Читать книгу The Future of Economics - M. Umer Chapra - Страница 10
ОглавлениеThe Islamic Paradigm Through History
We sent our Messengers with clear signs, and sent with them the Book and the Balance so that people may establish justice.
(al-Qur’ān, 57: 25)
Islamic belief has a reputation for being easily understood ..., its most essential elements can be set forth rather simply.
(Marshall Hodgson)1
Is the Islamic Economics paradigm significantly different from that of conventional economics? While there is a great deal that is common between the worldviews of most major religions, particularly those of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, it is not possible to say the same about Islamic and conventional economics. The paradigms of both disciplines are radically different. The Islamic paradigm is not secularist, value-neutral, materialist and social-Darwinist. It is rather based on a number of concepts which strike at the root of these doctrines. It gives primary importance to moral values, human brotherhood, and socio-economic justice and, unlike its Marxist or capitalist counterparts, does not primarily rely on either the state or the market for realizing its vision. It rather relies on the integrated roles of values and institutions, market, families, society, and the state to ensure falāḥ or the well-being of all. It places great emphasis on social change through a reform of the individual and his society, without which the market and the state could both perpetuate inequities.
The Qur’ān and the Sunnah together spell out the essential ingredients of the Islamic paradigm so clearly that there is little room for ambiguity. If there are differences of opinion, these are in the details. Hodgson has, hence, rightly stated that “the Islamic religious tradition, for all its diversity, has retained a certain integrity; distinctly more so than say, Christianity and Buddhism.”2 An effort is made below to clarify some of the central ideas of the Islamic paradigm that are relevant to economics.
The fundamental Islamic belief is that this universe and everything in it, including humans, has been created by the One and Only God. All human beings are His vicegerents and brothers unto each other. There is no superiority of one over the other because of race, sex, nationality, wealth, or power. Their sojourn in this world is temporary. Their ultimate destination is the Hereafter where they will be accountable before God. Their well-being in the Hereafter depends on whether or not they live in this world, and fulfil their obligations towards others, in a way that helps ensure the falāḥ of all.
One of the things that seriously affects the well-being of all is the way in which scarce resources, which are a trust (amānah) from God,4 are utilized. God, the Creator and Owner of these resources, has provided certain values, rules of behaviour, or institutions, within the framework of which human beings are expected to use these resources and to interact with each other. These values have not just been given to any one specific group of human beings, but rather to all people at different times in history through a chain of His Messengers (who were all human beings), including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and, the last of them, Muḥammad.5 Thus, according to Islam, there is a continuity and similarity in the value systems of all Revealed religions to the extent to which the Message has not been lost or distorted over the ages.
The Prophets, however, did not just bring values. They also struggled to reform their societies. Socio-economic and political reform is, therefore, the major thrust of the Islamic Message. To accept ‘what is’ and not to struggle for the realization of the vision or ‘what ought to be’ is a vote in favour of prevailing inequities and doing nothing to remove them. Such an attitude is not justifiable within the Islamic paradigm. The mission of human beings is not just themselves to abide by Islamic values but also to struggle for the reform of their societies in accordance with these. This is what is meant by righteous living. Ansari has aptly emphasized that the “essence of the Qur’ānic message to man is to live righteously”.6 Righteous living enables the use of scarce resources in a way that ensures the well-being of all, and, thereby, promotes not only individual peace of mind but also social harmony.
Human beings are, however, free to choose. They may either live up to this mission or reject it, except to the extent to which their behaviour harms themselves or others or undermines the very foundations of the society or civilization. This freedom to choose is emphasized in several verses of the Qur’ān, one of which says: “This is an admonition; whoever wishes, may take the road to his Lord” (al-Qur’ān, 73: 19).
True well-being within the framework of the Sharīʿah (Islamic teachings) is not necessarily realized by concentrating merely on maximizing wealth and consumption; it requires the satisfaction of both the material and the spiritual needs of the human personality in a balanced manner. While material needs include proper food, clothing, housing, education, transport, security of life and property, and all other goods and services that contribute to comfort and real well-being, spiritual needs include nearness to God, peace of mind, inner happiness, family and social harmony, and the absence of crime and anomie. Resources being limited, excessive emphasis on one may lead to a neglect of the other.
Both material and spiritual needs are closely interrelated. Islam does not, therefore, recognize any watertight distinction between them. Spiritual needs are not satisfied merely by offering prayers. Rather, all human effort, irrespective of whether it is for ‘material’, ‘social’, ‘educational’, or ‘scientific’ goals, is spiritual in character as long as it contributes to real well-being in conformity with the value system of Islam. Working hard for the material well-being of one’s own self, family and society is as spiritual as the offering of prayers, provided that the material effort is guided by moral values and does not take the individual away from the fulfilment of his social obligations.
It is unanimously agreed by Muslim jurists that one of the important objectives of the Sharīʿah is to reduce hardships and to make the life of all individuals more comfortable (al-Qur’ān, 2: 185; see also 5: 6). Nevertheless, more may not necessarily be better than less under all circumstances, as conventional economics would have us believe. Much depends on how the additional wealth is acquired, who uses it and how, and what the impact of this increase on the overall well-being of society is. More would be better than less, if the increase were attained without weakening the moral fibre of society and social solidarity, or raising anomie and ecological imbalance. Ideal behaviour within the framework of this paradigm does not thus mean self-denial; it only means pursuing one’s self-interest within the constraints of social interest by passing all claims on scarce resources through the filter of moral values.
Living in conformity with moral values helps promote a balance between individual and social interest and helps actualize the maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah (the goals of the Sharīʿah, or the vision of Islam, hereafter referred to as the maqāṣid), two of the most important of which are socio-economic justice and the well-being of all God’s creatures.7 Justice has received such a prominent place within the maqāṣid, that it is difficult to conceive of Islam and injustice surviving together in a truly Muslim society.8 Injustice could prevail only if Islamic values are not able to gain a firm foothold. This would in turn thwart the realization of true well-being, accentuate tensions and social unrest, discourage individuals from putting in their best, and thus retard development. However, while conventional economics assumes the prevalence of self-interested behaviour on the part of all individuals, Islam does not assume the prevalence of ideal behaviour. It adopts the more realistic position that, while some people may normally act in an ideal manner, the behaviour of most people tends to fall between the two extremes of selfishness and altruism and, hence, a constant effort (jihād) needs to be made on the part of both individuals and society for moral uplift.
Islam rules out the use of force for such moral uplift: “There shall be no compulsion in religion” (al-Qur’ān, 2: 256), and “Say that the Truth has come from your Lord: Whoever wishes may either believe in it or reject it” (al-Qur’ān, 18: 29).9 Rather, it stresses proper upbringing, creating conviction through logical reasoning and friendly dialogue (al-Qur’ān, 16: 125), and creating an enabling environment for motivating individuals to do what is right and to abstain from doing what is wrong. It expresses a great degree of tolerance for other faiths by stating: “For you your religion, and for me mine” (al-Qur’ān, 109: 6).
To motivate individuals to do their best for their own good as well as that of others, both material and spiritual incentives and deterrents are indispensable. Smoothly functioning competitive markets, where people interact with each other in their self-interest, are necessary for ensuring maximum efficiency. However, while competition does help safeguard social interest, total reliance cannot be placed on it because some people may use unfair means to enrich themselves. Hence governments have tried to pass and enforce regulations. But regulations are not necessarily possible without having a perception of what the right thing to do is. Therefore, once we regulate, we do not remain value-neutral. Moreover, it may not be realistic to primarily depend on regulations because these may be circumvented and need to be effectively enforced. The cost of enforcing them, however, may be lower if there is some effective mechanism for self-enforcement.
Such self-enforcement could come from two sources. One, from the innate goodness of the human being himself. Within the framework of Islamic beliefs, man is good by nature because God has created him in His own image (al-Qur’ān, 30: 30). The individual does not necessarily always act in his self-interest. He also acts in the interest of others and even makes sacrifices for them under a feeling of moral obligation. However, since the individual is also free and his behaviour not determined, he may or may not preserve his innate goodness and may act in ways that are against his nature. This may hurt both him and his society. Therefore, it is necessary to provide incentives and deterrents as well as an enabling environment. The problem with a number of this-worldly incentives and deterrents is that they may be insufficient or not justly implemented.
Therefore, the second source of self-enforcement is belief in the reward and punishment of the Hereafter. If I abstain from doing anything wrong and also sacrifice my material self-interest for the sake of others, I will improve my well-being in the Hereafter. The concept of the Hereafter, thus, gives a long-term perspective to self-interest by extending it beyond a person’s life span in this world. It is not possible for competition and government intervention to always motivate a person to do what is morally right and to abstain from what is morally wrong, to cooperate with others and to make sacrifices for them. Governments can try to ensure competition and to pass laws to safeguard social interest. However, there are so many clandestine ways of restraining competition and of cheating and exploiting others without being caught that it may be difficult for governments to succeed unless there is an inner urge on the part of operators in the market themselves to do what is right, to fulfil their contracts and other commitments faithfully, and not to try to undermine competition or resort to unfair means of earning. In the final analysis, therefore, it is not possible to effectively safeguard social interest without the help of moral values, and the creation of an effective motivating force and a proper environment for their enforcement. In this way, the burden on the government for safeguarding social interest could be reduced.
The Muslim world has not always succeeded in living up to the demands of the Islamic paradigm. Justice to and the well-being of all have not always been ensured.While there have been successes, there have also been serious failures for a number of reasons, some of which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 6. However, the ideals of the supremacy of moral values, brotherhood and justice, and the well-being of all have been so clear, and so widely upheld that the concepts of rational economic man, positivism, and laissez faire, as defined and understood in conventional economics, have not gained intellectual support from any of the outstanding scholars who represent the mainstream of Islamic thought.
Mainstream Islamic thought has been very clear in characterizing rational behaviour as that which enables the use of God-given resources in a way that helps ensure the individual’s this-worldly as well as other-worldly well-being and, thereby, brings about a balance between material and spiritual pursuits and between self-interest and social interest. There seems to have been a consensus that while poverty (faqr) is undesirable, wealth (ghinā) that is acquired wrongfully or which leads to extravagance, vaingloriousness and inequities is also to be censured. The emphasis of most writers has been on a balance between the material and the spiritual. There is nothing wrong in wealth if it is acquired by rightful means without injustice to anyone, and is spent or invested productively to fulfil one’s own needs and those of others in a balanced manner.10 Righteousness is necessary to help accomplish such a balance. The market mechanism cannot by itself do this. Al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), like all other Muslim scholars, considered it necessary to rein in individual desires through moral values.11 Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/ 1406) emphasized that moral orientation helps remove mutual rivalry and envy, strengthens group solidarity, and creates an inclination toward righteousness.12
A natural corollary of this has been less emphasis, at least conceptually, on the serving of self-interest and the maximization of wealth and consumption so overly magnified in post-Enlightenment Western philosophy. Though the Muslim world has had its own manifestations of materialism and hedonism, the concept of ‘rational economic man’ in the social-Darwinist, utilitarian and materialist sense of serving self-interest and maximizing wealth and want satisfaction has not received any intellectual blessing.
