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Johnson, Congress, and the Special Relationship

An American Commitment to the Survival of Israel

An American commitment to the survival of Israel became evident before and during the Six-Day War in June 1967. For the first time after the Holocaust, Jews in Israel felt genuinely afraid of being overrun.¹ Arab leaders, particularly Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, refused to recognize Israel and continually threatened to destroy it or to drive it into the sea. Nasser aimed to generate popular support through bombastic rhetoric and likely did not really believe Egypt—or any collection of Arab forces—could, or would, destroy Israel. But threats to exterminate Israel could not be ignored. Israel also contributed to the rising tensions in the region with its attack on Samu, a Jordanian village, in November 1966, and needless provocations with Syria, which led to an air battle in April 1967.

While the threats against Israel added to Nasser’s popular appeal in the Arab world, they encouraged American support for Israel just as much. As events moved toward war, U.S. legislators took to the House and Senate floors and collectively declared an uncompromising commitment to protecting Israel. After the war, the United States supported Israel’s decision to remain in the occupied territories (Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem) until Arab states agreed to make peace with Israel. That decision, which would guide U.S. policy for decades to follow, was originally rooted in an American commitment to securing the safety of Israel.

Map: After the Six-Day War, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and East Jerusalem. The Johnson administration initiated land-for-peace diplomacy, whereby Israel would give back Arab lands in return for peace agreements.

Lyndon Johnson felt a strong affection for the State of Israel, but like the presidents before him, he aimed to pursue an evenhanded policy in the Middle East. He often refused Israeli requests for weapons in order to stave off an arms race with the Soviet Union. Unable to prevent an arms race, Johnson tried to avoid selling weapons disproportionally in the region, to support American claims to evenhandedness. Despite his efforts, Johnson became the first U.S. president to sell offensive weapons to Israel. Nevertheless, Johnson’s decisions should be considered within the context of a desire to balance weapons sales between Israel and moderate Arab states and to limit such sales altogether. As Zach Levey has argued, Johnson wanted to avoid entering into a strategic relationship with Israel.² Israel, for its part, wanted to expand a special relationship into a strategic alliance built on military aid. Walter Hixson has ably demonstrated that the Israel lobby played an important role in pressuring Johnson into adopting a decidedly pro-Israel position.³

The U.S. Congress emerged as a vocal branch of dissent to Johnson’s foreign policy with Israel and, in particular, to his reluctance to sell weapons to Israel. Legislators forced Johnson to publicly contend with the issue of weapons sales to Israel by using legislation (binding and nonbinding), letters, speeches, and official statements to criticize the president’s unwillingness to better arm Israel. These efforts laid a foundation for an ongoing critique of presidential foreign policy in the region that contributed to a dramatic increase of weapons sales. Congress legitimized dissent of presidential foreign policymaking in both East Asia and the Middle East during Johnson’s presidency and in that way affected presidential decision-making in both regions.

Several scholars have analyzed U.S.-Israel relations during Johnson’s presidency; however, no work situates U.S.-Israel relations within the context of increased congressional activity in foreign policy during the LBJ years in order to explore how a Vietnam War–era Congress impacted the U.S.-Israel special relationship.⁴ This chapter attempts to fill that void.

U.S. Weapons Sales to Israel prior to the 1967 War

The persistent instability in the Middle East, which stemmed in part from the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, worsened during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency and brought about more U.S. involvement in the region. The 1948–1949 Arab-Israeli War was a War for Independence for Jews, who administered the newly declared State of Israel, but a catastrophe (nakba) for the stateless Palestinian Arabs, who did not receive the allotment of land designated by the U.N. General Assembly in November 1947. Approximately 700,000 Arabs either fled or were forced from their homes during the 1948–1949 war, which started the Palestinian refugee crisis. Border conflicts persisted throughout the 1950s, and conditions grew worse during the 1960s. Tensions arose between Syria and Israel over water rights to the headwaters of the Jordan River, with escalations in 1964 and 1965.⁵ The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), created in 1964, declared its central goal to be the destruction of the State of Israel. Yasser Arafat, the leader of Fatah (the largest and most important member organization of the PLO), continued his instigation of terrorist attacks against Israel.⁶ The PLO found more support for a war against Israel after a Syrian revolution brought the Baathist Party to power in 1966, supported by the Soviet Union. Many PLO attacks against Israel came from Syrian territory, with vocal Soviet encouragement for the Arab “progressive revolutionary” front.⁷ Terrorist attacks against Israel spiked in 1966 and 1967, and Israel often responded with disproportional force, which created hostile conditions that contributed to the outbreak of war in June 1967.

The Middle East did not figure prominently in Johnson’s foreign policy. He was a known “friend of Israel” from his days in the Congress, but the Vietnam War, beyond all other matters, dominated Johnson’s presidency. The former Senate majority leader from Texas preferred to focus on domestic issues, and particularly the Great Society, a New Deal–inspired program that aimed to eliminate poverty and promote civil rights. But advancements on the domestic front were undercut by the worsening war in East Asia. To make matters worse, the combination of a costly war with an overly ambitious domestic reform project, along with the end of the postwar boom in the United States and a consistent unwillingness to raise taxes, altogether created an economic malaise. Economic problems were compounded by social divisiveness, as the Civil Rights Movement and anti-war protests divided the nation. The beleaguered Johnson was so embattled he did not even run for reelection in 1968. After a poor showing in the New Hampshire primary in March 1968 (which he actually won), Johnson withdrew his candidacy.

Like many Americans, LBJ felt a cultural affinity for the people of Israel.⁸ He told a B’nai B’rith meeting in 1968, “Most, if not all of you, have very deep ties with the land and with the people of Israel, as I do, for my Christian faith sprang from yours.”⁹ While he regarded Israelis as tough pioneers, he regarded Arabs as “culturally different” with experiences “alien to his own.”¹⁰ As Spiegel notes, “Johnson tended to see the Israelis fighting the Arabs as a modern-day version of the Texans struggling with the Mexicans. The analogy between the Alamo and Masada was not far below the surface.”¹¹ Cultural factors certainly undergirded Johnson’s perspective; however, as president—entrusted with executing the foreign relations of the United States—the Cold War and domestic politics weighed much more heavily on his thinking regarding weapons sales to Israel.

As more and more Soviet weaponry made its way to client states in the region, Israel requested weaponry from the United States. According to Levey, between 1955 and 1965, the Soviet Union sold Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen approximately $2 billion worth of weaponry. Egypt was the main recipient. By the beginning of 1965, Egypt had 300 combat planes, including MiG jet interceptors and Tupelov bombers; by comparison, Israel had 250 warplanes, but no bombers. In terms of tanks, Egypt enjoyed a qualitative advantage over Israel. At the beginning of 1964, Israel had 798 tanks, compared with Egypt’s 739, but 300 of Israel’s tanks were obsolete M-4 Shermans, and only 150 British-made Centurions were of relatively recent manufacture.¹²

The United States preferred that Israel purchase its weapons from Western Europe. France had served as Israel’s primary weapons supplier. Like Israel, France resented Nasser’s influence in the region. But the Israel-France relationship cooled after the French exit from Algeria, and Western Europe proved reluctant to provide Israel with more weapons.¹³

U.S. weapons sales to Israel had grown from virtually nonexistent in the 1950s to several select packages in the 1960s. During 1962, John Kennedy authorized the first sale of U.S. weaponry to Israel—the defensive HAWK antiaircraft missile systems. But Kennedy refused to sell offensive weapons, in part because of Israel’s controversial nuclear weapons program, and also to limit American involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In early 1964, Israel requested to purchase five hundred tanks from the United States to offset Soviet tanks sold to Egypt. Both the State Department and the Defense Department recognized the validity of Israel’s arms request but also warned of the political cost to U.S. relations with Arab states. Johnson agreed with the assessment and offered to help Israel “behind the scenes” to find alternate sources. Soon thereafter, Israel quietly signed agreements with Britain and West Germany for tank purchases.¹⁴

In the summer of 1964, the Kingdom of Jordan informed U.S. policymakers that unless it could purchase fighter jets from the United States, Jordan would buy MiG fighters from the Soviet Union. Naturally, Johnson did not want Jordan to develop closer relations with Moscow. And while he wanted to bolster King Hussein’s government, he did not want to furnish Jordan with weapons that could potentially be used against Israel. Hixson details how the Israel lobby worked hard to scuttle the deal, and then decided to support it so long as Israel could acquire more sophisticated weaponry from the United States.¹⁵ Thus, the arms race would accelerate because Israel would undoubtedly demand a similar deal, and Soviet client states would demand more weapons, too. Johnson promised to sell Jordan twenty F-104 jets in February 1965.

