Читать книгу The SADF in the Border War - Leopold Scholtz - Страница 12

6

The pattern evolves: Sceptic

Immediately after Operation Reindeer, Military Intelligence started to contemplate the possibility of a SWAPO revenge operation. “Trustworthy sources in Zambia,” it was reported, indicated that the movement had taken an oath to avenge Cassinga and Chetequera. Attacks were expected on targets with a relatively high population density, such as Ruacana, Oshakati, Ondangwa, Oshikango, Rundu and – prophetically, as it turned out – Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip. Reindeer had weakened SWAPO in Angola sufficiently so as to preclude attacks against well-defended targets. “SWAPO in Zambia has the best capacity to act against targets in SWA,” the analysis stated. Central Ovamboland and the Caprivi Strip were specifically named as high-risk areas.[1]

The analysts were spot-on. In the early morning hours of 23 August 1978, SWAPO’s revenge came in the form of a series of 122-mm rockets fired from Zambian soil on the frontier town of Katima Mulilo at the eastern extremity of the Caprivi Strip. In fact, Military Intelligence knew through radio intercepts that an attack was coming, and the SADF had frantically prepared countermeasures. The bombardment turned out to be very inaccurate, only two of the 30-odd rockets falling in Katima itself. One damaged a school in the black township; the other landed on a dormitory containing sleeping soldiers, killing ten and wounding another ten. At the same time, a mortar attack was launched on Wenela base, not far away, but all bombs missed.[2]

The South Africans retaliated at once with everything they had. Within minutes, a troop of 140-mm guns started a counter-bombardment. Reinforcements, in the form of paratroopers and additional 140-mm guns, were flown in from Bloemfontein and Potchefstroom. The previous evening, the local commander, Commandant AK de Jager, had already organised his meagre forces into two combat teams, with armoured cars and motorised infantry supported by the artillery. They crossed the border even as the smoke was still billowing into the air at Katima.

One combat team moved rapidly to a PLAN base about 30 km inside Zambia, but discovered there that the estimated 200 guerrillas had already fled. The other team ran into resistance nearby. With the paratroop reinforcements having arrived, the SADF attacked SWAPO furiously. Alouette gunships circled in the air, taking pot shots at the guerrillas. The South Africans hunkered down for the night, while South African and Zambian artillery and mortars fired at each other. The next day, some of the Zambian bases were blasted by Canberra and Buccaneer bombers. After this, SWAPO scattered in all directions, and, although the pursuit lasted a while longer, there were no more advantages in continuing. By the afternoon of 27 August, all SADF soldiers were safely back in South West Africa. SWAPO’s casualties were estimated at 20 dead and an unknown number of wounded.

These events set in motion a process that would cause the rebel movement much grief. To begin with, the attack on Katima coincided with a visit to SWA of the Austrian general Hannes Philipp, the designated commander of the proposed UN peacekeeping force, which had to supervise elections in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435. His SADF counterpart in Windhoek, Major General Jannie Geldenhuys, immediately took advantage of this event to prove to the international community SWAPO’s aggressive intentions and its disregard for civilian lives. According to Geldenhuys, the Katima incident led to a “more advantageous climate for cross-border operations”.[3]

The SADF exploited this opening to the full. The government – the aggressive PW Botha had by now replaced the cautious John Vorster as prime minister – authorised two cross-border operations, Rekstok (in Angola) and Saffraan (in Zambia), in early March 1979. These came after PLAN launched mortar attacks on SADF bases on 13 and 26 February.[4] Not much has been written about these two operations, except that they were meant to hit SWAPO bases in the shallow area across the borders in Angola and Zambia. Very little action was seen, as SWAPO had already evacuated all its positions, but one of the SAAF’s irreplaceable Canberra bombers was shot down by SWAPO anti-aircraft fire.[5]

Some South African officers saw these two operations as failures, but they may have judged them too harshly. According to Geldenhuys, his primary objective was not so much to cause material damage to SWAPO, as to gather information. “The information we got from these operations, made the enemy picture much clearer . . . If these operations did not take place, we would have remained in the dark for much longer. From this time on we could act much more effectively.”[6]

Perhaps the most important outcome was a strategic one. Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda was severely embarrassed by the SWAPO presence on his soil and the forceful SADF response. Consequently, he halted all PLAN military actions. As Geldenhuys put it: “This was the big breakthrough. It made East Caprivi free from insurgence. This was the beginning of the fulfilment of our plan.”[7]

When we look at the counterinsurgency war in northern SWA in Chapter 9, the full implications of this decision will become clear. Suffice to say here that this was a prerequisite for Geldenhuys’s aspiration to limit the PLAN insurgency to Ovamboland.

