Читать книгу The History of Waterloo - John Codman Ropes - Страница 11

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Napoleon, as we have said above,58 “proposed to assemble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood of Charleroi,” and this step was, of course, the essential preliminary to the opening of the campaign. The five corps of which the army was to be chiefly composed, were widely separated from each other, and each was at a considerable distance from Charleroi. The 1st and 2d Corps lay to the westward of Charleroi, in the neighborhood of Lille and Valenciennes respectively, the 3d and 4th Corps to the southeastward of Charleroi, near Mezières and Metz; the 6th Corps was at Laon, about half way from Charleroi to Paris, and the Guard partly at Paris, and partly, not far off, at Compiègne. The four cavalry corps were stationed to the north of Laon, between that place and Avesnes. The larger part of these commands were placed on or near the frontier, and any movements on their part were likely to be observed by the enemy. Nevertheless the concentration of the army was safely and secretly effected. The 4th Corps, which was near Metz, broke camp as early as the 6th of June, the 1st Corps, which was near Lille, as early as the 9th, the Guard left Paris on the 8th, the other corps left their encampments at somewhat later dates. The Emperor left Paris at half-past three o’clock on the morning of the 12th, and so well were his calculations made that, on the evening of the 14th, his headquarters were at Beaumont, not more than sixteen miles south of Charleroi, with the entire army within easy reach. And, by the expedient which he adopted, of causing demonstrations to be made at various points on the frontier, from the English Channel on the west almost to Metz on the east, he diverted the attention of the enemy’s pickets and created false alarms, so that his formidable army was concentrated without arousing the serious concern of the chiefs of the allied armies.

On the evening of the 14th, at Avesnes, the Emperor issued to his soldiers one of his stirring orders;59 he reminded them that this was the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland; he called upon them to conquer or die.

As confirming what has been said above as to his plans and expectations, he wrote to his brother Joseph the same morning, as follows:60 “To-morrow I go to Charleroi, where the Prussian army is; that will occasion either a battle or the retreat of the enemy.” To the same effect he wrote at the same time to Davout:61 “I shall pass the Sambre to-morrow, the 15th. If the Prussians do not retire, we shall have a battle.” These letters show how perfectly clear his plan lay in his own mind,—not as a project of separating the allied armies from one another by occupying any points on the line by which they communicated with each other, but as an intention of attacking and defeating the army of Blücher before it could be supported by that of Wellington, unless, indeed, it should fall back before him.

That evening at Beaumont was issued a general order62 for the forward movement of the army, to commence at half-past two o’clock the next morning, the 15th. For each corps special directions were given, and also for each of the three divisions of the Imperial Guard,—Marshal Mortier, its commander, having through illness been obliged to remain at Avesnes. The 2d Corps, followed by the 1st, was to advance on the left of the army; the 3d and 6th and the Guard on the centre; and the 4th Corps, which was at Philippeville, on the right. Charleroi was stated to be the general objective point of the movement: but Reille was warned that the 2d Corps would probably cross the Sambre at Marchienne, a few miles higher up, and Gérard was by a later order6364 directed to cross with the 4th Corps at Châtelet, a little lower down. The sappers were to precede each column to repair the roads and bridges, which had been in the past few months broken up by the French, in order to obstruct the march of the allies, should they cross the frontier. The centre columns were to be preceded by the cavalry of the 3d Corps and by the cavalry-corps of General Pajol. The other three cavalry-corps, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, were to follow the army. (See Map 2.)

By the carelessness of the headquarters-staff in sending but one officer to Vandamme, and in not requiring a receipt65 from him, and by the accident of this officer being thrown from his horse and failing to deliver his message, Vandamme did not get this order in season; he consequently was not able to get the 3d Corps on the road till seven o’clock. This delay was, of course, vexatious, and operated to hinder the movement upon Charleroi, and to render it less decisive than it otherwise would have been.

An unhappy incident occurred to the 4th Corps. General Bourmont, who commanded its leading division, deserted to the enemy, accompanied by his staff. Bourmont was an old royalist, but he had apparently given in his unqualified adhesion to the imperial cause. His treason could not but have a very unfortunate effect on the soldiers, creating a feeling of distrust in their officers, particularly in those of high rank.

With these deductions, the day of the fifteenth of June was decidedly a successful one for the French. Although the Prussian General Zieten, who, with the 1st Prussian Corps, held the line of the Sambre, having advance-posts on the right or south bank, opposed at all points to the French a skilful and obstinate resistance,66 the superiority of his adversaries was too decided for a successful stand to be made anywhere.

