Читать книгу Military Memoirs of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington - Joseph Moyle Sherer - Страница 14

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It was upon the 6th of October that Sir John Moore first received the order of the English ministers to enter Spain.

An army of 35,000 men was to be placed under his command. Of these, 25,000 were to be immediately taken from the troops already in Portugal, and 10,000 were to be sent from England to the coast of Gallicia direct.

In twenty days from the receipt of his instructions, the general had completed his arrangements; the columns were already on their march, and the head-quarters had quitted Lisbon. When it is considered that supplies and transports were to be provided, equipments completed, the corps selected, and the army organized anew in divisions and brigades, and all this in Portugal and among the Portuguese, it will be seen that nothing but the most ardent zeal and the greatest possible exertion, could so soon have accomplished this important object Had the like zeal and the like exertion, informed by clear views and directed to great aims, been manifested at home, 60,000 British soldiers should at that hour have been descending from the mountains of Gallicia, or traversing the plains of Leon.

With the main body of his army, Sir John Moore marched to Salamanca by Almeida; and it being reported to him that the roads on that route were impracticable for artillery, he sent his guns, his cavalry, and a small column of infantry, under Sir John Hope, by the valley of the Tagus. They were to move by Talavera de la Reyna, and to join "him by the royal road which traverses the Guadarama mountains. He afterwards made the mortifying discovery, by personal observation, that his artillery could have accomplished the march by Almeida. But it is one of the trials of an English general, that a good military survey of the intended theatre of war is never to be found or furnished from any public office at home. England has no department or bureau to help a general in these matters: he must know every thing, and do every thing, unassisted; even without money he must provide food and contentment, and see both the troops and the followers of his army in long arrear.

Sir John Moore entered Salamanca on the 13th of November. Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men, was moving from Corunna to join him; and the column of Sir John Hope was pursuing its devious route with the same object

The 23d of November arrived before the successive divisions of Sir John’s own corps were concentrated at Salamanca. This army, in a high state of health and efficiency, of a discipline not often surpassed, and of a spirit to be daunted by no enemy, arrived upon the soil of Spain, burning with desire for battle, and in all the confidence of victory. They enjoyed for a while their rest in Salamanca, deeming it but an allowed refreshment necessary to the present concentration of the force, with a view to future operations in the field. While they were thus joyous, careless, and full of hope, their leader was weighed down and oppressed by the many and severe perplexities of his situation. No plan of operations had been given him; and such information as had been forwarded with his instructions relative to the state of Spain, and of her armies, he soon discovered to be false. In a few points, indeed, it had been founded on the slender support of a little truth; but the state of affairs, never one-tenth so bright or promising as it had been represented, was at the actual moment changed very materially for the worse. He had come to support the armies of Blake and Belvedere: they were already destroyed. He had come expecting to find a people of one heart and will, enthusiastic in their own cause, and full of all the noble energy of action:—he found a people in the plains of Leon impoverished and depressed.

He found among the upper classes of society the timid, the interested, and the vain; some fearing to lose, others eager to gain, and a few, and those miserably qualified, ambitious to shine. He found the common people an ungovernable race of wilful men; now going forth to fight, and now dispersing to their homes, just as the caprice of the hour affected them. Avaricious dealers and contractors, meddling priests and petty authorities, full of ignorance and trickery, many of them double-faced intriguers, were not wanting. To control these discordant elements, there was not one leading or master mind in the whole kingdom, nor one powerful and acknowledged council to unite them wisely, either in fear or affection, to one end. Some were distracted by the duties of their callings, some by their treasure or their families; and human nature was exhibiting itself in all those strange and contradictory varieties, which times of helpless trouble and bewildering confusion always elicit.

Sir John Moore found no armies to support, no generals with whom to concert measures, no government with which to correspond, no intelligence on which he could rely: in addition to these perplexities, he was without magazines, and (thanks to ministers) without money in the military chest to form them.

In Leon and the two Castiles, the people, though patriotic in heart, were, from the open nature of their country, defenceless, and had, consequently, less activity, because they had no chance of effectually protecting their naked villages from the cavalry of the enemy. They could, and did furnish men to the armies in the field; they gave money; they gave prayers for Spain; and, when the cavalry of the enemy rode into their open marketplaces, they yielded up their corn with eyes that scowled, and lips that closed in curses.