While a balance between the material and the spiritual seems to have been generally maintained in the hard core of Islamic thought, there have also been deviations. The Sufis or mystics emphasized spiritual ecstasy and de-emphasized material prosperity because wealth had, in their opinion, a tendency to promote arrogance and wrongdoing.13 Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728), an eminent early scholar renowned for his piety, wrote in one of his letters: “Beware of this world with wariness; for it is like a snake, smooth to the touch, but its venom is deadly. Turn away from whatever delights thee in it ...”14 Al-Baṣrī was not alone, for a chain of Sufi scholars tried to make poverty a virtue in clear contrast to the Islamic emphasis on balance. However, this has not gone unchallenged. Other scholars have emphasized that there is nothing wrong in rightly-acquired wealth because it provides security and strength and also enables a person to help others and, thereby, fulfil his or her moral obligations. Poverty was considered undesirable because it led to incapacity and helplessness. For example, al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) considered the Sufis to be misguided in rejecting wealth, and quotes Ibn Munabbih, a tābiʿī (follower of the Prophet’s Companions), who equated poverty with the worst death.15 Al-Dimashqī (d. 570/1175) adopts a similar stand.16
The test of a society does not, however, lie so much in its ideals as it does in the actual practice. While the ideal of a balance between material and spiritual pursuits seems to have been generally upheld by both rulers as well as the ruled in early Islamic history, it could not be maintained perpetually afterwards. While the common people have generally lived simple lives, and continue to do so, most rulers and men of wealth and position led lives of revelry and luxury instead of following the middle course. Protests and admonitions were made by the righteous and fearless. However, these protests were generally ignored by most rulers and their courtiers after political illegitimacy became entrenched in the Muslim world. Since this luxury was made possible by an inequitable tax burden on the general public and since criticism drew severe punishment from despotic rulers, the pious ʿulamā’ and the Sufis became extremely bitter and started avoiding the royal courts. As the public was generally under the sway of these pious individuals, the prevailing tension ruptured the solidarity between the government and the people, making the government weaker and unable to successfully face a number of challenges. It also had an adverse impact on the development of fiqh, as will be seen in Chapter 6.
The hope of realizing a balance between the material and the spiritual receded even further into the background after the onslaught of Western consumer culture on the Muslim world after World War II. This has further accentuated the divergence between Islamic norms and the prevailing life-style. Conspicuous consumption has continuously risen even among the middle classes where it did not exist before, leading to an accentuation of corruption and unfair means of earning. It has also become one of the important causes of low savings and the inability to adequately invest on the basis of domestic savings. Therefore, most Muslim countries suffer from high macroeconomic imbalances and debt-servicing burdens along with relatively lower rates of growth. As in the past, protests are being raised against this phenomenon from religious scholars and the conscientious élite. However, instead of looking at these protests cool-headedly in the light of Islamic values, the paucity of the Muslim world’s resources, and the need to increase savings and investments to accelerate growth without macroeconomic imbalances, the Western news media dub the protesters as anti-modernist and fundamentalist. It is perhaps not realized that what the Muslim world needs is not that modernization which is associated with hedonism and permissiveness but rather that which brings democracy, education, and technology. If the prevailing trend continues, the consequences will be accentuated imbalances and other socio-economic problems.
Positivism in the conventional economics sense of being “entirely neutral between ends” or “independent of any particular ethical position or normative judgements” also does not seem to have any trace in Muslim intellectual thinking. This was but natural. Since all resources at the disposal of human beings belonged to God, human beings were only trustees. They were accountable to Him for using them in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust, which were defined by the Sharīʿah. There was, accordingly, absolutely no room for value-neutrality. It would, in fact, be impudent for the agent (human being) to be neutral with respect to the terms and conditions set by the Principal (God). Scholars have, therefore, recognized throughout history, without any exception, the verdict of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah about resources being a trust from God and human accountability before Him. Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), for example, states in his letter to the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 193/809) that “you have not been created in vain and will not be left unaccounted for. God will question you about everything you have and what you have done with it.”17
If resources are a trust from God and human beings are accountable before Him, then there is no other option but to use them with justice. The Qur’ān and the Sunnah have both placed tremendous emphasis on justice, making it one of the central objectives of the Sharīʿah. Brotherhood, another central objective of the Sharīʿah, would be meaningless jargon if it were not reinforced by justice in the allocation and distribution of God-given resources. According to the Qur’ān, the establishment of justice is one of the primary purposes for which God has sent His Prophets (al-Qur’ān, 57: 25). The Qur’ān places justice nearest to righteousness or taqwā (al-Qur’ān, 5: 8), in terms of its importance in the Islamic faith. Righteousness is naturally the most important because it serves as a springboard for all rightful action, including justice. The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, equated the absence of justice with “absolute darkness” and warned: “Beware of injustice for injustice will lead to absolute darkness on the Day of Judgement.”18 This is inevitable because injustice undermines brotherhood and solidarity, accentuates conflict, tensions and crime, aggravates human problems, and, thus, ultimately leads to nothing but bleakness in this world, and misery in the Hereafter.
