Читать книгу The History of the West. Through the Eyes of Bears and Balalaikas - - Страница 7

From any historical phenomenon, event, or process, we are left with sources: eyewitness accounts, memories, archaeological findings. They serve as the primary source of our knowledge but do not replace a balanced analysis. It is difficult for people who are inside events to judge them objectively and impartially. As a rule, contemporaries are, in one way or another, interested or biased towards a particular point of view, and only from the vantage point of the passing years can one see a more or less objective picture of what actually took place.

Moreover, an eyewitness sees an event from one specific point of view. The logic and context of other participants are usually unknown to them. Therefore, to understand the nature of historical processes, it is necessary to analyze a multitude of sources – the more, the better.

From the veterans, we inherited a legendary dream that the Soviet people bore the entire burden of the war alone because the allies did not open a second front. They did not wish to fight for the common cause, only offering handouts.

It’s easy to understand where it came from: when you’re sitting in a trench under fire, retreating through snow and mud, starving, and charging at a machine gun, you wish for a miracle to happen, for a kind deity to descend from the sky or for unexpected help to arrive and bring salvation and hope.

When a Soviet soldier or officer, who knows the state of affairs from the heavily censored “combat leaflet,” discusses the opening of the second front, it is forgivable. But, let’s say, Stalin, who constantly demanded the opening of the second front from the allies, was much better informed. What was he counting on? Who was supposed to strike the Wehrmacht from the rear, where, and when?

Before 1941, there was no talk of a second front. More precisely, the Western front did exist at that time, but it was not only the first but also mainly the only one. The Soviet Union was not at war with Germany at that moment because, according to the official version, it “was not ready,” but it was at war with Poland – on the side of the Germans – and with Finland29 – on its own side.

The military aid from the allies would have been most useful in 1941, during the difficult times of encirclements and retreats. When all of Hitler’s forces were directed to the east, it was the perfect time to strike him from the other side… but who could do it? France, as a power, no longer existed; its remnant – the Vichy regime – was allied with Germany. America was not participating in the war, essentially had no land army, and its entire fleet was gathered in the Pacific, anticipating the upcoming fight with the Japanese. By the end of the war, America would become a first-class military power, and it would have so many ships that they could be sunk by the batch without regret during nuclear tests30. And in 1941, it had practically nothing to fight with in the east.

Like England. Its army is demoralized, and the weapons abandoned at Dunkirk. English pilots have just barely prevented an invasion of the British Isles31; had it happened, there would have been no one and nothing to resist with. Moreover, numerous colonies need protection, while the fleet – the only real asset the empire has – is spread thin and suffering loss after loss. When by the end of the year it will be necessary to defend Singapore32 – one of the main military bases and most significant possessions of the crown – all that can be done Britain was able to send a couple of battleships, which will find a quick and inglorious end there33. England of 1941 is not concerned with a second front; it is more worried about surviving at all.

Then maybe 1942. How useful the news of the Normandy landing would have been in the midst of the battles near Kharkov, during the defense of Sevastopol, at the most tragic moment when everything was collapsing and burning. But the summer of forty-two was a terrible time not only for the Soviet Union; it was a terrible time for everyone. Germans in Crete, Italians sinking Maltese convoys one after another, Rommel driving the British to Egypt – the Mediterranean Sea almost lost. And for the Axis countries, it’s not only security from the south and freedom of maritime communications but also access to the Middle East and Arab oil, the main resource they so desperately lack. The Japanese are thoroughly beating the Yankees, and it smells of a landing in Australia, if not in Oregon. After Pearl Harbor, there’s almost nothing to defend with; the same ships are darting across the vast ocean, covering the south and then the north. Even the sudden victory at Midway34 doesn’t change much; we now know it became a turning point, but back then it was followed by failure after failure. In 1942, Japan and Germany were still stronger than the Allies, and only by the end of the year, after El Alamein, did the balance begin to shift. This is immediately taken advantage of – in November, the Americans and the British land in Morocco and Algeria, and for the Germans and Italians, the evening ceases to be tranquil. But this is, of course, not the second front that the exhausted and miraculously surviving Soviet soldier dreams of and still needed by Stalin.

Then maybe 1943. In forty-three, the second front happens. The Allies land in Sicily35 and then in Italy, from where it’s not far to Germany within reach, really. The triumphant march to Rome takes Italy out of the war, but as soon as German troops take the place of the defenders, a tough, months-long battle for Monte Cassino begins: the Wehrmacht of 1943 is still a worthy opponent that cannot be quickly crushed by the blows of inexperienced newcomers. By the way, the Red Army fully felt this at the Battle of Kursk a couple of months earlier – despite multiple superiority in everything, despite precise knowledge of the enemy’s plans thanks to their own and British intelligence, and despite the fact that the Germans no longer had air superiority, Soviet troops fought fierce battles and only turned the tide of the battle when the enemy’s resources were exhausted. Resources that could have been replenished with troops from the south, but now they had to work hard for the Italians. This is still not the “second front,” but it’s all the Allies could do in Europe at that moment.

And in 1944, the second front truly happens, but now Stalin needs it like a cat needs a fifth leg. Stalin no longer doubts his ability to liberate Europe on his own and manage the victory as he sees fit. But the Allies also understand perfectly well that while they are banging against the closed door of the Apennines, the T-34s could roll to the Atlantic. And then try to push them back. After the landing in Normandy, the war turns into a race with the goal of getting as large a piece as possible before the inevitable post-war division. The rush results in significant bloodshed, completely unnecessary when victory is already absolutely inevitable, but now it is driven by geopolitics36, the desire not only to win the war but also to benefit from it. The apotheosis is the twofold surrender of Germany: first on May 7th in Reims without the participation of the USSR, and then on May 8th in full composition. As a result, the West celebrates victory on the eighth, and Russia on the ninth, depending on which surrender they prefer.

It was precisely this long-awaited landing in Normandy that led to the Soviet Union practically gaining nothing from the war. However, very soon it was able to retaliate slightly by initiating a race in the east: the defeat of the Kwantung Army was for the Americans just as much a disservice, formally fulfilling allied obligations, but in fact, a struggle for a piece of the post-war pie37. In August 1945, the USA would have easily defeated the Mikado38 without outside help, but then today we would not have a capitalist China under the rule of the Kuomintang39.

With the largest battle-hardened army in the world, the best battlefield equipment, and the readiness to fight to the last soldier, Stalin could have claimed even more. But the timely dropping of “Little Boy” and “Fat Man”40 and the presence of U.S. strategic bombers capable of delivering an atomic bomb to Moscow if necessary, convinced the Generalissimo to agree to a rather modest division. After this, the Soviet army began to gradually demobilize and disband, sending soldiers home. But the bitterness of resentment Stalin did not forgive either his own or others. From then on, the Americans were undermined wherever possible, and the Shakhurin case41 marked the resumption of repressions against anyone who could be blamed in any way for failure.