Читать книгу Multiverse Deism - Leland Royce Harper - Страница 9
ОглавлениеAs we have seen, the case that is being made for multiverse theories is in full-force from a variety of different perspectives and motivations and also seems to have a level of credibility and plausibility backing it. Coming from both the philosophical arguments and the scientific experimentation and research it appears that there is a solid case for the existence or, minimally, the plausibility of a multiverse with the only questions remaining relating to the particular construct of multiverse of which we happen to be a part. It seems that this being the case, theists could reasonably be willing to accept the existence of a multiverse as an ontological view. But if this is to happen, what exactly does it mean for the theist? Does adopting such an ontological view harm or hurt him in any way? Is it compatible with his theological beliefs? What are the potential drawbacks for a theist in adopting a multiverse view? These are some of the questions that any theist would have to consider before the adoption of a multiverse account in favor of a single-universe account, and these are the issues discussed in this chapter.
The first section of the chapter outlines several of the difficulties that the theist will have to face and account for in accepting a multiverse theory. Some of these difficulties will not apply exclusively to theists; rather, they will apply to anyone considering the acceptance of a multiverse. With that in mind, however, each problem discussed in this section will be one that has to be faced by the theistic-minded multiverse proponent, nonetheless. The next section details how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism. And finally, in the last section, I discuss how various accounts of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse in light of a deistic God, showing how various conceptions and combinations of free will and determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory for which I ultimately argue.
Before beginning, I think it is necessary to define precisely what I mean when I refer to theists or the theistic God. As I want this definition to be as inclusive as possible, it will be quite broad yet still set us up with a conception that is narrow enough to understand, grasp and implement. I will first begin with an outline of the God of which I will be discussing, and then from that, one can take a theist simply as one who believes in the existence of such a God. The kind of God of which I am speaking is the traditional “3-O” God of Judeo-Christian theism, attributing omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence (among other things) to Him. The three “omni” attributes are the most important for our concerns here, so the discussion of God will generally only be taken to be a conception in which these three attributes are essential. Of course, the interpretations of what exactly each of these particular divine attributes entails can be widely divergent but, for our purposes at the moment, the particularities and details of the attributes themselves can be set aside, rather the primary consideration is that God possesses these attributes, regardless of their particular interpretation. To be considered a theist one does not need to practice any active worship of this God, be of a particular denomination or organized religion, or anything of that sort, or even accept the veridicality of any particular scripture. The simple act of belief is enough to qualify some individual as a theist, in this sense. Being a theist is simply an ontological status or view, one that is distinct from any religious practice. While it may seem a bit out of place to discuss the attributes of and belief in the God of classical theism here, given that the overall project being presented makes a case for a deistic God, I feel that such a brief mention is necessary. The adoption of the God of classical theism, at this point, begins with establishing a set of attributes that He is traditionally thought to possess. This is done so that, following the discussion of the attributes of the deistic God that will come to be presented, the reader can reflect and see that the differences between the two interpretations of God (at least in terms of the attributes that they are said to possess) are minimal. The attributes of the deistic God that I will ultimately come to argue for do not vary at all from any of the attributes of the God of classical theism, rather they will simply require that we envision some of them in particular ways, and this will hopefully illustrate that if one is inclined to believe in the God of classical theism then he can perhaps be persuaded to believe in a deistic God without much amendment to his current beliefs, as the two are not quite as different as some may consider them to be.
Theistic Concessions in Accepting a Multiverse Theory
With all of the different types of multiverse models that have been discussed, there are some potential drawbacks for the theist if he accepts any of them. Of course, the degree to which the drawbacks will affect the theist will vary depending on the particular multiverse theory of which he is a proponent and on the particular ways in which he interprets the 3-O divine attributes, but they will exist, nonetheless. In the first case, some multiverse theories will entail the actualization of a whole host of universes that theists would not necessarily want to acknowledge as existing given the nature of their omnibenevolent God, so this is something for which the theist will have to account and explain. In the second case, multiverse theories will often take away from or discount the design argument, which is generally an argument put forth by theists to argue for the existence of God based on the unlikeliness that this universe could have arisen purely out of chance.1 This argument, however, is generally most persuasive when applied to a single-universe ontological view, and would seemingly not work for the theist who is a proponent of multiverse theory. And in the final case, for multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs,2 , 3 there is an ethical issue with which the theist must deal. Multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs raise interesting ethical problems since it seems an agent can remain indifferent to whether he ought to perform a good moral action or a bad moral action since whatever he does not do will be actualized in some other universe. This final difficulty is not exclusive to theists, as it will equally apply to all those who adopt a multiverse theory of this model; it is a difficulty that the multiverse theist will still have to face.