The promise of more U.S. weapons to Jordan amplified Israel’s request for weapons. To make matters worse, West Germany decided to abandon its agreement with Israel after delivering less than half of the number of promised tanks.¹⁶ Still reluctant to sell weapons to Israel directly, Johnson sent National Security Council staffer Robert Komer and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman to Israel to stress that the Jordanian package was simply to prevent a similar deal with the Soviets, and that Israel should expect no weapons sales from the United States. But the Harriman-Komer mission failed to get Israel on board with a U.S.-Jordan weapons agreement without, at least, a similar agreement with Israel.¹⁷

Cold War politics made an arms race in the Middle East unavoidable, which positioned the United States closer to Israel. To pacify the Israelis, Johnson agreed to sell the tanks promised from West Germany, which marked the first time that a U.S. president agreed to sell offensive weapons to the State of Israel. However, Israeli officials balked at this proposal, too, for being insufficient. Johnson then agreed to supply Israel with arms comparable to those it sold to Jordan, but with an understanding that it was a one-time deal; in other words, Johnson emphasized that such a sale would not set a precedent.¹⁸ Although Israeli officials continued to push for a decisive military advantage over Arab states, Johnson wanted to “turn talks away from an open-ended arms commitment.”¹⁹ Johnson agreed to supply Israel with ninety tanks by 1966, along with another one hundred tanks of superior quality to those sold to Jordan, and the promise to sell Israel twenty-four aircraft if it could not find a supplier in Western Europe.²⁰ Selling more weapons to Israel threatened to undermine U.S. claims to evenhandedness in the Middle East, but American officials were in a bind given Soviet involvement in the region.

Johnson and Congress

Johnson initially enjoyed overwhelming support from the legislative branch (and the American people) for his foreign policies. Congress had deferred to the president during the early years of the Cold War to give him enough freedom to effectively fight the Soviet Union, a dynamic often called the Imperial Presidency.²¹ But beginning in early 1966, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-AR), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, started to publicly question American involvement in Vietnam. Fulbright’s efforts would eventually lead to a full congressional assault on presidential foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford years. According to Robert David Johnson, “By the middle of 1968, a majority of Senate Democrats and a growing number of GOP senators, while not willing to advocate withdrawal from Vietnam, were sufficiently radicalized by the war to reverse their previous support for a weak legislative role in international affairs.”²²

The Johnson administration tried to limit congressional pressure. In August 1965, Komer and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy met with eleven Jewish members of the House of Representatives to offer what the administration called “an insider’s view,” in order “to reassure our Hill friends by appearing to lift the veil on our Israeli affairs on a confidential basis.” The key was secrecy. Bundy and Komer informed the congressmembers that U.S. aid to Israel, primarily economic to that point, totaled more than $1 billion and noted that “we want to convince them that we are really going all out to support Israel, so long as we can do it quietly.” The message from Bundy and Komer was this: “the more quiet … the more we can do.”²³

As with East Asia, Congress proved to be a thorn in Johnson’s side about foreign policy in the Middle East. Pressure mounted on Johnson to sell Skyhawk jets to Israel. On February 1, 1966, more than seventy-five representatives wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk to communicate their displeasure for an impending deal with Jordan without a corresponding deal for Israel.²⁴ It was no secret to the administration that Israel possessed a great deal of influence over members of Congress through lobbyists, and Komer pressed Johnson to “cope with this problem by requiring the Israelis themselves quietly to warn off their Hill lobbyists.”25 Johnson finally agreed to sell Skyhawk bomber jets to Israel that February, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara insisted that the Israelis agree to “sew up everyone in Congress to keep quiet.”²⁶

Just like the deal on tanks, President Johnson and his administration made it clear to Israeli officials that the sale of the Skyhawks was an exceptional case and constituted no change in the U.S.-Israel relationship. American officials informed the Israelis “not to bother us on planes for the next several years.”²⁷ Secretary McNamara also wanted Congress to understand that the Skyhawks sale signaled no change in U.S. arms-sales policies, and in May 1966, when speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he emphasized that the Skyhawk sale was “very restrictive.”²⁸

A few members of Congress started to press Johnson to sell weapons to Israel in order to contain communism. In September 1966, Rep. Seymour Halpern (R-NY) explained to the House floor that the PLO was amassing weapons for a war against Israel, and they had been “earmarked” by “Chinese Communists” to be “an effective instrument for revolutionary activity in this region.” Halpern submitted to the Record a letter from Congressman Glenn Cunningham (R-NE), which referenced the representatives’ letter from February 1966 that recommended strengthening Israel’s defenses, and further argued that recent developments required a reexamination of the U.S.-Israel relationship.²⁹ Rep. Lester Wolff (D-NY) spoke about tension on the Israel-Syria border and called for Americans to reaffirm their support for Israel, due largely to cultural ties between the United States and Israel, and especially because Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.³⁰

The sale of the Skyhawks did not prevent the United States from voting to censure Israel in the U.N. Security Council in November 1966. The censure came in response to Israeli military attacks on Jordan due to an increase in terrorism along the Israel-Jordan border. On November 13, an Israeli raid leveled the Jordanian border settlement of Samu, which resulted in the deaths of fifteen Jordanian soldiers, ten Israeli soldiers, and an Israeli commander; three villagers also died, along with nearly one hundred wounded. Syria had been behind the terrorist attacks, and Israel knew it. But Israel feared to attack Syria since it had just signed a defense pact with Egypt. The move against Jordan alienated King Hussein, who had been secretly collaborating with Israel, and convinced Hussein to move closer to Nasser, which he wanted to avoid.³¹

As U.S. forces were bogged down in East Asia, the Middle East appeared to be heading to another war. Terrorist border attacks on Israel, many by the Palestinian organization Fatah, with Syrian support, had significantly increased since 1965. The Israeli response was often disproportional, such as at Samu, and Israel proved to be equally responsible for the outbreak of war.³² U.S. officials believed Israel to have a decisive military advantage vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. In April 1967, McNamara related to Johnson that, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years.”³³ Under secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach reiterated this point to President Johnson in a May 1 memo, about five weeks before the outbreak of war.³⁴ Nevertheless, in May, the Johnson administration completed negotiations with Israel for one hundred armored personnel carriers (APCs), military spare parts, and other assistance that totaled $72 million.³⁵ The U.S. assessments were on point as Israel would soon demonstrate in a lightning-quick defeat of Arab militaries.

The 1967 War and the Congressional Response

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and political aftermath proved to be one of the most significant events in modern Middle East history. Nasser did not want war with Israel. In fact, prior to the 1967 war, Israel was not a central concern of the Arab world; instead, inter-Arab politics, Arab nationalism, anticolonialism, and revolutionary socialism dominated Arab politics.³⁶ Arab states pursued their own national goals, and there was no monolithic or coordinated Arab strategy vis-à-vis Israel. But the Egyptian president made provocative moves against Israel, short of outright aggression, that led to an Israeli first strike and the outbreak of war. In response to a false report from Moscow about Israeli troop movements on the Syrian border, Nasser asked U.N. Secretary General U Thant to remove the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai Peninsula that had been deployed there in the aftermath of the 1956–1957 Suez Crisis. To the surprise of many, U Thant quickly agreed to Nasser’s request, which removed the stabilizing force that had acted as a buffer between the two states. On May 22, Nasser also ordered a naval blockade against Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran, which violated the agreement reached in 1957.

