Читать книгу The Black Phalanx - Joseph T. Wilson - Страница 36

"Whereas the enemy have adopted a practice of enrolling Negroes among their Troops, I do hereby give notice That all Negroes taken in arms, or upon any military Duty, shall be purchased for the public service at a stated Price; the money to be paid to the Captors.

"But I do most strictly forbid any Person to sell or claim Right over any Negro, the property of a Rebel, who may take refuge in any part of this Army: And I do promise to every negro who shall desert the Rebel Standard, full security to follow within these Lines, any Occupation which he shall think proper.

"Given under my Hand at Head-Quarters, Philipsburg, the 30th day of June, 1779. H. Clinton.

"By his Excellency's command, John Smith, Secretary."

It is highly probable that many negroes made their way to the British camp. Col. Laurens wrote to General Washington, under date of February, 1780, six months after the issuing of Sir Henry Clinton's proclamation, as follows:

"Private accounts say that General Provost is left to command at Savannah; that his troops consist of Hessians and Loyalists that were there before, re-inforced by a corps of blacks and a detachment of savages. It is generally reported that Sir. Henry Clinton commands the present expedition."

Clinton left New York in the latter part of 1779, for the reduction of Charleston, which he completed in May, three months after the date of Col. Laurens' letter. Gen. Lincoln, who commanded the American forces at Charleston, joined in the effort to arm the negroes. In a letter to Gov. Rutledge, dated Charleston, March 13th, 1780, he says:

"Give me leave to add once more, that I think the measure of raising a black corps a necessary one; that I have great reason to believe, if permission is given for it, that many men would soon be obtained. I have repeatedly urged this matter, not only because Congress has recommended it, and because it thereby becomes my duty to attempt to have it executed, but because my own mind suggests the utility and importance of the measure, as the safety of the town makes it necessary."

The project of raising negro troops gained some friends in all sections, and Statesmen, both South and North, as they talked about it, became more free to express their approbation of the measure. They had witnessed the militia from Virginia and North Carolina, at the battle of Camden, throw down their arms before the enemy;[4] they had seen black and white troops under command of Gen. Provost occupy Savannah; the surrender of Charlestown had become necessary; and these evils were all brought about by the apathy of the white inhabitants.

Among those who spoke out in favor of Col. Laurens' and Gen. Lincoln's plan, was Hon. James Madison, who, on the 20th of November, 1780, wrote to Joseph Jones:

"I am glad to find the Legislature persisting in their resolution to recruit their line of the army for the war; though, without deciding on the expediency of the mode under their consideration, would it not be as well to liberate and make soldiers at once of the blacks themselves, as to make them instruments for enlisting white soldiers? It would certainly be more consonant with the principles of liberty: and, with white officers and a majority of white soldiers, no imaginable danger could be feared from themselves; as there certainly could be none from the effect of the example on those who should remain in bondage; experience having shown that a freedman immediately loses all attachment and sympathy with his former fellow slaves."

No circumstances under which the South was placed, could induce either their legislators or the people to adopt the recommendations of Congress or the advice of the patriots and statesmen of their section. The opposition to the arming of the negroes was much stronger than the love for independence. The British, however, adopted the plan, and left no stone unturned to augment the strength of their army. Thousands of negroes flocked to the Royal standard at every opportunity, just as in the war of the Rebellion in 1861-'65, they sought freedom under the national banner.

It has ever been the rule among American historians to omit giving credit to those negroes who sought to gain their freedom by joining the British. They have generally also failed to acknowledge the valor of those who swelled the ranks of the Continental army. Enough, however, can be gathered, mostly from private correspondence, to show that the hope of success for the Americans rested either in the docility of the negroes at the South, or in their loyalty to the cause of Independence. At all events, upon the action of the blacks more than upon the bravery and valor of the American troops, depended the future status of the Colonies; hence the solicitude of officers and of the leading citizens; and it was not the love of universal freedom, which prompted their efforts for arming negroes; not at all, but their keen appreciation of the value of a neutral power, which could be utilized for the benefit of America's Independence. Nor do I attribute other than the same motive to the British, who did arm and did free a great many of the negroes, who joined their service, especially at the South, where they must have organized quite a large force,—not less than 5,000. Early in 1781, (Feb'y) Gen. Greene, then in command in North Carolina, writing to General Washington about the doings of the enemy in South Carolina, where he formally commanded, says:

"The enemy have ordered two regiments of negroes to be immediately embodied, and are drafting a great portion of the young men of that State [South Carolina], to serve during the war."

