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The Austrian government, which is composed of old hereditary states and conquests of a later date, a sort of chequer-work of provincial privileges and immunities, may be said to be the creation of a statesman, who must be placed in a superior rank to all others.

It is not only under the aspect of a long and brilliant diplomatic career that we must regard the life of Prince Metternich, we must also look upon him as the head of the executive organisation, which includes so many various interests, and such a diversity of national characters and feelings, under the government of one sceptre.

Cast your eyes over the provinces which extend from the centre of Germany into Poland, from the extremity of Gallicia as far as Venice and Milan, from Zara on the Adriatic to Mantua, the key of Lake Garda and of the Tyrol, an assemblage of richer countries or more opulent cities cannot be met with. To Metternich belongs the honour of having already, for above thirty years, maintained his hold upon these various nations; he has realised the most difficult system of local administration and of a central government, great domestic liberty, with, at the same time, careful surveillance, an active police with very indulgent toleration, the most extensive credit with the least oppressive taxation. One might compare the Austrian government to the father of a family, anxious and rather strict with his children; the elder ones are tractable, the younger sometimes unruly, over whom he keeps a tight rein, in order that it may as seldom as possible be necessary to have recourse to chastisement.[1]

Railways and industrial establishments are becoming numerous in Austria; her navy is increasing on the Adriatic, and is a means of circulating her flourishing manufactures. Metternich has thus caused the age of labour to succeed to that of war and conquest. The ancient constitution of Germany was destroyed at the peace of Presburg, during the time of the contemptible and fragile assembly of the Confederation of the Rhine. The house of Austria then renounced the old imperial crown; but a new existence has opened for it, and, after innumerable reverses under the Republic and Napoleon, it again reared its head with a new state of political life and of military power. Since the year 1813, Austria has been constantly called upon to play a great part in the affairs of Europe, and Metternich has succeeded in giving to her politics a character of perseverance, or, rather, of immutability, the result of an idea nobly conceived, and then worked out like a mission he felt intrusted to accomplish.

The political life of a statesman is bound up in the work he has undertaken. It is not my habit as a historian to adopt the narrow views inspired by party-spirit or worn-out declamation: when a minister has achieved the greatness of an empire, resisted vassalage under Napoleon, and furnished the most extensive field for the page of history, I will not, from a weak patriotism, raise my voice against this master-mind. We may meet with enough men who destroy; we ought to feel respect for those capable of creating, and then maintaining their work.

Clement Wenceslaus, Count of Metternich-Winneburg-Ochsenhausen, was born at Coblentz, on the 13th of May, 1773, of a good German family, whose ancestors have served in former times against the Ottomans. I also find there were several officers of the name of Metternich in the company of Lanzknechts, in the time of the Reformation and of the League. His father, Count Metternich, a man of very moderate abilities, was greatly in the confidence of Prince Kaunitz, and his name is mentioned in all the business transacted concerning the Low Countries. Young Metternich received the names of Clement-Wenceslaus, after the Prince of Poland and Lithuania, Duke of Saxony, who stood godfather to him. At the age of fifteen he went to the university of Strasburg, at that time very celebrated, and the most frequented academy in Europe.

The philosophy of Voltaire, Helvetius, and Rousseau, was then in the ascendant—that empty sensualism which filled young heads with effervescing fancies. The university of Strasburg was under the direction of Koch, the celebrated lecturer upon international law; and, by a singular chance, another youth, whose name has since been well known, was also pursuing his studies at the same university; this was Benjamin Constant de Rebecque. Some degree of friendship sprung up between the students, and it is curious to observe what a different career was opened by the caprices of Fortune to the two pupils of Professor Koch. Count Metternich concluded his philosophical studies in the year 1790; the rest of his education was completed in Germany. When he reached the age of twenty he visited England and Holland, and afterwards went to live at Vienna, where he married Maria Eleonora, of Kaunitz-Rietberg.

Metternich's first entry into the diplomatic corps was merely as a secretary at the Congress of Rahstadt,—a singular negotiation, which had a most tragical termination;[2] he afterwards accompanied Count Stadion in his missions to Prussia and to St. Petersburg, and was at the latter court at the time of the alliance between Russia and Austria, which fell to the ground in consequence of the rapidity of Napoleon's military investment of Ulm, and the revolt of Bavaria,—an admirable campaign, which at once placed the French emperor in the rank of the greatest military commanders.

Even at this early period it was the opinion of Metternich that the triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Germany, would not be too much to restrain the power of Napoleon; and a striking evidence of the importance of France and of her leader had just been afforded by the battle of Austerlitz. Count Metternich was called upon to take a part in all the treaties concluded at this time; and, up to this period, his opinions appeared to belong to the same school as those of Count Stadion, who was shortly afterwards appointed minister for foreign affairs. By him Metternich was proposed as ambassador to the court of Russia; but, the treaty of Presburg having completely altered the position of Austria in Europe, Francis II. preferred sending the young diplomatist to Napoleon; and, on the 15th of August, 1806, the day of the solemn national anniversary, the ambassador presented his credentials, and first appeared before the favourite of fortune and glory.

The political system of which Count Metternich was the representative at Paris was very complicated. Since the first coalition against France, Austria had suffered the most severe reverses, having been twice deprived of the Milanese by Buonaparte, general and consul; then driven back on the banks of the Danube by Moreau, and having a second time entered the lists, after the alliance with Russia, this new coalition was dissolved by the battle of Austerlitz, and the Austrian cabinet was obliged to sign the treaty of Presburg,—a covenant submitted to through necessity alone, which broke up the old empire of Germany, and, in some measure, made an end of that of Austria.

It was the politics of this treaty, so fatal to the interests of the emperor, that Metternich was deputed to represent at Paris. The Confederation of the Rhine had overturned all the German system of affairs, which was as ancient as the Golden Bull. Wirtemberg and Bavaria, instead of being mere electorates, became kingdoms; when Bavaria received, at the expense of Austria, a territory of more than 12,000 square miles, a population of above 3,000,000 of souls, and a revenue of above 17,000,000 florins; and the aggrandisement of Wirtemberg, also prejudicial to Austria, though, no doubt, in a less degree, cost her about 150 square miles. Austria also lost the Venetian states, the Tyrol, the five cities of the Danube, Venetian Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro.