Perhaps most important for American legislators, some Arab leaders—and Nasser in particular—made inflammatory comments about destroying Israel. Ernest Gruening (D-AK), for example, referenced “repeated threats by Egypt, in which it was joined by some of the Arab countries, that its intention was the liquidation of the tiny nation of Israel.”³⁷ James Scheuer (D-NY) added that Nasser “encourages Arab refugees to believe that they will destroy Israel and he arms them.”³⁸ In all likelihood, Nasser’s rhetoric aimed to generate popular support for his leadership in the Arab world and did not accurately reflect Egyptian goals. Thomas Pelly (R-WA) made a perceptive remark on May 23 when he said, “I do not know if President Nasser is engaging in psychological semantics or if his war threats to Israel are serious, but there is no doubt that his words are like striking a match on a powder keg.”³⁹

Sincere or not, Nasser’s declarations reminded many of the Holocaust and brought about legislative expressions of support for Israel. Sen. Joseph Montoya (D-NM) wondered, “Are there not some of us here who remember the death camps…. I ask any humane and fairminded man here—have the Jews not paid out enough in the blood and agony of their people?”⁴⁰ Rep. Claude Pepper (D-NY) called Nasser “Little Hitler,” and Halpern warned against a “Munich-type sellout of Israel.”⁴¹

Many members of Congress spoke of the American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival dating back to Harry Truman’s administration. In separate speeches on May 23, Senators Walter Mondale (D-MN) and Edward “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA) reminded their colleagues of the U.S. commitment to preserve the boundaries of Israel and the adjacent Arab states and to oppose the use of force in the Middle East, in line with the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, a joint declaration of the United States, Britain, and France.⁴² Wayne Morse (D-OR), for his part, added that in the Tripartite Declaration, the three major powers pledged to “come to the assistance of the party against whom aggression had been committed.”⁴³ More often than not, legislators referenced only an American commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel.

The United States, true to its special relationship with Israel, would not allow Israel to be destroyed. Sen. Joseph Clark (D-PA) spoke “to anybody in the Soviet Union … do not think that the United States of America is going to permit the Arab nations to overrun Israel.”⁴⁴ A few days later, Rep. Jack Brinkley (D-GA) extolled the historical virtues of the Hebrew people and echoed Clark: “We cannot permit Israel to be overrun.”⁴⁵ Sen. Jacob Javits (R-NY) argued that the United States had a “clear obligation and responsibility and a vital national interest in the area and in Israel.” He cited John Foster Dulles’s statement that “it is U.S. policy that the preservation of the State of Israel is a fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy.”⁴⁶ Rep. Wayne Hayes (D-OH), aware of the divisive Vietnam War, observed that an Egyptian attack on Israel would turn “a lot of the doves in this country into hawks immediately.”⁴⁷ Hayes returned to the same theme the next day and mentioned that Representatives Sidney Yates (D-IL) and Jonathan Bingham (D-NY)—two doves on Vietnam—had explained to him that one can “be a hawk with Israel and a dove with Vietnam.”⁴⁸ Gruening and Pepper each suggested a mutual defense pact with Israel.⁴⁹ Numerous additional legislators rose in vocal support of an American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival.

Israel chose war on the morning of June 5. According to William Quandt, who served in the National Security Council for Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, the Johnson administration changed its “red light” to a “yellow light,” which meant the administration would not protest an Israeli first strike.⁵⁰ In addition to the exit of UNEF and the blockade in the Straits of Tiran, Israel felt hemmed in by a collection of Arab states that called for its destruction. Also, Jordan signed a defense treaty with Egypt on the eve of war in 1967, which heightened Israel’s fears. Within hours of the first morning, the Israeli Air Force had destroyed approximately 90 percent of the Egyptian Air Force. In control of the skies, Israel proceeded to decimate the Arab armies in six days. The war ended with a cease-fire after Moscow threatened military intervention to save its allies, especially the shaky Syrian government, as Israeli forces seemed poised to strike Damascus.

The outbreak of war intensified legislative voices of support for Israel. On June 5, Rep. William Ryan (D-NY) called on the United States “to do whatever is necessary to protect Israel in this hour of crisis.”⁵¹ Fellow congressman Leonard Farbstein (D-NY) followed by arguing that “Israel represents the American presence in the Middle East.”⁵² Rep. Silvio Conte (R-MA) stated, “The commitments of the United States to uphold and safeguard the national and territorial integrity of Israel are clear. We are the moral and legal ally of Israel in defense against territorial aggressors. We must and do stand ready with unilateral military assistance in behalf of the Israelis.”⁵³ Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), among other legislators, claimed that the United States had a moral and legal obligation to defend Israel.⁵⁴ Bingham encouraged other legislators to follow his lead in giving blood to support Israel.⁵⁵ Regarding an Israeli first strike, which started the war, Javits assured the Senate and the American people, “Israel’s Prime Minister has declared that his nation has no territorial ambitions. He did not have to make that declaration. We all know that.”⁵⁶ This would become a debatable point in years to come.

President Johnson felt heavy domestic pressure to back Israel. As Hixson has argued, the Israel lobby undertook intensive efforts to elicit U.S. support from the legislative and executive branches for Israel against Nasser.⁵⁷ Prior to the war, hoping to persuade the Johnson administration to support an Israeli first strike, the Israeli government instructed its ambassador in Washington to “create a public atmosphere that will constitute pressure on the [Johnson] administration … without it being explicitly clear that we are behind this public campaign.”⁵⁸ The effort aimed to get sympathetic Americans to write letters, editorials, telegrams, and public statements to “strengthen our friends within the administration.” The pressure was so bothersome that the White House requested that the Israelis shut it down, although the Israeli ambassador reported back, “Of course we are continuing it.”⁵⁹

To the dismay of Israeli officials and Israel’s supporters in the United States, the Johnson administration tried to maintain an evenhanded position. On the first day of the war, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey communicated to the press, “We have tried to steer an even-handed course…. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.”⁶⁰ McCloskey’s statement drew the ire of many Jewish Americans.⁶¹ Later that day, Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano phoned Secretary of State Rusk to say that McCloskey’s statement was “killing us with the Jews in this country” and asked Rusk to issue a more pro-Israel statement. Rusk released a statement that blandly reaffirmed Johnson’s position of independence and territorial integrity in the Middle East.⁶² Two days later, American Jewish Zionists communicated their “sharp disillusion and dismay” to the White House.⁶³ David Ginsburg, the long-time advocate for American Jewish Zionists, pressured U.S. officials to not force an Israeli withdrawal, which Eisenhower had done during the Suez Crisis. He wrote in a memo to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, “Here I’ll add a word of my own: what was done particularly in 1956 and 1957 but since then as well, from the viewpoint of U.S. interests alone, was appalling.” Ginsburg also warned the White House, “What the Administration is saying and doing now is being watched carefully not only by the Jewish community, but by others who should be and have been close to the Administration and whose support—and advice—we need, have had, and should have again.”⁶⁴

Legislators took aim at McCloskey’s statement of neutrality and denounced it on the floors of the House and the Senate. Rep. William Scott (R-VA) stated, “The people of this country are not neutral in thought and word. Everything I hear, every expression of opinion from people in all walks of life, shows a deep concern for the preservation of the State of Israel.”⁶⁵ Senator Clark remarked, “Morally and legally we are an ally of Israel. Their cause is our cause. We are not neutral in thought, word, or deed. I am distressed by our Government’s ambiguous declaration of neutrality.”⁶⁶ Rep. Louis Wyman (R-NH) derided the Johnson administration for “flubbing the ball just at the wrong time” and for giving “the impression to the world that we are pussy footing…. We cannot possibly be neutral in the situation of Nasser versus Israel.”⁶⁷ Representative Ryan called the neutrality declaration “grotesque” and insisted that “the United States has never been ‘neutral in thought, word, and deed’ on the matter of Israel’s right to exist.”⁶⁸ For Rep. Margaret Heckler (R-MA), “Historically, we have had a close and special relationship with the State of Israel from the time of its inception. Consequently, I rise to protest against the administration’s declaration of ‘neutrality’ in this great crisis.”⁶⁹

Several legislators used a familial analogy, of an American mother to an Israeli child, to describe U.S.-Israel relations. Rep. Jacob Gilbert (D-NY), for one, regarded Israel as “the child of Western humanitarianism and U. N. diplomacy.”⁷⁰ According Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-NY), “Since its inception in 1948, Israel has been a stepchild of the United States…. If necessary, this country must defend Israel’s territorial integrity.”⁷¹ Benjamin Blackburn (R-GA) claimed that the United States “served as midwife during the birth of Israel as a free and independent nation” and, therefore, “now has a moral responsibility to protect her rights as such.”⁷² Not long after the war, Sen. Frank Church (D-ID) similarly stated that “the United States was the midwife at the birth of Israel, and the Arab countries have been determined, ever since, to kill the child.”⁷³

