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PRESIDENT IN 1914 LAID DOWN POLICY WHICH GUIDED THE NAVY IN YEARS OF PREPARATION—ON VERGE OF WAR IN 1916—FLEET PREPARED TO MOBILIZE—"DEUTSCHLAND" AND U-53 WARNED US TO EXPECT SUBMARINES—CONGRESS AUTHORIZED BUILDING OF 157 WARSHIPS—MERCHANT SHIPS LISTED, MUNITIONS ACCUMULATED, COUNTRY'S INDUSTRIES SURVEYED.

"We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas," declared President Wilson in his annual message to Congress in December, 1914, and this was the guiding policy in the years of preparation that preceded the war. And the two years that followed were the busiest the Navy has ever known in time of peace.

The United States was on the very verge of war a year before it was declared. All preparations were made to mobilize the Fleet when President Wilson, after the sinking of the Sussex, sent his ultimatum to Germany declaring:

Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.

That note was despatched on April 18, 1916. Germany did not reply promptly and in a few days the following order was issued:

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington, April 27, 1916.

Confidential.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Mobilization Plan.

The following order had this day been approved by the Secretary of the Navy:

"1. In case of mobilization for war in the Atlantic the organization of the naval forces will be as indicated in the mobilization sheets published from time to time by the Department.

"2. Plans will be developed by all officers concerned for execution upon the receipt of the order to mobilize.

"3. The order to mobilize when received will be construed as an order to take all necessary action for the rapid assembly of ships at the rendezvous in all respects ready for war service.

"4. The rendezvous is designated as Chesapeake Bay."

Copies of mobilization sheets are forwarded herewith.

All our battleships except three, and 40 of our 47 destroyers were reported immediately available. Mobilization is the next step to actual hostilities and is only justifiable when conditions are extremely threatening. That was the case in the spring of 1916. In fact, what threatened then was what actually occurred a year later.

The German Government in its note of May 4th met all Wilson's demands, declaring it would do its utmost to confine the operations for the rest of the war to the fighting forces of the belligerent. "Guided by this idea," it notified the United States Government that the German naval forces had received the following orders:

In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless such ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

It was not until Feb. 1, 1917, that Germany repudiated this pledge and resumed ruthless U-boat warfare. But it did give us warning that it could send its undersea craft to American waters whenever it chose.

If there ever had been any fancied security from their submarines, it was removed that Sunday, July 9, 1916, when the Deutschland bobbed up in Chesapeake Bay, and a few hours later reached her dock in Baltimore. Coming from Bremen via Heligoland, it had made its way through the North Sea and around Scotland, crossed the ocean and entered Hampton Roads under the very noses of the British cruisers just outside. Two hundred and thirteen feet long, with a displacement, submerged, of 2,200 tons, it had a surface speed of 12 to 14 knots an hour, and could run under water at 7-1/2 knots. Though unarmed, and called a "mercantile submarine," by the placing of guns and torpedo tubes aboard, she could be quickly converted into a man-of-war. The Deutschland came again to America in November, going to New London, Conn., reaching Germany, on her return, December 10. This was her last trip as a merchantman, for she was soon afterwards converted into a warship, and was one of the submarines sent to sink shipping in American waters in 1918.

Even more startling was the visit of the U-53. This German submarine, almost as large as the Deutschland, suddenly appeared off Point Judith and calmly steamed into Newport, R. I., the afternoon of October 7th. Flying the German man-of-war ensign, she carried two guns conspicuously placed. The cruiser Birmingham, Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves commanding, was near by, and the U-53 asked to be assigned a berth. Kapitän Leutnant Hans Rose, her commander, in full uniform, called on the commandant of the Naval Station, stating that his object in entering the port was to "pay his respects," and that he intended to sail at 6 o'clock. He invited our officers to visit his ship, saying he would be glad to "show them around." The crew seemed anxious to impress the Americans with the boat and its mechanism.

While in port, the U-53 was careful not to violate neutrality regulations, but the day after leaving Newport she began a slaughter of vessels. On October 8th, she sank the British steamships Stephano, Strathdine and West Point, the Dutch steamer Blommersdijk, and the Norwegian Chr. Knudsen. The first two were attacked within sight of Nantucket Lightship, just outside the three-mile limit. The others sunk were farther away, but all were near our coast.

