeyed with the highest complacency and veneration. The love of friendship is the love of our equal, or satisfaction and delight in his happiness, equal to what we perceive in our own. The love of benevolence, is the love of an inferior and more imperfect being, which disposes us seriously to promote its happiness, as much as the nature of the being permits.
SECTION LXXXVII
The nature of the love of devotion and obedience.
From these definitions it follows, that we cannot have love of devotion or obedience towards a being, unless we be persuaded of its superiority and greater perfection; nor can this love take place, unless such a being be of such a character and temper as to desire to be loved by us. And this love ought <58> always to be joined with veneration and obedience suitable to the perfections of such a being.*
SECTION LXXXVIII
The love of friendship its nature.
Further it is plain that the love of friendship arises from equality. Now equality is either an equality of nature, or an equality of perfections. Wherefore, where the former takes place, equal offices of love are reciprocally due; and for that reason, amongst all who are by nature equal, these incomparable rules ought to obtain. “Whatever you would not have done to yourself, do it not to other.” And, “Whatever you would have another do to you do unto them.” Matt. vii. 12. Luke vi. 31. Tob. iv. 16. The first of which is the foundation of the love of justice; the other, of the love of beneficence and humanity. But because, however equal the being beloved, and the being loving may be by nature, yet the one may be either more perfect, or more imperfect than the other; it may happen that we may be obliged to have at the same time a love of friendship towards a man, as equal to us by nature, and a love of devotion and obedience, or of benevolence towards him as being more perfect or more imperfect.*<59>
SECTION LXXXIX
The love of benevolence.
Finally, since benevolence seeks the enlargement and promotion of the happiness of a more imperfect being, as much as its nature is capable of happiness (§86). Hence it follows, that we ought not to hurt such a being, or refuse to it what is its right and due; but that we ought to do good to it, to the utmost of our power, with prudence however; and therefore whatever kindness is not agreeable to reason, or conducted by prudence, is not benevolence and liberality, but profusion, or any thing else you please to call it.
SECTION XC
What are the objects of this love?
Now if we consider accurately the beings with which we are surrounded, we shall find there are three only, to which we are under obligation to render the offices of love: God, the creator of all things; ourselves, who are certainly the nearest to ourselves; and other men, whom we plainly perceive to be by nature equal to us. For as to spirits, such as angels, we know not their nature, nor have we such commerce with them, as to be under the obligation of certain duties towards them. And between men and brutes there is no communion of right, and therefore no duty is properly owing to them; but we owe this to God not perversely to abuse any of his creatures.† Puffend. de jure nat. & gent. 4. 3. 6. <60>
SECTION XCI
The first axiom of love to God.
Since we cannot conceive otherwise of God than as a most excellent, most perfect, and infinitely good Being, upon whom depends absolutely our existence and felicity, of whose superiority we are absolutely persuaded, as well as of his will and desire to be loved by us (§87), it follows, that we owe to him a love of devotion and obedience, which that it may be worthy or suitable to a most perfect Being, this rule or maxim immediately occurs, “That God, upon whom we absolutely depend, ought to be adored by us with all the vigour of our mind; and that to him ought to be rendered the most perfect and sincere obedience.”*
SECTION XCII
A second axiom concerning love to ourselves.
Our love to ourselves must consist in satisfaction and delight in our own perfection and happiness (§80). Hence therefore we are obliged to pursue <61> the preservation and augmentation of our perfection and happiness with all our might. But since the more perfect a being is, the more honour and obedience we owe to it (§87); we must take care that we do not love ourselves more than God, least our self-love should thus degenerate into immoderate and unproportioned selfishness. Whence flows this other maxim, “That man is obliged to omit nothing, that may conduce to preserve, promote, or augment his perfection and happiness, which is consistent with his love of God.”*
SECTION XCIII
A third axiom concerning love to others.
Since moreover all men are by nature equal, and that natural equality requires a reciprocal obligation to equal love (§88); the consequence of this is, that we are obliged to delight in the happiness of others, not less, but not more than in our own; and therefore to love others as ourselves; but ourselves not less than our neighbour. Whence flows a third maxim, “That man is obliged to love his fellow-creature no less than himself, and consequently not to do to any other, what he would not have him do to him; but, on the other hand, to do to others all those offices of kindness which he can reasonably desire them to render to him.”
SECTION XCIV
This principle is true, evident and adequate.
In fine, upon a due consideration of the pre-requisites to a principle of moral science which have <62> been explained, we will find that this is the most genuine principle of moral science. Nothing can be more certain, it necessarily flows from the divine will and the nature of man; and, which is very satisfactory to me, it is authorised by the sacred writings. Nothing can be more evident, since it is such as may be easily conceived by the unassisted reason of every man, even among Pagans. Nothing can be more adequate, for in fact we shall soon see, that there is no duty of a man as such, or of a citizen, which may not be easily and clearly deduced from this first principle.