Some State Department officials stressed the need to continue an even-handed position and not appear biased by Israeli sympathies. Benjamin Read, the executive secretary for Rusk, informed Bundy that it was in “our national interest” to maintain “reasonably friendly relations with both Israel and the Arab states” in order to “preserve some continuing role in the development of petroleum and other resources.” Read argued that “we must avoid full commitment to either side or to any party…. Our influence is greatest if we serve as a balance, not a partisan.”⁷⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff and future National Security Advisor for Jimmy Carter, recommended that the best path would probably be “publicly defining a U.S. position that is reasonable, fair and constructive, even if initially not satisfactory to any of the belligerents.” The United States had to keep in mind “the long-range interests of the region” and not become “identified with one side alone.” Brzezinski realized, “Some Israeli resentment of the above posture is to be expected, but that is unavoidable unless the United States wishes to become fully identified with it.”⁷⁵

The war severely strained U.S.-Arab relations. During the course of the war several Arab countries—including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—broke diplomatic relations with the United States, and Arab oil-producing states unsheathed the “oil weapon” against the United States and Britain. Although the uncoordinated attempt failed to influence either American or British policy, the effort provided the groundwork for a future oil embargo, with much greater impact, in 1973. According to an intelligence memorandum, “the course of the present Arab-Israeli crisis has already done considerable damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world. Most Arabs believe the U.S. is the staunch ally of Israel and can in effect control its actions.”⁷⁶ Even further, “the damage to the U.S. position in the area already appears serious.”⁷⁷

Not even an Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, an American spy ship in the Mediterranean, lessened support for Israel. On June 8, Israeli aircraft struck the Liberty with rockets and napalm, followed by boat-launched torpedoes, which killed 34 crewmembers and wounded 171. Israeli officials insisted the attack was a result of mistaken identity, believing the ship to be Egyptian. But Liberty crewmen had notified Israeli forces that they were Americans, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) headquarters had identified the Liberty only several hours before. Many Americans never accepted the Israeli explanation and felt the attack was a deliberate attempt to prevent American monitoring of a potential Israeli attack on Syria or Israeli executions of Egyptian captives, or to keep the Liberty from jamming Israeli communications.⁷⁸

Little was said on the House and Senate floors about the controversial attack. Rep. Roman Pucinski (D-IL) and Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-NY) both called the attack on the Liberty a “tragic mistake,” and Pucinski and Senator Javits noted that Israel had already apologized for the attack.⁷⁹ Javits excused the apparent mishap: “I have heard Senator after Senator say that while they were terribly dismayed and saddened by this accident, they understood how it could take place under the terrible stress which the forces of Israel have been under in these last few weeks.”⁸⁰ Almost two months later, John Tower (R-TX) submitted a resolution from the American Legion Post 52 of Houston that denounced the “unprovoked attack” and aimed “to see that those Israel officials or personnel who were responsible for the attacks be punished in keeping with their participation and in keeping with the enormity of their criminal acts.”⁸¹ Israel paid millions of dollars in compensation, but no Israeli was ever blamed or punished.⁸² Rep. Harold Royce (H. R.) Gross (R-IA) wondered, based on reports that the U.S. government had made $27 million available to Israel for food and other supplies, if the United States was subsidizing Israel’s “payment of full compensation for the lives that were destroyed, the suffering of the wounded, and the damage from this wanton attack.”⁸³

Legislators broadly supported Israeli occupation of Arab lands taken during the war. Representative Pucinski, with the aftermath of the 1956 war in mind, did not want to “again rob Israel of the gains she has won on the hard-fought fields of battle.”⁸⁴ Rep. Robert Sikes (D-FL) went further than Pucinski. Sikes suggested that Israel “simply annex” the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula “and eliminate future problems.” For Sikes, the move would have biblical implications as Israel “would then control, essentially, the Jewish homeland.” Sikes closed with a contestable point: “Had we and our allies kept hands off in 1956, the situation could have been solved permanently at that time.”⁸⁵ Rep. Donald Clausen (R-CA), who also used a religious allusion, believed “Israel was ‘sinned’ against … and is entitled to retain whatever gains she has made in the interim.”⁸⁶ Rep. Alphonzo Bell (R-CA) supported Israeli occupation and predicted that Israel “will prove herself to be a magnanimous victor, but this magnanimity must be allowed to be voluntary.”⁸⁷ Representatives Ogden Reid (R-NY) and Floyd Hicks (D-WA) stressed the need to not repeat the perceived mistake of 1956–1957.⁸⁸

Some legislators made the specific connection between Israeli occupation of Arab lands and a diplomatic plan to secure a lasting peace in the region. A poll conducted by the Associated Press revealed that 365 out of 438 responses from legislators “were opposed to withdrawal without peace.”⁸⁹ Rep. Thomas Morris (D-NM) wanted Israel to keep the territories to secure its “right to live in peace with her neighbors.”⁹⁰ Halpern followed, “If the Arabs expect Israel to leave the territory she has won, then Israel is entitled to a treaty of peace, signed by the Arabs.”⁹¹ Rep. James Corman (D-CA) argued, “The Arab world must accept the permanency of the State of Israel,” and therefore he wanted “no attempt” by the United Nations or the United States to force an Israeli withdrawal.⁹² Senator Mondale stressed that “there must be no return to a quasi-permanent supervised military standoff between Israel and the Arab nations…. We must reinforce our historic commitment to the existence and permanence of the State of Israel.”⁹³ Rep. William Widnall (R-NJ) called for U.S. support “of the present lines” until Israel received recognition and peace.⁹⁴ Halpern reiterated his earlier point: “No withdrawal can be expected of Israel without … peace and stability.” He also mocked the State Department’s neutrality statement and wondered, “Is our Government going to heed our voices, the voices of the vast majority of the American people? Or are we going to crawl back into the State Department shells and let the striped-pants boys continue to guide U.S. policy.”⁹⁵ Indeed, Congress stood solidly behind Israel’s occupation of Arab lands until its neighbors offered recognition and peace.

But Israel wanted land more than it wanted peace. According to Avi Raz, Israel did not genuinely seek peace with its Arab neighbors after the war. The Israeli cabinet developed a June 19 peace plan that would have returned the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula in return for peace agreements with Syria and Egypt. But the “generous peace offer” was never communicated to the Arab states. Instead, Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Abba Eban, perpetuated the myth of such an offer to secure U.S. support against a Soviet measure at the United Nations that called for an immediate Israeli withdrawal.⁹⁶ According to Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, in the wake of the war, Israel started to construct settlements in the occupied territories, which Israeli officials claimed were reversible military outposts and not civilian in nature. This deception aimed to provide cover from international pressure during a vulnerable period of civilian settlement construction. The Johnson administration, distracted by the Vietnam War, failed to offer any substantial resistance to the settlement construction and missed an early opportunity to shut down Israel’s efforts to create “facts on the ground.” Israel would continue to build more and more settlements in the occupied territories in the years and decades to follow, which added a major obstacle to peace efforts and fulfillment of a two-state solution.⁹⁷

Legislators did not demand the return of Arab territory; however, a few voices cautioned against indefinite Israeli occupation. On the second day of the war, Representative Hayes reasoned that “if we are going to maintain the territorial integrity of all the states out there in the Middle East, we will possibly have to get in against Israel.”⁹⁸ After the war, Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX) pointed out that “Israel has every right to demand security, no right to demand spoils.”⁹⁹ Representatives Pucinski and Ray Madden (D-IN) both criticized the Soviet Union for demanding an Israeli withdrawal, given its occupation of Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁰

Numerous legislators stressed the need to address the grievances of Palestinian refugees. On June 8, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV) hoped that “some headway can be made in the Arab refugee problems, which have long been the source of deep irritation.” Senator Javits, known for his pro-Israel orientation, followed by agreeing with his colleague. According to Javits, an acceptable settlement “includes the Palestinian and Arab refugees…. Israel is not going to like this. We know that. There are some things that Israel may have to do which it finds especially distasteful, especially after such an enormous victory at arms. We must, however, bring about an end to this situation.”¹⁰¹ Sen. Edward Brooke (R-MA) called for “Israel and Arab nations” to “be more flexible in their refugee resettlement policies.”¹⁰² According to Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI), “The refugee shame must be liquidated once and for all. It is a crime against humanity to incarcerate a million people for 20 years simply as pawns in an international political disagreement.” Pell, however, failed to mention Israel’s role in the ongoing refugee crisis and placed the onus of responsibility squarely on Arab states, saying, “I believe this problem could have been resolved by the Arab nations if they had really desired to do so.”¹⁰³ Several other legislators agreed with the need to address Palestinian grievances, such as Senator Mondale and Representatives Wright, Ryan, and Paul Fino (R-NY).