A substantial number of multiverse theories, especially those coming from the scientific perspective, argue for a multiverse that contains or exhausts every metaphysically possible universe. That is, they argue for a multiverse that contains or exhausts every universe that is physically possible given some range of set physical constants. If we are to limit our discussion to scientific multiverse models, then it seems that all of them entail the actualization of all possible universes, be their actualization and existence simultaneous to one another, be they part of an infinite series of big bangs and big crunches, wavepacket collapses, or of part of some other cyclical model.4 Included within these actualized universes, then, would be a whole series of universes that either contain no sentient life, no life at all, significant amounts of evil and suffering, or are just on-balance “bad”5 universes. The existence of many of these universes is potentially at odds with the conception of an omnibenevolent God that many theists hold, given that many theists would argue that God would create only universes that meet specific criteria. Surely there is nothing overtly illogical or incoherent about the existence of such “bad” universes, and there is no clear contradiction between them and the existence of God, but it remains that some theists may not want to concede the existence of, say, multiple universes containing an immense amount of pain and suffering, or universes in which there is no sentient life whatsoever. Furthermore, theists may not even want to concede that the existence of such universes is possible, and this is where the tension lies. While there is no explicit contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of all logically and metaphysically possible universes within a multiverse a contradiction could arise given certain specific interpretations of God’s attributes and His nature.
The scientific multiverse accounts presented are generally concerned not with the content of the universes; rather, they are concerned purely with the physical constants and ways by which these universes can come into existence given quantum mechanics and laws of nature. The concern of physicists and mathematicians is not with the moral content of these universes—whether they are good or bad in relation to some arbitrary scale of worthiness; rather, they are merely concerned with the sheer existence of the universes. The theist, on the other hand, may place considerable importance on the content of the universe, concerned with things such as ethical considerations, overall goodness, inherent value, and the like. Because of this, the scientific approach to the multiverse in most, if not all, cases entails the existence of far more universes than does the theistic one. The theist who aims to adopt a multiverse view and to incorporate the scientific case for that multiverse will then be forced to reconcile this difference, which may be seen as a drawback for theists in accepting multiverse theories. Essentially, a concession concerning the scope of universe inclusion within the multiverse will need to be made, either on the theological side or on the scientific side. Proponents of the theistic multiverse may try to reconcile this difference by inserting a threshold, such that any universe that falls below this threshold given whatever value and method of measurement is being used is not even a possible universe and thus would not be actualized at any point within the multiverse. This approach, however, demands that the theist justify his threshold, both in where he chooses to place the threshold and in what it purports to value. He must also provide reasoning as to why this particular threshold is more suitable than other potential thresholds that are placed at other locations and value other variables. This will not entirely solve the problem for the theist though, since the scientific models would call for very different thresholds and would set out very different definitions of possible, so still the issue remains for the theist that scientific multiverse models entail the existence of far more universes than they would generally like to acknowledge as possible. So many universes that the theist may not want to accept as possible that it may even prove to be damaging to the theist’s particular conception of God and how He operates.
