Читать книгу The History of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, in the War, 1914-1918 - John Victor Macartney-Filgate - Страница 7

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On a foggy afternoon, typical of Flanders in December, there crept into Aire station a long and heavy train obvious even to the lay mind as a troop train, consisting as it did not only of ordinary passenger coaches, but also of innumerable horse boxes and a line of long open trucks crammed with guns and wagons. Every window was crowded with faces—the faces of British soldiers surveying with interest this, to most of them, new and strange land, listening with a thrill to the distant mutter of guns, looking with eagerness for signs of war and for a first view of the billets in which, for the next few days at any rate, they were to live. At Hazebrouck and at Lillers similar trains were pulling in, disgorging on to the track men, horses and guns in what might appear to be indescribable confusion, but which had in it all a method and a certain order. To the inhabitants there was nothing new in this sight; scores of times had they seen the arrival of fresh units from England in just this manner, but to the men themselves the affair was one of the utmost significance. As a unit they were making their first appearance within actual reach of the scene of war, and the unit was that one whose history the ensuing pages will endeavour to record; it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery once more, the batteries of which for days had been swallowed up, not exactly in the fog of actual war, but in the impenetrable maze of Lines of Communication. For days they had been just a memory, a rumour, an entry on the time-tables of various R.T.O.s, scattered about the railway line between Havre and Aire; for days they had indulged in wanderings which at times made them wonder exactly where the war was to be found, and at last in their estimation they had found it.

It must not be supposed that the journey of the Division from Amesbury to its billets in the "rest" area was one long, smooth, perfectly run affair. Far from it! On arrival at Southampton it was found that two of the transports were in the wrong berths, while the engines of a third had broken down; as a result, one brigade had to disembark and be broken up into small parties, each party going on to a different ship. On arrival at Havre mistakes had been made with regard to the accommodation of the men, and one wretched party which marched seven miles out to Harfleur had to return again over the same weary road before a shelter could be found. In fact, the journey in trucks marked "Hommes 40, chevaux 8" (a phrase no less sinister in practice than in meaning) marked the termination of a period of discomfort and homelessness which few who shared therein will ever forget. When one remembers, however, the mighty forces which during these months were moved from England to France, the actual fresh units which came over railways overloaded with ammunition and supplies for troops already in the Line, one cannot help recognising the ability and organisation which enabled such work to be carried out, and which moved a division of artillery to scheduled time across a railway system already strained to breaking point.

It was on December 10th, it will be remembered, that the Divisional Artillery disappeared so mysteriously from England; on December 16th, at 2.30 P.M., the concentration of the same Divisional Artillery was reported to be complete in the Aire-Thiennes area. The cloud of mystery was once more lifted: the batteries were known to be "somewhere in France." Actually, the area in which they were billeted was the rest area of the First Corps; they were attached to the division in reserve, and were billeted in the villages of Mazinghem, Berguette, Guarbecque and Mt. Bernanchon.

The first few days in France proved rather a disappointment. Everybody (other than those who had been "out" before) had come full of ideas about the war, mostly taken from picture papers and so-called war stories; most of the men had somehow expected to find themselves well within sight and hearing of the battle itself, with all the accompanying thrills of aeroplane fights, shelling in the distance, ambulances and what not, and what did they find? An ordinary village, rather dirty and very muddy; a flat, uninteresting country and the usual routine of stables, watering, exercise and gun drill—just a continuation of the training which they had carried out at Bulford, with the difference that away on the horizon there was that continuous giant thudding, that heavy sullen muttering which betokened artillery at work, not now in mere practice but in grim earnest.

However, it was not of much good being in France unless use was made of the proximity of the war for instructional purposes, and so, two days after the completed concentration, parties were sent from each of the brigades to be attached to the 2nd Divisional Artillery, then holding the line on the La Bassée front from Givenchy on the north nearly to Fosse 8, the scene of such fierce fighting in the Loos offensive, on the south. These parties were conveyed by motor-bus to Cambrin, Annequin and Gorre, whence they were led on foot by guides to the positions of the batteries to which they were attached. Six parties in all went up from the brigades between December 18th and January 11th, the duration of stay in the line being usually four days, so that by the end of the second week in January all the officers, N.C.O.s, and gunners had had their first look at the war, had seen their first glimpse of the enemy lines, had had their first experience of shell fire.