A few days after writing this letter, Gen. Greene met the British at Guilford Court House, and again witnessed the cowardice of the Southern militia,[5] whose conduct gave victory to the British, under Cornwallis.

The persistency of Col. Laurens in his effort to organize negro troops, was still noteworthy. Having returned from France, whither he went on important business, connected with the welfare of the States, he resumed his "favorite pursuit." Under date of May, 19, 1782, in a letter addressed to Washington, he says:

"The plan which brought me to this country was urged with all the zeal which the subject inspired, both in our Privy Council and Assembly; but the single voice of reason was drowned by the howling of a triple-headed monster, in which prejudice, avarice, and pusillanimity were united. It was some degree of consolation to me, however, to perceive that the truth and philosophy had gained some ground; the suffrages in favor of the measure being twice as numerous as on a former occasion. Some hopes have been lately given me from Georgia; but I fear, when the question is put, we shall be out-voted there with as much disparity as we have been in this country.

"I earnestly desire to be where any active plans are likely to be executed, and to be near your Excellency on all occasions in which my services can be acceptable. The pursuit of an object which, I confess, is a favorite one with me, because I always regarded the interests of this country and those of the Union as intimately connected with it, has detached me more than once from your family, but those sentiments of veneration and attachments with which your Excellency has inspired me, keep me always near you, with the sincerest and most zealous wishes for a continuance of your happiness and glory."

Here ended the project of arming negroes in South Carolina, and before an earnest effort could be made in Georgia, the brave man laid his life upon the altar of American liberty.

But to show the state of public opinion at the South, as understood by the Commander-in-Chief of the American army, we have but to read Washington's reply to Col. Laurens' last letter, in which he speaks of "making a last effort" in Georgia. Gen. Washington uses this emphatic language:

"I must confess that I am not at all astonished at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which, at the commencement of this contest, would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public but private interest which influences the generality of mankind; nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under the circumstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded; nor will you, I fear, have better success in Georgia."

This letter settles forever any boast of the Southerners, that to them is due the credit of gaining the independence of the United States. It is true Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, Va., was the last of the series of battles fought for independence.[6] But we must remember that the French were at Yorktown. It cannot be doubted but that from Charleston to Yorktown the Americans met negro troops more than once fighting under the Royal flag; while at the east, in every important engagement between the two enemies,—British and American,—the negro was found fighting with the Americans. This division of the negroes can easily be accounted for, since at the North and East the object of the war was acknowledged to be set forth in the Declaration of Independence; at the South only so much of the Declaration was accepted as demanded Independence from Great Britain. Therefore, though in separate and opposing armies, the object of the negro was the same—liberty. It is to be regretted that the historians of the Revolutionary period did not more particularly chronicle the part taken by negroes at the South, though enough is known to put their employment beyond doubt.

Johnson, the author of the life of Gen. Greene, speaking of Greene's recommendation to the Legislature of South Carolina to enroll negroes, says:

"There is a sovereign, who, at this time, draws his soldiery from the same class of people; and finds a facility in forming and disciplining an army, which no other power enjoys. Nor does his immense military force, formed from that class of his subjects, excite the least apprehension; for the soldier's will is subdued to that of his officer, and his improved condition takes away the habit of identifying himself with the class from which he has been separated. Military men know what mere machines men become under discipline, and believe that any men, who may be obedient, may be made soldiers; and that increasing their numbers increases the means of their own subjection and government."

Cornwallis doubtless had gathered within his lines a large number of negroes, to whose energy and labor, the erection of his breastworks were mainly due. Lafayette feeling satisfied that the position of his army before Yorktown would confine the British, and make the escape of Cornwallis impossible without battle, wrote to Gen. Washington in September: