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Ashworth (‘The Scope of Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424) argues that where the rescue of the victim would not pose a danger to the defendant, then liability should always be imposed for a failure to act, even where there is no pre-existing duty to act. Ashworth labels this as a ‘social responsibility’ on the part of citizens. You may find this approach sensible and worth investing in. Indeed, Cobb (‘Compulsory Care Giving: Some Thoughts on Relational Feminism, the Ethics of Care and Omission Liability’ (2008) 39 Cam LR 11) argues that a general ‘citizenship duty’ which would focus on a mandated reasonable action to prevent harm to one’s fellow citizens would be ‘fairer, clearer and simpler’. See also Ashworth and Steiner, ‘Criminal Omissions and Public Duties: The French Experience’ (1990) 10 LS 152.

This approach, however, is not short of difficulties, with two prominent questions needing to be answered:

(1) Who decides when intervening would or would not pose a danger?

(2) Is the test for such a decision subjective (looking at what the individual thought at the time) or objective (looking at what the reasonable man would do in that situation)?