About the middle of January the batteries were considered to have gained sufficient experience to merit their taking a more strenuous part in the war, and complete batteries were accordingly sent up in turn to take over the positions of the 12th Divisional Artillery (63rd and 64th Brigades R.F.A.) and of the 2nd Divisional Artillery (9th, 17th, 48th, 56th and 71st batteries), stretching from Givenchy down to Vermelles. As a rule three batteries were sent up at a time for six days, the wagon line work and ammunition supply being carried out by the batteries to which they were attached, while those not in the line continued training, with a few inspections and sudden wild rumours to help pass the time. Of inspections there were two:—on January 20th C/166 was reviewed by General Joffre, while on January 26th the 162nd, 166th and 167th Brigades were inspected by Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough, then commanding the 1st Corps. As, prior to this, the 156th Brigade had lined the route in December to bid farewell to Field-Marshal Lord French, the whole Division in its early days had an opportunity of seeing three great men whose names were to be connected so closely with the history of the war.

The demon Rumour held widespread popularity at this time; rumours of sudden moves to a different part of the line; rumours of a sudden advance to support our infantry—anything, in fact, which billet gossip could evolve on a quiet evening. Nor was this gossip entirely to blame if it gave rise to so many rumours, for official orders and counter-orders themselves gave plenty of scope for wonder to the average brain. As an example of the continual uncertainty which prevailed regarding future movements, the case of the Divisional Ammunition Column might well be taken. On January 26th it was ordered to stand by, ready for a sudden move; this order was cancelled at 1.30 A.M. on January 27th, was revived again at 5.30 the same evening with the additional information that it must be ready to move at two hours' notice, and was finally cancelled at 11.35 P.M. that night. Nothing immediate came of these rumours, and all through February the same training, now grown very tedious after the interest of a first visit to the Line, was carried on. A somewhat ambitious plan of two-day manœuvres was carried out in the First Army area around Estrée-Blanche and Therouane on the last days of January by those batteries which were not at the time undergoing training in the Line, but February 1st saw a resumption of the old billet life again.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

December 1915—May 1916.

H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A.	Brigade Major.	Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.	Major Sheppard.	Capt. T. Usher.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall, M.P. (till February).	Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. Holden (till February).	Lieut. W. G. Pringle.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Major Alcard (till January).	Capt. R. D. Russell.	Capt. G. Lomer.	Capt. S. Talbot.
Capt. L. R. Hill (after January).
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Duncan.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. F. C. Packham.	Major R. G. M. Johnston.	Capt. A. van Straubenzee.	Major D. Stewart.
166th Brigade.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. D. M. Coffin.	Major T. E. Durie.	Capt. H. Freeman.	Capt. G. Fetherston.
167th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Du Plat Taylor.
Lieut.-Colonel Harpur.
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. D. Watson (till January).	Lieut. H. C. Cory.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. M. A. Studd.	Major Barkworth.	Major W. P. Bennett.	Capt. W. A. T. Barstow.

Three units, however, escaped the general air of boredom which was now gradually pervading the Divisional Artillery—one at an early stage and the others later. C/167 (Major Bennett), as far back as December 30th, marched up to the Line and came permanently into action in a disused battery position about 150 yards south of the La Bassée Canal, midway between Vauxhall Bridge and Pont Fixe. It was attached to the 1st Corps Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work, and, covering as it did the wide front from Violaines on the north to Auchy on the south, with observation stations in Givenchy ("N"), Cambrin, "King's Clere" and "Mountain House," it had an excellent opportunity of learning accurately the whole of the front which the Divisional Artillery was at a later date to cover. The wagon lines were bad, but the battery position, despite the fact that it had to be built while the guns were actually there, was not too uncomfortable. An occasional shelling with whizz-bangs at that early stage did nothing more than arouse interest and teach a few healthy lessons, while the daily shelling of Pont Fixe, about 300 yards away, by a 5·9 in. howitzer was regarded as a free entertainment of great attraction.

A/162 (Captain Packham) and A/166 (Captain Coffin), the other two batteries to go into action independently, were rather later than C/167; they did not move into action until February 13th, when they were attached to the 1st Corps Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work and, having marched up through Béthune, Beuvry and Annequin, took up positions covering, with C/167, the same wide front.