The build-up to Operation Sceptic

One result of Operation Rekstok was that SWAPO withdrew its bases from the shallow areas just north of the border to deeper inside Angola.[8] This meant that future South African cross-border operations would have to penetrate considerably deeper into Angola to get at the rebel movement.

A pattern was slowly starting to develop. During the rainy season, a veritable deluge of insurgents would cross the border into South West Africa, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the lush foliage and water in the many streams and rivers. During these months, it was difficult to locate them at their bases in Angola. Therefore the SADF started launching big conventional cross-border operations during the dry winter months when it was easier to move large numbers of vehicles north of the border. The winter was also the time when PLAN regrouped its forces to recuperate and to do retraining, which made it an even more attractive time to attack them.[9]

Another element of this evolving pattern was the SADF’s excellent strategic capability to intercept enemy radio communications. Neither SWAPO nor FAPLA nor the Cubans ever realised it, but the vast majority of their radio messages were intercepted and decrypted. As General Georg Meiring, who used to be a signaller himself, said: “If anyone north of us opened their mouths we had it on tape somewhere . . . Our communications interception system was the best in the world at the time.” According to him, there never was a single major interception: “Rather, you get a lot of interceptions from which a pattern emerges. Out of that you build your intelligence. Thousands upon thousands of messages were intercepted.” He conceded that the Cubans and FAPLA also intercepted SADF messages, but insisted the South African capability was better.[10]

In order to understand the successive SADF cross-border operations during the next few years, it is necessary to say something about PLAN’s deployment in Angola. The headquarters of SWAPO’s armed force was at Lubango (see map on page 6), as was the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre, where insurgents received their military training. The SWAPO forces were divided into three fronts: Western, Central and Eastern. The Western Front’s headquarters was at Cahama, while the Central Front was controlled from Cuvelai and the Eastern Front from Ngluma/Puturunhanga. PLAN also had a so-called mechanised brigade – a grand name for a poorly trained and equipped unit, which existed mainly for its prestige value and had no real place in an insurgency war. The formation, about 2 500 men strong, mostly operated against UNITA as payment to the MPLA for being allowed to use Angolan territory against the “Boers”. SWAPO also had four “semi-conventional” battalions of between 100 and 350 men, situated in the general vicinity of Cassinga.[11] This meant that PLAN was mostly stationed in Cunene province in southwestern Angola, and so this was where the South African axe would fall repeatedly.

A tactic often used by SWAPO was to let specially trained guerrillas infiltrate right through the operational area into the “white” farmlands around Grootfontein, Tsumeb and Otavi to terrorise the white farmers and politicise their workers. This happened for the first time on 8 May 1979, when 30 insurgents crossed the cutline (the border between Ovamboland and the white farming area). During that night, they attacked two farm homesteads and killed a grandfather, grandmother and two minor children. This led to 61 Mech’s first operational deployment, ironically in a counterinsurgency role rather than in the conventional mobile warfare for which it was created. Armoured cars were deployed in stopper groups on roads in the demarcated area, while infantry carried out follow-up patrols on foot and artillerymen protected the farmhouses. This operation was known as Carrot, as would similar operations be in the following years. In this case, all 30 insurgents were rapidly found and killed or taken prisoner, or managed to escape to Angola.[12]

In February 1980, the insurgents tried again. In a widely publicised case, guerrillas attacked the farmhouse of the Dressel family, 45 km south of Grootfontein, and killed the farmer, Eberhard Dressel. His 15-year-old daughter, Sonja, opened fire on the attackers and shot two dead, after which the others fled.[13] The result was pretty much the same as in 1979: altogether, 31 insurgents died and the rest of the group of 60 were either captured or made their way back to Angola. The SADF suffered two fatalities.[14]

But things were not looking good for the South Africans. In February 1980, the SADF registered 42 land mines – a record number – in Ovamboland.[15] And the SADF learnt that the Soviet Union was pressurising SWAPO to intensify the war. Apparently with this purpose in mind, about 800 PLAN fighters were transferred from Zambia to Cunene province. For the first time, attempts were made to infiltrate Kaokoland (hitherto free of insurgents), while the hydroelectric works at Ruacana (supplying northern SWA with electricity) were also attacked. SWAPO was very far from being beaten. On the contrary, the insurgents were aggressive and spoiling for a fight. Everything pointed to a large-scale guerrilla offensive, although Military Intelligence could not pinpoint exactly what was going to happen.[16]

At the same time, South Africa’s strategic position was weakened by the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia. Following the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, elections were held in that country in February 1980. Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo’s Patriotic Front won an overwhelming majority in the new parliament, with the result that a valuable South African ally was gone. With the transition from white-ruled Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe, the international focus would now clearly fall on South West Africa. The thinking in SADF circles was that the Rhodesian government had waited too long to strike across its borders, which was one reason for its demise.[17] The arguments advanced in the first months of 1978 in favour of a large cross-border operation were – from the SADF point of view – more valid than ever before.