The general found himself and his army reproached and vilified by the ignorant population of Salamanca and its district. “Why,” said they, “why don’t you advance, and fight the French, as the Spaniards have done? ” And the very men who fled from the fields in which their armies had sustained defeat, amid the mortifications of flight, still retaining the memory of a front offered to the foe, and of a short though vain contention, held the same tone of reproof. They had witnessed the courage of the French troops, and the skill of the French generals, and judged that the English were held in inactivity by fear, or by a secret design of abandoning the cause of Spain.

From the moment that the eyes of Moore were opened to the actual state of the Spanish people in these provinces, and to the fate of their armies, he knew that, sooner or later, retreat would be inevitable; and his judgment told him that the line of his retreat should be by Ciudad Rodrigo upon Portugal, and that to effect it in good order the movement should no longer be delayed. It is to be regretted that, having deliberately formed this judgment, he did not at once act upon it He might have issued a proclamation to the Spaniards, declaring to them the naked truth, concerning the fate of their own armies, and setting forth the wisdom and the necessity of his present retreat, with a view to render them more effectual assistance at a future period. For this he would no doubt have had to endure a storm of reproaches, furious but not lasting; for the prudence of the wise leader is never long confounded with the irresolution of a weak capacity, or the timidity of a foiling heart.

Mr. Frere, the English minister, was his only medium of communication with the supreme junta, which then directed the affairs of Spain. The authority of this junta was nowhere acknowledged beyond the precincts of the city where they sat; neither was it deserving of any influence, seeing the little which it exercised was for evil and not for good. The British envoy, deceived himself, was unconsciously representing matters as they were not, and urging movements in advance as a duty; while the prescient mind of Moore could see nothing in such a course but disaster and destruction. Never, perhaps, was a general placed in a position of greater difficulty, or in circumstances more perplexing and harassing to a noble spirit.

The people of England had their eyes fixed upon him, with expectations of a nature to the full as extravagant as those of the Spaniards themselves; and Sir John well knew that an appeal to the reason of excited and misjudging enthusiasts would be, in the first moment of disappointment, vain. He had already found it so in the case of Mr. Frere the minister, a man of warm temperament and ardent hopes, but of utter inexperience in all military affairs. Here, where he should have found the solid support of a grave, calm, deliberative wisdom, he was fretted by inconsiderate proposals, worrying importunities, and indelicate remonstrances. His generous spirit was overwhelmed; and his harassed and unhappy state of mind is thus evidenced in a letter to his brother:—“Pray for me,” says the general, “that I may make right decisions: if I make bad ones, it will not be for want of consideration.” He at one moment conceived the heroic notion of throwing himself into the heart of Spain, H 2 and rallying upon his small army that of Castaños and the wrecks of that of Belvedere; but this course became, after the battle of Tudela, too hazardous, he thought, to be risked.

Early in December general Sir John Hope? after a march, the latter part of which, from the movements of the French, was rendered difficult and insecure, but which was conducted with a most happy union of prudence and vigor, reached Alba de Tormes in safety. An intercepted dispatch from Berthier to Soult first acquainted Sir John Moore with the fall of Madrid; and then it was that he hastily conceived the design of striking a blow at the corps of Soult, which lay apart and exposed at Saldanha on the Carrion. Sir John Moore had already made a forward movement to cover the advance of his stores, and the march of Sir David Baird from Astorga, when the dispatch alluded to was brought to his head-quarters at Alaejos, on the 14th of December. The cavalry of lord Paget was at Toro, with two brigades of infantry; general Hope was at Torrecilla; general Charles Stewart’s cavalry was at Rueda. At this place a squadron of the l@th hussars surprised a French post of infantry and horse, on the night of the 12th of December. Some were sabred, some taken, and a few effected their escape.

On the 18th the British head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo; from that place Sir John Moore apprized Romana of his intended movement against Soult, and requested his cooperation. On the 20th all the British troops were concentrated—the infantry at Mayorga, the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo. This arm distinguished itself greatly on the march. They skirmished boldly with the enemy’s horse, and took upwards of a hundred prisoners. With perfect confidence the smallest patrol of British cavalry would charge a body double its strength. The total of the English army, as now united, was 23,600 men, with sixty pieces of artillery. Of this force 2278 were cavalry. Soult’s corps of 16,000 infantry and 1200 horse lay upon the Carrion. Of these, more than 12,000 could be readily assembled to oppose the British: the main body of foot was at Saldanha, and the dragoons of general Debelle were at Sahagun. Sir John Moore, who well knew that the British army would become the immediate object of the emperor’s attention, and that the enemy’s masses were everywhere in motion, and would doubtless be directed at once upon his communications, felt all the danger of his attempt But it was a solace to make some effort He relied upon his own ability and promptness, and marched forward.