Legislators felt far less sympathy for Egypt or Jordan, and some questioned the U.S. policy of trying to remain friendly with Arab states that threatened to destroy Israel. In a lengthy speech on June 26, Senator Church called Johnson’s “arsenal diplomacy” in the Middle East a “failure.” He noted that Jordanian arms from the United States had been used in a war against Israel and questioned the “policy which assumes that we can exercise a restraining influence by judicious distribution of our weapons.” For Church, the June war demonstrated that the “misguided attempt to prevent ‘polarization’ of western arms in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab hands, and still keep on friendly terms with both sides, called for omniscient qualities of judgment which our Defense officials, or indeed any mortals, do not possess.”¹⁰⁴ Senator Gruening picked up where Church left off. He questioned the broader American policy of pressing “our aid on nations whose policies were antagonistic to ours,” which he called “an extremely shortsighted policy…. In all history no nation has ever squandered so much on so many.” He also noted that U.S. arms to Jordan “got there just in time to enable Jordan to embrace Nasser.”¹⁰⁵ Gruening continued his attack on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East the following day in an even longer speech. Comparing the situation to Munich, he said, “The United States sought to appease those nations bent on the destruction of Israel. The policy of appeasement failed.”¹⁰⁶ Johnson’s efforts to balance weapons sales and still protect Israel, or to avoid an arms race in the Middle East altogether, had both foundered, which must have made it easier for the president to support Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

The Johnson administration determined, in opposition to Eisenhower’s policy in 1957, that Israel did not need to vacate the occupied territories. In 1957, numerous legislators (most notably, then-Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson) disagreed with Eisenhower’s decision to push Israel out of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Ten years later, the Johnson administration encouraged a land-for-peace arrangement, whereby Arab states would make peace with Israel in exchange for the return of Arab territories. The move received overwhelming approval from Congress.

The land-for-peace formula signaled a major transformation of U.S. policy. Rather than pressure Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, Johnson released his “Five Principles” for peace on June 19: the right to national life, justice for the refugees, free maritime passage, limits on the arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all. Despite Johnson’s fifth principle, the administration did not honor its pledge to protect the territorial integrity of Arab states. Rather than preserve existing boundaries in line with the Tripartite Declaration, Johnson decided to support altered boundaries in order to pressure Arab states to make peace with Israel. The reasoning was simple. The armistice agreements of 1949 failed to bring about peace, and so did Eisenhower’s policy of forced Israeli removal. The volatile region seemed combustible, and the situation demanded a new approach that could lead to a lasting peace. Otherwise, another war could lead to superpower confrontation, maybe even nuclear warfare, and perhaps the annihilation of Jews in the Middle East. But by tying land to peace, Johnson also tied an American special commitment to ensure Israel’s survival to support of Israeli occupation of Arab lands until peace could be achieved. From that point, the two became inseparable.

The war demonstrated that Israel could effectively employ military force against its neighbors, which supported the conclusion that, with ample weaponry, Israel could defend itself until the Arab states agreed to make peace. But additional U.S. military sales to Israel did not happen immediately after the war. President Johnson had ordered an embargo on new U.S. arms shipments to the Middle East once the fighting started. He hoped the Soviets would reciprocate, but Washington again found Moscow uninterested in arms restraint.¹⁰⁷ French President Charles de Gaulle ordered an embargo on weapons sales to Israel after its preemptive strike, which ended the Israel-France weapons arrangement and left Israel without a major supplier of weaponry.

Congress pushed for more weapons sales to Israel. On August 1, Representative Sikes claimed that “efforts to put a brake on the sale of American military equipment abroad” negatively impacted Israel. Referring to Israel as “the only friend we have left in the Middle East,” Sikes called on the United States to fill the void left by France to challenge “Arab forces” that were “being resupplied rapidly by the Russians.”¹⁰⁸ Senator Tower also argued for selling more weapons to Israel. He wondered, “Mr. President are we to leave Israel to the tender mercies of the dictatorial designs of Nasser over all the Middle East as a pawn of the Soviet Union?” He added that the Soviet Union was “dumping arms back into the United Arab Republic just as fast as they can. Already they have replaced half the equipment the Arab States lost in the Arab-Israel war.”¹⁰⁹

Congress debated restricting arms sales, especially to Arab states, in order to prevent a global arms race. Legislators considered an amendment to limit the credit resources of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, which could be used by less developed countries to finance arms sales, including certain Arab states, such as Jordan. (The purpose of the credit financing was to assist in economic development, but it was also used for military purchases.) Sen. Daniel Brewster (D-MD) “was shocked to learn that almost 36 percent of all Export-Import loans this year went for the purchase of American armaments.” He also added that credit financing helped Jordan to “wage war on her declared enemy, Israel.”¹¹⁰ Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), who supported large defense contracts to create jobs for Boeing in his home state, urged rejection of the amendment, which, he said, “would unduly and dangerously tie the hands of the President … in the conduct of foreign policy.” He recognized that the amendment would not deny Israel assistance in the future but that it may be in the “national interest” of both the United States and Israel “that certain assistance be given to certain developing countries in the Middle East.”¹¹¹ Rep. Joshua Eilberg (D-PA) supported an amendment to restrict the training of certain foreign nationals and wondered why the United States trained pilots and military personnel from Arab states that severed relations and aimed to destroy Israel. Representative Ryan sought to eliminate all assistance to Egypt and “other Arab nations which have waged war against Israel.” He supported a different amendment to enable “Congress to end this bankrupt policy which is so detrimental to peace in the Middle East.”¹¹²

Some legislators wanted to prevent a global arms race but also wanted to provide for Israel’s defense. Gruening called on “the United States to take leadership in the world in stopping the arms race.” Although U.S. officials aimed to use weapons sales to contain communism, Gruening pointed out that U.S. tanks to Jordan, justified by containment, were used against Israel, a noncommunist country.¹¹³ Representative Sikes pushed for more weapons for Israel and warned that limiting arms sales to foreign countries would potentially hurt “the best friend we have in the Middle East.” He believed Israel to be “seriously, almost desperately, in need of aircraft and spares.” He also noted that airpower had been the decisive factor in the recent war and argued in support of more aircraft for Israel.¹¹⁴ Emmanuel Celler (D-NY), in his twenty-third term and the most senior member of the House (Dean of the House), worried that an existing amendment to eliminate a proposed program that would have granted new authority to the president to finance arms sales might “militate against our desire to supply Israel properly with arms…. it would be tragic indeed if Israel could not forfend against her Arab neighbors who are bent upon plunging her into the sea.”¹¹⁵ Representatives Bingham, Ryan, and John Dow (D-NY) all assured Celler that Israel would not be affected. Bingham said, “There are plenty of ways for us to supply Israel with all necessary arms,” and Ryan added that he wanted to eliminate a “new blank check authority” that “may be used to arm Israel’s eternal enemies.” The House passed the amendment.¹¹⁶

As Congress encouraged a one-sided U.S. policy in the Middle East, the prospect for peace seemed to take a negative turn. On September 1, the heads of thirteen Arab states released the Khartoum Declaration, which famously declared the three “No’s”—no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. The declaration came about six weeks after Arab states refused to accept a joint U.S.-Soviet draft resolution that called for Israel to withdraw “without delay” in return for nonbelligerency. The Arab states, according to Spiegel, “flatly rejected it,” and Quandt explains that “radical Arab objections to provisions calling for an end of war with Israel” led to the rejection.¹¹⁷ Israel also opposed the U.S.-Soviet resolution because it did not call for direct negotiations, did not mention Israel by name, and included only vague arrangements for peace.¹¹⁸ Israel was determined not to withdraw to previous lines without guarantees of peace—precisely what had happened with the Suez Crisis only ten years before. U.S. policy had already evolved to a point that peace with Israel must happen before the return of Arab territories; therefore, the Khartoum Declaration, which denied both formal recognition and a peace treaty, portended even worse U.S.-Arab relations.