All leading jurists throughout Muslim history have therefore, without exception, held justice to be an indispensable ingredient of the maqāṣid. For example, Abū Yūsuf elaborated on justice in his letter to the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd by saying that: “Rendering justice to those wronged and eradicating injustice, raises tax revenue, accelerates development of the country, and brings blessings in addition to reward in the Hereafter.”19 Al-Māwardī argued that comprehensive justice “inculcates mutual love and affection, obedience to the law, development of the country, expansion of wealth, growth of progeny, and security of the sovereign”, and that “there is nothing that destroys the world and the conscience of the people faster than injustice”.20
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) considered justice to be an essential outcome of Tawḥīd or belief in One God:21 “Everything good is a component of justice and everything bad is a component of injustice and oppression. Hence, justice towards everything and everyone is an imperative for everyone and injustice is prohibited to everything and everyone. Injustice is absolutely not permissible irrespective of whether it is to a Muslim or a non-Muslim or even to an unjust person.”22 He zealously upheld the adages prevailing in his time that: “God upholds the just state even if it is unbelieving, but does not uphold the unjust state even if it is Islamic”, and that “the world can survive with justice and unbelief, but not with injustice and Islam”.23
Ibn Khaldūn unequivocally stated that it is not possible for a country to develop without justice,24 something that has now belatedly been recognized by the pundits of development economics after a long flirtation with injustice.25 He went to the extent of emphasizing that “oppression brings an end to development and the end of development becomes reflected in the breakdown and destruction of the state,”26 and that “a decline in prosperity is the necessary and inevitable result of injustice and transgression”.27 Furthermore, “oppression does not consist merely in taking away wealth and property from its owner without cause or compensation. Oppression has rather a wider connotation. Anyone who seizes the property of others, forces them to work for him against their will, makes unjust claims on them, or imposes on them burdens not sanctioned by the Sharīʿah, is an oppressor”.28
Since achieving a proper material reward for one’s labour and entrepreneurship in the form of wages and profit is necessary not only to fulfil the imperative of justice but also to realize efficiency, all authors have recognized its importance. Ibn Khaldūn emphasized that the “confiscation of people’s pecuniary reward reduces the incentive for earning and acquisition” and “a loss of incentive leads to abstinence from effort and enterprise”. He further stated that “if confiscation is great and widespread in all sectors of the economy, there will be a general abstinence from earning because of the total loss of incentive”.29 This idea permeates the thinking of practically all writers and has led to condemnation of the confiscation of property, price controls under normal conditions, and excessive taxation. In spite of this, emphasis on incentives, the serving of self-interest, profit-earning and individual freedom in their conventional economics sense do not appear in the Islamic literature. In this sense, they simply do not fit into the Islamic paradigm.
Among relatively modern writers, Shaykh Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905) considered ẓulm or injustice to be the most hideous evil (aqbaḥ al-munkar) within the framework of Islamic values.30 Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1385/1966), Sayyid Mawdudi (d. 1399/1979), and Bāqir al-Saḍr (d. 1400/1980), whose writings have become an integral part of the ongoing Islamic resurgence, were highly critical of the prevailing socio-economic and political systems in the Muslim world because of the absence of justice. Sayyid Qutb viewed justice as “a comprehensive and indispensable constituent of all aspects of human life” within the framework of Islamic teachings, in his book Al-ʿAdālah al-Ijtimāʿiyyah fī al-Islām (Social Justice in Islam), first published in 1949.31 He employed 284 verses from the Qur’ān to elaborate this all-embracing concept of justice in Islam.32 Sayyid Mawdudi also found it an indispensable obligation of a Muslim society to establish justice at individual as well as social levels with the objective of eliminating all shades of inequity from human society, creating a balance in all spheres of life and freeing it from extremes and excesses, and enabling all sectors of society to obtain their rights and discharge their responsibilities.33 Bāqir al-Saḍr considered it important for Muslims not only to respond to the Islamic call for social justice, but also to understand fully its diverse implications.34
It is because of this emphasis on justice that jurists have laid down, over the centuries, a number of legal maxims that can help realize the well-being of all in a just and balanced manner.35 Some of these are as follows:
• A private sacrifice or loss may be inflicted to save a public sacrifice or loss, and a smaller benefit may be sacrificed to realize a larger benefit (Art. 26).
• A greater loss may be offset by a smaller loss (Art. 27). The larger interest of the majority should take precedence over the narrower interest of a minority; public interest takes precedence over private interest (Art. 28).
• The removal of hardship and injury should take precedence over the giving of benefit (Art. 30).
• Injury must be removed to the extent possible (Art. 31).
All the above maxims undoubtedly conflict with the concept of Pareto optimum, which does not recognize any solution that requires a sacrifice on the part of a few (rich) for raising the well-being of the many (poor). Hence, this concept cannot, under any circumstances, occupy the prestigious place in the Islamic Economics paradigm as it does in that of conventional economics.
Therefore, the word efficiency in its modern equilibrium and value-neutral Pareto optimum sense has also not appeared in Islamic literature. This does not mean that the concept of efficiency is not recognized. Rather, it has been identified in a number of senses. One of these is in the sense of striving for the best possible results. The Prophet himself, peace and blessings of God be on him, expressed great esteem for quality by stressing iḥsān (beneficence) and itqān (perfection). He said that “God has made iḥsān obligatory towards everything”, and that “God loves that when anyone of you does a job, he does it perfectly”.36 The effort to realize iḥsān may complement as well as moderate the effort to realize itqān, and the two may together help realize the most efficient and equitable use of material and human resources.
Efficiency is also important in a different context whereby resources must not be wasted or misused because of the accountability before God. According to an instruction from Abū Yūsuf to Hārūn al-Rashīd,37 based on a ḥadīth,38 this accountability applies to all resources, including an individual’s entire life span (ʿumr), knowledge and technology (ʿilm), wealth (māl), as well as all capabilities of the human body (jasad). Such accountability requires that all these resources be used in a way that helps maximize human well-being. It applies to all resources, irrespective of whether they are human or material, scarce or abundant, costly or free.39
Thus, while in conventional economics, the most efficient use of resources may be defined in terms of Pareto optimum, in an Islamic economy it may have to be defined in terms of the maqāṣid. Any use that frustrates the realization of the maqāṣid has to be considered as wasteful or inefficient.40 For example, in conventional economics the concept of Pareto efficiency allows the destruction of excess output if this enables the businessman to prevent a decline in his profit without making the consumer worse off through a rise in price. This is not, however, acceptable in the Islamic paradigm because such behaviour leads not only to a destruction of resources provided by God as a trust, but also to an injustice to the consumer. Although the maintenance of prices at the present level may not make consumers worse off, they could have been made better off if the excess output were not destroyed and either the prices were allowed to fall or the excess output was distributed to the poor. Similarly, the time and energy spent on prayers and fasting may appear to be a waste of resources within the framework of materialism because it may lead, though not necessarily, to a decline in output, thus preventing maximization of that output and profit. However, if looked at from the point of view of the rich contribution that character building and spiritual uplift can make in the long-run to output as well as human well-being, prayer and fasting may in fact be positive advantages. It is perhaps for this and other reasons that, as indicated earlier, one of the legal maxims of Islamic jurisprudence allows for the imposition of a small private sacrifice to attain a greater public benefit.41
Scholars have, in general, expressed the view that the Sharīʿah, with the moral values and the strategy it provides to inculcate these values effectively in society, may not only help ensure the justice and well-being of all but also promote human progress and advancement.42 Al-Māwardī indicated that Islamic teachings have proved to be a solid foundation for improvement and stability in this world.43 Ibn Khaldūn also stressed that a country cannot gain prestige and strength except by implementing the Sharīʿah.44
It may have become clear from the previous discussion that, while competition and regulation are both important, they are nonetheless not sufficient. The role of moral values and the reform of all players in the market has, therefore, been emphasized by most Muslim scholars for maintaining sanity and fairness in the market. However, all individuals may not be aware of their moral obligations, and even if they are, they may not be willing to live up to them. It is also possible that they may be simply unaware of the urgent, unsatisfied needs of others, or of the problems of scarcity and social priorities in resource use. Moreover, there are a number of functions which need to be performed in the interest of general well-being, but which individuals may not be willing or able to perform even in a morally-charged society because of market failure and imperfections or the inability to mobilize adequate resources. Under such conditions, moral uplift and the price system, no matter how indispensable, may not be sufficient to actualize the socially-desired goals.