The act of the Confederation of the Rhine, which was the work of Talleyrand, Otto, and Reinhard, tore away the last remains of the old imperial mantle: and Francis II. was obliged to lay aside this ancient dignity, which would have been, in time to come, nothing but an empty title. Napoleon's system was to invade every thing, and a treaty was to him but an opportunity of launching out into fresh conquests. He had planted his family in Germany by instituting the kingdom of Westphalia; and, by means of marriages, he connected himself with Wirtemberg and Bavaria: all the stipulations in the treaty of Presburg had been insisted upon with the most inflexible haughtiness.

After these terrible reverses, Metternich considered the best means of regaining a little influence in Europe was to keep on good terms with Napoleon, or rather to preserve a strict neutrality, which might allow Austria to trace out an advantageous line of conduct for herself, should any decisive circumstance occur, as it could hardly fail to do sooner or later. The diplomatic system of Metternich was consequently one of expectation and inquiry; his special mission was, to become intimately acquainted with the most trifling peculiarities of this new and singularly constructed court, and to discover the thoughts and even the caprices of the powerful Emperor of the French.

Fresh successes had just crowned the arms of Napoleon. After some unfortunate hesitation, Prussia had cast herself headlong into the Russian alliance; and, after her subsequent defeat at Jena, the peace of Tilsit had laid the foundation of a temporary truce, for treaties with Napoleon could only possess that transitory character. Metternich received orders from his court to endeavour, by means of a respectful deference, to conciliate the favour of the great sovereign. The almost magical influence which Napoleon had obtained over the mind of Alexander at Tilsit had excited great apprehensions at Vienna: an interview was about to take place at Erfurt, and the probable consequences that might result from it were a source of serious alarm to Austria. Metternich was constantly seen at the Tuileries. He was the representative of a very ancient European court; himself a man of good birth, and with aristocratic manners, every thing was in his favour, and he was perfectly successful in his mission. At the court of Napoleon there existed much formality, a tone of society combining at once a degree of constraint with the blunt manners of the camp. It was a mere collection of puerile ceremonies; and a man of good family enjoyed an incontestable superiority there from the good taste and ease communicated by education, and the constant habit of society. The ambassador was then thirty-four years of age, his countenance was noble and intelligent; he went to all the court entertainments, and attracted universal attention by the elegance of his equipage and his expensive habits. Young, brilliant, gifted with a ready wit and an easy flow of language, with a slightly emphatic manner of speaking, Count Metternich had the reputation of being a successful gallant, and highly in favour with the Parisian ladies.

The ambassador had recourse to the pleasing species of politics which reaches the secrets of the cabinet—through the heart. His fascinating manners had gained him the good-will of Napoleon, who took pleasure in distinguishing him in the crowd of foreign ministers, and liked to converse with him, though with an occasional observation that he was very young to be the representative of one of the oldest courts of Europe. "At the battle of Austerlitz you were scarcely older than I am now!" was one day the reply of the ambassador. The Emperor was never hasty in his language to Metternich, for he considered him as the means by which an idea of the French system could be conveyed into Austria; and more than once the subject of their debate was the question of the balance of power in Europe, which assumed in the mind of Napoleon such gigantic proportions. Metternich's scheme was to represent the alliance between France and Austria as indispensable; and he spoke of the treaty of 1736, concluded under the influence of the Duc de Choiseul, as the basis of all political grandeur in Europe. The conference of Erfurt was, however, a source of constant uneasiness to him, and Napoleon had just departed for the meeting which was to reconcile the two empires of the North and the South. Promises had been exchanged between the emperors, and in these plans the sacrifice of Austria was determined upon. They were not ignorant of this at Vienna: had, then, all the efforts of Metternich in Paris been in vain? The Spanish war had just broken out, and another sovereign had been hurled from his throne. Was not this a fresh warning to the House of Austria? The alarms it inspired were confessed at the court of London, and England fed their fears in order to induce them to take a vigorous part in the war; for which purpose a report was circulated of a projected change of succession in the Austrian dynasty, favoured by Napoleon.

The peace of Presburg, by placing every where in the Germanic Confederation French principles, and almost French administration, had excited strong dissatisfaction, and the general detestation had been increased by large military contributions, and numerous vexatious oppressions indulged in by the generals and their subordinates. In every direction burst forth the anti-Gallic spirit in favour of the liberty of Germany, especially among the nobility and the secret associations, which had become formidable as early as 1808. The liberal impulse against Napoleon had been awakened in Europe, and it was not one of the least influential causes of his downfall. England encouraged these views; subsidies were promised to a government deeply involved in debt; the resistance of the Peninsula was pointed out to Austria, and the difficulties thereby opposed to the military power of Napoleon, especially after the capitulation of Baylen. Why should they not take advantage of this opportunity to burst through the conditions imposed by the treaty of Presburg? England engaged to subsidise the Austrian army, if, uniting their efforts to the common cause, they would seize that moment for declaring against France; and she also promised a simultaneous diversion in Holland and Spain. These warlike propositions soon found friends among the German nobility, and Count Stadion entered completely into the English views. The levies were immense, for the fate of the empire was at stake.

At this period the business of the young ambassador was to mask by flattering promises the military preparations that were making in Austria. His papers were full of protestations of confidence: and how could he act otherwise? Is it not the duty of a diplomatist to soften the course of events, and to moderate the first bursts of anger and vengeance of one nation against another? Austria did not wish to engage in war until Napoleon should be completely absorbed in his Spanish expedition. But as soon as the Emperor and the Old Guard had left Paris, to raise the puppet throne of Joseph at Madrid, she no longer dissembled her warlike preparations; hostilities were commenced against Bavaria, the close ally of Napoleon, and the Austrian standard was unfurled at Ulm. Napoleon, informed of this unexpected movement, made but one step back to Paris. Metternich was still there.