At last orders came, on February 15th, for the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to take over the line from the 12th Divisional Artillery. The relief began on February 23rd, when the first sections of the batteries relieved their opposite numbers in action; three batteries (C/156, C/162, A/166) which were already in the line for training stayed there, and on February 25th the remaining sections of the batteries came into action. C/167 vacated its position at Cuinchy, marched to the wagon line on the night of the 23rd/24th and was split up, the right section going to D/167 (Captain Barstow) and the left to A/167 (Captain Studd) to form six-gun batteries. B/167 (Major Barkworth) had on February 14th been posted to the 1/4th London Brigade R.F.A. (T.F.), and was permanently struck off the strength of the Division.

At noon on Saturday, February 26th, the relief was reported complete, the 33rd Divisional Artillery under its C.R.A., Brig.-General C. F. Blane, assumed responsibility for the artillery support of the front covered by the 33rd infantry, and for the first time held the line entirely on its own. The front extended from Boyau 1 to Boyau 53, that is from Mad Point to just south of Givenchy. The four brigades, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel Duncan, Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel Harpur, were divided into two groups, "Z," the Northern Group, being commanded by Colonel Goff, "A," the Auchy Group, by Colonel Harpur; the batteries of both groups were dispersed all along the front from the La Bassée Canal to as far south as Vermelles.

Here a slight digression may well be permitted. It will be noticed that Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall is not mentioned above as one of the Brigade Commanders. To the regret of all ranks he returned to England on February 15th, handing over the command of the 156th Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd. It would be impossible to over-estimate the work which Lieut.-Colonel Hall did in organising the recruitment of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in Camberwell; without his work, and the work of Lieut.-Colonel Duncan who was also lost to the Division in March when he handed over the command of the 162nd Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, the brigades could never have been formed so rapidly as they were. In these pages, which perpetuate the history of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, it is essential that there should also be recorded the great effort made by Lieut.-Colonel Hall in raising the four brigades, an effort which was appreciated by His Majesty the King at a later date, when he bestowed upon him a Knighthood of the Order of the British Empire.

To return, however, to the war. The trench system here, as everywhere on the Flanders front, was situated in very flat ground, and O.P.'s in the front line were of little use except for shooting on the enemy fire trench. Providentially, along the rising ground a few hundred yards behind the front line there were a number of ruined houses dotted about at odd intervals, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups; all of these were practically destroyed by shell fire, but had just enough left standing to offer a precarious perch to anyone wishing to observe therefrom, and to provide a screen for such sandbagging, strengthening and revetting as an ingenious mind, coupled with no small influence with the Sappers and a desire for greater comfort, might devise. "N" and Artillery House in Givenchy were but little used as they were rather too far to the north, but King's Clere and Mountain House (in Cambrin), Braddell Castle, The Ruin and the Four Hundred on either side of the La Bassée road, with Dead Man's House, Wilson's House, Ridge View and Maison Rouge stretching along the line just south of the road, made excellent spots from which, perched usually in the wreckage of the roof, one could direct fire on to every spot in the zone. The Ruin and, before it was rebuilt, the Four Hundred were trying in the extreme to the nerves, for they hung together in a manner which might have appeared impossible even to the ingenious mind of a Heath Robinson; moreover, they were almost daily attended to by an ever-persistent German gunner with an unlimited supply of 5·9 in. ammunition and a nice taste in house removing, but King's Clere, a little further to the north, provided an excellent view of all the front and back areas, and had been thoroughly and effectively secured by means of cement and iron girders. This part of the front was, indeed, a most fascinating one for shooting over, provided a good O.P. was available. North of the canal had little of interest, save the ruins of Violaines and Canteleux, but to the south, and just on the bank, was the Railway Triangle with its mysterious tower and mound. Auchy offered several moderately undamaged houses whence, in the early morning, smoke could be seen issuing, while loopholes appeared and disappeared, or were camouflaged, with extraordinary frequency. Les Briques, with its dead trees and ruined house, struck a grim and forbidding note, but, just south of it, the green fields around Lone Farm were always full of possibilities. Many and varied were the ideas as to the use which was made of Lone Farm; as a farm it had totally disappeared and suggested nothing more than a few dead trees and a mound of bricks, but underneath those bricks there must have been some splendid cellars. Every morning, just as day broke, parties of twenty or thirty Germans could be seen there, and every morning some battery or other, with an unexpected burst of shrapnel, used to lengthen the German casualty list in no small manner. It took the Germans an extraordinary time to learn the lesson of Lone Farm, and for quite a considerable period it was there that the newly-arrived battery officer from England saw the first grey-clad figures of the enemy; there, as like as not, that he first saw his shells actually bring death. South of Lone Farm again came the Corons de Maron and the "Dump," or, to give it its correct title, Fosse 8 de Béthune, but both of these were out of the zone of the batteries and had, therefore, to be left undisturbed.