Upon the morning of the 21st lord Paget at the head of 400 of the I5th hussars, came in presence of a line of 600 French, dragoons, at Sahagun, and, after a few skilful manœuvres, charged and overthrew them. Many were sabred on the spot, and thirteen officers and one hundred and fifty men made prisoners. The English infantry occupied Sahagun. Romana, who had only 6000 men, and those in a miserable condition, remained at Mansilla; nor did he venture to advance. Sir John Moore was forced to halt the 22d and 23d for his supplies; but he planned a march during the night of the 23d, and an attack upon the French troops at Saldanha on the morning of the 24th. Already in the chill night were the English columns in motion towards the Carrion, warmed and cheered by the promise of battle, when such intelligence was brought to the general of the enemy’s movements as compelled retreat.

Napoleon had been informed of Moore’s advance on the 21st On the evening of the 22d, 50,000 men, under his immediate orders, were already at the foot of the Guadarama pass. The French troops at Talavera were also in full march to act upon the English army. It was only by twelve hours that Moore saved the passage of the Esla, and evaded the prompt manœuvre whereby Napoleon, in person, had hoped to intercept him. The retreat to this point was conducted in masterly order. General Hope moved by the road of Mayorga; general Baird by that of Valencia San Juan. Romana engaged to hold the bridge of Mansilla. The light brigades and the cavalry remained to the very last at Sahagun; and, to cover these movements, patrols of British horse were pushed boldly to the very lines of the enemy. The column of general Hope, and the reserve and light brigades, under the commander-in-chief, following in succession, crossed the bridge of Castro Gonzalo on the 26th. On the same day general Baird passed the Esla, at Valencia, by the ferry and the fords. Lord Paget, just as he had marched through Mayorga with the rear-guard, discovered the advanced horsemen of marshal Ney’s corps. A body of them was drawn up on a rising ground flanking the road, and ready to act upon the line of his retreat He directed two squadrons of the 10th upon them. At the head of his brave men, colonel Leigh spurred up the hill, and, despite the vantage-ground and their great superiority of numbers, rode in upon the enemy, broke them, sabred many, and took a hundred prisoners. From Mayorga lord Paget marched to Benevente. On the 27th the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was destroyed. The communications with Astorga being now recovered, Sir John Moore halted the army for two days at Benevente, to clear out his magazines, after which he continued his retreat upon Astorga. For the greater part of his stores he could procure no transport, and they were destroyed. Upon the 29th all the infantry had already quitted Benevente; the cavalry alone remained in the town, having their pickets upon the fine plain in front The fords of the Esla were watched by these parties. Early on this morning general Lefebvre Desnouettes crossed the river at a ford near the bridge, with six hundred horsemen of the imperial guards, and advanced upon the pickets. They retired, steadily skirmishing, till, being joined by a small party of the third German hussars, they repeatedly charged the enemy and checked his advance. Colonel Otway commanded these pickets till General Charles Stewart took charge of them. Handsomely disputing their advance, the general slowly gave ground before the French, till he drew them well forward into the plain. The 10th hussars were formed quickly by lord Paget under cover of some houses near the town; and when the favorable moment arrived, they rode out smartly, and joining the pickets, the whole charged with such vigor that the imperial guards fled at speed to the fords, and re-crossed the river. They lost from fifty to sixty cut down on the field; seventy prisoners, including their general; and had seventy more wounded, who escaped. The loss of the British was fifty. It is said that Napoleon, whose head-quarters were at Valderas, on the opposite bank, witnessed this combat Soon after this period the emperor quitted the army, and returned to France.