The ambassador was now placed in a very delicate position, for the Austrian war had really been a surprise. Napoleon thought himself the dupe of Metternich, and he commanded Fouché, the Minister of Police, to cause him to be seized, and marched from one military station to another, until he reached the frontier. The order was harsh, brutal, and contrary to all diplomatic usages. Is not an ambassador bound to obey the instructions of his government, and to serve its interests? and is it not his duty to conceal every thing that may injure his court? Fouché, with his usual regard to his own interest, and who considered what the future might bring forth, executed the orders of Napoleon with delicacy and politeness. He went to the ambassador's house, told him the occasion of his visit, and expressed the most lively regret for it. A degree of dissatisfaction had already begun to arise in the mind of this minister, who looked forward to the time when the insatiable ambition of Napoleon must have a limit, and he and Metternich expressed to each other, in mutual confidence, their feelings on the miseries of war and the rapacious spirit of Napoleon; and Fouché, whose disposition was generally communicative and incautious, went so far as to give utterance to most singular opinions concerning the probable downfall, or even death, of his master. In order as far as possible to soften the rigorous orders he had received, a single captain of gendarmerie, chosen by Marshal Moncey, accompanied the travelling-carriage of the ambassador to the frontier. Prince Metternich takes pleasure in relating the curious occurrences of this journey, which, like that of the aide-de-camp Czernicheff in 1812, was not devoid of peril.

Then the earth was shaken! The Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, fought valiantly for the defence of their country and their sovereign, and the battle of Essling menaced the fortunes of Napoleon. The disastrous event of this day was never fully published in France; but elsewhere it was perfectly known. Preussisch-Eylau, the capitulation of Baylen, and the battle of Essling on the Danube, appear to me to be the three culminating points, which first taught the world that the armies of Napoleon were no longer invincible: these battles had a great moral influence upon the affairs of Europe, and Wagram was necessary to restore the powerful effect of the Emperor's name; the field of battle on this occasion was doubtful, but nothing could be more decisive than the result; great discouragement was manifested in the councils of Vienna, and the party in favour of peace carried the day.

Victory had then decided between France and Austria, proving the star of Napoleon to be utterly irresistible. The two parties which divided the court of Vienna now became more marked, the opinion in favour of peace, represented by Count Bubna, prevailed in the Emperor's council, and Count Stadion, who had hitherto had the direction of affairs under the influence of the English system, was obliged to retire from the cabinet. The ministry for foreign affairs having thus become vacant, Francis II. thought to conciliate France by the appointment of Metternich, who had displayed great abilities during his embassy to that country. The count, having been reconciled with Napoleon, had since then carefully maintained a middle course between peace and war, and he had also begun to adopt in politics the attitude of armed neutrality, which, ever since 1813, has been the characteristic of Austrian policy. This was a period of deep humiliation for the old imperial crown. The Moniteur had announced that the House of Lorraine had ceased to reign; the Austrian monarchy had been vanquished in the struggle, its armies had experienced terrible reverses; but there still remained to the Emperor Francis the devoted affection of his people, and the indignation they felt at the prospect of French domination.

Count Metternich was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Napoleon, together with Count Bubna, and interviews took place for the purpose of treating of peace. The victor was excessively irritated at the vigorous conduct of Austria, and never were conferences attended with more violence or more fiery disputes; so that Metternich was obliged to apply all the powers of his mind towards inspiring the haughty conqueror with more moderate sentiments. If Napoleon bore in mind his silent and skilful conduct in 1809, he knew, that by favouring his elevation at the court of the Emperor of Austria, he should secure to himself an ally and a representative of his system. These motives, joined to dark hints of assassination, and to the uneasiness caused by the religious brotherhoods among the people, which were already beginning to stir for independence, all contributed to hasten the conclusion of the treaty of Vienna. Is it necessary to remind the reader that the French every where made use of their victories with the inflexible right of the conqueror?

On the occasion of this treaty, Count Metternich received the title of Chancellor of the State, with the direction of foreign affairs,—an office of immense responsibility under existing circumstances. The population was exhausted by the war; the treasury without resources, having been completely drained by the contributions levied by the French; and the monarchy was deprived of all influence in Germany, the treaty of Vienna having robbed it of the last remains of importance towards the south; so that, as I have elsewhere[3] remarked, beside her was the Confederation of the Rhine, that is to say, Napoleon; in front the Helvetic Confederation, again Napoleon; to the south the kingdom of Italy, still Napoleon. There remained but a choice of two plans to Austria, either again to try the chance of war, or to appease the Emperor of the French by the most profound submission to all his wishes. Such was the idea of Metternich, when he suggested the marriage of the archduchess, when, as it was said by the implacable Lady Castlereagh, it was necessary to deliver up a daughter of the house of Austria to satisfy the Minotaur.

If the French emperor were to choose a wife among the grand-duchesses of the house of Romanoff, the plan proposed at Erfurt would be quickly accomplished, that is to say, the formation of two great empires, around which there would be a number of small intermediate kingdoms, in some degree dependent upon them; and, to avoid this peril, Metternich hastened the marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa: by this means the house of Austria would secure a real protector in the French emperor, and the suit of a brilliant adventurer, at the feet of the daughter of a royal line, might be advantageous to the future prospects of the German crown. It is allowable in politics to calculate to what extent human passions may affect the course of affairs, and therefore the new chancellor of the state, when negotiating the union of the archduchess with Napoleon, looked forward, by means of a family arrangement, to recovering the position of which Austria had been deprived by the fortune of war. The marriage of the archduchess was arranged and concluded entirely by Metternich.

Still, however, he carefully pursued the course towards which there appeared at that time to be a general bent in Europe. In the beginning of the year 1811, certain symptoms appeared to indicate to the court of Vienna that a rupture was about to take place between France and Russia, and these suspicions were changed ere long into certainty: M. Otto, the French ambassador at Vienna, opened his mind completely to Metternich, and, acting on the principle of the late alliance, he proposed they should form a kind of league of offence and defence in the war Napoleon was about to commence against Russia. The French emperor only required a detached corps of 40,000 Austrian auxiliaries as an active force, who were to attack the eastern extremity of Gallicia, at the same time that the French army should proceed to the Vistula. This treaty farther stipulated that the Austrian possessions in Poland should remain untouched, and certain territorial cessions in favour of Austria were agreed upon, in the event of the war against Russia proving successful; thus Metternich began to reap the advantages of the French alliance.

The campaign of 1812 began. The Austrian corps of 30,000 auxiliaries was posted on the Vistula, and, if not required to take an active part in the operations, it still was a check upon the Russian army, which already threatened the flanks of Napoleon's troops. Metternich watched with extreme anxiety the movements of the invading army in Russia; its disastrous retreat was an appalling and unlooked-for catastrophe, and Prince Schwartzenberg went to oppose the Russian troops.