And thus, in May 1980 the decision was reached: SWAPO had to be taken on and beaten in its lair. The date would be 10 June. The SADF was expressly forbidden to tangle with FAPLA troops. The strategic purpose of the attack was to break down SWAPO’s image as a war-winning movement, to show the South West Africans that they should not depend on SWAPO, but that the South African government was dealing the cards, and to pre-empt SWAPO’s offensive even before it could start. Operationally, the attackers had to destroy PLAN’s command post and headquarters, to disrupt its logistics system, to gain maximum intelligence, and to “eliminate SWAPO terrorists”.[18] The base complexes of Chifufua (also known as Smokeshell, or QFL), Ionde, Mulola and Chitumba were to be attacked and destroyed on the first day. Thereafter the force would stay in the vicinity for ten days to follow up and hunt down SWAPO groups that might have escaped. For the operation, known as Operation Sceptic, the invading South African forces were divided into four combat groups:

 • The main punch would be provided by 61 Mech (called Combat Group 61 for the duration of the operation), under the command of Commandant Johann Dippenaar. The formation would consist of two mechanised infantry companies, two parachute infantry companies (motorised), an armoured car squadron and support troop, a battery of 140-mm guns, a support company with two antitank platoons as well as a mortar platoon, and a combat engineer troop, together with other support troops.

 • The other part of the punch was concentrated in Combat Group 10, under Commandant Chris Serfontein, with two paratroop companies (motorised), one armoured car troop and a support company. His target was Mulola.

 • The third element was Combat Group 53 (three motorised infantry companies, two armoured car troops and a support company), under Commandant Jorrie Jordaan.

 • Lastly there was Combat Group 54, with five light counterinsurgency infantry companies (including two from 32 Battalion and one from the parabats) and a mortar platoon, all under Commandant Anton van Graan. This group would not be part of the main operation. Van Graan’s light battalion would kick off the operation by securing the area just across the border up to Mulemba for the others to pass through safely. At Mulemba, a temporary base area would be set up where troops would sleep overnight on 9/10 June and from where Smokeshell would be attacked the next day.

The intelligence about Smokeshell was rather deficient – Dippenaar describes the information at his disposal as “very vague”.[19] After a while, it became clear that Smokeshell was not so much a base as a complex of 13 positions, spread out over an area of 3 km by 15 km, all of it in dense bush. Each position covered approximately 300 m by 600 m. SWAPO had clearly learnt a lot from Cassinga and Chetequera; Smokeshell was dug in, with the fighters living in foxholes, trenches and covered bunkers, all of which had been excellently camouflaged. This showed a strong Soviet influence. The SADF identified seven anti-aircraft positions, some with the feared 23-mm gun, and the whole complex was manned by an estimated 800 men.[20] (As far as could be ascertained, no women or children were present this time. Had SWAPO learnt its lesson?) The position was, as the crow flies, about 180 km north of the border, but, with winding sandy tracks along which the army would advance, the distance would in fact be about 260 km.[21]

The idea was that Combat Group 61 would lead the way across the border towards Chifufua, with Combat Group 10 in its wake. By noon on 10 June, the attackers were meant to be in place. After an aerial bombardment by the SAAF and a follow-up by 61 Mech’s artillery, the South Africans would move in from the east and advance through the complex. It was expected that the enemy would not stand and fight, but would immediately flee westwards. The two parachute companies from Combat Group 61 would be choppered in on the western side to act as stopper groups. Afterwards, the focus of the attack would shift eastwards to the Ionde complex, with four positions and 700 men.[22] And while the assault on Smokeshell took place, Combat Group 10 would take on Mulola, to the south.[23]

Of course, General Constand Viljoen again insisted on being part of the operation, and accompanied Commandant Dippenaar in his command Ratel. As at Cassinga, this would cause discomfort in certain quarters.

The Battle of Smokeshell

The SADF went to considerable lengths to keep PLAN from learning that another big cross-border operation was on the way. The units earmarked for the operation spent approximately ten days before Smokeshell either doing highly visible exercises or counterinsurgency operations in Ovamboland to mislead the enemy.

The SAAF had learnt from Operation Reindeer that air support had to be adequate. For Sceptic, a strong force, consisting of 18 Mirage F1AZ fighter-bombers and 4 Buccaneer and 4 Canberra bombers, was sent to South West Africa. For security reasons – the SAAF feared that people living around Waterkloof Air Force Base, just outside Pretoria, could inform “unfriendly” embassies who could in turn warn Angola and SWAPO about the activity– the aircraft flew there separately and mostly by a roundabout route via Upington.