Therefore, an effective role for the state as partner, catalyst and facilitator is indispensable for realizing the Islamic vision. There are a number of sayings of the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, which emphasize such a role: “Anyone who has been given the charge of a people, but does not live up to it with sincerity, will not taste even the fragrance of paradise.”45 In another ḥadīth he says: “God restrains through the sovereign more than what he restrains through the Qur’ān.”46 What is it that the sovereign can restrain but which the Qur’ān cannot? It is all socially harmful behaviour, including injustice, fraud, cheating, and the non-fulfilment of contractual and other obligations.47 The Qur’ān can only provide norms and exhort Muslims to live up to them. It is expected that Muslims will abide by them. Nevertheless, a number of them may not do so, particularly if the general moral environment has deteriorated. The state has, therefore, an important role to play through education, incentives and deterrents. It is in this sense that “the ruler is the shadow of God on earth”.48 If it does not play this role effectively, violation of the Qur’ānic norms may become widespread and not only adversely affect development and general well-being but also lead to social chaos and economic collapse.
This emphasis on the role of the state has been reflected in the writings of all leading scholars throughout history.49 Al-Māwardī emphasized that an effective government (sulṭān qāhir) was indispensable for preventing injustice and wrongdoing. Hence, he stressed that the Islamic state may have to continue the Prophet’s mission in both religious and worldly affairs.50 Ibn Taymiyyah also held that Islam and the state were indissolubly linked and neither would be able to play its role effectively without the other. Implementation of the Sharīʿah may not be possible without the state playing an important role, and the state may degenerate into an unjust and tyrannical organization without the restraining influence of the Sharīʿah.51 He, therefore, considered the state to be a trustee of public interest and the chief instrument for ensuring justice through the implementation of the Sharīʿah.52
What is it that the state is expected to do? A number of scholars writing on the ‘Mirrors for Princes’ tried to answer this question.53 One of them, Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), argued in his Siyāsat Nāmah, which may liberally be translated as “Principles of Government”, and which was written at the request of King Malikshāh (d. 485/1092), the long-reigning ruler of the Saljuq dynasty (447–590/1055–1194),54 that the ruler’s responsibility is to ensure justice and to do all that is necessary for general prosperity.
None of these authors, however, visualized regimentation or the owning and operating of a substantial part of the economy by the state. Several classical Muslim scholars, including al-Dimashqī and Ibn Khaldūn, clearly expressed their disapproval of the state becoming directly involved in the economy.55 The state rarely played such a dominant economic role in Islamic history.
Among the more modern religious reformers, Shaykh Hasan al-Banna stressed that governments are the heart of socioeconomic reform; if they become corrupt, they may corrupt everything and if they are reformed, they may be able to reform everything.56 Sayyid Mawdudi argued that God did not send His Prophets merely with a scheme to establish justice. The scheme was also accompanied by an effective strategy. A strong justice-oriented role for the state within the framework of Islamic political teachings is an indispensable part of this strategy.57 Bāqir al-Saḍr for his part found the intervention of the state in the economic sphere of life to be important for ensuring compliance with Islamic norms.58
Say’s Law does not, therefore, constitute a meaningful proposition in an Islamic paradigm. Hence, there has, perhaps, been no classical author who has advocated a passive role for the state. The concept of laissez faire has been nearly non-existent. This was but natural because the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, himself emphasized a welfare role for the state.
A detailed discussion of the functions of a modern Islamic state, given the resource constraints of most Muslim countries, has, however, not manifested itself. If one looks at illiteracy, technological backwardness and moral decline, one cannot but fail to see the need to give primary importance to all-round education. This would not only help internalize moral values among individuals and expedite social, institutional and political reform but also accelerate development. The provision of various other public goods would also be indispensable to promote development and general well-being. The state may also have to clearly determine priorities in its use of scarce resources. Allowing the private sector to play a leading role in the development of the economy would be consistent with the Islamic tradition. This would, however, necessitate the provision of incentives and facilities, and the creation of a proper legal framework along with an effective network of checks and balances and rewards and penalties. The state may also have to create a proper framework for the interaction of individuals, families and society, values and institutions, and markets for the realization of goals without excessive government intervention.
One thing that may specifically have to be ruled out is the obligation of the state to provide subsidized services to all persons, irrespective of whether they are rich or poor. Only those individuals and families need to be helped who are not a part of the social security network and who are not capable of helping themselves, and only to the extent to which it is necessary and feasible with the available resources. The paucity of resources may not permit anything more. The modern welfare state is facing financial problems in many countries because of the desire to abstain from making value judgements. This has prevented it from applying the means test and, thereby, led to an excessive extension of its scope.