Similar to Nasser’s saber-rattling before the war, the Khartoum Declaration should not be taken at face value. According to Avi Shlaim, the Arab heads of state were prepared to recognize Israel as a state, though short of legal de jure recognition; were willing to negotiate with Israel through a third party, though not directly; and were willing to move to a state of peace short of a formal peace treaty. According to King Hussein of Jordan, Nasser encouraged him to “speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a peace.” Shlaim notes that Khartoum was a victory for moderate Arabs who wanted a political rather than military solution, and that the meeting marked “a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel.”¹¹⁹ Israeli leaders intentionally misrepresented Khartoum in order to justify their own hard line.¹²⁰

According to U.S. documents, U.S. and Israeli officials clearly recognized the apparent moderation of Khartoum but doubted the sincerity of an Arab change of heart. On September 25, Johnson sent a letter to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that stated, “I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation.” But Johnson also added that the Arab position “states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs may be willing to do.” He welcomed the decision to move from a military to a political solution but questioned the Arab insistence on belligerency if they really hoped for a peaceful resolution.¹²¹ The State Department reiterated Johnson’s position on Khartoum in a telegram to Jordan a few days later.¹²² Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, told Adan Pachachi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, “that it was difficult indeed for us to encourage the Israelis or anyone else to believe the Arabs wanted a political settlement when statements continued to emanate from Arab countries indicating the war would go on.”¹²³ Battle told Israeli Ambassador Abraham Harman that “reports of growing moderateness after Khartoum have so far not been borne out by any concrete Arab steps.”¹²⁴

As Arab states searched for some way to secure a political agreement, Israeli flexibility diminished. Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told President Johnson that there were “some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, and some signs of hardening in the Israeli camp.” Goldberg cited “serious internal problems” in Israel, likely meaning a euphoric public mood following the dramatic victory, which made it “difficult for any Israeli spokesman to be ‘sweetly reasonable.’”¹²⁵ Eugene Rostow noted that “accepted wisdom” held that “the Israeli position is ‘hardening.’”¹²⁶ Battle questioned Harman about the announced establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and on the Syrian border. He advised the Israeli ambassador to “not provide ammunition for those at U.N. who would interpret” the Israeli “position as hardening in direction of territorial acquisition rather than negotiated settlement.”¹²⁷ Secretary of State Rusk, when talking about territorial withdrawal in the Middle East, told Johnson, “In my opinion we are going to have to wrestle with Israel.”¹²⁸

The Johnson administration could not mesh a commitment to territorial integrity for all states in the Middle East with a policy of protecting Israeli occupation until Arab states made peace. In response to Arab ambassadors’ questions about territorial integrity, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wrote Johnson, “Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace.” But even with “an honest peace settlement,” Rostow recognized that pushing “Israel back to 4 June borders … could lead to a tangle with the Israelis.”¹²⁹ King Hussein sent President Johnson a letter in early October, which noted that Khartoum reflected Arab flexibility, and that even Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal was possible if Israel would redress wrongs done to Palestinians since 1948. Hussein expressed his “deep hurt” by what he regarded as a “basic pro-Israel position” of the United States. He lamented the “double standard” applied to Arabs and Israelis regarding territorial integrity.¹³⁰ The Jordanian ambassador, Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, also communicated to Johnson an Arab frustration with an American double standard regarding territorial integrity. According to Harold Saunders’s notes from the meeting, “The Arab governments feel they have a right to expect the Government of the United States to honor that pledge. They have been deeply hurt that we have not.” Johnson responded that “we continue to support strongly the principle of territorial integrity but that the problem of putting that support in practice was a difficult one which we had not yet solved.”¹³¹ Also in the spirit of compromise, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad admitted to U.S. officials that Egypt’s calls for the destruction of Israel had been a “mistake” and that Egypt did not challenge “Israel’s right to exist.” Rather, the main problem was refugees.¹³²

The administration’s perception of the U.S.-Israel relationship continued to evolve. According to Saunders’s notes of a conversation with Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron, Israel wanted new weapons sales connected to a strategic alliance. Evron asked that the Johnson administration treat Israelis “as close friends … rather than treating them like bazaar hagglers.” Evron recommended that the administration not try to exact any conditions for the sale of additional aircraft but to instead tell Israel through an informal channel “that we were doing this at some political cost and would therefore expect something from them in return.” By implication, Evron suggested the United States and Israel develop a strategic alliance in addition to a special relationship. Saunders made an insightful remark: “This strikes once again at the heart of our relationship with Israel. The Israelis always tried to get close to us and to build the kind of relationship we have with the British. We have—at least at the professional level of our government—kept them at arms length, and they have been deeply hurt. Evron and I have discussed this aspect of our relationship before, and it’s no surprise that he sees here a chance for a new start.” Saunders added that before the June war, the argument against more arms deals with Israel had nothing to do with dollars or armored personnel carriers—“the real argument was over what kind of relationship we should have with Israel.” Saunders added, “I’m tempted to take the risk Evron suggests … the real leverage we have is not a specific number of aircraft but our total relationship.”¹³³

As the administration considered the next step in U.S.-Israel relations, a few legislators challenged Johnson’s arms embargo that held up the delivery of the Skyhawks purchased in 1966. On September 21, Donald Rumsfeld, a Republican representative from Illinois and future Secretary of Defense for Gerald Ford and George W. Bush, cautioned the administration against putting pressure on Israel by threatening to withhold arms. He noted that the Soviets had already resupplied their client states and that France refused to sell more aircraft to Israel. Rumsfeld was worried “that the U.S. position might be based on a desire to exert pressure on the Israelis to withdraw,” which Rumsfeld called “most unwise.” He further argued that it was “imprudent” to put “pressure on Israel by denying her the needed capability to deter further aggression.”¹³⁴ Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-CA) reminded his colleagues that Congress is “charged with the responsibility for overseeing our foreign policy,” and he blasted the administration for providing disproportionate arms sales to Arab states. He noted with disdain McCloskey’s June 5 statement that the United States was “neutral in thought, word, and deed.” Wilson wanted to “junk our policy of restricting arms sales to Israel” and to immediately approve the delivery of Skyhawks.¹³⁵ Congressman Joel Broyhill (R-VA), similar to Rumsfeld, worried “that the planes are being withheld to obtain bargaining leverage to force Israeli concessions.” In his speech to a Virginia Lodge of B’nai B’rith, Broyhill vowed to “urge, with every bit of persuasion at my command, that these planes be released.”¹³⁶ Representative Halpern called for the delivery of the Skyhawks and complained that “the Department of State is using the Congress as an excuse” for not honoring the sale of Skyhawks to Israel. (He pointed out that congressional concern had been about the financing of arms sales to Arabs and in no way meant “to obstruct the arming of Israel.”)¹³⁷

Johnson wanted to release the Skyhawks to Israel, but he also wanted to resume arms shipments to moderate Arab states. On October 9, Walt Rostow informed Johnson that Israeli officials were “deeply suspicious—despite our contrary assurances—that our freezing past aid means we’re going to use it as leverage to force them to terms with Arabs. They well remember 1956–57 when we froze their assets here and then forced them back to the armistice lines.” Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted to continue the freeze, not to pressure Israel, but to avoid upsetting legislators on the issue of military credit sales.¹³⁸ However, as noted above, Representative Halpern obviously disagreed with the administration’s position on the matter. By October 12, the administration had determined to resume shipments to Israel and planned for the delivery of the Skyhawks to begin in December; McNamara sent a letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban to that effect.¹³⁹ But the administration also indicated that arms shipments would resume to moderate Arab states. Walt Rostow told Evron “that it would be impossible for the U.S. to have an Israel policy without a Middle East policy.” Evron agreed and added, “If we are to work together, as we must, on issues like Middle East arms supply, we ought to try to work out a more lucid common strategy for the whole region.”¹⁴⁰ Here again, Evron pushed for a stronger strategic relationship between the two countries. But for domestic political reasons, Israeli officials could not formally approve of the U.S. decision to resume arms shipments to Arab states. Therefore, on October 18, McNamara decided with Israeli ambassador Harman that Israel would not respond to McNamara’s letter to Eban, and instead, the two sides informally agreed to the arrangement.¹⁴¹

