Читать книгу The Great Debate That Made the U.S. Constitution - Madison James - Страница 22

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Resol: 9 being resumed

The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the National tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their organization.

Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, then moved the following resolution respecting a National Judiciary,viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.

Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the National Legislature."

Mr. Madison, objected to an appointment by the whole Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

Mr. Sherman & Mr. Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the appointment by the Senate was ag^d to nem. con.

Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they would repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.

Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.

Mr. Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch. If they said have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it would be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum would be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.

Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the proposition.

Mr. Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to the case of amendments.

Mr. Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate should be formed on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they said have equal power, otherwise if a different principle said be introduced.

Mr. Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger whichever way the Senate be formed. We establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance business — The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by himself is a maxim. In Connecticut both branches can originate in all cases, and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.

General Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. and has been a source of pernicious disputes between the 2 branches. The Constitution is now evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from the Senate to the other House.

Mr. Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in the lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.

On the question for excepting money bills, as proposed by Mr. Gerry, Mass. no. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. Maryland no. Virginia ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.2

Committee rose & Mr. Ghorum made report, which was postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report was in the words following:

Report of the Committee of Whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.

1. Resolved that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National Government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.

2. Resolved that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.

3. Resolved that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States for the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term of service, and under the national Government for the Space of one year after its expiration.

4. Resolved that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely, seven years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and under the National Government for the space of one year after its expiration.

5. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts.

6. Resolved that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

7. Resolved that the rights of suffrage in the 1st branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants, of every age sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State.

8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2d branch of the National Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.

9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for — to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty — to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.

10. Resolved that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless by two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature.

11. Resolved that a National Judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to be appointed by the 2d branch of the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

12. Resolved that the National Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.

13. Resolved that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect the collection of the National revenue, impeachments of any National Officers, and questions which involve the national peace & harmony.

14. Resolved that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.

15. Resolved that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the completion of all their engagements.

16. Resolved that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.

17. Resolved that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Resolved that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.

19. Resolved that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.

1

Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, June 13, 1787:

"The public mind is now on the point of a favourable turn to the objects of your meeting, and, being fairly met with the result, will, I am persuaded, eventually embrace it — being calculated for the permanent fitness, and not the momentary habits of the country, it may at first be viewed with hesitation, but derived and patronized as it will be, its influence must extend into an adoption as the present fabric gives way — the work once well done will be done forever, but patched up in accommodation to the whim of the day, it will soon require the hand of the cobbler again, and in every unfortunate experiment the materials are rendered the less fit for that monument of civil liberty which we wish to erect. — Constitute a federal Government, invigorate & check it well — give it then independent powers over the Trade the Revenues, and force of the Union, and all things that involve any relationship to foreign powers — give it also the revisal of all State acts — unless it possesses a compleat controul over the State Governments, the constant effort will be to resume the delegated powers, — nor do I see what inducement the federal sovereignty can have to negative an innocent act of a State — Constitute it in such shape that, its first principles being preserved, it will be a good republic — I wish to see that system have a fair experiment — but let the liability to encroachment be rather from the federal, than the State, governments — in the first case we shall insensibly glide into a monarchy: in the latter nothing but anarchy can be the consequence.

"Some Gentlemen think of a total surrender of the State Sovereignty — I see not the necessity of that measure for giving us national stability in consequence — the negative of the federal sovereignty will effectually prevent the existence of any licentious or inconsiderate act — and I believe that even under a new monarchy it would be found necessary thus to continue the local administration — general Laws would operate many particular [undecipherable] and a general legislature would be found incompetent to the formation of local ones — the interest of the United States may be well combined for the common good — but the affairs of so extensive a country are not to be thrown into one mass — an attempt to confederate upon terms materially opposed to the particular Interests would in all probability occasion a dismemberment, and in that event, within a long time yet to come, the prospects of commerce will be at an end as to any degree of national importance, let her fate be what it may as to freedom or vassalage." — Mad. MSS.

2 According to the Journal (121) Pennsylvania was among the noes.