The effort by the state to ensure well-being, justice and fair play in all walks of life is reflected in the institution of ḥisbah,59 which mirrors the Prophet’s saying that “the worst of people are those who do not establish justice, and do not enjoin good and prohibit evil.”60 A muḥtasil is one “who has been appointed by the ruler or his deputy to keep an eye on the affairs of the people to know their condition and to protect their interests.”61 In its wider sense, ḥisbah stands for “ensuring the prevalence of virtue, if its decline has become apparent, and the prevention of vice, if its perpetration has become apparent”.62 In its narrower sense, ḥisbah stands for the monitoring of the markets to ensure justice and fair play in human interaction and to prevent cruelty to animals. For example, ʿUmar, the second Caliph, punished those who loaded their camels beyond their ability to carry the load.63
Several classical authors wrote on the subject of ḥisbah, including al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), Abū Yaʿlā, (d. 458/1065), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shayzarī (d. 589/1193), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), Ibn al-Ukhuwwah (d. 729/1329), al-Nuwayrī (d. 732/1332), Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), and al-Maqrīzī (d. 846/1442).64 All these writers emphasized the regulation of economic activity and of markets in the light of the Sharīʿah so as to ensure justice and fair play which were seen as indispensable. This function continued to be performed, though not always very effectively, during the greater part of Muslim history.
The objective behind ḥisbah is not only to allow the markets to operate freely and prices, wages and profits to be determined by the forces of demand and supply (which happens in a capitalist state as well), but also to ensure at the same time that all economic agents fulfil their obligations towards each other and adhere to the rules of the Sharīʿah.65 Every precaution needs to be taken to ensure that there is “no coercion, no deception, no taking advantage of the dire circumstances or ignorance of a contracting party,” and that there is no withholding or destruction of supplies to raise prices.66 The state need not have any qualms about intervening when the thresholds of justice and fairness are crossed and there is no justification for waiting until the market forces correct the inequities themselves. Such intervention should not, however, be arbitrary for this, in itself, could lead to inequities. It should rather be on the basis of a proper analysis by experts and, if the price is regulated for some valid reason, it should not be out of tune with the price of similar goods and services in normal circumstances.
In spite of being an antithesis of the laissez faire state, the Islamic state was perhaps never conceived as the equivalent of a totalitarian or socialist state by any of the classical writers or jurists.67 Recognition of private property and respect for individual freedom have always been prevalent. The slant towards nationalization and regimentation came in the thinking of some Muslim writers under the influence of socialism, and was exploited by ambitious politicians in several Muslim countries including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Indonesia.
The army has been the primary force behind socialism in the Muslim world. The rationale given for military coups was invariably the desire to eliminate corruption, accelerate development, and promote socio-economic justice. All these goals appealed greatly to the downtrodden masses. The Islamic strategy for this purpose did not, however, suit most of the military dictators because of their generally secularist leanings and/or their ambition to perpetuate their control over the political system. This is easier when the economy is also totally under their thumb. Islam with its emphasis on shūrā, socio-economic justice, and a decentralized economic system could not have been but a hindrance in the realization of their ambition. Hence, there could have been nothing better than socialism to serve their vested interest.
Nevertheless, they could not dispense with Islam. This would have been highly unpopular. Therefore, they also exploited Islam for their ends by bracketing Islam with socialism. This is clearly evident from a speech delivered by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, who argued in his speech that:
“Islam and the principles of socialism are not mutually repugnant. Islam preaches equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it ... Pakistan cannot last without the supremacy of Islam. A socialist form of government does not rival that supremacy. On the contrary, socialism will make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values.”68
Socialism and Islam were both exploited to legitimize any and every government intervention considered by socialist dictators to be in their interest.69
Socialism has, however, brought nothing but misery to the Muslim world. Arbitrary nationalization along with ill-conceived policies and excessive controls have ruined the economies of practically all the countries where it was resorted to. Large-scale enterprise was promoted in urban areas at the expense of rural development. Excessive budgetary deficits financed through debt and monetary expansion are still taking a heavy toll on these economies in terms of inflation and debt servicing. Corruption has increased and development has been slowed. The performance of socio-economic justice has been nothing but disappointing. The condition of the masses has only worsened even in oil-producing countries like Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Indonesia, where oil revenues, if utilized effectively, could have brought prosperity. Hence all the three arguments (eliminating corruption, accelerating development and prosperity, and socio-economic justice) advanced in favour of socialism have proved to be merely wishful thinking.
The Dilemma: The Ideal and the Reality
Looking at the record of Muslim history, one does, however, find that the kind of just and concientious state desired by Islam has not always been realized. While there have been excellent rulers, there have also been those who were corrupt and despotic and who exploited the masses to serve their own vested interests. This has perpetuated a conflict between the rulers and the pious ʿulamā’70 – a conflict which has played an adverse role in the cycle of Muslim decline, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. This may lead one to conclude that the call for laissez faire in the West may, perhaps, not have been a misconceived idea. However, laissez faire has not been, and cannot be, helpful in realizing justice. The welfare state has also had its problems. The question that, therefore, arises is whether a balance between the two can be attained. The West has been trying to establish a just balance between market failure and government failure, but does not seem to have succeeded so far. Can the Muslims succeed? They have no choice. The imperative of establishing a just society, makes it their moral obligation to struggle until they succeed.
The effort to establish in Muslim countries a just society of the kind that Islam envisages is bound to be an uphill task. Democracy with proper checks and balances, combined with effective implementation of the Sharīʿah to ensure the honest and effective use of public resources for the well-being of the people, is indispensable for this purpose. However, most Muslim countries have neither democracy nor the rule of the Sharīʿah in the true sense of the term. Efforts are made by illegitimate rulers even to interpret the Sharīʿah in ways that suit the perpetuation of their despotic rule. The ʿulamā’ have become preoccupied with trivialities that have nothing to do with the establishment of a just and morally upright society. That scientific and technological advance which took place in earlier centuries with the support of government, does not seem to be making much headway. The kind of education system that would combine moral education with modern technical and scientific education is barely discernible. Those factors which brought the Muslim countries to this state of affairs will be analyzed in Chapters 3 and 6 while the measures that need to be taken for the reversal of this trend are discussed in Chapter 8.