Before the administration formally announced its decision to lift the arms embargo, another violent event in the Middle East hastened congressional calls for more arms to Israel. On October 21, Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat. An Egyptian boat within the harbor at Port Said, armed with Soviet missiles, fired upon and ultimately sank the Eilat, which had been in international waters approximately ten miles from the harbor. The attack was in response to a July attack by the Eilat on Egyptian boats that happened within Egyptian waters. Several Republican representatives voiced their Cold War concerns about Soviet activity in the Middle East. Bob Wilson (R-CA) believed the Soviets were testing the United States, since they had rearmed their Arab allies “without the United States keeping its commitment to sell a limited number of military jets to Israel.”¹⁴² Like Wilson, Edward Gurney (R-FL) was disturbed by the use of sophisticated Soviet weaponry as the sinking of the Eilat was “the first time in history that this type of radar missile has been used to sink a ship of any flag.” Gurney found it “inconceivable” that the Johnson administration “is reneging on its commitment to Israel…. By withholding this sale of jets to Israel … we are encouraging further Communist Russia intervention into the Middle East.”¹⁴³ By October 25, the administration had announced the lifting of the arms embargo, which pleased Bingham, who added his satisfaction for the administration’s decision during his denunciation of the Eilat attack.¹⁴⁴ James Fulton (R-PA) went even further. In addition to delivery of Skyhawks, he called on the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution to give “Israel at once, a late series destroyer to replace the Israel destroyer.”¹⁴⁵ Representative Farbstein, a New York Democrat, echoed the call for a replacement of the Eilat.146 Surprisingly, perhaps, representatives and senators voiced more concern on the House and Senate floors with Egypt’s attack on the Israeli Eilat than with Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty.

While Soviet weapons threatened Israel in the Middle East, reports surfaced that Moscow had taken measures to oppress Jews living in the Soviet Union by placing restrictions on emigration. Speaker of the House John McCormack (D-MA) reported that Soviet treatment of Jews worsened after the June war, and that in August “the Soviet government barred the emigration of some 6,000 Soviet Jews to Israel.” McCormack added that “Soviet authorities” were pressuring “Soviet satellite countries in Europe to do likewise.”¹⁴⁷ (In the years to follow, the Soviet Union would place greater restrictions on emigration, which prompted further congressional action—the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.)

Finally, in November, after months of negotiations, the U.N. Security Council agreed to Resolution 242, which called on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the conflict in return for peace agreements. The resolution formalized the land-for-peace framework as the basis for the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, the resolution failed to mention the Palestinians by name, and unfortunately their plight would often be overlooked in the peace process. At the time, no serious discussion was devoted to a two-state solution. Moreover, Israel fought hard to remove the word “the” from the phrase: “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from [the] territories occupied in the recent conflict.” In doing so, the resolution failed to firmly articulate which territories should be evacuated by Israel’s forces. The Israeli interpretation held that Israel did not have to leave all of the territories, and that the ambiguity of 242 provided room for negotiations; the Arab interpretation held that Israel had to leave all of the territories, not just some of them, which made negotiations much less essential to the process. Thus Gunnar Jarring, the diplomat appointed by the United Nations to facilitate peace negotiations, faced the unenviable task of trying to build agreements on an intentionally vague resolution. All the while, the United States and the Soviet Union sent more weapons to the region for purposes of the Cold War.

Phantom Feud

Johnson’s foreign and domestic problems came to a head in 1968, and an increasingly assertive Congress pushed Johnson to move closer to Israel with another major weapons sale—Phantom jets. After the weapons embargo was lifted, Israel requested twenty-seven more Skyhawks and fifty Phantom jets.¹⁴⁸ With supersonic speed, radar-guided missiles, and the potential to deliver a nuclear weapon, the Phantoms were far more sophisticated than the Skyhawks. The State Department opposed the sale in the hopes of advancing armslimitation agreements and repairing the damage done to U.S.-Arab relations during the recent war. The Joint Chiefs opposed the sale because, according to analyses, Israel did not need the Phantoms. The Defense Department did not necessarily oppose the sale, as long as moderate Arab regimes also received arms.¹⁴⁹ Johnson again proved reluctant to sell weapons to Israel. He hoped to avoid a strategic alliance with Israel, and selling Phantoms would further alienate Arab states. Johnson also wanted to support the efforts of Jarring, and selling the Phantoms would undercut his peace efforts. As Bard notes, “No decision was reached during the remainder of the year [1967], despite a deluge of letters from congressmen urging the president to sell airplanes to Israel.”¹⁵⁰

Johnson met with Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol at his Texas ranch in January 1968 to discuss U.S.-Israel relations. Johnson insisted that Israel enjoyed a position of strength and would be wise to pursue a peace program with its neighbors, rather than an arms program with the United States. Johnson told Eshkol bluntly, “Phantoms won’t determine security. Planes won’t change things that basically. The big problem is how 2–1/2 million Jews can live in a sea of Arabs.”¹⁵¹ Johnson also mentioned the stiff congressional resistance to recent military-assistance programs due to Vietnam, suggesting that if Israel hoped to get the Phantoms, Israelis needed to cultivate congressional support.¹⁵² The following day Johnson reiterated that the pursuit of peace, not weapons sales, would drive U.S. policymaking. He wanted to provide the Israeli Air Force with necessary equipment but stressed the importance of Jarring’s efforts to negotiate peace agreements, along with the need to reach an agreement with the Soviets on the arms race.¹⁵³ Selling Phantoms would hinder, rather than advance, both of those goals. The Johnson administration hoped to use the Phantoms as leverage to ensure Israel’s best efforts to reach peace agreements.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Johnson agreed to put fifty planes in the production line in case an arms agreement with Moscow could not be reached.¹⁵⁵

For Johnson, the decision to sell Phantoms to Israel had much more to do with a moral commitment to ensure Israel’s survival than with any strategic alliance between the two countries. On March 24, Johnson intimated to Arthur Goldberg that he felt compelled to sell the Phantoms because the Soviets would not agree to arms control. Johnson worried that Israel would be crushed by Soviet weaponry without American military assistance. He told Goldberg, “They don’t know when they’re going to be run over; they don’t know when they’re going to die; they don’t know when those goddamn Russians are going to come in there. They don’t know anything.”¹⁵⁶ A week later, overwhelmed by the Vietnam War and domestic divisiveness, the embattled Johnson became a “lame duck” president as he declared he would not seek reelection.

Administration officials stressed the need to link weapons sales to peace talks and nuclear nonproliferation. According to Quandt, “some” administration officials “felt that Israel should be asked to agree to the principle of full withdrawal in the context of peace in exchange for the jets. Others, fearful of Israeli nuclear development, argued that Israel should be required to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before receiving U.S. arms.” Although Israel would not publicly acknowledge possessing any nuclear weapons, Israeli representatives assured U.S. officials that Israel would not be the first Middle East country to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the region. The United States never reached a quid pro quo with Israel regarding nuclear nonproliferation and weapons sales.¹⁵⁷

Congress offered solid backing for the sale of Phantoms to Israel, hopefully (though not necessarily) in the context of peace agreements in the Middle East. During an election year, some Republicans challenged Democrats over their pro-Israel credentials. Representative Widnall pointed out several times in a speech to the House floor, “It was not a Republican administration” that withheld jet sales to Israel to counterbalance Soviet MiGs going to Egypt, or provided secret arms financing to Arab states, or sent fighter jets to Jordan.¹⁵⁸ Rep. S. Fletcher Thompson (R-GA) called the U.S. policy of providing jets to Jordan “idiotic” and insisted on more weapons sales to Israel, particularly fighter jets.¹⁵⁹ Democratic representative Farbstein noted the ever-increasing numbers of Soviet weapons being sent to Egypt, including ground-to-ground missiles, and urged the government to sell Israel enough planes “to deter the Arab States and their Russian masters from starting hostilities.”¹⁶⁰

The State of Israel and pro-Israel forces in the United States undertook efforts to pressure Johnson into selling the Phantoms. Israel sent Yitzhak Rabin, former chief of staff (and future prime minister), as ambassador to Washington to advance the Israeli position with American officials. According to Spiegel, “In the Jewish community, every major organization stressed the importance of the jets in its political or educational activities (depending on the nature of the group).”¹⁶¹ Non-Jewish organizations, like the AFL-CIO, Democratic Action, and the American Legion, also endorsed the sale.¹⁶² But according to Bard, Johnson was especially irritated by pro-Israel lobbyists who pushed for weapons sales to Israel but failed to support the administration on Vietnam, which made him less inclined to sell the Phantoms.¹⁶³

