Читать книгу The State Franchise. Competitive Democracy - - Страница 5

Who, on a national scale, is the General Manager? From the title alone, it’s clear that this person is not the owner of the country, nor its beneficiary. The General Manager is the one responsible for the speed and accuracy of decisions made. He is the chief «chess player,» empowered by the country to represent it in competitive matches against representatives of other nations. And here, the main question becomes: what principle should guide the selection of this person?

It’s obvious that if we were to select our representative for a global chess tournament through even the fairest and most democratic elections, we would end up deeply disappointed with the tournament’s outcome. The most popular politician will inevitably lose at the chessboard to seasoned grandmasters. He will misjudge the position, miss the best move, miscalculate variations, and so on. However, the competitive struggle for a nation’s development, for its growing influence on the world stage, for leadership in citizens’ quality of life, demands that the General Manager of the state be intellectually superior to all competitors – by an order of magnitude.

Therefore, the selection of a General Manager in an effective system should take place through a multi-stage open competition, similar to sports tournaments, with qualifying rounds, quarterfinals, semifinals, and the final. We’ll touch on the details of this competition a bit later.

For now, the global ideal remains the election-based model, where a person tasked with monumental intellectual challenges in governing a country is chosen through popular vote – a fundamental weakness of such «franchises.» This very weakness of choosing the General Manager through democratic means often leads to the rise of undemocratic and totalitarian regimes. It is risky, inefficient, naively childish, and easily manipulated by dishonest players representing big capital. Yet a system where citizens have no power to choose their leader is also unattractive and, consequently, cannot be replicated as a franchise.

Thus, a solution that separates the powers of an elected President and a General Manager chosen through open competition becomes the only viable alternative to existing systems.

So how can we most efficiently and attractively distribute powers between these two roles? Given the nature of how these positions are obtained, one could say that the General Manager is the mind of the nation, while the President is its conscience. Clearly, the General Manager – having passed the trials of a grueling competition – must hold all executive powers over foreign and domestic policy, with the exception of the judiciary, the national audit system, the voting system, and the system for holding competitions (including for the General Manager position and all other key posts).

Since the competition is open, broadcasted, and beyond the control of the sitting General Manager, the public will not distrust it – especially as the final stage will include a public opinion survey that will influence the final decision.

The powers of the President, while seemingly more modest, will include crucial responsibilities: ensuring the integrity and transparency of the competition for the General Manager and other leadership roles, maintaining the independence of the judiciary and audit systems, and conducting weekly public sessions to receive performance reports from the General Manager. Other duties will be detailed in the relevant sections.

At this point, it’s worth highlighting a serious flaw shared by most current governmental «franchises»: the unacceptably low compensation of heads of state compared to CEOs of global companies. The salaries of top corporate managers are dictated by natural economic forces. If a manager is not paid what may seem like an astronomical sum, he will almost inevitably resort to corruption to take care of himself – and the damage from such corruption would far exceed the amount saved on his salary. That’s why these «huge» salaries are justified and approved by shareholders. There are no «honest» people – only systems that eliminate the possibility of corruption.

It is therefore beneficial for citizens that their state leaders – President and General Manager alike – earn more than the heads of major corporations.

There is one key point to add about compensation: for national leaders (whose terms must be limited to two five-year terms), their remuneration should be divided into two parts. The first part, a monthly salary of about one million USD (adjusted to 2026 purchasing power), is paid during the term. The second, more substantial part is paid three months after they fully leave office, once a full audit confirms the absence of corruption. Over five years, this second part should equal 0.1% of the national budget. For Russia, this is around $500 million.

Tying compensation to the national budget will incentivize the General Manager to increase GDP. If GDP rises by more than 50%, the outgoing General Manager could walk away with over a billion dollars. And the fact that the final payout is only made after full departure may motivate candidates to serve just one term – since choosing a second term would delay the payout, which would then grow by only 10%. The same conditions would apply to the President.

Such significant rewards will help attract the most capable and talented individuals to both elections and competitions, while the risk of losing the payout will deter them from engaging in illegal activity or being influenced by foreign intelligence services or competing foundations. Another irrefutable argument for high compensation – making the person a multimillionaire – is the potential to draw an enormous number of intelligent and effective people to the selection process.

Finally, the two-term limit is necessary because: first, it ensures a more objective audit of their work, and second, a new leader always brings new growth drivers, fresh perspectives, and consequently, new advantages.