Scale 1:20,000.

Behind Auchy and Lone Farm could be seen Indian Well House, Haisnes, Douvrin and the road running up to La Bassée. For normal purposes this area was out of range, but was none the less interesting in that it afforded all manner of unexpected sights. A train, a lorry going along the road, a couple of horsemen trotting down a bridle path are commonplace sights in England, but when you are separated from that train or lorry by a network of ditches containing death in a hundred forms, when that train or lorry is carrying men who will probably to-morrow be trying their best to kill you, and whom you may, with considerable fortune, kill first, then the matter appears in a different light, and you feel an intense interest in the objects visible.

Up to the present this chapter has been devoted to a description of the front on which the Division was operating. It may be that too much space has been given to what is, after all, merely of personal interest, but it should be remembered that this was the first front upon which the Divisional Artillery served as a unit, and therefore the memory of it has been impressed upon the minds of both officers and men probably to a far greater extent than has any other portion of the British Front in France. Now, however, regard must be had for the tactical situation as it presented itself in the winter of 1915-16.

It will be remembered that, since the battle of Loos in September and October 1915, no attack on any large scale had been carried out by the British troops. Heavy fighting continued throughout the winter along the newly-formed salient at Loos, and this in itself proved such a drain upon the forces of both sides that the remainder of the 1st Army front was comparatively quiet. On December 19th the Germans launched a heavy gas attack in the Ypres salient, and on February 13th, in the same area, occurred the famous attack on the Bluff. The end of February saw the beginning of the great battle of Verdun, and it was therefore a natural result that the La Bassée front, situated as it was outside the zone of these different operations, remained in a state of comparative quiet, and was disturbed solely by the raids, mine explosions and artillery activity which were the invariable régime of trench warfare.

This period of the campaign saw the arrival in France of a great number of New Army divisions, and as far as possible these divisions, with one or two noteworthy exceptions, were placed in a part of the line which was not likely to be subjected to any large scale operations but which, by the opportunities it offered of raiding, patrolling and the like, formed an excellent training ground for troops not yet experienced in modern warfare. No better part of the firing line could, in fact, have been chosen than the La Bassée sector. The famous Brickstack area was a centre of great mining activities; raids were the order rather than the exception, and big trench minenwerfer were daily in action. The back areas of the German zone were in full view of the artillery observation stations whence practice could be obtained, day in day out, on every possible type of target. Salient features presented themselves for registration and calibration of the guns, and during these shoots the accuracy and drill of the gun detachments could be fully and carefully noted. Numerous houses, in a more or less advanced state of dilapidation, gave all ranks a good idea of the effect of modern artillery fire on fortifications, while working parties and moving targets of all descriptions taught observing officers and gun detachments the essential lesson of quick shooting without loss of accuracy, and the absolute necessity of a familiarity with every inch of the ground covered.

It has already been stated that the mining activities of both sides were very marked. Although this would appear to concern the infantry rather than the artillery, the effect on the latter was of great importance. The explosion of a mine was in many cases followed by an infantry raid, and for this reason gun detachments and officers on duty with the infantry were kept up to a high pitch of speed and smartness in putting down an immediate barrage. Moreover, this barrage shooting was most effective in instilling confidence in the accuracy and good shooting of gun detachments. It was a very strong but utterly fatal temptation to a battery commander to add twenty-five or even fifty yards to the range of his guns, to ensure that no shell fell short and inflicted casualties on our own infantry. To withstand this temptation needed the most complete confidence in the guns of the battery, but, on the other hand, to add the margin of safety almost invariably meant that the barrage dropped beyond its mark and inflicted no damage whatever upon the raiding party or trench for which it was intended. Gradually did the infantry learn completely to trust their gunners in barrage firing, and once and for all did the battery officers realise that there was only one range which would hit their target, and that any addition to that range, although satisfying their own peace of mind, would effectually wipe out any good which their efforts might have done, and would leave the infantry to the mercies of a hand to hand encounter with the enemy.