This makes it all the more difficult to understand why the air force immediately announced its presence in the operational area by attacking both SWAPO’s Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre at Lubango and, of all places, Smokeshell itself on 7 June, and again on 9 June, the day before the ground attack. Apparently, they caused little damage.[24] It is not known what SWAPO deduced from this, but it seems a strange way to keep your enemy in the dark about your intentions.

The troops started moving from their bases early on 8 June. The convoy was an impressive sight. When the first vehicles reached Eenhana for a fuel refill, the last ones were just about to leave Omuthiya, the starting point.[25] But, as the previous operations also illustrated, the planned march tempo was too ambitious, thanks to the dense bush and sandy ground. The Eland armoured cars led the way, followed by the Ratels and then the G-2 Magirus Deutz gun tractors. By the time the big tractors were on the move, the tracks had been ploughed up by the Elands and Ratels, with the result that engines overheated, some guns broke loose due to metal fatigue, and delay after delay tested people’s tempers. Mulemba, already secured and prepared as a temporary base by Van Graan’s Combat Group 54, was reached on the evening of 9 June.[26]

Early the next day, the force moved out again for the 130-km advance to Smokeshell, with Combat Group 61 in a huge convoy of 151 vehicles. The troops were tense, but hyped up. As often happens in battles, things had already started to go wrong. At Mulemba, helicopters were supposed to pick up the paratroop stopper groups and deliver them to their designated areas west of Smokeshell. But someone had forgotten to organise fuel for the Pumas at Mulemba, which meant an important part of Dippenaar’s battle plan could not be executed.

Nevertheless, by 13h15 the rest of the force was in place, the teams all having reported “Ek’s hier!” (I’m here!). The SAAF’s strike force was present in full strength. Their attack was meant to stun the defenders so that they would offer no or little resistance. However, this raises the question of why the air attack started at 08h00, while the ground attack began only at 12h00, giving the guerrillas ample time to recover. It made no sense, as some of the officers present themselves observed. At any rate, the attack was a failure, with the bombs falling in an empty area to no effect, apart from warning SWAPO that something was brewing.

At 13h15 Dippenaar gave the order: “Laat waai!” (Let rip!) The artillery was supposed to start firing now, but there was only silence. The battery, under the command of Major Tobias Vermaak, was not yet in position. And, when the big guns finally started thundering, their bombardment, like that of the air force, had little effect. In the middle and north of the complex, SWAPO had already evacuated the identified positions or had moved its defence to alternative positions. The bunkers could be destroyed only by a direct hit.

For the assault, Dippenaar had divided his force into six combined-arms combat teams with mechanised and motorised infantry and 90-mm gun support:

 • Team 1 (A Company, mechanised infantry, supported by Ratel 90s and mortars), under Major Paul Fouché;

 • Team 2 (B Company, mechanised infantry, also supported by Ratel 90s and mortars), under Captain Louis Harmse;

 • Team 3 (C Squadron, Eland 90 armoured cars with a support infantry platoon), under Captain Jakes Jacobs;

 • Team 4 (parabat company with three stopper groups), under Captain Mac Alexander;

 • Team 5 (parabat company with three stopper groups), under Captain Piet Nel;

 • Team 6 (reserve), under Major Jab Swart.

The main effort, consisting of Teams 1, 2 and 3, would be launched from west to east, while Teams 4 and 5 were supposed to act as stopper groups on the western side when the insurgents started fleeing. In effect, they were out of the fight due to the aviation fuel blunder. The Elands of Combat Team 3 would be in the north, with Team 1 in the middle and Team 2 in the south. Team 2 would also be supported by 61 Mech’s mortar and Ratel 90 antitank platoons.

The attacks by Teams 1 and 3 went like clockwork. Very little resistance was encountered, the defenders – apparently with PLAN commander Dimo Hamaambo among them – having already fled. The question has to be asked whether the SAAF attacks of 7 and 9 June, as well as the early-morning attack on 10 June, were responsible for this. The attackers moved quickly through the complex. Team 1 found it exceedingly difficult to navigate in the dense bush, and after a while found themselves about 800 m north of where they were supposed to be. Team 3 was exactly on target. Both teams found several abandoned anti-aircraft guns. A few skirmishes with fleeing SWAPO fighters ensued, and six of them were killed.