The first news we had of this raid was that the American steamer Kansan had been stopped early in the morning by a German submarine, which, after examining her papers, had allowed her to proceed. A short time later a radio message was received stating that the British steamer West Point was being gunned. After that, distress signals came thick and fast. Rear Admiral Gleaves immediately ordered our destroyers to the relief of the vessels attacked, and they rescued crews and passengers, bringing them safely to port.

Within seven or eight months those destroyers were across the Atlantic, fighting the undersea raiders in European waters. And they had their revenge in September, 1918, when an American destroyer and sub-chasers bombed the U-53 with such effect that according to reports, she abandoned the fight, glad to be able to get to her home base.

Thus Germany in 1916 gave us a taste of submarine warfare, showing what it could do and did do in American waters in 1918, and what sound strategy caused naval experts to expect it to undertake in the spring of 1917. The U-53 had been careful not to attack any American vessels, and had conducted its operations outside our territorial waters. But this piece of German bravado aroused the indignation of the entire country. It was a warning—and probably so intended—that the Germans could at any time send their U-boats across the seas to sink our vessels off our own shores.

Even then the country at large seemed to regard our entrance into war as improbable, and to the average man it did seem only a remote possibility; but our attaché in Berlin reported that Germany was building U-boats by scores, the parts being made at plants in various parts of the country, and assembled at coast shipyards. The Germans continued to talk peace, but our Navy continued to build ships, enlist men, and accumulate reserves of guns, ammunition, and war materials.

Congress on August 29, 1916, authorized the construction of 157 war vessels—ten battleships of the largest type and six huge battle cruisers, larger and swifter than any then in existence; ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, nine fleet submarines, fifty-eight coast submarines and one of the Neff type; three fuel ships, two destroyer tenders, two gunboats and two ammunition ships, a repair ship, a transport, a hospital ship and a submarine tender. Sixty-six vessels were appropriated for, to be begun in the current year. That bill carried total appropriations of $312,678,000, the largest amount ever granted for naval purposes in time of peace, and larger than previous appropriations when this country was actually engaged in war.

Usually, after vessels are authorized, months are required to prepare the plans and specifications. That was not the case this time. The Bureau of Construction and Repair, under the direction of Rear Admiral David W. Taylor, regarded in this country and abroad as one of the world's ablest naval constructors, had begun work on the plans long before. They were ready when the bill passed Congress. Bids were advertised for the next day, and as soon as the law allowed, contracts were let. Before the end of 1916, we had entered upon the biggest shipbuilding program ever undertaken by any navy at one time.

Providing for an enlisted strength of 74,700 regulars, Congress also authorized the President to increase the Navy to 87,000 in case of emergency. This, with the 6,000 apprentice seamen, the Hospital Corps, and allowance for the sick, prisoners and men on probation, would give us an emergency strength of some 95,000—including both officers and men, a force of over 100,000. Five thousand additional enlisted men and 255 more officers were authorized for the Marine Corps, which could be raised in emergency to 17,500. The increases alone were larger than the entire number of men employed by the Navy in the Spanish War. The Naval Reserve, instituted in 1915, was made a Naval Reserve Force unlimited in numbers.

The Naval Militia had grown to a force of nearly 10,000, and interest had been stimulated by a training cruise for civilians on eleven war vessels, known as the "Ocean Plattsburg." The Act of 1916 laid the basis for the enormous personnel we secured during the war—over half a million men in the Navy, and 75,000 in the Marine Corps. Immediately after its passage, a vigorous recruiting campaign was begun.

Large reserves of powder and shells had been accumulated, but orders were given for much more, and efforts were made to speed up projectiles under manufacture. "We had at the end of 1916," Admiral Strauss, then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, stated, "batteries of four guns each for 189 auxiliary ships. These batteries were housed at navy yards, and the full supply of powder, shell, primers, etc., were all prepared and ready for these ships at the nearest ammunition depots, so that in the event of war the guns could be secured on the ships and the magazines and shell-rooms supplied at once."

Equipment for ships to be converted, and spare parts of all kinds were accumulated and stored at points where they would be quickly available. All the bureaus concerned with construction, shipbuilding, conversion, and repair, engines and machinery, ordnance and supplies were increasing production, reporting, as did our vessels, constant improvement in "readiness for war."