A new train of ideas, a new series of negotiations were now to be entertained. The retreat from Moscow had been so calamitous, that it had not spared to the French enough troops to protect the line of the Oder, far less to retain possession of that of the Vistula. If Prussia and Austria had been faithful to their alliance with Napoleon, they ought immediately to have combined their forces, and opposed all their strength to the Russians, who were already making incursions on every side. The situation of the two courts was very difficult, for the whole German nation was so unanimous in their dislike to the French, that it would have been impossible for the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to take any steps in their favour, without placing themselves in direct opposition to the people they governed; and, besides, after the deep humiliation they had both endured at the hands of Napoleon, was it not natural they should seek some motive, or, if the expression be preferred, some pretext, for delivering themselves from a state of subjection so fatal to them? Prussia, who was foremost, had no hesitation in abandoning an alliance that was so dishonourable to her. Metternich did not immediately follow her contagious example, but, a cessation of hostilities having taken place between the Russian and Austrian armies, the eyes of France fell upon the cabinet of Vienna, as the mediatorial power which was to prepare a peace, on a foundation in better keeping with the general equilibrium of Europe. In his conferences with M. Otto, the imperial chancellor gave him clearly to understand, that the Austrian government would not depart from the principles of the French alliance, but that the nature of their situation had been altered by the late military events, and, as the frontier of Austria might become the theatre of war, the cabinet of Vienna would naturally assume a more decided attitude, in order to bring to a conclusion a struggle which would for the future so closely affect the empire.

The mission of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Bubna, at Paris, was conducted in the same spirit. Without giving up the alliance, the Austrian government signified that it could no longer rest upon the same basis, in fact, that they must take a more decided part in the approaching military crisis. Metternich's object in this new negotiation was to lay the foundation for a general peace. Such a resolution was by no means disinterested on his part, for, in the new settlement of the boundaries of the different states of Europe which must ensue, Austria would obtain an accession of territory, as a consequence of the position in which the course of events had placed her. The English party was gaining ground at Vienna, and Lord Walpole had arrived with offers of subsidies and augmentation of territory; in proportion, also, as the French army met with fresh reverses, the popular feeling of Germany assumed a more decided character; still Metternich persisted in his mediatorial system, from the conviction that it would be for the real advantage of his country.

These negotiations continued all through the winter of 1812-13. In the meanwhile, M. Otto had been replaced by Count Louis de Narbonne, the representative of the family alliance. He had been appointed by Napoleon, in the hope that his presence would remind Austria that an archduchess sat upon the throne of France; and, by the decree of the senate and the emperor, this same archduchess had just been officially proclaimed regent during the absence of Napoleon: the government being placed in her hands was a fresh guarantee to Austria of the personal feelings of the emperor's son-in-law. In politics alliances are formed upon positive interests, and Napoleon had too greatly abused his victories; the decree had gone forth, the empire, which extended from Hamburg to Venice—the protectorate, which pressed heavily upon Germany, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland—the diplomatic oppression which burdened Sweden and Denmark—all must have an end: after action, a reaction must be expected.

During this time considerable levies took place in every part of the Austrian territory, for it was determined the army should be made up to its full complement of 300,000 men. Metternich justified these warlike preparations by the natural position in which Austria was placed: when the belligerents came so closely in contact with the territory of a neuter party, it appeared quite natural that the neuter should take precautions to preserve its own independence. The position which Metternich had given to Austria had made her a predominant power, with the right of insisting upon real advantages, by way of indemnity; this was an admirable change of circumstances, which left Austria at liberty to come to a definitive decision.

Baron Weissemberg then started for London, under the official pretext of bringing about a general peace, but in reality for the purpose of sounding the English cabinet upon the advantages likely to be offered to Austria, in the way of subsidies and accession of territory, in case she should declare openly in favour of the coalition, and should be willing to furnish so considerable a force as 450,000 men. Now all this occurred in the month of March 1813, and the armaments of Austria received a fresh augmentation, when the thunders of the artillery were heard at Lutzen and Bautzen; 200,000 men were already located in Bohemia: against whom could these immense bodies of troops be intended to act? At this juncture, Metternich again appeared in his mediatorial capacity, to prepare the armistice of Plesswitz, afterwards definitively settled at Nieumarch: Austria constantly declared that, as the conflicting armies occupied four hundred leagues of her frontiers, it was impossible she should any longer refrain from taking an active part in the struggle, if the belligerent powers would not agree to terms of reconciliation. A step was thus taken, from a state of alliance with Napoleon, towards a condition of armed neutrality, and how could so powerful a country as Austria long continue in this situation? In the heated state of the public mind in Germany, how was it possible to calculate the exact point where the mediation would stop for the casus belli?

It was the interest of Russia and Prussia to keep on good terms with a court capable of drawing up a body of excellent troops 200,000 strong. After some bitter and ill-advised observations, Napoleon also accepted the mediation; it was a sort of break in the military operations, an expression of the weariness felt by an army now worn out with battles. We may see how great a part Metternich had created for Austria in these negotiations, for, on former occasions, the plenipotentiaries could treat the Austrian interests as a separate concern, while in her new position Vienna became the indispensable intermediate agent in any treaty that might be contemplated. The question was, Did Austria offer her mediation in good faith, with a sincere wish for peace? or was it merely as a lure, to enable her to render her military establishment more complete? This becomes an important question for history.

It must be remembered that, after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the desire for peace was universal, even in France, and in the tent of Napoleon, in the military night-watch, as well as on the morning of battle; the troops still fought, but it was no longer with the willingness, the enthusiasm of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena. Napoleon submitted to the powerful voice of public opinion, but could his iron disposition bend to circumstances? Until that time as general and consul, and afterwards as emperor, he had been accustomed to say to the vanquished states, "These are my conditions, you have no choice but to accept them; and, if there are any alleviating circumstances, it is to my clemency alone that you will owe them." In 1813, the tables were turned: cabinets now appeared with powers quite equal to that of France, animated, too, with the ardour of battle, and burning with the desire of repairing their former humiliation, and reconquering their independence. The allied powers had signed the armistice of Nieumarch, one great inducement being the opportunity gained for carrying on a secret negotiation with the crown prince of Sweden, and also for the sake of persuading Austria to join the league. I think their anxiety for peace was less than their wish to gain the time necessary to complete their vast military arrangements, by detaching Austria from her part of mediator, and inducing her to join them in the war against the common enemy; pious Germany, having gained her feet, now wanted to make an end of her oppressor. Now, would Metternich continue to preserve this neutral position? would not the Austrian government be inclined for a change of system?