In the south, things went horribly wrong for Team 2. After apparently surprising some SWAPO members at lunch, the team advanced rapidly before making contact with aggressive defences at a previously unknown position. As dictated by mechanised infantry tactical doctrine, Captain Harmse divided his force into a fire support group (a troop of Ratel 90s, a mortar platoon, and a mechanised infantry platoon) and an assault group (two mechanised infantry platoons). He also requested – and got – artillery support. But the support group, once again, walked straight into an anti-aircraft gun position, so that neither the mortar platoon nor the Ratel 90 troop could support the assault group as they were supposed to; they had to fight hard for their own survival. The Ratel 90s even had to use their main guns in close-quarters combat – as little as 30 m at times – and trampled several defenders under their big wheels, while the mortarists had to fight as ordinary infantry.

Meanwhile, the assault group advanced further, not fully realising what was happening to their mates in the support group. SWAPO soldiers were seen running all over the place. As Corporal Gareth Rutherford wrote shortly afterwards, “[t]his was exciting. This was what everybody had been waiting for.”

Then, at a shona (an opening in the bush), all hell broke loose. Several anti-aircraft guns, including three 14,5-mm and one deadly 23-mm, suddenly ripped through several Ratels in quick succession. Rutherford wrote:

Then it happened – not tack tack any more, but doof doof dooooof, doof doof dooooof, about three per second, heavy automatic fire. Memory of the briefing we had back at base, of huge anti-aircraft guns, 4 barrels, 8 ft high, 5 man crew – cutting through a Ratel like butter. I looked up at Gary, our Section Leader, and said, “Gary, do you know what that is?”, and he said, “Ja”. The booming went on, and we didn’t know where it was coming from; what we did know was that it would be tickets if we were hit. Our hearts sank, and our faces must have turned pale as fear turned to terror.[27]

Rifleman WS Bornman remembered that the 23-mm cannon “sounded like a big motorbike’s accelerator which one opens quickly and releases again, so rapid did it shoot”.[28] And Rifleman Marco Caforio wrote:

Our Ratel was hit. Suddenly everything went into almost slow motion. Steve Cronjé turned in his seat and opened the hydraulic doors for us to get out, that’s when I saw he had been hit in his chest. While I sat staring at Steve in total disbelief, three tracers passed by me inside the Ratel causing shrapnel to bounce around.

I realised at that point that we had just been hit with heavy calibre rounds. I turned to Robert and shouted at him to get out as we were being hit.

I told him to jump. Both of us jumped out of the top hatches. As I came off, I felt a burning sensation in my right hip and my left thigh. I hit the ground with my rifle in hand, where my webbing went to only God knows.

I screamed for Robert, but he didn’t answer. I saw him lying about a metre away from me and I crawled to him telling him that I had been hit. I grabbed him and shook him, his eyes were open but he had already gone. From seeing him lying there my mind snapped and I started shooting at what I didn’t know. While I was shooting I could hear AK rounds bouncing off the Ratel.

Crawling from under the Ratel at the back end Van der Vyver, or Van as I called him, was shouting to me: “Caforio, Caforio, jy moet dekking slaan, hulle skiet op jou.” I shouted to him: “Waar is die ouens? Waar is almal?” His reply was: “Hulle is almal dood.”[29]

Lieutenant Paul Louw, commander of 2 Platoon, which was hit badly, would never forget “the expressions on troops’ faces, the crumpled and charcoaled bodies, the smell of burnt human flesh, the smell of diesel early in the morning”.[30] Bornman remembered that “the Ratel in which I sat, one smelt just death as it was smeared with the blood of people who had been shot”.[31] Twelve South African soldiers died that day, the SADF’s largest casualty figure for one day’s fighting since 1945.

Those troops who were still unharmed, badly shaken or not, debussed immediately and attacked the enemy positions on foot. Rifleman Andrew McClean took a Bren machine gun, coolly walked towards a 23-mm gun position and shot the crew.[32] The problem was that the assault group and the support group could not render mutual aid, as doctrine called for; both were involved in desperate battles of their own. Reading the eyewitness accounts, one gets the impression that everything must have seemed very surreal at that moment. There was the deep roar of the anti-aircraft guns, the deafening chatter of small-arms fire and the explosions of all sorts of shells. But a job had to be done and the SWAPO fighters had to be killed or driven away.

To complicate matters further, Team 2’s rather rattled commander, Louis Harmse, pulled out of the fight and reported to Dippenaar. Harmse stayed with Dippenaar for the rest of the day, leaving his men to continue fighting without their commander. His report did have the advantage of bringing Team 2’s serious position to Dippenaar’s attention. He immediately took steps to remedy the situation by ordering the reserve Team 6 under Major Jab Swart to go and help Team 2. Team 1 (Paul Fouché), which had already fulfilled its task, was also ordered southwards at 16h30 to reinforce the embattled Team 2. The Elands of Team 3 (Jakes Jacobs) became the new reserve.