This was the result of two years' constant work. Special duties were imposed from the beginning of the European conflict in 1914. Only a few days after hostilities began, the cruisers Tennessee and North Carolina sailed, carrying millions of dollars in gold to relieve the thousands of Americans stranded in Europe, unable to get home. Naval vessels were kept busy along our coasts, enforcing neutrality in our territorial waters. Naval censors were placed at wireless stations, preventing the sending of unneutral messages. Intelligence officers were active in thwarting the machinations of German spies and plotters. But all this was small in comparison with the efforts we were making to increase and improve the Navy in its every branch and prepare it for any emergency.

The sinking of the Lusitania, May 7, 1915, was followed by such naval activity as had never been seen before, except in the midst of hostilities.

Congress had created in the current naval bill a Chief of Naval Operations, charged with "the operation of the fleet and its readiness for war." For this important position, I had, after careful consideration, selected Rear Admiral William S. Benson, whose ability and experience admirably fitted him for this vital task. He assumed office on May 10, three days after the Lusitania went down. It was a critical period. The President on May 13 addressed to Germany his vigorous note giving notice that this Government would omit no word or act to protect its citizens against murder on the seas. Many Americans were urging that war be declared at once. The crisis lasted for weeks, and ended only when the German government gave its promise that non-belligerent vessels would not be sunk without warning.

Admiral Benson, bureau chiefs, commanders, and officials devoted every energy to preparing the fleet for war. Abolition of the cumbersome system of naval aides brought the bureau chiefs in closer touch with the Secretary. There was no longer any division of authority and responsibility, and we could get direct action. On this basis we built up a departmental organization so efficient that no change was found necessary during the entire war period, the bureaus merely expanding to meet the enormously increased demands, each new activity easily fitting into some part of the existing organization.

The General Board of the Navy, of which Admiral Dewey was the head until his death Jan. 16, 1917, had developed a comprehensive administrative plan, under which each bureau was required to report, periodically, on its readiness for war. This enabled us to keep informed of exact conditions and progress made. The Board also worked out a scheme for development of shore bases and stations.

Navy yards were expanded not only to repair and convert vessels, but to build warships of every type. These new ways and shops formed a substantial and valuable addition to the nation's shipbuilding facilities.

I created the Secretary's Advisory Council, consisting of the Assistant Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations and the chiefs of the various bureaus. Meeting regularly once a week and oftener when necessary, this Council brought together the chief administrative officers of the Department, and discussed all matters of general interest to the service. Thus the heads of bureaus kept in close touch with each other; having the advantage of a General Staff without its many disadvantages.

Comprehensive plans for possible war against Germany—we then called it "war in the Atlantic"—had been made by the General Board, and were constantly corrected and brought up to date in accordance with war developments.

When the fleet was reviewed by President Wilson at New York, May 15, 1915, Admiral Dewey wrote:

The people of New York have just cause for pride in the fleet now assembled in their harbor. Not only is it composed of the finest and most efficient warships that we have ever had, but it is not excelled, except in size, by the fleet of any nation in the world. Our ships and guns are as good as any in the world; our officers are as good as any; and our enlisted men are superior in training, education, physical development and devotion to duty to those of any other navy. As President of the General Board for the past fifteen years, I can say with absolute confidence that the efficiency of the fleet has steadily progressed, and has never been so high as it is today.

For months we had been at work on a plan for reorganizing the fleet. Completed and put into effect in July, 1915, that plan proved so efficient that it was continued throughout the war. Four battleships, the Pennsylvania, Nevada, Oklahoma and Arizona, ten destroyers, seven submarines, and two tenders, the Melville and the Bushnell, were completed in 1915-16.

Battle and target practice were conducted with a constant improvement in gunnery. In August, 1916, there was held off the North Atlantic Coast the largest "war game" in the annals of the Navy. Eighty-three vessels, including twenty-eight battleships and thirteen submarines, engaged in this strategic maneuver, which lasted for four days, and simulated the conditions of a great naval battle.

Congress had, in 1913-14, authorized the construction of five dreadnaughts as compared with only two granted by the previous Congress, and we were building more destroyers and submarines than in previous years. Forty-one more ships were in commission, and there were 5,000 more men in the service than there had been in 1913. The fleet was incomparably stronger than it had ever been before, but we were heartily tired of the hand-to-mouth policy that had prevailed so long, a policy that made it impossible to plan far ahead and develop a consistent and well-balanced fleet. In common with its officers, I wanted the United States to possess a navy equal to any afloat, and to initiate a building program that should be continuous and not haphazard.