On March 8th an important alteration was made in the disposition of troops along the Divisional front. From this date two infantry brigades were kept in the line, each brigade maintaining two battalions in the front line. Each artillery section was divided into two sub-sections composed of two 18-pdr. batteries apiece, and it therefore worked out that each battalion of infantry in the front line had two 18-pdr. batteries to provide it with direct artillery support. This system appeared on paper excellent, and indeed from the point of view of establishing close co-operation between the Divisional Artillery and its own Infantry no fault in the plan could be found, but there was one tremendous handicap which every day made itself felt more vitally amongst gunners and infantry alike. Throughout this period the supply of ammunition for daily firing was most closely limited, and on March 18th the allowance was restricted to sixteen rounds per battery per day. It is not intended here to enter into the great ammunition controversy. Such a matter would be out of place in what is meant to be an historical record of an artillery unit throughout the war, but it is mentioned in view of certain remarks which will later be made concerning the mutual relations of the infantry with the artillery, and is one of the chief difficulties with which the artillery had to contend at this time.

March 18th saw the first attack of any dimensions which had so far taken place in the neighbourhood of the 33rd Divisional zone. After a short but very heavy artillery bombardment and the explosion of three mines, the Germans made an attack upon the 12th Division which was at that time on the right of the 33rd Division and was confronting the Hohenzollern redoubt. Apart from a heavy bombardment of Annequin with gas shells and the general searching with long range fire of all the roads leading up to the front, no material effect was felt by the 33rd Divisional Artillery. It gave the batteries, however, some idea of what would be expected of them in the event of a hostile attack on their own front, and, although conducted at a distance, enabled them by sight and hearing to realise the weight of shell fire to which they would be subjected if they were themselves attacked.

April 27th saw a much larger attack by the Germans, once again upon the right of the 33rd Division, and this time on the 16th Division in the Hulluch sector. Early in the morning of that day a very heavy bombardment began on the Division's right, and shortly afterwards a call for mutual support was received. A heavy mist lay upon the ground, but through it could be heard the throb and roar of a battle in progress, mingling with the nearer and more persistent thunder of our own guns and of the German retaliation. Gradually the mist thickened instead of clearing, and gradually did the firing become more intense; suddenly in the distance was heard the wail of a siren which was taken up by one closer at hand. The Division had never before been subjected to a gas attack, and at first the true meaning of these sirens was only suspected and not fully realised, but a certain pungency soon made itself felt in the morning air. The men began coughing and sneezing, the atmosphere became thick and unbreathable, and in a very few minutes all batteries were working under the protection of their gas helmets. The battle was over by the middle of the morning, and the batteries were able to return to the ordinary routine of the day, but a lesson and a valuable lesson at that had been learnt, and it was brought home even more clearly than before that the detachments must be prepared to work under more difficult conditions than they had as yet experienced. Whilst on the subject of this gas attack it is important to note that, on the occasion in question, so dense were the gas clouds that they were even felt at the wagon lines as far back as Beuvry.

After this attack followed renewed trench activity and mutual retaliation. On April 28th the wagon lines of the 166th Brigade at Beuvry were heavily shelled by a long range gun, and numerous casualties were suffered by horses and men. The shelling of wagon lines is at all times most unsettling and likely to do great damage, but this particular case, being the first of its kind of which the batteries of the Division had had experience, created a great impression.

About this time a somewhat curious incident occurred between the German Air Service and our Artillery. On April 28th a German aeroplane flew over the battery position of A/167 (Captain Studd) and dropped a long streamer to which was attached a message. This message stated that German headquarters were aware that No. 1 Harley Street (a big building used as a dressing station and situated in a road which derived its name from the number of aid posts which lay along it) was a dressing station, but that, owing to the great damage which was being done by the battery of howitzers in action behind this particular house, they were reluctantly compelled to destroy it by shell fire. Apart from anything else, this was a considerable compliment to the work of A/167, the battery referred to, but it did not say much for the observation powers of the German aircraft. A/167 was then in action on the eastern end of Tourbiers loop, and was at least 600 yds. from the dressing station in question. Next day the bombardment of No. 1 Harley Street by aeroplane observation began; a great number of direct hits were obtained, and, although the Red Cross was clearly visible, the building was entirely destroyed. It is pleasant to note, however, that this incident did not pass unavenged. Early one morning a short time afterwards, the battery commander of A/166 (Captain Coffin) saw a large convoy of German ambulances proceeding along the road near Haisnes. A burst of high explosive blocked the front and rear of the convoy, a steady and destructive fire of high explosive and shrapnel swept the length and breadth of the road, and in a short time the debt owing to the Germans by the destruction of the dressing station in Harley Street was more than wiped out. The shelling of dressing stations and ambulances was not, at this time, a practice usually indulged in by our guns, but of late the enemy had been consistently shelling all our aid posts, our dressing stations and our field ambulances, and it was hoped that a short sharp lesson such as that detailed above might tend to lessen in the future the sufferings of our own wounded.