WO1 Peet Coetzee from Team 6 described the scene where the Ratels had been “shot and cut to ribbons”:

I . . . witnessed the devastating effects of what a 20-mm [sic; 23 mm] anti-aircraft cannon’s armour-piercing rounds could do to a Ratel. It simply went through everything, and that included the occupants sitting inside.

In another Ratel the driver was shot from behind and plastered against the driver’s front window. His flesh was protruding through the hole made by the passing round. It was not a pleasant sight and remained with me for a long time . . . I saw a critically wounded guy being made comfortable under a bush in a shady patch, his right arm having been blown off at the armpit with blood squirting out.[33]

Major Jab Swart, commander of Team 6, collected the bodies of some of the South African dead and gathered the remains of Team 2, but then ran into another contact. He swept right through it, firing all the way. Two of his Ratels lost their way, but such was the general mayhem that Swart did not wait to gather them, but continued onward. One Ratel found its way back; the other group spent an anxious night in the bush, fearing a SWAPO attack at any moment.

Dippenaar struggled to maintain his command. It needed a superman to re-establish control in a situation where sight was extremely limited and navigation difficult due to the dense bush, coupled with the shock of the tremendous noise and the losses on the South African side. But Dippenaar was a very good officer. When Major Paul Fouché from Team 1 ran into yet another ambush as he was moving southwards, Dippenaar ordered Jacobs and the Elands of Team 3 forward. Once again, mechanised infantry doctrine kicked in: Fouché pulled back about 200 m to disengage from the ambush and then moved around the enemy’s left flank, while Jacobs’s armoured cars supported them with their 90-mm guns. At last, everything came together in a textbook attack, and even the air support, in the form of two Impala IIs, was bang on target. In the process, a large number of enemy fighters were killed and two SWAPO prisoners taken. Some of the highly charged troops wanted to kill them, but Constand Viljoen and Johann Dippenaar strictly forbade it, saying, “Shoot at or touch those people [and] you’ll be court-martialled!” This was just as well, because the prisoners supplied the South Africans with much valuable information about other targets in the vicinity.

This attack finally broke SWAPO’s back. At 17h30 a signal was intercepted: “Enemy infantry had attacked our positions. We tried but we lost conduct of controlling the troops. We are evacuating.”[34]

But SWAPO still had a sting in its tail. While moving further southwards in the dark to a spot where they could spend the night, the combat group once again ran into a classic L-shaped ambush. But every South African vehicle brought down maximum fire on the enemy, and this proved too much for the defenders, who broke and ran after about 20 minutes. The night was spent in great anxiety, a massive SWAPO attack being expected any minute. But it never materialised. Most probably, SWAPO was equally, or even more, rattled by the day’s carnage.

The sun rose on the morning of 11 June on a scene of utter destruction. Military equipment was strewn about – some destroyed or damaged, some still intact – among dead bodies and the general chaos of war. In the course of the morning, the two companies of paratroops finally arrived in lorries from the echelon area at Mulemba and were used to mop up the area. The mechanised part of Combat Group 61 was by this point very low on fuel and ammunition, and some vehicles even had to be towed, having run dry. A while later, the rear echelon also arrived, as did Combat Group 10 (Chris Serfontein), and the whole Smokeshell complex was examined carefully for survivors and intelligence during the next few days.

At this time, something potentially serious happened. While Dippenaar was moving his headquarters, his command Ratel detonated a double mine. General Constand Viljoen happened to be in the vehicle, but he was thrown clear and was not injured. But at the operations headquarters at Eenhana, where Major General Jannie Geldenhuys was following the progress on radio, there were a few tense minutes until they heard Viljoen was unhurt. This did not stop Geldenhuys from joining Serfontein’s combat group just the next day!

In his detailed report, Dippenaar mentions that Viljoen, with “his inexhaustibility and activity was at that stage my biggest worry. The best I can describe General Viljoen is undoubtedly like an ant, because whenever there was a chance, he walked about, looked at equipment and talked to the soldiers. At no stage did he interfere with my command, although, from time to time and when asked, he gave his opinion.”[35]

By early afternoon on 13 June, the Smokeshell complex was completely free of SWAPO and in South African possession. Altogether, 267 bodies of PLAN fighters were found and buried, while 10 anti-aircraft guns and huge quantities of ammunition were also taken. Because of the length of the operation, it was judged that the insurgents had evacuated their bases at Ionde and that it would be unnecessary to attack that as well. Then 61 Mech moved back to the base area at Mulemba, where the following day the troops crowded every available radio to listen to the rugby Test between the Springboks and the visiting British Lions. Their day was made when the Boks trounced the Lions 26–9, which made up somewhat for the traumatic battle of four days before.