In the centre, the operations were under the immediate direction of the Emperor, who mounted his horse at three in the morning.67 In the march on Charleroi the Young Guard followed the cavalry, Vandamme’s Corps having been, as we have seen, delayed. Everywhere the enemy were pushed back. Pajol entered Charleroi about noon. Here a halt was made to allow Vandamme time to arrive, and the enemy took up a strong position on the heights of Gilly, a little to the north and east of Charleroi. Their firm attitude seems to have imposed somewhat68 on Marshal Grouchy, who had come up with the cavalry-corps of Exelmans, and on Vandamme, who in the afternoon arrived and took his proper post in the advance; and it was not until about five o’clock,69 when Napoleon assumed command in person, and with a vigor that savored perhaps of impatience assaulted the position, putting in even the cavalry of the headquarters-guard, that the enemy gave way, and retired to Fleurus.

Vandamme and Grouchy, with Pajol’s and Exelmans’ cavalry, bivouacked a mile or two south of Fleurus. The Guard rested between Charleroi and Gilly; the 6th Corps on the south bank of the river, near Charleroi.

On the right, the corps of Gérard crossed the river at Châtelet, and remained for the night on the road to Fleurus.

Thus, three corps,—the 3d, 4th, and 6th,—the Guard, and the greater part of the cavalry, were concentrated near Charleroi and between that place and Fleurus, ready to attack the Prussians at Fleurus or Sombreffe the next day.

The Emperor’s headquarters were fixed at Charleroi.

Coming now to the operations of the left wing,—Reille, at the head of the 2d Corps, starting from Leers, on the Sambre, at three in the morning, drove the enemy from point to point, occupying the various bridges across the river, until he reached Marchienne.70 By the terms of an order71 dated 8.30 A.M. he was allowed to pass the Sambre at this point, and by another order, which is not preserved, but only referred to in an order to d’Erlon,72 he was directed to march on Gosselies, and to attack a body of the enemy which appeared to be there. In obedience to his instructions, Reille crossed the bridge at Marchienne and moved directly upon Jumet, a village on the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels. Here he encountered a Prussian rear guard, which he quickly overthrew, and at once moved upon Gosselies. It was “at this moment,” when he was marching on Gosselies, he says, that Marshal Ney arrived and took command.73 This was about five o’clock in the afternoon.74

Ney, who had just overtaken the army on the march, had ridden over from Charleroi, where he had seen the Emperor, and had received75 from him the command of the 1st and 2d Corps. Napoleon had told him that Reille was marching on Gosselies, and, when he reached Reille, he found him, as we have just seen, in the very act.

On his arrival at Gosselies, Ney carried forward with himself to Frasnes the cavalry of the 2d Corps, Piré’s, and the division of Bachelu. About half-past six,76 Ney with these troops drove the enemy,—a brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar,—from Frasnes. They fell back to Quatre Bras. The division of Girard was sent in pursuit of the Prussians, who had retired from Gosselies on Fleurus. The other two divisions,—those of Jerome and Foy,—remained at Gosselies. A division of cavalry of the Guard, under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, about 2000 strong, which had been lent temporarily to Ney, was placed by him in support of the troops at Frasnes.77 Ney remained at Frasnes till a late hour in the evening.

Thus the 2d Corps had accomplished its tasks for the day. Its commander had shown himself energetic and capable. The advance at Frasnes observed the enemy’s post at Quatre Bras. The troops had had a very exhausting day and needed a good night’s rest.