Consequently, in July, 1915, I requested Admiral Dewey to have the General Board submit its opinion of what should be done to give us a navy worthy of this country and able to cope with any probable enemy. In response the General Board set forth this policy, which has guided us ever since and is now nearing a triumphant reality:

The Navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of development, year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not later than 1925.

WAR CHIEFS OF THE NAVY, THE SECRETARY AND HIS ADVISORY COUNCIL

Seated—Secretary Daniels. Standing (left to right):—Maj. Gen. George Barnett, Commandant U. S. Marine Corps; Capt. W. C. Watts, Judge Advocate General; Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan, Paymaster General, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Rear Admiral Robert S. Griffin, Engineer-in-Chief, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering; Rear Admiral David W. Taylor, Chief Constructor, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair; Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations; Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance; Commander H. G. Sparrow, Naval Aide to the Secretary; Rear Admiral Charles W. Parks, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Rear Admiral Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; Rear Admiral William C. Braisted, Surgeon General, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

A FRIENDLY BOUT

Spectators on the U. S. S. Bushnell are having as much fun as the boxers.

SCHOOL HOUR ABOARD A BATTLESHIP

It was in accordance with this policy, and at my direction, that the General Board developed the continuous building program, comprising 157 war vessels, later known as the "three-year program," which was authorized by Congress in the next naval appropriation act. Presented in my annual report for 1915, it was strongly urged by President Wilson in his message to Congress, and he sounded the keynote in his speech at St. Louis, February 3, 1916, when he declared: "There is no other Navy in the world that has to cover so great an area of defense as the American Navy, and it ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the most adequate Navy in the world."

With all the Navy striving to build up and expand the service, I turned attention to other forces that might be utilized. War had become a science; inventions were playing a vastly greater part than ever before, and on July 7, 1915, I wrote to Mr. Thomas A. Edison, suggesting the formation of a board of eminent inventors and scientists, and asking if he would consent to become its head. The idea appealed to Mr. Edison, as it did to the various scientific and engineering societies, and in a few weeks the Naval Consulting Board became a reality. Composed of men of eminence and distinction, this was the first of those organizations of patriotic civilians which, when war came, rendered such signal service to the nation.

This board began in 1915 a survey of all the country's industries and resources which might be employed, in case of war, for the production of munitions and supplies, and the thousand and one things required by armies and navies.

The Navy made a survey of all merchant ships and privately owned craft which might be utilized as auxiliaries. The Board of Inspection and Survey was increased, each vessel listed for service to which it could be adapted, and plans made for all the changes needed to convert it to war purposes. This was worked out to the last detail, even to the yards to which the vessels would be sent, and the accumulation of machinery and materials for their conversion. A standardized schedule was developed of all ammunition, materials, equipment and supplies needed by vessels in case of war.

Aviation received earnest attention. Seaplanes and flying boats were secured, and a school and station established at Pensacola, Fla., for the training of aviators. The cruisers North Carolina, West Virginia, and Washington were fitted with a launching device, from which aeroplanes could fly from ships. Operating with the fleet, our aeroplanes began developing the tactics of aircraft at sea.

During the Sussex crisis, arrangements were made for the mobilization of the communications of the entire United States radio, telegraph and telephone. This important experiment was carried out from May 6 to 8, 1916, and was a complete success, proving that in a day we could link all methods of communication and put in touch all our yards and stations and our ships at sea. Congress had previously authorized the erection of a chain of high power radio stations to span the Pacific—at San Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and at Cavite, in the Philippines—and these were under construction.

The Naval Communication Service was created and under its direction all our communications, wire and wireless, were prepared for war. This entire service was mobilized the day the United States severed relations with Germany.

Admiral Dewey said, in the autumn of 1916: "The last three years have been wonderful years. I have been in the Navy since 1854, and both in material and personnel, we are more efficient today than ever before." Admiral Charles J. Badger, who, upon the death of Dewey in January, 1917, became head of the General Board, stated: "I do not mean to say that we had attained to perfection in the Navy—we never shall; that no errors of judgment or mistakes were made—they will always occur; but I assert that the Navy when it entered the war was as a whole, well prepared and administered."