Let us not forget how Austria was at that time situated. Had she not a right to obtain, by diplomatic means, all the advantages offered by her present position? We know the heavy losses she had sustained in Italy; the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Illyrian provinces, had been successively torn from her: and was it not natural she should take advantage of her armed mediation, a favourable position in which Metternich had contrived to place her? Had she derived the expected advantages from the general peace, she would not have joined the coalition against Napoleon; failing in that, she must endeavour to recover by force of arms all she had been deprived of during the war. It was for the purpose of justifying this delicate situation that Metternich first introduced the elegant system of high and noble diplomatic language, a style of which Baron Gentz has since been the most distinguished organ—Gentz, whose life has been so busy, and so full of disappointments, who, in his old age, came to utter soft love speeches at the feet of Miss Fanny Elssler.

Metternich unfolds in his papers his ideas upon the balance of power in Europe, which tended to diminish the prodigious influence of Napoleon, to the benefit of the allied states. I am not aware of any thing written in a more remarkable style than these despatches; they are, perhaps, rather loose in their details, but all the expressions are so carefully guarded, that they never compromised either the cabinet or the writer.

After signing the armistice of Nieumarch, Napoleon had fixed his head-quarters at Dresden. Successive despatches, from the French cabinet, requested the Emperor Francis II. to affix his signature to the preliminaries of a treaty of peace; at last, Metternich, bearing an autograph letter from his sovereign, in answer to the overtures that had been made to him, repaired to Dresden, commissioned to find out what might be the definitive intentions of Napoleon with regard to peace. The conference lasted nearly half a day; the emperor, in his military dress, strode hastily up and down the room, with flashing eyes, and sharp, hurried gestures: he took up his hat, then laid it down again, and threw himself into a large easy chair, while the perspiration started on his brow; he was evidently disturbed in mind, for he burst forth, in no measured terms, to Metternich: "Your government," said he, "wants to take advantage of my perplexed situation; and the question with you is, whether you can exact so much from me without fighting, or whether you must decide in ranging yourselves among my enemies? Well, let us see! Let us negotiate—I am perfectly willing. What do you want?"

To this abrupt sally, to this demand so little in accordance with the usual diplomatic forms, Metternich merely replied, "That Austria was desirous of establishing an order of things, which, by the wise distribution of power, should place the preservation of peace under the protection of an association of independent states; that the object of the cabinet of Vienna must be to destroy the sole predominancy of the Emperor Napoleon, by substituting to his colossal influence a balance of power, which should establish Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on a footing completely independent of the French empire." As a summary of these conditions, Austria claimed Illyria, and a more extended frontier towards Italy; the Pope was to be reinstated in his dominions; Poland to be subjected to another partition; Spain and Holland were to be evacuated by the French army; and the Confederation of the Rhine and the mediation of Switzerland were to be given up by the Emperor, who was already overwhelmed with ill-fortune.

Thus was to be accomplished the dismemberment of the gigantic work erected by the toils and victories of Napoleon. Shall I venture to describe this scene as it has been depicted to me by the sole eye-witness, Prince Metternich himself? As the Austrian plenipotentiary unfolded the views of his cabinet, the sallow complexion of Napoleon gradually assumed a crimson hue; at last he exclaimed, "Metternich, do you attempt to impose such conditions upon me without drawing a sword? These demands are most insulting! And it is my father-in-law who agrees to such a plan! What kind of position does he wish to place me in with regard to the French people? Ah, Metternich! how much has England given you to play this part against me?"

To this offensive language, Metternich, retaining his calm and dignified demeanour, replied not a word; and Napoleon, in the violence of his gestures, having let fall his hat, the Austrian minister did not stoop to pick it up, as politeness would have induced him to do under any other circumstances. There was a silence of half an hour.[4] Afterwards the conversation was resumed in a cooler and calmer tone; and, in dismissing Metternich, the Emperor, taking his hand, said to him, "After all, Illyria is not my last word, and we may be able to arrange better conditions."

This dialogue is of importance to history, for it decided the fate of Napoleon.

The Emperor's habits of command made his language hasty and his summons for an answer abrupt; and, when he addressed himself thus to a person in an elevated position, it naturally gave great offence. Metternich retained the strongest resentment for his behaviour—he had been deeply insulted; and, besides, so experienced a minister could not fail to discover the secret thoughts of the Emperor, and must have been well convinced that, with such a character as his, there was but little reason to hope for the re-establishment of the balance of power in Europe.

Nevertheless, Austria consented to the conferences at Prague, and, by a fresh agreement, the suspension of hostilities was prolonged till the 10th of August. Metternich, as the representative of the mediatorial power, was by right president of the congress, in the same manner as it had fallen to the Swedish minister at the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick. M. Maret first raised difficulties on the score of etiquette, because Baron Humboldt and Baron d'Anstett, the representatives of Russia and Prussia, were only ministers of the second rank, while M. de Caulaincourt and M. Maret belonged to the first. They next discussed the order of precedence and little questions of detail; they considered whether the negotiation should be carried on in writing or viva voce, and the forms of the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick were called for. The object of each party was to gain time, in order that hostilities might recommence. At last, Metternich, seeing the indefinite turn affairs were taking, resolved to join the military Congress of Trachenberg, where the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte, was employed in tracing out the vast plan of the campaign of the allied armies against Napoleon. They decided upon marching straight upon Paris, without a moment's hesitation, and making an appeal to the people, dissatisfied with the Emperor. At Trachenberg, Russia and Prussia received all the propositions of the Austrian minister without the slightest difficulty; they agreed, whatever might be the personal pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, that the general command of the allied troops should be conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg. The importance of securing the co-operation of the Austrian army was fully appreciated, and no sacrifice was spared to attach an additional force of 200,000 men to the coalition.

With a view to avoid this immense co-operation, Napoleon had addressed himself at once to the Emperor Francis II., recalling to his mind the alliance of their families. Maria Louisa had gone to Mayence, and her husband, taking advantage of one or two days which the armistice still left at his disposal, went to meet her there, to give his last instructions to the daughter of the Cæsars, and to confirm to her all the powers of the regency. France then would be governed by an archduchess, and, according to all dynastic ideas, could Austria fight against a country ruled by the daughter of her emperor? They were mistaken; the cabinets no longer stood in awe of Napoleon, and this was a circumstance which the French plenipotentiaries at Prague had not understood. M. Maret, in particular, had shewn his insufficiency, or, at all events, an inferior capacity, unable to bear a comparison with a statesman of the school and character of Prince Metternich. One of the greatest misfortunes of the Emperor Napoleon was, that he was surrounded by a crowd of people constantly at his feet, and dazzled with his glory: these were clerks, not statesmen.

Thus the negotiations continued to assume the character of indecision and ill-humour, which had marked their origin. The slightest proposal called forth anger, the most trifling insinuation gave offence. Metternich retained the character of mediator, which had been recognised by the other powers; he resisted all idea of overturning the French government, and, when General Moreau arrived on the Continent, the first words the Austrian minister said to M. Maret were, "Austria has nothing to do with this intrigue; she will never approve of the proceedings of General Moreau." At last, the ultimatum of the allied powers, communicated by Metternich, was as follows. The dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria (Dantzic was given to Prussia); the cities of Lubech and Hamburg were to be reinstated in their independence, the kingdom of Prussia was to be remodelled, and one frontier was to extend to the Elbe; all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste, were to be ceded to Austria, and a reciprocal guarantee was to be given, that the condition of the sovereignties, both small and great, should not be subject to alteration, except by common consent, but should continue such as they might be settled by the peace. The Emperor of the French at first refused to accede to these terms, which were afterwards modified, and at last received a reluctant and tardy assent; for Austria was then entering with all her strength into the coalition.

I have consulted upon the events of this period the two men who played the principal parts in the diplomatic transactions of the war, Count Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Metternich. I asked them, "Was there really a sincere desire for peace at Prague?" They both answered in the affirmative. Pozzo di Borgo, in his hatred for Napoleon, described to me the anxiety he felt at witnessing the hesitation of Austria; and Metternich justified himself to Europe for the indecision of his conduct by his desire to bring his diplomatic mediation to a happy issue, for the interests of Napoleon, Austria, and the general peace.

A notification from the court of Vienna announced to Count Nesselrode and Prince Hardenberg, that, for the future, Austria, as a member of the coalition, would locate 200,000 men, in large bodies, behind the mountains of Bohemia. The joy of the Allies was not to be expressed; one should have heard Count Pozzo di Borgo recount the magical effect produced by this letter of Metternich; it arrived in the middle of the night at a barn, in which were reposing the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Count Nesselrode, Prince Hardenberg, and all the staff of the allied troops. They arose and embraced each other, as if the salvation of Europe were achieved, and Napoleon tumbled from his throne. The manifesto of Austria, which was the work of Metternich, appeared ten days later. In spite, however, of this rupture, Caulaincourt remained at Prague, and the chancellor of state still assured him he was ready to proceed with the negotiation if France would agree to the independence of the Germanic Confederation and of Switzerland, and to the reconstruction of the dominions of Prussia on a scale of greater importance. Napoleon, still unwilling to give in, applied to Count Bubna, in the persuasion that he would be able to exercise a favourable influence over his father-in-law, the emperor; at last, on the 14th of August, he gave his consent to the proposals of the Austrian cabinet, and his answer was despatched to Prague; but it was too late. Metternich declared the impossibility of entering into a separate treaty, and said it would be necessary to refer simultaneously to the three courts whose political interests were henceforth inseparable.

Still Napoleon did not abandon all hope of drawing Austria over to his interests, and he proposed entering into a negotiation, even after the commencement of hostilities, when the Austrian army was actually in motion. 200,000 Austrians came forth from the mountains of Bohemia, and turned the flank of the French army. Then the general rising in Germany took place; a transitory lustre was conferred by the admirable battle of Dresden, but Leipsic witnessed the last expiring gleam of the French glory. By the end of 1813, the line of the Elbe was lost, and even that of the Rhine was compromised. All Germany was in arms, and the whole of Europe had assumed a threatening posture.

Austria had hardly joined the coalition before difficulties arose in this vast body, agitated by so many different interests. Some jealous feelings had already been entertained concerning the title of generalissimo of the armies, which had been conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg, and other questions were subsequently started as to the object of the campaign. As long as the French occupied Germany, the most pressing anxiety was to get rid of this heavy yoke. Having once reached the Rhine, there was no confederation, no imminent danger; the soil was covered with the wrecks of Napoleon's empire, and Germany had recovered her ancient independence. The sole remaining possessions of the French in that country were some fortresses, which, after a siege of longer or shorter duration, must revert to their ancient sovereign. The house of Austria had ceased to be afraid of France, but had begun to entertain some apprehensions with regard to Russia. The Russians had been taught the road towards the south of Europe, and they were likely to remember it.

In the opinion of Metternich, France, with a certain degree of power and a definite extent of territory, was necessary to the balance of power in Europe; and he took care this should be mentioned in the manifesto published by the allied armies on the Rhine. This manifesto, of which the idea belonged to Metternich, was executed by Gentz. Austria, being now free from danger in Germany, could, without risk, lend assistance to the threatened empire of France. The family connexion with Napoleon was not yet broken; his moral influence, it is true, was greatly weakened; but his powerful mind was in its pristine vigour, and he was still capable of making some daring attempt. These long-sighted views were clearly displayed in the conversation between Metternich and M. de St. Aignan. Austria, already embarrassed by her position with regard to France and Russia, would gladly have withdrawn from a war which no longer closely affected her own interests; but a principle, fatal to Napoleon, had been admitted,—the allied powers were no longer at liberty to enter into a treaty the one without the other. When Lord Castlereagh arrived on the Continent, he gave additional solidity to this tendency to unite in a common cause; and the implacable enemy of Napoleon, Count Pozzo di Borgo, had been despatched to London to request the presence of the prime minister of England on the Continent. They were desirous of rendering the alliance incapable of future alteration, for the first successes beyond the Rhine had naturally given birth to two separate questions: one relating to territory in the new settlement of the boundaries in Europe; the other, a moral question, as to the form of government which should be established in France in case the allied armies should take possession of Paris. The interests of England and Austria were differently affected from those of Russia and Prussia by the arrangements that might be entered into.

In the first place, what would they do with the most important conquests? Russia was in possession of Poland, Prussia of Saxony, and Austria of a great portion of Italy. Should the Emperor Alexander attempt to set up a sort of kingdom in Poland, the interests of Austria would suffer. Again, could Prussia be permitted to enlarge her dominions by the addition of Saxony? All these questions were already subjects of debate in the diplomatic body, which, to all outward appearance, was still perfectly united; the most unlimited confidence in each other was expressed by all parties, but, in reality, interest and selfishness were the prevailing feelings. Lord Castlereagh shewed great ability at this juncture by constituting himself the general bond of union of the coalition.

With regard to the questions connected with the government of France, it was hardly possible to suppose Austria would agree to a project of a change of dynasty, when an archduchess held the reins of government as regent. The Emperor Alexander had entered into a private contract with Bernadotte, whose feelings against Napoleon were very bitter. Alexander would agree to any form of government that might be proposed, but in the conference at Abo all possibilities had been discussed, even one which might place Bernadotte at the head of affairs in France. England, though well inclined towards the Bourbons, did not make their restoration so indispensable a condition as to render debates upon matters of more personal interest subordinate to it. Lord Castlereagh had explained this to the exiled princes; they had not yet been permitted to land upon the Continent, and the Comte d'Artois did not arrive at Dole until January, 1814.

It is particularly in this point of view that the history of the Congress of Chatillon is deserving of a serious study. At this meeting there was still an evident desire on the part of Austria to conclude a treaty on the basis of the balance of power in Europe; but, from the very commencement, Metternich must have discovered that the position of Austria was no longer the same as at the beginning of the campaign. All moral influence had now passed over to the side of the Emperor Alexander, who had become the arbiter of the destinies of the coalition; Prussia and Austria only appeared in the light of useful auxiliaries, the principal influence and popularity rested with the czar; he alone was talked of, and the negotiations were especially addressed to his cabinet. The military treaty of Chaumont, which fixed the number of troops to be furnished by the coalition, was dictated by Lord Castlereagh, who was afraid of a dissolution of the alliance. It was then declared that the allied powers would never sheathe the sword till they had reduced France within the limits it occupied in 1792; and, for this purpose, each cabinet promised a contingent of 150,000 men under arms, England agreeing to furnish a subsidy.[5]

From this period Metternich found himself in a very delicate position. As the events of the war gradually brought the allies nearer to Paris, the Emperor of Austria could not with any degree of propriety take a part in military operations whose object was the capture of a metropolis governed by the archduchess. Metternich, who was in correspondence with Maria Louisa, could no longer control the course of events, and, perhaps, this princess, weary of seeing herself surrounded by so much littleness of mind, avidity, and folly, as were exhibited by the relations and supporters of Napoleon, when the regency was at Blois, might not have been sorry to get rid of her fictitious dignity. The Emperor Francis II. remained at Dijon, while the bold advance of Schwartzenberg laid Paris at the mercy of the allies.

A reproach has constantly been cast upon Metternich for his conduct upon this occasion; how, it is said, could he sanction a proceeding which rent the imperial crown from the brow of Maria Louisa? I believe, at this time, all idea of the continuance of the empire had been abandoned, its time had passed away: there are seasons when the force of public opinion carries every thing before it, and now there was a sort of weariness of mind, people were tired of Napoleon and his military system, the string drawn too tight had snapped asunder. A retrospect must be taken of that time, and it will explain the resolution of the allies. It would have been difficult to maintain even the regency of the empress, and at the same time carry out the military engagements entered into at Chaumont. In France all were tired of the war, a general rising had taken place in Europe, nor would Napoleon have submitted to the degradation of a kingdom bounded by narrower limits than the Rhine. No doubt the regency would have been the most complete triumph of the Austrian system, but what would have become of Napoleon under the regency? would he have resigned himself to so humiliating a situation? would he not have been stifled in the small kingdom of France? The proceedings in Paris were quite independent of Metternich, who was not even present at them. The Emperor Alexander had acquired so overwhelming an influence in the senate with the patriots of 1789, that no cabinet, even of the first order, would have contended with it. The archduchess had been conducted from Blois to her father, Francis II., without any discussion taking place concerning the regency or the empire. Talleyrand had said, "The restoration of the Bourbons is a principle; every thing else is an intrigue:" and this expression put an end to all negotiations that had not the return of Louis XVIII. for their object. The diplomatic corps were occupied with the Treaty of Paris, which produced the re-establishment of order, the general peace, the restoration of the Bourbons, and the settlement of the boundaries of the French territory, which had been the principal object and most important result of the campaign. But this was not all; the immense empire of Napoleon was in ruins, and how should these important fragments with which the world was overspread be divided? Might Francis II. resume the old imperial crown, which he had resigned at the treaty of Presburg? In spite of the strong predilection then entertained for ancient customs, Metternich felt that the crown of Charlemagne would be merely an empty title unsupported by any real influence, and it would have been a cause of offence to Prussia, whose jealousy would have been roused by the existence of a German empire in close contiguity with her own kingdom, which embraced nearly a third of the population of Germany. With the strong instinct which forms part of his character, Metternich felt that, for the future, Austria, while retaining a great general influence over Germany, had better strive to become a southern sovereignty, having Gallicia at one extremity, and Dalmatia at the other, and including the Lombardo-Venetian territories, under the ancient and magnificent iron crown. He carried this idea into the Congress of Vienna, when the new constitution of the European sovereignties was to be established on a general basis, and he took care to bring it forward again upon every occasion in which the diplomatic system of Austria was displayed. This alone affords an explanation of the extreme and constant solicitude evinced for the possession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and the constant tendency, both by means of conquest and commerce, towards the shores of the Adriatic.

At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich exercised a prodigious influence. The Emperor Francis had made a great family sacrifice, by abandoning the cause of Maria Louisa, and, in honour of this conduct, Europe fixed the assemblage of the sovereigns at Vienna. In the midst of balls, elegant amusements, and entertainments, Europe was to be remodelled on a different basis; the long conferences, which were to decide the fate of nations, were intermingled with flowers and pleasure. Prince Metternich, then in his forty-first year, saw the object of his anxieties and wishes fully accomplished; Vienna afforded the most brilliant spectacle; the sovereigns were assembled there, accompanied by a myriad of persons of princely rank, with their families, their courts, and their numerous suites. Love intrigues contended with the more serious business of this Congress, which had become the rendezvous of all the most distinguished characters in Europe. In the evening people assembled at the Royal Theatre, or in the brilliantly illuminated saloons, where, at the gaming-table, Blucher was employed in completing the ruin of his affairs, which he had begun in Paris.