The 1st Corps, under the Count d’Erlon, did not do so well by any means. To begin with, d’Erlon did not start at 3 A.M., as he was ordered to do, but at 4 o’clock.78 His troops had no fighting to do; they simply followed in the rear of the 2d Corps.79 They had, to be sure,80 five miles farther to go, having bivouacked at Solre-sur-Sambre, and they were, no doubt, affected by that tendency to delay which seems always to attend the last half of a long marching column; it is well known that the last half never keeps up, relatively, with the first half. D’Erlon had also been required to detach part of his troops at the various crossings of the Sambre.81 But these facts afford no adequate explanation of the tardiness of this corps. At night d’Erlon’s headquarters were at Marchienne; his leading division, Durutte’s, had reached Jumet;82 but at least one-fourth of his troops had not crossed the river. Nevertheless, by an order83 dated 3 P.M., d’Erlon had been informed that Reille had been ordered to march on Gosselies and to attack the enemy there, and that the Emperor wished him, d’Erlon, also to march on Gosselies and to support this operation. Later in the day, or perhaps in the evening,84 after Marshal Ney had assumed command of the two corps, d’Erlon was informed85 that it was the Emperor’s intention that he should join the 2d Corps at Gosselies, and that Ney would also give him orders to that effect.86 This last sentence must imply that Napoleon had enjoined on Ney to bring up these troops. It is true that Charras87 says that, on the evening of the 15th, the 1st Corps was in echelon from Marchienne to Jumet, implying that all the troops had crossed the river; and this is the generally accepted belief.88 But we find a despatch,89 dated at Marchienne at 3 A.M. of the 16th, from the chief-of-staff of the 3d division of the 1st corps, Marcognet’s, to General Noguès, who commanded the 1st brigade of that division, informing him that the 2d brigade would remain at Marchienne until the arrival of the 1st division, that of General Allix. This shows beyond a doubt that, notwithstanding the order of three o’clock in the afternoon for the 1st Corps to reach Gosselies and support Reille in attacking the enemy, and the subsequent order to the same effect, yet, at three o’clock in the morning of the 16th, twelve hours afterwards, one division had not arrived at the river, and another division (two brigades) was still at Marchienne. This state of facts, it must be recollected, existed when the whole 2d Corps had been at and beyond Gosselies for more than eight hours! It is impossible not to blame d’Erlon for this excessive tardiness in the movements of his corps,—not only for not having executed the order of three o’clock in the afternoon to proceed at once to Gosselies, but generally, for not having seen to it that his troops were, during the entire march, within a short distance90 of the 2d Corps, a measure certainly, when all the circumstances are taken into account,—and especially that the advance of Reille was to be made in an enemy’s country and was actually stoutly resisted,—of the most obvious necessity. And it must not be forgotten that in Belgium in the middle of June, it is light until nine o’clock in the evening, and the sun rises before four.

It may be remarked that the controversies which have been waged in regard to the truth of Napoleon’s statement that he, on the 15th, gave Ney verbal orders to seize and occupy Quatre Bras, have deflected the attention of historians from the subject now under consideration,—the conduct of d’Erlon in regard to the march of the 1st Corps on the 15th,—a subject closely connected, as we shall hereafter see, with the operations of the army on the succeeding day.

In regard to the much vexed question referred to above, we shall say nothing here. It is not pretended that Napoleon gave to Ney on the 15th any written orders to go to Quatre Bras. Napoleon’s statement91 that he gave him verbal orders to that effect has been denied, and is widely disbelieved. We prefer, for many reasons, to confine our narrative to generally admitted facts, or to those which admit of definite proof. What we have to say about this matter will be found in the Notes to this chapter.

In summing up the situation, we may fairly conclude, that, with the exception of the backwardness of the 1st Corps, the progress made during the day had been satisfactory to the Emperor. He says himself:—

“All the Emperor’s manœuvres had succeeded to his wishes; he had it thenceforth in his power to attack the armies of the enemy in detail. To avoid this misfortune, the greatest that could befall them, the only means they had left was to abandon the ground, and assemble at Brussels or beyond that city.”92

Napoleon had in fact concentrated in front of Fleurus a sufficient force wherewith to fight the Prussians, if, as he thought it not unlikely, they should risk a battle on the next day. He was not apprehensive of the Anglo-Dutch army joining their allies in this battle, for Wellington, as he calculated, could not concentrate in season a sufficient force to overcome the two corps which, under Ney, he intended should occupy Quatre Bras the next forenoon. He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe, for he feared that if he did this, Blücher, finding his communications with Wellington blocked at this point, would retire without a battle, and endeavor to effect a junction with the English at Wavre, or elsewhere to the northward; whereas, so long as the road which connected his army with that of Wellington remained free, Blücher might with confidence be expected to risk a battle for the preservation of that line of communication, that is, at or near Fleurus, with the expectation of being reinforced by his ally. But if he ventured upon this course, Napoleon expected to beat him, for Napoleon calculated that, by the occupation of Quatre Bras the next morning, he could prevent Blücher’s receiving any assistance from his Anglo-Dutch allies.

A letter93 written by Baron Fain, one of the Emperor’s secretaries, to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Charleroi, June 15th, at 9 o’clock in the evening, states that the Emperor has just returned, very much fatigued, having been on horseback since three in the morning, and has thrown himself on his bed for a few hours’ repose; but that he will mount his horse again at midnight. This, however, as we shall see hereafter, he did not do, as at midnight Marshal Ney came to confer with him, having just ridden back from his extreme front at Frasnes.