Notes
1. Hodgson, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 73.
2. Ibid., p. 87.
3. For greater detail on the fundamentals of the Islamic paradigm, see Chapra, Challenge, 1992, pp. 201–12.
4. Zubair Hasan probably reflects the Muslim consensus when he states that “amānah underlies Islam’s entire socio-economic philosophy” (Zubair Hasan, 1988, p. 41).
5. The Qur’ān does not make any mention of the Prophets sent by God to people other than those in the Middle East. Their names were not familiar to them and the Qur’ān is not intended to be an encyclopaedia. It, however, states clearly that: “And indeed We have sent Our Messengers to every community in every period” (al-Qur’ān, 16: 36). “And We sent Messengers before you; some of them We have mentioned to you, while some others We have not mentioned” (al-Qur’ān, 40: 78).
6. Z.I. Ansari, 1992, p. 142.
7. For a brief discussion of the maqāṣid, see Chapra, Challenge, 1992, pp. 7–9. There has been a substantial discussion of the maqāṣid in fiqh literature, some of the most prominent exponents being: al-Māturīdī (d. 333/945), al-Shāshī (d. 365/975), al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1012), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), al-Āmidī (d. 631/ 1234), ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1327), and al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388). For a modern discussion of these, see: Masud, 1977; al-Raysuni, 1992, pp. 25–55; Nyazee, 1994, pp. 189–268.
8. This same idea has been beautifully expressed by Erfan Shafey by saying: “To a devout Muslim, and by definition, Islam is justice and justice is Islam.” (Comments on Zubair Hasan’s paper in M. Iqbal, 1988, p. 63.)
9. The Qur’ān repeats the same message in a number of other places. For example: “Are you going to compel people to believe” (al-Qur’ān, 10: 99), and “You are not there to force them to believe. Exhort through the Qur’ān whoever takes heed of the Warning” (al-Qur’ān, 50: 45).
10. Jurists have talked about necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), conveniences (ḥājiyyāt), and refinements (taḥsīniyyāt). However, all of these, as conceived by jurists, fall within the range of what may be called ‘needs’ in modern economics, and may be used to refer to all those goods and services which make a real difference in human well-being by fulfilling a need or removing a hardship. Anything that goes beyond needs has been treated by the fuqahā’ as prodigality and self-indulgence and is strongly disapproved of. The fuqahā’ have used a number of terms like taraf, isrāf, tafākhur, and takāthur for various aspects of wasteful and luxurious living.
11. See al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), pp. 118–20.
12. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, p. 158.
13. Al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), p. 203. It may be worthwhile to see the whole section on “Madhāhib al-Nās fī al-Ghinā wa al-Faqr” (People’s Ideas About Wealth and Poverty), pp. 203–10. See also al-ʿAbbādī, 1977, Vol. 3, pp. 15–29.
14. Cited from the Ḥilyat al-Awliyā’ of Abū Nuʿaym (d. 430/1038) by Arberry, 1950, p. 33.
15. See Abū Bakr al-Khallāl, 1407 AH, pp. 50 and 90 respectively. He states that there are a number of verses in the Qur’ān which enjoin the establishment of Islam through the development of land, which is not possible without wealth. Moreover, wealth also enables a person to act upon his religion, to give charity to others, and to pray (p. 73). He also quotes the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, and a number of his Companions as well as people from the following generations to show that wealth is an asset for Islam (p. 75); the self-respect of Muslims lies in being able to dispense with the help of others (p. 28), improving their houses and living conditions (pp. 39 and 49), and developing their wealth (p. 41). He even states that wealth is like a weapon (p. 50). According to him, the Sufis were misguided in their rejection of marriage, wealth and food (p. 50).
16. See Jaʿfar al-Dimashqī, 1977, p. 19.
17. Abū Yūsuf, 1352 AH, p. 4.
18. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (1955), Vol. 4, p. 1996:56, Kitāb al-Birr wa al-Ṣilah wa al-Adab, Bāb Taḥrīm al-Ẓulm, from Jābir ibn ʿAbdullāh. The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, used the word ẓulumāt in this ḥadīth. Ẓulumāt is the plural of ẓulmah or darkness, and signifies several layers of darkness, leading ultimately to ‘pitch’ or ‘absolute’ darkness, as is also evident in the Qur’ānic verse 24: 40.
19. Abū Yūsuf, 1352 AH, p. 111; see also pp. 3–17.
20. Al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), p. 125.
21. Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 1961, Vol. 18, p. 165.
22. Ibid., p. 166. See also his Minhāj al-Sunnah, 1986, Vol. 5, p. 127.
23. Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Ḥisbah fī al-Islām (1967), p. 94. For a translation, see Muhtar Holland, Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Ḥisba (1982), p. 95.
24. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, p. 287.
25. See Chapra, Challenge, 1992, pp. 143–56 and 168–9.
26. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, p. 288.
27. Ibid., p. 288.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 286.
30. Sayyid Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār (1954), Vol. 4, p. 45.
31. Sayyid Qutb, Al-ʿAdālah al-Ijtimāʿiyyah fī al-Islām, 6th ed., 1964, p. 34; tr. John B. Hardie, Social Justice in Islam (1970), p. 29.
32. See Adnan M. Musallam, “Sayyid Qutb and Social Justice, 1945–1948”, 1963, p. 61.
33. Mawdudi, Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, commentary on verse 25 of Sūrah 57 (al-Ḥadīd), Vol. 5, p. 322.
