Читать книгу Hermann Roesler and the Making of the Meiji State - Johannes Siemes - Страница 18

Roesler's Introductory Remarks^*

In commenting on the draft of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan it may first be convenient to briefly inquire into the nature and object of a constitution. In a more general sense a constitution is a fundamental law by which a certain system of government is established. In that sense every people formed into a state must have a constitution, written or not written, because there can be no state without a chief who exercises, or commands to be exercised, the governmental powers according to certain principles of law, without a certain formation of public authorities, and without a certain legal condition of the people and certain legal relations between the chief of the state and his subjects. In that sense Japan was from immemorial times possessed of a constitution because it was governed by a hereditary Imperial dynasty; a jurisdictional and administrative system was organized throughout the country and the people were formed into a system of feudal orders which has lately been transformed into a system of social classes.

But in a more special and modern sense, a constitution is a fundamental law by which the subjects are admitted to the enjoyment of certain rights in respect of the government. A constitutional government is formed when the exercise of the governmental powers is to a certain extent controlled by, or brought under the influence of the people. It is opposed to an absolute government in which the people have no political rights, that is to say, no legal powers of controlling and influencing the acts of the government. As regularly the people at large cannot well be admitted to an interference into the exercise of governmental powers, a national representation is to be formed which is entrusted with the exercise of the political rights of the people inasmuch as an immediate concurrence with the government is concerned. Consequently the formation of a national representation for controlling and examining the acts of government is essential to a constitutional government, and in order to secure a lawful and beneficial concurrence of the sovereign power and of the national representation, a careful and exact determination of the rights and duties of both of them is required. Thus, in a constitutional government the working conditions and objects of the exercise of sovereign rights is in a certain degree not left to the free judgment of the chief of state but determined by law, and insofar the sovereign power is limited. A constitutional government may be, what is commonly, and especially in Germany, called either simply representative or parliamentary. A parliamentary government is that in which the balance of political power rests with the national representation, while in a representative government that balance rests with the chief of state, and consequently in a monarchy with the monarch. For Japan, by the present constitution, a representative, not parliamentary, system of government has been established; consequently the sovereign decision will, where no express provision is made to the contrary, be reserved to the Emperor. Thus the time-honored elements of the original Japanese constitution have been maintained, and the sacred Imperial Power, as it has been transmitted from ages immemorial by the glorious Imperial ancestors, has not radically been changed but only developed into a more convenient condition according to the requirements of the time. Also it appears wiser to let the constitutional system gradually develop, and not to overstep hastily, in pursuance of lofty theories, the necessary stages of progress; the much more so, as the parliamentary system, even in those countries where it has gone into practice, shows by no means an entirely satisfactory experience and is recently found more and more objectionable.

The general object of a constitution is to raise the people to a state of lawful liberty and to secure to the state more effectively the elements of power and civilization. No doubt the enjoyment of political rights, and the security of civil rights based thereon, strengthens the development of human forces, moral, intellectual and economical, and produces a stronger and firmer coherence of the national community, because the common exercise of political rights by the people fosters their national unity. A constitutional government therefore is favorable to the interests of civilization as well as to the national elevation of a people. Although the principles of constitutional government originate more in the West, and especially in the nations of the German race, yet they will be equally applicable to Asiatic nations as they are doubtless able to adopt the principles of Western government in general.

The most essential political right to be granted by a constitution is the right of voting the laws and the taxes. Without this power of self-assertion and self-protection of individual rights, especially of the right of property, by the people, there is no true constitution. The right of voting the laws and taxes is the constitutional center towards which all other political rights gravitate. So the institution of an independent judicature according to law; the respect of law and of individual rights by the administrative authorities; the responsibility of ministers; the exact delineation of the executive power; the acknowledgement of certain general rights of the subjects, as conditional of their personal liberty and of a higher state of civilization—these are, in general, the popular rights which shall be granted by the constitutional law. But this law has not only to define the rights, but also the duties of the people, as with respect to taxation, conscription, the financial requirements of the state and generally submission to every lawful and constitutional exercise of the sovereign power.

Although the constitutions of different countries must agree with regard to the main constitutional principles and objects, yet they differ greatly in particulars according to the national views, wants and history of each country. So also the Japanese Constitution has been modelled according to true constitutional principles which are recognized everywhere. But it cannot in its particulars be criticized according to the constitutional law or practice of special other countries; in its own peculiar features it must be regarded as a pure Japanese law, adapted to the national character of the Japanese people.

His Majesty the Emperor, in graciously granting a constitution to His faithful subjects, makes use of His indisputable sovereign right of modifying the Imperial Government in consideration of the actual internal and international condition of the Empire. No doubt that constitution, so as it is granted, must be accepted and obeyed by the people. The Japanese Constitution will be a constitution by charter, and not by compact between the Sovereign and the subjects. But once being in force, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be altered without the vote of the national representation. Frequent changes of the constitution are not desirable and therefore should be somewhat checked. The constitution of a country should be as firm and stable as the character of a man; a nation which lightly changes its constitution, is similar to a man shaked and whirled by various violent passions. It is to be hoped that the admirable stability of the old constitution will pass over into the new one; and this reason affords a sufficient justification for the time-proven elements of the old monarchical system being transferred into the new constitution as much as it may seem compatible with the principles of a constitutional government.

Footnote

* This document is found in the National Diet Library in the collection Itō Miyoji Bunko. As much as possible, the original text was copied faithfully; this accounts for inconsistencies in capitalization, punctuation, and abbreviations, as well as for the occasional Germanic-English expressions which sometimes had to be clarified. Obvious spelling errors in the original have been corrected, however.