From the moment that the retreat commenced, discontent and disorder possessed the soldiers; and here in Benevente their angry devastations began. The fine castle of Benevente, a stately monument of the age of chivalry,—of such spacious grandeur as to afford in its vast halls and magnificent galleries lodging for two entire regiments, and a train of artillery that stalled its horses below,—was rudely dismantled by its guests. Fires were lighted on its tesselated pavements, and blackened its jasper columns, while the pictures were torn down from the walls of its rich chambers, and heaped as fuel upon the flames: and as the soldiery served this palace, so did they many a goodly mansion, and many a peaceful cottage on their route to the coast They were already murmuring and disobedient; they moved along the weary roads dejected and sullen; broke their ranks on the smallest pretences; and their looks and words were alike insubordinate. Upon entering Astorga they found Romana’s troops, who had just been driven from Mansilla and Leon. A scene of confusion arose. Romana had promised not to cross the British line of march; but with all good-will, and all honest intention, Romana had no power to keep his promises, whether they regarded the taking part in hostile operations, or the observing of separate and regular lines of movement In common with Sir John Moore, Romana himself had been left again and again without any information, or deceived by false intelligence; like him, too, he had suffered all those inconveniences and obstructions which the local authorities were perpetually imposing. He had been often compelled to counteract by force the frauds and the evasions of the rapacious and the interested. The picture of his wretched army at this period is thus given by colonel Jones:—

"The soldiers under arms little exceeded in number the sick borne on cars or mules; and as they slowly passed along, emaciated and enfeebled by disease, the procession had much more the appearance of an ambulatory hospital in need of an escort, than of an army to defend the country.”

From Astorga to Lugo the English line of march was a scene of great suffering and incredible disorder. If any one thing had been a source of pride to Sir John Moore, beyond all other, it was the high, the unequalled discipline of the fine army which he had led forward into Spain. The men were steady, clean, and obedient; robust, hardy, and brave. Discipline had now vanished; their attachment to their general was gone; their respect shaken. The length of the marches, the severity of the weather, and the wretched state of the roads,—here mud, there snow,—the want of supplies, and, above all, the dispiriting effect of a retreat, made them careless, irregular, and insolent; they quitted their ranks in search of food and liquor; they plundered; they wantonly destroyed property; they broke open stores of wine; they drank and loitered, and lay stupid in the roads. At Bembibre some hundreds, who sallied out from the plundered wine-vaults when the French cavalry appeared before it, were taken or sabred on the road, as they vainly sought to run, staggering after the rear-guard. At Villa Franca the soldiers were again busy at the work of plunder, and the general caused one of the marauders to be shot as an example: moreover, he issued the severest orders to the army. At Calcabellos on the Guia there was an affair between the British reserve and the enemy’s advanced guard, consisting of six or eight squadrons. Not until many of these brave horsemen had fallen under the fire of the English riflemen were they supported by any of the French infantry; but at length they were strengthened by a body of Voltigeurs. In this combat about two or three hundred on both sides were killed and wounded. Among the first slain was the French general Colbert, a fine man, and a gallant soldier, whose daring valor had been so conspicuous as to attract the notice and admiration of his English foes. His name was of great note in his own army, and many a battle-plain in Germany had seen him lead up into the hottest fire the decisive charge. In this petty affair he fell.

The face of the country from Villa Franca to Lugo is mountainous and rugged. The cavalry, therefore, preceded the infantry, by whom they, in turn, were now covered. Prom the commencement of the campaign, the resolute and undaunted bearing of the British cavalry had been an honor to the army. The rear-guard reached Herrerias on the 5th of January ; and here Sir John Moore abandoned the intention of embarking at Vigo, and, from the reports of his engineers, selected Corunna, as offering a more favorable position to cover his embarkation.

The division of general Baird was at Nogales; those of generals Hope and Fraser near Lugo Sir John having resolved to rally his army at Lugo, and to offer battle to the enemy, sent an order to the leading division to halt at that place. This order was carried to Sir David Baird by an aide-de-camp. That general most imprudently forwarded it by a private dragoon: the man got drunk, and lost the dispatch. In consequence, general Fraser’s division had a severe and toilsome march, and retraced their steps by a painful countermarch, an operation which lost to it 400 stragglers. The passage of the bridge at Constantino, a spot which offered such advantages to the pursuing enemy that a great loss had been anticipated, was most skilfully and happily effected by the reserve without any. General Paget with two regiments made good an excellent formation on the other side, and, though repeatedly assailed by the enemy, held his ground firmly till nightfall. On the 7th Sir John Moore drew up his army in a position near Lugo, in order of battle. As by magic, the organization of his disorderly battalions was again complete. Neither severity of rebuke, nor even the example of a summary execution, had hitherto availed to check the wide and fearful insubordination; but when it was known that the colors of their regiments were planted in bivouac on a line of battle, to the joy and the pride of their officers, the men came hurrying to the ranks; and as they examined their locks, fixed their flints, and loosened in the scabbards those bayonets which the pouring rain had rusted fast in the sheaths, they again looked to their officers with the regard of a ready obedience and a brave devotion.