34. M. Bāqir al-Saḍr, Iqtiṣādunā, 1981, p. 303.
35. Majallah al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyyah, briefly known as the Majallah, states 100 maxims of jurisprudence (al-Qawāʿid al-fiqhiyyah) in its preamble. An English translation of the Majallah by C.R. Tyser et al. and entitled The Mejelle was published in 1967 by the All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Nabha Road, Lahore. Although the Majallah is a Hanafi compendium codified during the Ottoman period, the maxims are almost universally used by jurists of all schools of Muslim jurisprudence. See also Mustafa A. al-Zarqa, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī Thawbihī al-Jadīd (1967), Vol. 2, pp. 945–1060; Ali Ahmad al-Nadwi, Al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyyah (1986). The numbers given within brackets after each principle refer to the articles of the Majallah from which the principle has been derived. See also the section on “Principles of Spending” in Chapter 6 for further maxims.
36. The first ḥadīth is from Shaddād ibn Aws in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Kitāb al-Ṣayd wa al-Dhabā’iḥ, Bāb al-amr bi Iḥsān fī al-Dhabḥ wa al-Qatl, Vol. 3, No. 57, p. 1548; the second ḥadīth is from Sayyidah ʿĀ’ishah in al-Bayhaqī’s Shuʿab al-Īmān, 1990, Vol. 4, No. 5312, p. 334.
Iḥsān demands the rendering of more than what is required by ʿadl or justice. For example, if the seller gives to the buyer honestly not only the agreed weight or measure in return for the price he has paid but something more, then he is acting upon the principle of iḥsān.
37. Abū Yūsuf, 1352 AH, p. 4.
38. The actual wording of this ḥadīth is: “A human being will not be able to make any move on the Day of Judgement until he has been questioned about his life, how he passed it; his knowledge, how he applied it; his wealth, how he acquired it and where he spent it; and his body, how he exhausted it.” Narrated by Tirmidhī from Abū Barzah al-Aslamī, see al-Mundharī, 1986, Vol. 1, No. 5, p. 115.
39. See Anas Zarqa, 1980, p. 13.
40. Faridi defines an optimum allocation of resources as “the one that establishes an equilibrium between the moral and economic imperatives of the society, given its income and the state of technology” (Faridi, 1983, p. 40).
41. Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the Majallah.
42. See Shāh Walīullāh (d. 1176/1762), Hujjatullāh al-Bālighah, 1992. The whole book (two volumes) is intended to show the wisdom behind the different teachings of the Sharīʿah.
43. Al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), p. 120.
44. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, p. 287.
45. Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Aḥkām, Bāb Man isturʿiya raʿiyyatan falam yanṣaḥ, from Maʿqil ibn Yasār.
46. Cited by al-Māwardī, in Adab, 1955, p. 121.
47. Prof. North has used the term ‘nasty’ for all such behaviour. See the Chapter “Ideology and Free Rider”, in North, 1981.
48. Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿīyyah, 1966, p. 139. This is really a part of a ḥadīth which says: “The ruler (sulṭān) is the shadow of God on earth; every oppressed person seeks his protection. If he does justice, he deserves reward and the subjects owe thanks. However, if he commits injustice, he bears the burden and the subjects need patience” (Ibn ʿUmar by al-Bayhaqī, Shuʿab al-Īmān, Vol. 6, p. 16: 7369).
49. Some of these scholars include: Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065), Niẓām al-Mulk ((d. 485/1092), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/ 1406), Shāh Walīullāh (d. 1176/1762), Jamāluddīn al-Afghānī (d. 1315/1897), Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905), Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1357/1938), Hasan al-Banna (d. 1368/1949), Sayyid Mawdudi (d. 1399/1979), and Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d. 1400/1980).
50. Al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām, 1960, p. 5.
51. See Khadduri, 1984, p. 179.
52. Ibn Taymiyyah’s Al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyyah, 1966, is an elaboration of the Qur’ānic verse, “God bids you to place your trusts with those who are worthy of them” (al-Qur’ān, 4: 58). He, like most other authorities, considered government positions to be trusts. See in particular, pp. 9–14 and 138–44.
53. Some of these authors include: al-Kātib (d. 132/749), Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 139/756), al-Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), Kai Ka’ūs (d. 475/1082), Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 520/1127). (For details, see Essid, 1995, pp. 19–41.)
54. This book has been translated from Persian into English by Hubert Darke under the title, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings (London, 1961), p. 7.
55. Al-Dimashqī, 1977, pp. 12 and 61; Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, pp. 281–3.
56. Hasan al-Banna, Majmūʿah Rasā’il (1989), p. 255.
57. This idea is expressed by Mawdudi in a number of places. See for example, his commentary on verse 25 of Sūrah 57 (al-Ḥadīd) in Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, Vol. 5, pp. 322–3; Islamic Law and Constitution, 1967, pp. 247–8.
58. Al-Ṣadr, Iqtiṣādunā, 1981, p. 721. See also Taleghani, 1982, p. 28.
59. See Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, pp. 225–6.
60. Cited from ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second Caliph, by Ibn al-Ukhuwwah, n.d., p. 17–18.
61. Ibn al-Ukhuwwah, n.d., p. 7.
62. Al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām, 1960, p. 240.
63. See Rabah’s Introduction to Ibn Taymiyyah’s Al-Ḥisbah, 1967, p. d. ().
64. For a more comprehensive list, see Tables 1 and 2 in Shalaq, 1989, pp. 65–6.
65. Islahi, 1988, p. 19.
66. See M.N. Siddiqi, in Islahi (1988), p. 16. See also Islahi’s Chapter 3.
67. For example, al-Māwardī discussed ten functions of the state in his al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. All concern the well-being of the people, but within the framework of freedom of enterprise (part of function 3). See al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, 1960, pp. 15–16.
68. Bhutto, 1968, pp. 14–15.
69. See the papers on Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Pakistan in Desfosses and Levesque, 1975.
70. See Goitein, 1966, pp. 197–213.