According to Geldenhuys, a pattern developed during Operation Sceptic that would be repeated later. “Firstly, an ants’ nest is kicked open and the ants scatter. Secondly, there is a search around the nest for ants. Smokeshell was the ants’ nest. Most cadres swarmed out in little groups to seek refuge at their other nests, or bases. Then a combination of area operations, follow-ups, and search-and-destroy operations were launched to locate and destroy them.”[36]

It is not necessary to follow the operations of the next few days in detail. Suffice to say that the South Africans stormed various PLAN bases, but found them empty, hurriedly evacuated after the huge clash at Smokeshell.[37] In the course of these operations, Chris Serfontein and Combat Group 10 also clashed with SWAPO’s so-called mechanised brigade north of Xangongo. Apparently, Serfontein came across the enemy rearguard and immediately attacked with two companies, assisted by some SAAF Impalas and mortar fire. Jannie Geldenhuys, who was present, relates that there wasn’t really a true fight, as SWAPO immediately broke and fled. Many documents, as well as 76-mm guns and other war materiel, were captured and taken back to South West Africa.[38]

But, on the way back to SWA, something happened to Serfontein’s Combat Group 10 that would be an ominous harbinger of what lay ahead. The plan was for the force to move through the village of Mongua, where it would meet up with Dippenaar’s force and return home. What Serfontein did not know was that a company-size mechanised FAPLA force was concentrated there. It appears that the Angolans were as surprised as the South African advance party (travelling in Buffels) when the two parties unexpectedly bumped into each other, but both recovered quickly. The Angolans charged with three BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, but the South Africans knocked them out in quick succession. Serfontein immediately sent a reinforcement company to the front, and together they counterattacked. An air strike with Mirages followed, and the Angolans fled.[39]

The fight itself was not that remarkable; the South Africans reacted rapidly to an unexpected situation and came out on top. This would happen countless times in the future. What made this fight especially noteworthy is that this was the first time that the SADF and FAPLA had clashed while the South Africans were fighting SWAPO. Given the circumstances, one gets the impression that it was purely incidental – there was no deliberate attempt by FAPLA to intervene in the war between the SADF and PLAN. Nevertheless, a line had been crossed, and within a relatively short time the South Africans would find it more and more difficult to fight against PLAN without coming up against FAPLA as well.

Conclusion

Operation Sceptic, especially the Battle of Smokeshell, was an important development in the Border War. Its predecessors, operations Reindeer, Rekstok and Saffraan, had been limited in scope and time. Sceptic evolved into a much longer operation, during which PLAN was hunted deep within its own rear areas in Angola for about three weeks. Apart from Savannah, this was the biggest and longest operation the SADF had been involved in since 1945.

Another difference from the Battle of Cassinga was that the result at Smokeshell was never really in doubt, in spite of the sudden setback Combat Team 2 suffered in the south of the complex. Although the troops of 61 Mech were highly trained and motivated, they had seen no action before the battle, yet they acquitted themselves well. The members of Louis Harmse’s Combat Team 2 in particular would be understandably haunted by their experience for decades to come, but even in the face of death they did what they had to do – they attacked the enemy and defeated him.

Nevertheless, Operation Sceptic laid bare a number of deficiencies in the SADF that had to be remedied. These are addressed below.

Intelligence: Several officers were not satisfied with the intelligence they received about the Smokeshell complex. According to Commandant Dippenaar, there “remained uncertainty about the nature of the target”. For instance, even though he knew Smokeshell consisted of 13 bases, it was unclear what “the composition of the enemy” was in each complex.[40] The biggest factor at the time was whether the enemy was dug in or not. The battle plan was based on information that there were only shallow foxholes. The fact that this information was wrong was directly responsible for the problems encountered by Combat Team 2.

The army and SAAF: During this operation the coordination between the SAAF and the army was less than optimal. Firstly, the air attacks in the preceding days either would have warned SWAPO of a planned attack or would have encouraged an evacuation as a precaution against further attacks. Secondly, on the day of the attack on Smokeshell the air attacks were not properly coordinated with the ground assault. Given that the ground forces would reach Smokeshell only later that day, what was the advantage of an early-morning attack? It only gave PLAN time to recover their wits and either prepare for the expected assault or melt away into the dense bush. Reflecting on the battle, Paul Fouché quite correctly wrote in his report: “Air support must be followed up immediately with an attack.”[41] Louis Harmse and Jakes Jacobs also criticised the coordination between the air force and the army.[42]

Underestimating your enemy: In his war diary, Commandant Dippenaar states that intelligence had indicated that PLAN would not stand and fight, and that the leaders would flee first.[43] It is true that the defenders of the northern parts of the complex had fled before the attack started, but many of those in the south stood fast and fought courageously. Combat Team 2’s attack, with the Ratels’ 20-mm guns rattling and the Ratel 90s spewing death and destruction, must have been very frightening. Yet eyewitness accounts tell of SWAPO cadres fighting to the death, spraying the South Africans with deadly fire from 14,5-mm and 23-mm anti-aircraft guns.

