Читать книгу The Philosopher's Toolkit - Julian Baggini, Julian Baggini - Страница 84

But what about philosophical theories? It would seem that if certainty in philosophical theories were attainable, there would be little or no dispute among competent philosophers about which are true and which false – but, in fact, there seems to be a lot of dispute. Does this mean that the truth of philosophical theories is essentially indeterminate? Is deep disagreement a fundamental characteristic of philosophical inquiry?

Some philosophers would say no. For example, they would say that although there remains a great deal of dispute, there is also near unanimous agreement among philosophers on many things – for example, that Plato’s theory of metaphysical forms is false and that Cartesian mind–body dualism is untenable.

Others of a more sceptical bent are, if you’ll pardon the pun, not so certain about the extent to which anything has been proven, at least with certainty, in philosophy. Accepting a lack of certainty can from their point of view be seen as a matter of philosophical maturity.