As soon as marshal Soult arrived before the British position, he made a strong reconnoissance first on the English centre with four guns and a few squadrons, and afterwards upon the left with a heavy column of infantry and artillery. From the centre he was driven off by the cannonade of fifteen pieces, and on the left his column, after pushing in the British outposts, was charged by the light troops under the immediate direction of Sir John Moore, and very rudely handled. The enemy lost 400 men. Throughout the whole of the 8th the two armies lay in presence of each other, in order of battle, but Soult declined the attack. The English general, satisfied with having rallied his own troops, and brought his pursuers to a stand, decamped in the night, and continued his retreat, leaving the fires burning bright upon his position, to deceive the enemy.

In silent order the troops retired, commencing their march about ten o’clock; but in spite of all the precautions taken to mark the right tracks, which led from the different parts of the position to the high road, the marks were destroyed by rain and tempestuous wind. Two divisions were completely bewildered, and were still near Lugo in the morning. Fatigued, depressed, and foundered for want of shoes, they straggled onwards through the mud, chilled by a falling sleet; and in a few hours the firm battalions, which had stood in position the day before, ready and eager for battle, were a mob of fugitives and marauders. The reserve, under general Edward Paget, was the only body which, throughout this long and disastrous retreat, maintained its discipline and efficiency—a fact signally honorable to that officer. In justice, however, to the other troops, it should be allowed, that in the reserve, the minds of men were engaged by duties which interested and animated them; for, as the rear-guard, they were constantly in the presence of the enemy.

Between Sahagun and Lugo the casualties of the army, including those who fell in action, amounted to 1500. The loss of men between Lugo and Betanzos was yet more considerable. Here Sir John Moore halted, and assembled all his force. Discipline was again, in some degree, restored by great exertions, and the columns marched from hence to Corunna in very tolerable order.

As soon as the general reached Corunna, where the transports had not yet arrived, he made all the necessary dispositions for covering his embarkation. The land-front of this weak fortress was strengthened, and the sea-face was dismantled. In all the labor of these preparations, the Spaniards of the city worked freely, tendering the British all possible assistance with heart and hand, although they well knew the object and end of our operations; an act of itself sufficient to stamp the character of the Spaniard with nobility.

A magazine of 4000 barrels of powder, upon a hill, three miles from the city, was fired on the 13th. The explosion was terrific; the earth trembled; the waters were agitated; and every body stood, for a short and awful pause, breathless and grave.

The horses of the cavalry which had survived the march, were brought out and shot; for the ground near Corunna not being practicable for that arm, they could not have been used in action; and it was humanely resolved that they should not be left in their miserable plight to fresh sufferings.

The assembling of the French army in his front, made it necessary for Sir John Moore to select a position on which to meet them.

On the evening of the 14th, the transports from Vigo entered the harbor, and me embarkation of the sick, the artillery, and the dragoons commenced; eight British and four Spanish guns were retained on shore.

During the night of the 15th, and on the morning of the 16th, all the baggage and all encumbrances were put on board ship; and it was intended to withdraw the army after dark that evening. About two o’clock in the afternoon the French beat to arms, and prepared to attack the position of the English. Half a league from Corunna, the English army, 14,500 strong, was drawn up on a low range of hills; the only position which their numbers and their object allowed them to occupy. A loftier range of rocky heights encircled and commanded it within cannon-shot, and on these the French had already taken post.

Marshal Soult had 20,000 men under arms. From the lighter guns along his front, and from a battery of heavier calibre on his left, he opened a smart cannonade, and under cover of the fire moved down in three weighty columns to the attack. The first of these, throwing out its voltigeurs, and driving in the pickets, attacked the British right, assailing the front and flank of general Baird’s division. The second column marched upon the British centre. The third, with less of earnest intention in the character of its attack, moved upon the British left, where the troops were commanded by Sir John Hope.