The second potential drawback for the theist is that the multiverse theory undermines the design argument. Design arguments typically argue, in one way or another, that the universe appears to have been intelligently designed, which entails an intelligent designer, and that this intelligent designer is God (Ratzsch, 2010). The arguments generally “involve reasoning from seemingly purposeful features of the observable world to the existence of at least one supernatural designer” (Manson, 2003, p. 1). One particular example of such an observation and inference may be that the physical constants required to produce and sustain life are very narrow, and based on the fact that we see life in this universe, one can argue that it could not possibly be the case that all of these things simply came together by chance, but that the creation of something as complex as our universe would have required significant design and intent.6 It is important to note that many design arguments do not explicitly posit the existence of God, rather they point to the existence of just some supernatural designer, and that a further step is needed to identify that supernatural creator as God (Manson, 2003, p. 1).7 Design arguments, however, are typically used, and generally work better with, single-universe models rather than multiverse models. This is because such arguments appeal to the uniqueness of our particular universe, arguing that the chance of such a universe coming to exist as it has is virtually impossible without some sort of intent and creator behind it. Many multiverse theories, however, claim that since all possible universes have or will be actualized at some particular place or time, then the existence of a universe such as ours is not only highly likely but inevitable. For example, for proponents of cyclical multiverse models, it would merely be a matter of time before, at some point in the infinite sequence of universes coming into and going out of existence, our particular universe with all of these life-supporting features should come to exist.8 So, while the multiverse is not a direct challenge to the theistic view, it does undermine one of the stronger arguments that theists often appeal to in making a case for the existence of God. On most multiverse accounts there is no need to posit the existence of God to account for the apparent design of our universe since the existence of a universe just like ours is inevitable and is simply one of the wide variety of possible universes that has been actualized or that will, at some point, be actualized.
Finally, in the case of the ethical problem that the theistic proponent of multiverse models that entail the actualization of all possible states of affairs it faces, the theist will have to explain just how a traditional conception of morality can be maintained or if it needs to be maintained at all, in such a multiverse model. The issue is that, for an agent, his motivation for doing morally good acts may become diminished, trivialized, or altogether lost since, whether he does the morally good act or not, it will be actualized in some universe within the multiverse by either himself or one of his counterparts. Robert Adams captures the sentiment of this problem in writing that any particular agent in any particular universe could reasonably ask himself “[w]hat is wrong with actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible [universe] anyways if they don’t occur in this one” (1979, p. 195). Likewise, an agent’s refusal to commit some morally evil act will only make it so that that evil does not occur in his particular universe, which will further entail that that same evil that he refused to actualize will be actualized by one of his counterparts in some other part of the multiverse. The possible conclusion that stems from this is that it appears to trivialize all of our ethical considerations since whatever we do, or don’t do, will entail the opposite outcome in some other universe. On this, the motivation to perform morally good actions is seemingly lost since the agent could adopt an “if I don’t do it another version of me will” sort of attitude, as is discussed by Adams (1979). David Lewis, however, replies to such a worry as directed at modal realism, but what he says about modal realism can be applied to our case of the multiverse as well. He argues that
For those of us who think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and respect and esteem, loyalties and affections and solidarity, the other-worldly evils should not seem even momentarily relevant to morality. Of course, our moral aims are egocentric. And likewise, all the more for those who think of morality in terms of rules, rights and duties; or as obedience to the will of God. (Lewis, 1986, p. 127)
Of course, such a reply is not readily accepted by everyone, and Yujin Nagasawa argues that the kind of reply provided by Lewis does not adequately solve the problem. Of such a reply, Nagasawa writes
However, if the multiverse model in question is correct, it is difficult not to extend our concerns to other possible universes in our context because even if people in other possible universes are morally irrelevant to what we do in our universe they nevertheless exist and form part of God as the totality. (Nagasawa, 2015, p. 188)9
While ethical and moral issues of the kind faced by modal realists will have to be addressed by any multiverse theory, this is something that the theistic multiverse proponent will be harder-pressed to provide a response to and discuss how his model will deal with certain ethical considerations. A theistic multiverse account has the added layer and factor of God, and how ethics and morality relate to Him, to navigate whereas nontheistic multiverse accounts do not have this hurdle to deal with and thus can potentially avail themselves of many more possible responses.
