Читать книгу Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas - Jr. Edward S.G. Dennis - Страница 5

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After reviewing the stand-off at Waco, including the progress of the negotiations and the conception, approval and implementation of the tear gas plan on April 19, 1993, this Report concludes as follows.

The fire on April 19, 1993 was deliberately set by persons inside the compound and was not started by the FBI's tear gas insertion operations. It is not certain, however, whether a substantial number of the persons who died in the compound on April 19 remained inside voluntarily, were being held in the compound against their will or were shot in order to prevent their escape from the fire. Preliminary medical reports are that a substantial number of individuals had died of gunshot wounds. Among those shot were young children. Koresh's body was found with a gunshot wound to the forehead. The FBI did not fire on the compound during the tear gas operation, although shots were fired at the FBI from the compound. The FBI did not fire on the compound at any time during the fifty-one day stand-off.

The evidence forecasting David Koresh's intention to orchestrate a mass suicide was contradictory. Koresh and his followers repeatedly assured the negotiators that they did not intend to commit suicide. On several occasions agents were told that suicide was against the Davidians' religious beliefs. However, one released member said there was a suicide plan. Other released members denied there was a suicide plan. In any event, the risk of suicide was taken into account during the negotiations and in the development of the gas plan.

The FBI developed a coherent negotiating strategy to talk the Davidians out. However, the negotiators had strong objections to pressure tactics they felt were counterproductive. The use of pressure tactics immediately after Koresh sent out Davidians from the compound may have undermined the negotiators' credibility and blunted their efforts to gain the Davidians' trust and to discredit Koresh in the eyes of his followers. Nevertheless, tactical actions designed to increase the safety margin for agents were appropriately given priority over negotiating considerations. I conclude that the events of April 19 were the result of David Koresh's determined efforts to choreograph his own death and the deaths of his followers in a confrontation with federal authorities to fulfill Koresh's apocalyptic prophesy. The deaths of Koresh, his followers and their children on April 19th were not the result of a flaw in the gas plan or the negotiation strategy.

The FBI used many qualified experts, including its own FBI behavioral experts to evaluate Koresh. Their assessments were thorough and many proved quite accurate.

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The Attorney General was adequately briefed on the tear gassing plan, was fully infromed of the options, and was given a realistic appraisal of the risks. All reasonable alternatives were considered and the decision to insert CS gas was a reasonable one. I conclude that an indefinite siege was not a realistic option. According to the plan, gas would be inserted in stages and the FBI would wait 48 hours for it to have an effect. As the plan was being implemented, the tanks were ordered to enlarge openings in the compound to provide escape routes for the Davidians.

The FBI did anticipate that a fire might occur at the compound. Fire fighting equipment was not kept close to the scene because the heavy weaponry used by Koresh and his followers presented unacceptable risks to fire fighters. In any event, the independent arson experts concluded that the fire spread so quickly in the poorly constructed compound that even prompt fire fighting efforts would have been ineffective.

The FBI exhibited extraordinary restraint and handled the crisis with great professionalism.