Quite soon after this incident another opportunity very fortunately presented itself of impressing upon the Germans our intention of brisk and immediate retaliation for any attacks on their part. Three big minenwerfers had, of late, been harassing our infantry to an undue extent every night from the vicinity of the Railway Triangle, Spotted Dog and Ryan's Keep, and it was decided to organise a really efficient shell storm to try and discourage the enemy from this particular form of attack. Accordingly it was arranged that, at 3.25 on a certain morning, a sudden and concentrated bombardment by 9·2 in., 6 in., 4·5 in. howitzers and 18-pdrs. should take place on the area from which the "Minnie" worked. By a great stroke of fortune, ten minutes before the bombardment was due to begin, the minenwerfer in question started its nightly bombardment. Hardly had it begun than from all sides there poured down shells of every description, trench mortar bombs and rifle grenades, and for upwards of twenty minutes the German trench system was one vast mass of smoke, flame and dust. Not for many days afterwards did that minenwerfer worry our troops, and the Germans must indeed have been impressed by the organisation which in the space of a few minutes brought down upon them such a concentrated and well-timed barrage.

On May 19th an important reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took place. When the 33rd Division embarked for France its artillery consisted of four brigades:—the 156th, 162nd, 166th and 167th. Of these, the first three brigades were made up of 18-pdr. batteries, while the 167th was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade. By an order which now was issued, the brigades were reconstituted to consist each of three 18-pdr. batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer battery. The effect of such an organisation was that each Brigade Commander had a small but complete tactical force under his direct command, and, in the event of open warfare and a moving battle, was so disposed that he had a percentage of both types of artillery under his control. Everything, in fact, was now clearly indicating the early resumption of active operations, and June 18th might be considered to mark the first step in this direction in the La Bassée sector.

On June 18th the 39th Division, then holding the line on the left of the 33rd, was withdrawn, and the 33rd extended its front northward as far as Grenadier Road in Givenchy. For one division this was an extraordinarily wide front, and necessitated the alteration and widening of gun pits, the establishing of new observation stations in Givenchy, with the consequent laying of telephone lines—a very heavy strain on the batteries who were responsible for the support and protection of such a widely spread body of infantry. The group system of batteries was reorganised into two new groups—Givenchy and Cuinchy—and the late Auchy group became a subsection of Cuinchy group. As an example of the width of front to be guarded by the batteries, it may be stated that the howitzers had to cover a front of 120°. In addition to the extension of the front, preparations for operations on a large scale were ordered to be taken. Every battery had to make accommodation for keeping around the guns four times the amount of ammunition to what had previously been the rule; all ranks were made acquainted with the forward zone and the best lines of advance in case of a German withdrawal, advance positions were selected and the whole front began to seethe with an undercurrent of preparation and anticipation. To the inexperienced minds of the troops this appeared to indicate an offensive on the La Bassée front. Never before had the batteries been in a big battle; they did not know that, had an attack been contemplated on their front, the activity would have been multiplied tenfold. They did not know that, far away in the south, preparations on a vast and unprecedented scale were being made; that there were in the Somme area concentrations of artillery, infantry, ammunition and material which exceeded anything yet seen in war. They only saw their own preparations and formed their opinions accordingly.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

May 1916—June 1916.

H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A.	Brigade Major.	Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.	Major H. K. Sadler, M.C.	Capt. T. Usher.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. G. Pringle.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. L. R. Hill.	Capt. R. D. Russell.	Capt. G. Lomer.	Capt. M. A. Studd.
Capt. Lutyens.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. F. C. Packham.	Major R. G. M. Johnston	Capt. A. van Straubenzee.	Major W. P. Bennett.
166th Brigade.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.	"D" Battery.
Capt. D. M. Coffin.	Major T. E. Durie.	Capt. H. Freeman.	Capt. W. A. T. Barstow, M.C.
167th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.
"A" Battery.	"B" Battery.	"C" Battery.
Capt. S. Talbot.	Major D. Stewart.	Capt. G. Fetherston.