The horse of the commander-in-chief stood saddled for him to visit the outposts just as the alarm was given. He rode thankful to the field. The thunder of the guns and the rolling of the musketry was already begun as he galloped to the summons with a grave joy.

The battle was most furious near the village of Elvina, on the British right In this quarter of the field Sir David Baird was severely wounded; and here, while earnestly watching the progress of the stern combat in Elvina, Sir John Moore himself was struck upon the left breast by a cannon-shot: it threw him from his horse; but, though the laceration was dreadful, it did not deprive him of his mental energy; he sat upon the ground, and watched the battle. His eye was stedfast and intent, and it brightened as he saw that all went bravely and well. The soldiers now put him in a blanket to carry him to the rear; as they did so, the hilt of his sword struck upon his wound, and caused him a sudden pang. Captain Hardinge would have taken off the sword, but the general stopped him, saying, “It is as well as it is: I had rather it should go out of the field with me!” With these words he was borne from the battle. It was a long way to the town, and the torture of the motion was great; but the expression of his countenance was calm and resolute, and he did not sigh. Several times he made his attendants stop, and turn him round, that he might gaze upon the field of battle.

After he was laid down upon a couch in his lodgings, the pain of his wound increased. He spoke with difficulty, and at intervals. He often asked how the battle went; and being at last told that the enemy were defeated, he said instantly, “It is a great satisfaction to me to know that we have beaten the French.” He was firm and composed to the last; once only, when speaking of his mother, he betrayed great emotion. “You know,” said he, to his old friend colonel Anderson, “that I always wished to die this way! ” The bitter agony of spirit which he had long endured was thus mournfully evidenced. “I hope,” he exclaimed, “the people of England will be satisfied !—I hope my country will do me justice ! ” These precious sentences were among the last he uttered ; his sufferings were not long; he expired with the hand of colonel Anderson pressed firmly in his own.

We shall not further describe the action than by saying, that when darkness put an end to the work of battle, not only had the French been repulsed at all points, but the line of the English was considerably advanced beyond the original position. The loss of the French was, by their own admission, 3000; that of the British was about 800 killed and wounded.

The brigade of general Hill and that of general Beresford remained on shore the 17th, to cover the embarkation of the army, which began soon after the close of the engagement. By night the victorious troops filed down from the field of battle to their boats, and embarked. There was a moon, but it gave only a wan and feeble light; for the weather was misty and chill. Soon after night-fall, the remains of Sir John Moore were quietly interred in the citadel of Corunna. “Soldiers dug his grave; soldiers laid him in the earth. He was buried in his military cloak, and was left asleep, and alone, upon a bastion —a bed of honor well chosen for a hero’s resting-place. This last duty done, the officers of his personal staff went on shipboard, “in soldiers’ sadness, the silent mourning of men who know no tears.”

Sir John Moore had signalized his name in the West Indies, in Holland, and in Egypt His life was spent among the troops; among the troops he died; and, to this hour, it is a distinction to any officer to have learned his duty under the eye and the voice of Moore. We admire his character; we glory in his warrior-death; we consider his fame hallowed by his end;— but we think that, with the deep knowledge of human nature he possessed, the state of Spanish society, under the actual circumstances of peril and bewilderment, ought not to have surprised him, far less to have irritated him to the extent to which it certainly did. That time was lost at Salamanca, is a matter of fact, and a subject of regret The value of a day, or of an hour, in war, is great It is vain to ask what might have been the consequences of a movement into the heart of Spain, which was never made, and which, according to able and acute men, never should have been contemplated; but it is certain that between that measure and a retreat on Portugal, Sir John Moore wavered long in his decisions. War, we are told, and truly, by all good officers, is a science; and we are shown how accurate and profound are, and ought to be, the calculations of a commander; yet, “nothing venture, nothing have,” has passed into a proverb with mankind.

In all undertakings, we must leave something in a state too incomplete to command the certainty of success. We must exercise our trust in Providence, whatever be our aim and end; for “the lot is cast into the lap, the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord;” and, undoubtedly, with a righteous cause, we may look hopefully for help. We are not of the number of those who dare to speak lightly of the spirit of Moore ; for we know the help of Heaven was that to which he looked; and we believe that it was an act of conscientious self-denial, which made him hesitate to risk the lives of so many thousands on the desperate hazards of a chivalric effort.