Читать книгу Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II - Len Deighton - Страница 50

Peace is better than war, because in peace the

sons bury their fathers, but in war the

fathers bury their sons.

Croesus to Cambyses (son of his enemy Cyrus the Great)

It was not only the ‘Maginot mentality’ that rendered France so vulnerable in 1940. Although the generals failed to equip France’s army for modern war, the nation itself during those interwar years became ever more demoralized and divided. Political extremists of both left and right had a powerful influence upon French society, as did the widespread corruption that so often procured fat government contracts. The French aircraft industry provided an example of the crippling effect of political theorists. In 1936 all the well established French aircraft manufacturers were nationalized by the Communist air minister Pierre Cot. The effect upon production was devastating, and the resulting chaos was still being sorted out when the Germans attacked in 1940. France’s relationships with the rest of the world suffered as a result of its own dissensions. Although the French had remained Britain’s close allies since before the First World War, the ties between the two countries had grown more and more uncertain. Even in November 1938 – after the Munich agreement – the British prime minister thought it necessary to ask the French whether they would support Britain if it became the victim of German aggression. In the same cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain said he had been assured that France was not proposing to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany that would rule out help to Britain.¹ These were chilly words about Britain’s closest neighbours immediately prior to a life-and-death struggle with a well armed and determined enemy.