On June 24th these suspicions, already fostered by the Higher Command in order to cover operations elsewhere, were more than doubled. On that day the whole of the British line burst into flame. From Ypres to the Somme a steady bombardment of the German trench system began, wire was cut and kept open, repairs to damaged trenches were prevented by persistent bursts of fire, and in every sector did it appear that an attack was imminent; unless the German Headquarters could discover where the main concentration was taking place it was impossible for them to gauge the most probable place of assault. That they did discover it was realised, and realised bitterly, on July 1st and the succeeding days, but there is no doubt that the artillery activity along the whole front kept them in a considerable state of apprehension, nor did they dare to dispatch troops to the Somme in such a whole-hearted way as would otherwise have been possible.

Naturally, with both sides in such a state of activity, it was inevitable that a great deal of raiding should go on—raids by the Germans to try and discover in what strength we were holding the line, raids by our troops to determine the German order of battle and to follow, by identification, the arrival or departure of troops to and from the zone. On June 22nd, at 2 A.M., a tremendous mine was exploded by the Germans near the Duck's Bill in Givenchy. So great was the mine, which had been dug right underneath Company Headquarters of the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, that a complete company was almost annihilated. Following the explosion, the Germans raided the trenches under cover of a heavy barrage, and for several hours hand to hand fighting of the fiercest nature was carried on. Every gun which could be brought to bear upon that area gave such support to our harassed troops as was possible, and eventually the position was more or less restored. It is doubtful whether this raid had any connection with the forthcoming Somme offensive. It was conducted on such a large scale, and the mine shaft itself extended for such a distance, that preparations must have been begun some long time previously.

On June 27th it was our turn to harass the enemy by one of the swiftest and best planned raids which had yet been carried out. Two parties of the 9th Battalion Highland Light Infantry went across No Man's Land at Mad Point and, under cover of a barrage, entered the German front line at two spots some 250 yards apart. The barrage in this case was a most difficult one for the batteries to carry out, as not only had the two parties to be covered on their front and flanks, but the reserve trenches behind the gap which lay between the two parties had also to be blocked. This, however, was only the beginning of the affair. Gradually the Highlanders, having destroyed all the dug-outs, mine shafts and hostile troops within their reach, began to bomb their way along the trench inwards towards each other. Gradually such Germans as were not bombed retreated before the hostile raiders and congregated in a herd in the middle, with the raiding parties closing in on both sides and the barrage roaring over their heads to cut off all retreat. And then, when the Germans were crowded and wedged into one section of the front line, unable to move either way and awaiting a bombing attack from both flanks, the raiding parties suddenly ceased pressing on, a mine was exploded right underneath the spot where the Germans were assembled, and the raiding parties returned to our own trenches, all further work on their part being unnecessary. It was a triumph of organisation and accuracy, and fully merited the results it achieved.

On July 2nd the 2nd Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment raided the enemy lines for one hour and a half, and inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy, and on July 5th the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers raided the enemy opposite the Duck's Bill and remained in their trench system for over two hours. By now the German infantry were in an advanced state of nerves. Although the news of the offensive on the Somme had reached them and they realised that the main attack was to the south, the continued bombardment on their own front and the nightly raids gave them not one moment's peace of mind, nor dared they materially weaken this part of the line. The raid by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers on July 5th deserves rather more than a passing word. It will be remembered that, on June 22nd, they had suffered heavily at the hands of a German raid. On July 5th they were given a chance of retaliation, and never has a raiding party gone over the top with such a thirst for blood and revenge. Not only did the infantry attack, but with them went a party of the Tunnelling Company who were sore at the thought that the German miners had evaded their counter-mining and had managed to carry a shaft so far beneath the British trenches. It was not their fault—in that marshy ground the most up-to-date and scientific apparatus was necessary to carry a shaft to any depth beneath the ground. That apparatus the Germans possessed and we did not, and as a result they carried their shaft far deeper than we could reach, and blew up a company of British infantry with one touch of an electric contact. July 5th, however, proved an adequate revenge. For upwards of two hours the infantry bombed and bayoneted, the sappers blew up all the mine shafts, whilst the Cuinchy group of artillery alone fired 6,000 rounds, relays of detachments keeping the guns firing at "gun fire" practically all the time.

