Читать книгу The Guilt of William Hohenzollern - Karl Johann Kautsky - Страница 13
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CHAPTER IX
WILLIAM'S MONARCHICAL CONSCIENCE
In the memorandum drawn up immediately before the crime at Serajevo, it was in regard to Rumanian affairs that Austria had shown herself chiefly concerned. Now, however, Serbia moves into the foreground. That country had only received an incidental mention in the text of the document. A postscript was now added, as follows:
“The present memorandum had only just been drawn up when the dreadful events of Serajevo took place. To estimate the full significance of this wicked deed is hardly possible as yet. It may, however, be said that in any case the impossibility of bridging the gulf between the Monarchy and Serbia is now demonstrated, as well as the danger and intensity of the Great-Serbian movement, which shrinks from nothing to attain its ends.
“All the more imperative is the necessity for the Monarchy to tear asunder in the most resolute manner the net which its opponents are endeavouring to weave over its head.”
In other words, Austria, or, rather, Count Berchtold and his associates, were resolved on a war against Serbia, and if necessary also against Russia.
In the face of this situation, what position did the German Government take up? Up to the present, no clear answer to this question could have been given. Did it allow itself to be dragged in tow by Austria without knowing exactly where it was going, or did it act with Austria willingly, energetically, and in full consciousness of what was afoot?
We find that its attitude in regard to Austrian policy in the Balkans was profoundly altered by the outrage at Serajevo.
When, in 1913, Rumania entered upon the second Balkan war in league with Serbia, the Hohenzollern Carol of Rumania had the Hohenzollern William of Germany covering his rear against the Habsburg. On that occasion Berlin was urging Vienna to hold back.
Thus, on July and, 1914, Berchtold remarked to Tschirschky:
“When Rumania, without reference to us, and, as she well knew, against our interests, leagued herself with Serbia and fell upon the defenceless Bulgaria, Germany protected Rumania, and gave us to understand that we were not to move.” (Red Book, 1919, p. 19.)
But after Serajevo, the wrath of Austria was not directed against Rumania and Serbia combined; it was wholly concentrated on the latter. And the Serbian Government, Monarchy as it was, now figured in William's eyes as the abettor and originator of regicide. His dynastic feeling, which had saved Rumania from Austria, now urged Austria as strongly against Serbia. Did he not abandon the projected visit of condolence to Vienna on July 2nd because hints from Serajevo had inspired him with the fear that a horde of Serbian assassins awaited him in the Austrian capital?
The instant he heard of the crime, he sprang without the least hesitation to the same conclusion as that which Francis Joseph expressed in his personal letter to William, received by the latter on July 5th:
“It must be the future task of my Government to bring about the isolation and diminution of Serbia.”
And it closed with the words:
“You also will, after this last and most terrible occurrence in Bosnia, have come to the conclusion that there can be no longer any thought of a reconciliation of the opposition between Serbia and ourselves, and that the continued peace-policy of all European monarchs will be threatened so long as this horde of criminal agitators in Belgrade are allowed to live unpunished.”
But even before this letter had reached Potsdam, William had decided that, whatever the consequences might be, Serbia must be laid low. By the shots at Serajevo his monarchical sympathies had been inflamed into a stormy passion for mortal vengeance on this race of murderers. Prince Lichnowsky was in Berlin during the days following the outrage. He reports a conversation with Zimmermann, who was then representing Jagow in the absence of the latter:
“One would gather from his words an unmistakably unfriendly feeling towards Russia, which stood in our way in every direction.... I was, of course, not told that General von Moltke was urging on war. I did, however, learn that Herr von Tschirschky had been reprimanded because he reported that he had recommended moderation to Vienna in her dealings with Serbia.” (“Meine Londoner Mission,” p. 27.)
Lichnowsky's statements are confirmed by the documents of the Berlin Foreign Office. We reproduce a report which Tschirschky addressed to the Imperial Chancellor on June 30th. Its importance lies in the marginal comments of the Kaiser, which we insert in square brackets, marked with a “W.”
“Count Berchtold told me to-day that, according to all appearances, the threads of the conspiracy to which the Archduke fell a victim could be traced to Belgrade. The affair was so well thought out, that intentionally only young people were charged with the execution of the deed, because their punishment would be milder [Let us hope not!—W.]. The Minister spoke very bitterly about the incitements proceeding from Serbia.
“Here, even serious people are saying that accounts with Serbia must be settled once for all. [Now or never.—W.] A series of demands must be presented to Serbia, and in case she does not accept them energetic steps must be taken. I use every occasion of this kind in order to warn our friends quietly, but very emphatically and seriously, against taking any over-hasty steps. [Who gave him any authority to do that? That is very stupid! No affair of his, since it is purely Austria's affair what she thinks fit to do in this matter. Afterwards they will say, if things go wrong, ‘Germany would not let us!’ Tschirschky must kindly avoid this nonsense. Serbia must be settled with, and that soon.—W.]
“Above all things, people must be clear as to what it is they want, for all the sentiments I have heard expressed up to the present have been very confused. Then the possible outcome of each course of action must be carefully weighed, and Austria-Hungary must realize that she does not stand alone in the world, and that besides consideration due to her Allies she must take into account, in relation to all Serbian questions, the general situation in Europe, and especially the attitude of Italy and Rumania. [All this is obvious, and mere platitudes.—W.]”
This document came back from the Kaiser to the Foreign Office on July 4th. Thus we see that even at that stage, and before Austria had made a demand of any description whatever, William was resolved that “the Serbians must be settled with, and that soon.”
The idea which has found much support in Gooss's book, that Germany was merely dragged into the Serbian crisis in the wake of Austria, in whom she had confided too much, falls wholly to the ground.