REMARKS on This Chapter
I can’t help thinking that our excellent author is not so distinct in this chapter as he ought to have been, and withal too tedious. It was indeed necessary to distinguish between the principle which constitutes external or legal obligation, and the principle which is the medium of knowledge with regard to it; or the mean by which it may be known and demonstrated. Now it is the will of God which constitutes external or legal obligation. But what is the medium by which the divine will may be known? Our author had already often said, that right reason is the faculty by which it may be known. But hence it follows, that conformity to reason, is the mean by which agreeableness to the divine will may be known and demonstrated. Why then does he dispute against those who say conformity to Reason, or which comes to the same thing, to our rational nature, is the principle or mean of moral knowledge? Or why does he not immediately proceed to enquire what is, and what is not agreeable to reason or our rational nature? Why does he dispute against those who in their reasonings about the laws of nature, infer them from the divine sanctity or moral rectitude, which must mean reason, or our rational nature compared with the rational nature of the supreme Being? For if the law of nature be discoverable by reason, conformity to reason, to the reason of God, and the reason of man, must be the principle of knowledge with regard to the law of nature. Nor can the divine sanctity or divine moral rectitude be an obscure idea, unless conformity to reason, or to a reasonable nature, be an obscure idea. Our author seems to have forgot what he said (§1), when he says (§86), that the happiness and perfection of mankind is not a principle from which the law of nature can be inferred; and what he here refutes, he afterwards (§77) returns to, as a necessary first principle in demonstrating the law of nature, viz. “That God intends the happiness and perfection of mankind.” For if his reasoning, <63> (§77) be just, the business of the moral science is to enquire what tends to the perfection and happiness of man, and what is necessary to it; and these will be good moral reasonings, which shew an action to be conducive to human happiness and perfection, or contrariwise: For thus they shew what the divine will commands, and what it forbids: nay, according to his reasoning in that section, we can not advance one step in morals, without first determining what our happiness and perfection requires, and what is repugnant to it. He seems likewise (§70) where he says, “That the intrinsic pravity or goodness of actions, is not a sufficient principle for deducing and establishing the moral laws of nature,” to have forgot what he had said in the former chapter, and frequently repeats in succeeding ones, of the priority in nature or idea of internal to external obligation. And indeed, to say that the laws of nature concerning human conduct, cannot be deduced from the consideration of the internal nature of actions, is in other words to say, that they cannot be deduced by reason; for it is to say, that they cannot be deduced from the conformity or disconformity of actions to reason. All I would infer from this is, 1. That it is impossible to make one step in moral reasonings, without owning a difference between conformity and disagreeableness to reason, and using that general expression, or some one equivalent to it; for the will of God cannot be inferred but from conformity to reason, or something equivalent to it, i.e. from some principle, which however it may be expressed, ultimately signifies conformity to the nature of things, or to reason. 2. That conformity to reason, to a reasonable nature, to moral rectitude, to the divine nature, and conduciveness to the perfection and happiness of a rational being, or conduciveness to the perfection and happiness of man, as such, and several other such phrases used by moralists, have and must all have the same meaning, or terminate in the same thing. 3. That to ask why a reasonable being ought to act agreeably to reason, is to ask why it is reasonable to act reasonably; or why reasonable is reasonable. This must be the meaning of that question, as it is distinguished from this other, “Is there good ground to think, that the supreme Being, the maker and governor of the universe, wills that his reasonable creatures should act reasonably, and will proportion their happiness according to their behaviour?” which question does likewise amount in other terms, to asking whether it is agreeable to supream reason, to approve acting according to reason? There is therefore no necessity of dwelling long upon either of these questions in moral philosophy; but it is its business to enquire what rules of conduct, what methods of action are agreeable, and what are disagreeable to reason, to the nature of things, to the qualities of reasonable beings, to the perfection and happiness of mankind as such; all which phrases, as hath been said, must have the same meaning, and may therefore be promiscuously used: And indeed about them there can be no dispute, unless <64> one has a mind to make a particular favourite of some one of them in opposition to all the rest; in which case, the dispute, ’tis evident, will be merely about a phrase; as in fact, most disputes in the moral science realy are, for that very reason, viz. through a particular liking to some favourite words.
Our author’s method of reasoning is, when he brings it out, plain and just enough. It amounts to this, “If we own the being of a God, and have a clear and just idea of his perfection, we must own that he wills the perfection and happiness of all his creatures, his moral creatures in particular: man therefore being a moral creature, God must will the happiness and perfection of man. He must then for that reason, will that man pursue his own perfection and happiness. But such is the nature of man, and so are things relating to him constituted and connected, that the pursuit of his perfection and happiness consists in what may properly be expressed in one word, Love, the love of his Creator, the love of his fellow creatures, those of his own kind in particular, and the love of himself.” Now according to this way of reasoning what our author hath to prove, is the latter proposition; and accordingly he goes on in the succeeding chapters to prove it.
In other words, our author’s manner of deducing human duties amounts to this, “Every obligation which man can be under as a rational agent, external or internal, may be expressed by one word, Love. For we can owe nothing to any being but love: all our obligations must therefore be reducible to these three; the love of our Creator, the love of our fellow-creatures, of those of our own kind, or with whom we are more nearly and immediately connected in particular; and the love of ourselves.” And accordingly our author proceeds to explain the duties belonging to these three classes. The principle upon which he founds may justly be called clear, certain, and adequate. For if there be any such thing as obligation upon a rational agent, external or internal, it can be nothing else, but obligation to love: internal obligation can belong to nothing else but the dictates and offices of reasonable love; and therefore external obligation can belong to nothing else. Wherefore love is justly said in the sacred writings, to be the fulfillment of the law; of the law of nature, of the law of reason, of the law of God. But let me observe, that this method of our author’s, is the same in other words with some of them he refutes. For is it not evidently the same thing as to say “that duty, obligation, or what is reasonable with regard to human conduct, must be inferred from the human nature, and the constitution of things relative to man. But according to the frame of man and the constitution of things, the chief happiness and perfection of every man arises from the love and the pursuit of order within and without him; or from the observation of the prevalency of wisdom and good order, and consequently of greater happiness in the administration of the universe; and from such an orderly discipline of his <65> affections as tend to produce universal happiness, order, and perfection, as far as his affections, and the actions they lead to, have any influence?’’ According to which state of the question, the remaining enquiry will be what the love of good order and general happiness requires.