That operation proved to be the last carried out by the 33rd Divisional Artillery on the La Bassée sector. No hint had been received by the batteries of a move, no word of warning was given of an early departure, but suddenly, at about five o'clock on the afternoon of Thursday, July 6th, there came a bolt from the blue. Orders were received that the 33rd Divisional Artillery was to move down to the Somme, that it would be relieved forthwith by the 39th, and that the first half-batteries would march to the wagon lines at 2 A.M. on the 7th, i.e., in eleven hours' time. Now the batteries had been in action in the same positions for nearly five months, and a few hours was but scanty notice to give in which to move out from long-inhabited trench positions, ready and equipped for fighting of any sort. Yet the order was complied with, and, when dawn broke the following day, all traces of the departure had disappeared, and away in the wagon lines were to be found the guns and men who, the previous evening, had been in action within, in some cases, 1,700 yards of the enemy.

Before the further activities of the batteries are followed, a word must be spoken in summary of the doings of the Divisional Artillery on this front during the five months in which they were in action. It may be complained that the foregoing chapter deals too fully with the action of the Division as a whole, and that not enough detailed information has been given concerning the daily life of the batteries. The answer is, that what concerned the Division vitally concerned the batteries, and that it has been considered more desirable to give a general résumé of the work carried out by the Division, for in that work the Artillery played a most active part. It would have been easy, and to a few people interesting, to have recorded the shelling to which the batteries were subjected, the difficulties and trials they had to undergo, and individual cases in which particularly brilliant or destructive shoots were carried out, but in so doing the general picture would have been lost and the value of this record greatly reduced. The period spent on the La Bassée front was a period of stationary warfare during which the batteries were hardened and experienced, and, as such, lacked the interest which the ensuing part of the campaign supplies. The description which has been given of the type of fighting carried out during this time will enable an idea to be gained of the work of the batteries, but two points in particular are worthy of record.

When the batteries arrived in France they were raw and untrained as far as actual fighting was concerned. The resulting strain upon all battery commanders was tremendous, for no man knows, until he has been under shell fire, the actual sensations of that experience, and no battery commander knew exactly how his men would bear the very great trial to which they were going to be put. In those five months every battery had to suffer such shelling and bombardment, had to carry out such accurate and wearying shooting, and to work under conditions of such difficulty as to satisfy commanding officers that the 33rd Divisional Artillery was indeed one of which to be proud, and that the men could be relied upon to undergo any trial, to meet danger and death in any form without deviating one inch from the work put before them. When the batteries moved south to the Somme there was but one feeling which pervaded officers and men alike, a feeling of complete confidence, of complete determination and of keenness to take part in real active operations which they fully realised, from the previous five months' experience, they were well qualified to take.

And the other lesson learnt—what was that? It was the most valuable one of co-operation and even of personal intimacy with the infantry. During the whole of the La Bassée period, with one short exception, the 33rd Divisional Infantry were holding the line. Day in day out, officers from every battery were attached to battalion and company headquarters, and the friendship of the infantry for the gunners and vice versa became very real. Even the N.C.O.s got to know each other by name, and the resulting feeling of confidence and friendship was of the greatest value. It was difficult to maintain this practice in later days when casualties in the infantry and gunners increased by leaps and bounds, when old friends were lost and new faces were ever appearing, and when the batteries were continually being attached to strange divisions and were covering infantry other than their own; but the lesson had been learnt, and throughout the war the Divisional Artillery made it an aim and object to get to know the infantry it was covering, to live and fight with them, and to perfect that liaison which was so important, not only by the teachings of the cold official text books, but by the invariable lesson of human nature.

From the wagon lines to which they had marched on the night of July 6th-7th, the batteries moved to Mt. Bernanchon and Guarbecque, and there the Divisional Artillery concentrated. One day it spent in overhauling, refitting and inspecting, and on the 9th it entrained at Fouquereuil, Chocques and Lillers, and moved to the Somme, a unit no longer raw, inexperienced and untried, but a unit trained and hardened by five months' trench fighting, now setting off to take part for the first time in large scale operations, in pitched battle, open fighting and all the trials and sufferings attendant thereto.