The Multiverse Entailment of Deism
Now that several of the potential drawbacks that theists may face in accepting particular multiverse theories have been discussed, the attention now turns to how and why I think that the adoption of a specific kind of multiverse theory may entail deism if the proponent of the multiverse theory aims to maintain the existence of God. For purposes of clarity, I would like to specify the kind of multiverse model that I will be referring to, moving forward. It appears that most, if not all, of the strongest multiverse theories put forth by both science and philosophy entail the existence of all possible universes. There are two distinctions that differentiate each of these theories from one another, however. The first distinction is that each theory proposes its conception of how these universes exist in relation to one another. That is to say, these theories will vary in their explanations of the degree to which the universes within the multiverse are spatiotemporally distinct and isolated from each other, how and when the universes come to exist, how these multiple realities come to be actualized, and other similar factors. The second way in which these multiverse theories vary is in their conceptions of what exactly constitutes “possible” when referring to a possible universe. Some conceptions may argue that only universes that contain sentient life are possible, some may argue that only universes that possess a certain amount of goodness or happiness are possible, some may argue that any conceivable and logically possible universe is possible, while still others may argue that only universes that adhere with particular physical constants are possible. The variations among what ought to confer possibility upon a universe are wide and divergent, and this remains one of the most debated aspects of the multiverse discussion. When referring to the multiverse for the remainder of this project, unless otherwise indicated, the type of multiverse that is being referred to is this general kind that includes and exhausts all possible universes. That is to say, multiverses that entail the actualization, by whatever means and processes, of every possible universe, be it simultaneously, cyclically, part of an infinite sequence or any other mode. The key is that the multiverse models to which I refer when using the term “multiverse” are those that include, in some capacity, the actualization of all metaphysically possible universes. The individual conception of the relations of the universes to one another, as well as the conception of what exactly constitutes a possible universe, are not of extreme importance in this case since all types of these multiverse theories ultimately entail the same preference of a deistic God over the God of classical Judeo-Christian monotheism. So, while in this discussion, I will be speaking of an “all possible realities exist” kind of multiverse that is akin to modal realism (Lewis, 1986). This is done simply for the purposes of inclusion. What this means is that if my arguments seem plausible on this most extreme account of the multiverse, then surely it will plausibly transfer onto other brands of multiverse that happen to fall within this highly inclusive multiverse model. What I mean by “fall within” is that on the account that I am employing, very little (if any) restrictions are placed on what entails a possible universe, so any multiverse model that does propose any sort of definition that excludes some universes as impossible would be a multiverse that necessarily contains a numerically smaller amount of universes than does my inclusive model.10 Any of those restrictions would then have to be argued for on their own basis, independently of my deistic argument. For example, suppose that the inclusive multiverse model contains 10,000 individual universes within it, and through all of these universes, every possible universe has been actualized. Now, if we take another multiverse model, let us call it Multiverse C, that includes a threshold claiming that only those universes that include sentient beings are truly possible, and thus are the only ones that can be included in the multiverse. Given this threshold, Multiverse C may contain only 5,000 individual universes.11 Similarly, we can imagine another multiverse model, Multiverse D, that accepts as possible only those universes that contain sentient beings and that are also on-balance good, this model would contain only, perhaps, 3,000 individual universes. So, if my proposed arguments work on the level of the inclusive multiverse, since I make no claims as to whether a threshold for conference of existence really exists or, if it does exist, where it should be, any other multiverse models, such as those exemplified by Multiverse C or Multiverse D, would simply yield less individual universes for my proposal to range over. This is not a problem at all. The difference between multiverse models, for the scope of this project, is only that each one will include a different number of individual universes within it, and I have simply chosen the model that entails the largest number of individual universes within it to allow for my argument to range as broadly as possible.
The adoption of such a multiverse theory, for anyone who desires to maintain the existence of God, appears to be an ontological view in which this God would not be required to, or even feel compelled to, act in the natural world in any way aside from the initial act of creation. The reason for which an active God would be superfluous on a view such as this is that, given the fact that every possible universe is/was/will be actualized either at some particular time or at some particular space, this would entail that every possible state of affairs is/was/will be actualized as well. Given this, everything possible will happen in some universe at some time or in some place, so God’s action would seemingly be pointless and unnecessary since He would simply be forcing the actualization of some particular state of affairs in one universe at one particular time over another at another particular time. It could not be the case that God loves one universe more than another and that this would cause Him to carry out some act on some particular universe (though we may want to think that we are the most important, this universe is merely indexical). Since God is all-loving, and His love is inexhaustible, there is no reason to think that God loves any one universe more than any other, and it is perhaps even an incoherent notion to suggest its possibility. Of course, whether it is even possible to think of God being infinitely loving yet still loving one thing more than another is a whole discussion in itself, but one that would require substantial thought and is not of immediate concern for our purposes here. But the simple position here is that God loves all of His creations equally and maximally, so while it may be nice to think that He loves us more than others, this is not the case. To suppose that God loves us more than other universes, or that He has a higher degree of concern for us than He does for other universes, and that He ought to actualize certain good states of affairs in our universe over others is simply an indexico-centric mindset, for lack of a better term.