Congress tried to force the sale of Phantoms through legislation. In April, Rep. Bertram Podell (D-NY), in coordination with AIPAC, introduced a “sense of the House” resolution favoring the sale.¹⁶⁴ While not a binding piece of legislation, a sense of the House seeks to demonstrate general support for a certain measure. Ultimately, more than one hundred representatives and a few senators either signed or voiced support for the resolution.¹⁶⁵ In June, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) “threatened to kill the military sales bill if the president did not deliver the Phantoms,” though Symington’s motivation for the sale was likely due to the fact that they would be built in his home state.¹⁶⁶ The following month, Representative Wolff offered an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 that ordered the president to sell fifty Phantoms to Israel and replace losses suffered in the 1967 war. The Wolff amendment, after numerous representatives rose in support, cleared the House as part of the Foreign Aid Bill of 1968.¹⁶⁷

Unlike Podell’s resolution from April, Wolff’s amendment did not have the backing of AIPAC because the legislation would have intruded too much on the president’s right to conduct foreign relations. I. L. Kenen, head of AIPAC, informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a resolution like Podell’s that expressed the “sense of the Congress” would be sufficient.¹⁶⁸ According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “AIPAC generally followed ‘Kenen’s Rules’ to advance Israel’s cause. Rule No. 1 was: ‘Get behind legislation; don’t step out in front of it (that is, keep a low profile).’”¹⁶⁹ Senator Church offered a substitute amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill that indicated congressional support for sale of the Phantoms, which passed the Senate on July 31.¹⁷⁰ Senator Javits urged President Johnson to take note of the section of the bill that called for immediate negotiations for the sale of supersonic jets to Israel as a deterrent force against future aggression.¹⁷¹

The Phantoms became an issue leading up to the 1968 presidential election. AIPAC, more commonly associated with lobbying the legislative branch than the executive branch, secured statements of support for the sale from the major presidential candidates and worked to get favorable planks at each party convention in 1968.¹⁷² Presidential hopefuls Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey trumpeted their support for the sale while speaking at the B’nai B’rith convention in Washington on September 8. President Johnson spoke after the two candidates and shifted the discussion to the need for an arms-limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. The next day both Nixon and Humphrey reasserted their positions, and Humphrey claimed the sale of Phantoms was “now a necessity.”¹⁷³

Congress displayed strong, bipartisan support for the sale.¹⁷⁴ After rumor spread that the administration was leaning against it, Hugh Scott (R-PA) read on the Senate floor part of a letter he had just sent President Johnson that restated his repeated calls for the sale of the Phantoms. Scott also suggested his close relationship with AIPAC when he claimed to be “responsible in large measure for the language in the 1968 Republican platform which urged that the United States provide supersonic jets to Israel.”¹⁷⁵ Rep. Jacob Gilbert (D-NY) called for the sale of fifty Phantoms to Israel to restore the balance of power; Rep. Ovie Clark “O. C.” Fisher (D-TX) wanted the U.S. government “to provide Israel with the arms that it needs for its own defense”; and Representative Blackburn went so far as to write a letter to Johnson to explain that even though he voted against the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, he still wanted Johnson to sell the planes to Israel.¹⁷⁶ Representative Podell criticized the State Department for not recommending the sale and pointed out, “Both Houses of Congress believe that Phantom jets should be sold to Israel. The major party candidates for President are in full agreement on this policy. The failure to agree to this sale brings joy only to the Arab States and to the Soviet Union.”¹⁷⁷ Additional remarks in support of the bill came from Representatives Pelly, Bell Jr., Richard McCarthy (D-NY), and Senator Javits.¹⁷⁸

Opposition to the sale from within the administration started to soften due to Soviet aggression and congressional assertiveness. Previously, bureaucratic officials believed that Israel’s forces were already superior; that selling the Phantoms would harm diplomatic relations with Arab states; that the sale would undermine Jarring’s peace efforts; and that Israel should agree to nuclear nonproliferation as a precondition.¹⁷⁹ But ongoing efforts to reach an arms-control agreement with Moscow again came to naught.¹⁸⁰ The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August signaled Moscow’s willingness to employ its military power, and the failure to reach an arms agreement in the Middle East compounded American concerns about Soviet machinations. Secretary of State Rusk ultimately concluded that the Phantom deal “is the most we can get away with in the light of the action of the Congress.”¹⁸¹

The congressional message to the president was received. When Johnson signed the Foreign Assistance Act in October, he “announced that he had taken note of the section concerning the sale of airplanes to Israel, and was asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with Israel.”¹⁸² Legislators happily noted the cooperation of the two branches in foreign policy decision-making. Sen. Clifford Case (R-NJ) applauded Johnson’s “prompt response to the request by Congress,” while Rep. Bill Roth (R-DE) noted with satisfaction how the president had responded to “Congress’ mandate” and started negotiations with Israel. Farbstein congratulated the president and stated his belief that “the action of the Congress in recommending the sale of Phantom jets to Israel carried great weight with President Johnson in coming to his conclusion.”¹⁸³ While congressional insistence likely influenced the president’s decision to agree to the sale, Johnson, a consummate politician, undoubtedly recognized that the announcement of the sale of Phantoms would help Vice President Humphrey in the upcoming presidential election.¹⁸⁴

Johnson agreed to sell fifty Phantoms in December 1968, with sixteen to be delivered in late 1969 and another thirty-four in 1970.¹⁸⁵ President-elect Nixon was left with the task of delivering the Phantoms to Israel, as well as dealing with more Israeli requests for additional weapons sales, supported by an increasingly combative Congress. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke observed, “We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel’s security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States.”¹⁸⁶ After the Phantom sale, the Soviet Union began delivering two hundred MiG 23s to Egypt, which escalated the arms race in the Middle East.¹⁸⁷

Conclusion

The June war concretized the U.S.-Israel special relationship, strained American relations with the Arab world, and redefined the nature of the conflict and peace process. Johnson felt a strong cultural connection to Israel, but he did not want to develop a strategic partnership with Israel, either. As in later years, congressional insistence on weapons sales to Israel beyond the desires of the president worked to undercut peace initiatives by placing the United States more squarely on the side of Israel, and by empowering Israel to the point at which there was less incentive to compromise in peace negotiations. While Jarring’s efforts to reach peace probably would have failed regardless of U.S. arms to Israel, the sale of the sophisticated Phantoms only further militarized the region. Over time, Israel developed such a military advantage, thanks largely to the United States, that it severely hampered the peace process. The United States shifted its policy from territorial integrity in the Middle East to support for Israeli occupation in order to force Arab states to make peace. That would remain U.S. policy, presumably, until peace was achieved by the warring parties.

The Vietnam War opened the door for more congressional involvement in foreign policy, and even though concerns about Vietnam would continue, the Middle East would gradually become more important in the minds of Americans and U.S. policymakers, and much more so after the 1973 oil embargo. Moving forward, between the Vietnam War and Nixon’s Watergate fiasco, as Johnson notes, “Congress was situated to assume a degree of control over U.S. foreign policy unmatched since before World War II.”¹⁸⁸ The Vietnam War also created enough distraction for the Johnson administration to fail to check Israel’s ambition to construct civilian settlements and hold onto the territories taken during the war.

Congressional activity pointed to shifting support for Israel that increasingly reflected conservative political priorities and, overall, reflected a bipartisan consensus. Traditionally, U.S. political support for Israel came from the Democratic Party. But the political left had fragmented: support for labor declined, the Civil Rights Movement alienated Southern Democrats, and the Vietnam War and antiwar protesters furthered the split of the Democratic Party. Liberal support for Israel would continue to remain strong, but the New Left started to support Arab states against Israel’s perceived imperialism. At the same time, the political right started to warm up to Israel.¹⁸⁹ Israel demonstrated military might at a time when the left started to crack, and when the right longed for a reliable partner in the Cold War. The swift Israeli victory in June 1967 stood in stark contrast to the quagmire in East Asia. Israel exhibited traits prized by Americans—“self-reliance, democracy, anti-communism, successful pragmatism, idealism.”¹⁹⁰ The split in the Democratic Party over U.S.-Israel relations could be seen very clearly through the perspectives of William Fulbright and Henry “Scoop” Jackson, two leading Senate Democrats, to whom the story now turns.