Prince Metternich had the direction of the diplomatic party, while the empress, wife of Francis II., received the august strangers with the grace and dignity she was so well known to possess. The splendours of the Congress of Vienna left a strong impression upon the minds of the diplomatic characters who were present at it; they are associated in their memory with the fresh and pleasing recollection of the days of their youth, and, when you converse upon the subject with those whom death has spared, they speak in enthusiastic terms of the chivalric entertainments, the fancy balls of the empress, and the galanteries of the sovereigns. What brilliant parties were those of Lady Castlereagh, a female diplomatist, as active as the English prime minister in all negotiations relating to the management of the world!

In walking through the streets of Vienna, it was no uncommon sight to meet the three sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, shaking hands, and giving each other marks of mutual confidence, and yet the most serious dissensions already prevailed in the Congress concerning the territorial arrangement of Europe. The quadruple alliance, as it had been settled in the treaty of Chaumont, was nothing but a military convention, intended to overturn the power of Napoleon; more a kind of plan of battle, or strategic stipulation, than a regular and political negotiation. After the fall of Napoleon, the allied powers resumed their natural interests. Thus, on the question of German supremacy, Prussia would naturally be inclined to side with Russia, and draw off from Austria; England, to oppose Russia in every thing relating to the sovereignty of Poland, which the Czar had already appropriated to himself; and France, though so terribly shaken by the late invasion, must endeavour to regain some degree of credit in Europe, by keeping on good terms with England and Austria. I must say, to the honour of the eldest branch of the Bourbons, that it always exhibited the most perfect dignity in its foreign relations, and perhaps the critical situation of our internal affairs was only produced by a fatal reaction of foreign dissatisfaction upon ourselves. From the first assembling of the Congress, private conferences had taken place between Lord Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand, to take into consideration the conditions of a treaty which might afford a counterpoise to the immense ascendancy Russia had obtained during the invasion of France and the events of 1814. By this treaty, which was signed in the month of March 1815, subsidies were agreed upon in the event of certain occurrences, and an engagement was entered into, that a fixed number of troops should always be in readiness for the casus belli, should Russia and Prussia attempt to disturb the equilibrium established among the European powers, and, according to a despatch of M. de Talleyrand, France was to maintain a half war establishment.

Metternich was the principal author of this secret treaty, because, after things had been replaced in their original state by the restoration of Louis XVIII., he began to be afraid of Russia and her immense weight: the question of Poland was the pretext. France manifested particular anxiety for the re-establishment of the King of Saxony, whose territory Prussia was desirous to absorb; while England, on the other hand, but little inclined to favour Russia, considered it indispensably necessary that Prussia should possess very extensive territorial strength, that she might serve as a constant barrier against northern invasion. It was necessary Metternich should combat this opinion for the sake of Saxony, and he did so in a series of papers opposed to those of Prince Hardenberg and Baron Humboldt. On the Polish question he perfectly agreed with England: at the bottom of Alexander's good-will towards the Poles, there lurked an idea of political aggrandisement; for, by making a kingdom of Poland, he well knew that the portion of that country that had accrued to Austria, as well as what had fallen to the share of Prussia, would sooner or later all unite under one sceptre. On no account would Alexander resign his paramount influence[6] over Warsaw. Things reached such a pitch, that Metternich issued orders that the Austrian armies should be maintained upon a war establishment, while Russia kept her troops in readiness, and appealed to the Poles to stand by their country. Whilst Metternich warmly opposed the establishment of Russian Poland as a kingdom under any circumstances, England was desirous it should be placed on so firm a foundation, as to serve as an obstacle to the encroachments of the Russian cabinet.

Serious events already obliged Metternich to turn his attention towards Italy, and here we must look back upon events of a rather earlier date. As far back as the month of February 1813, England had taken advantage of some dissatisfaction entertained by Murat, and still more by Caroline, Napoleon's own sister, to hasten the downfall of the French empire. All the good people of Buonaparte's family appear to have taken their royalty in good earnest, and to have fancied they possessed some consequence of their own, and might remain kings and queens independent of the great emperor. England, clever at taking advantage of these little absurdities, reminded Murat of the example of Bernadotte, and suggested the possibility of his becoming king of all Italy. While Napoleon was abusing his brother-in-law in his haughty and violent letters, reminding him that "the lion was not dead," the English cabinet soothed with the most flattering hopes the imagination of Murat, who had but a poor head for politics, and every thing was brought into play that could flatter the vanity of the most theatrical soldier of the imperial era.

At the close of the year 1813, Murat was already in the occupation of the Roman States, making an appeal to the patriots, for it was the custom of Europe at that time to march forward invoking the liberty of the people. To detach him from a bad cause, Metternich had particularly recourse to a gentle and tender influence, a pleasing reminiscence of his embassy in Paris, and he guaranteed to Murat the peaceable possession of the kingdom of Naples. After the re-establishment of the Bourbons in France gave rise to the strongest uneasiness in his astonished mind, King Joachim deputed the Duke of Serra Capriola to the Congress of Vienna, pleading his treaties with Austria and England; but his envoy was not admitted to the assembly, for a negotiation was on foot to replace the old dynasty of Sicily upon the throne, a negotiation conducted by Prince Talleyrand. Louis XVIII. had recommended the interests of his family to the Congress of Vienna, and M. de Talleyrand was to receive from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons a rich equivalent for his sadly compromised principality of Benevento. Austria was a little unmindful of her promises, and defended her engagements with Murat but very feebly; indeed, the general bent towards the restoration of the former order of things was so strong, that he who had usurped the crown of Naples was actually declared guilty of treason. In the English House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh read a private correspondence, carried on with Napoleon at the very moment when Murat was negotiating with the Alliance, which afforded evidence of a double policy having been pursued. Having become uneasy concerning the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna, he made vast military preparations, in concert with the patriots and the secret societies, with the intention of assuming the great crown of Italy. Metternich caused the Austrian armies to assemble en masse in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, where they awaited under arms the coming events.

The storm soon burst.

Napoleon then landed in the Gulf of Juan to attempt his heroic exploit of the Hundred Days. Matters were in a strangely complicated state at the Congress of Vienna, and Napoleon, looking at the affairs of Europe under one point of view only, had formed a fair judgment of the condition of the allied powers with regard to each other, without, however, comprehending that his presence on the Continent would unite them all in a terrible coalition. The very name of Buonaparte filled the old European sovereignties with so much alarm, that they recovered themselves with the utmost haste, in order to take measures for the general safety.