In a comment reminiscent of Cassinga, eyewitness Chris de Klerk explained how SWAPO kept at it: “When you shot one terr behind his gun, another jumped in, and if you shoot him another jumps up. If you shot one it didn’t mean the weapon didn’t work any more – they jumped like rabbits out of those holes, and carried on shooting at you.”[44]

It is never a good policy to underestimate your enemy.

Navigation: The terrain in and around Smokeshell was flat and featureless, while dense bush restricted sight and faint paths made navigation difficult. Several times, both during the advance and at the target itself, the South Africans lost their way and floundered about. Once, an SAAF spotter plane guided them back to where they had to be; at other times, they only had a general idea of where they were. This would prove to be an issue for the duration of the war. Only in 1983/1984 did the artillery get a primitive kind of navigation system, along the lines of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which took about 75 minutes to set up.[45]

Equipment: Several equipment problems were identified during Operation Sceptic. Firstly, experience confirmed that the Eland was not really suited to the kind of lightning operations the SADF was conducting. The Eland still burned petrol, whereas all the other vehicles ran on diesel, and its range was considerably less than that of the Ratel (300 km against the 800 km of the Ratel). This made logistics more complicated. During Sceptic, the Elands sometimes ran out of fuel when the Ratels still had more than enough, with the result that the Noddy cars had to be towed.

But even the Ratels gave problems. The accumulation of leaves clogged the air intakes and caused the vehicles to overheat and even to catch fire. More than one 20-mm gun was bent by the vehicle smashing through bushes and trees.

As during Operation Reindeer, the radios gave trouble. Units and sub-units found it difficult to talk to each other; communication with tactical headquarters at Eenhana was problematic; and the SAAF aircraft and the army on the ground could not converse easily.

The artillery dated from the Second World War, and the gunners had trouble calibrating their old guns for accurate fire. Their Magirus Deutz gun tractors overheated, and the old towing equipment sometimes broke down due to metal fatigue.

Operation Sceptic finally proved that the 7,62-mm R1 rifle was not suitable for mechanised operations. It was an excellent weapon, with formidable stopping power, and was very well liked by the troops, but the R1 was too large to be used comfortably from within a Ratel. During his time at the front, General Viljoen carried a 5,56-mm R4, an adaptation of the Israeli Galil rifle, with a folding stock, which would become – and at the time of writing still is – the standard South African Army rifle.

By and large, Sceptic was a valuable learning experience for the SADF and provided several lessons, large and small, which would be applied on forthcoming operations.

One question remains to be answered. Did Sceptic succeed in its objective? The SADF lost 17 soldiers, as well as one Impala light jet bomber and an Alouette III helicopter. The number of PLAN bodies counted were 380. Several hundred tonnes of arms and ammunition were destroyed, and some 150 tonnes, including vehicles and light artillery, were taken back to SWA.[46] SADF Military Intelligence estimated that about 75% of PLAN’s transport capacity had been taken or destroyed.[47] The statistics were impressive.

All the sources are unanimous that SWAPO had suffered a substantial reverse: several of its bases were destroyed, its forces were scattered, many fighters were killed and much materiel was destroyed. The South Africans also captured several secret documents, which revealed SWAPO’s future plans.

But, despite Operation Sceptic’s seemingly conventional nature, it should not be evaluated according to conventional warfare standards. The Border War was essentially a counterinsurgency and guerrilla war, even if the battlefield had been moved from Ovamboland to Cunene province. And in a guerrilla war, reverses like this one are, in the long run, not all that important. After the South Africans had left, PLAN would reoccupy the bases or establish new ones. Their arms and equipment would be replenished – the Kremlin would see to that.

Therefore, although the planned infiltration offensive that gave rise to Operation Sceptic in the first place was disrupted, the effect was temporary. That offensive went ahead, albeit in reduced form. According to Willem Steenkamp, July saw 65 PLAN fighters killed in Ovamboland, 102 in August and 170 in September,[48] suggesting that Sceptic did not really reduce PLAN’s capacity to infiltrate into South West Africa. Indeed, when viewing the statistics, 1980 saw an absolute peak of 1 175 incidents (contacts, ambushes, mines detonated, incidents of intimidation and sabotage). But a total of 1 147 PLAN fighters were also killed (see tables in Chapter 9). Could PLAN take the punishment and still continue as an effective force? The next few years would tell.