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‘Unless we can land overwhelming forces and beat the Nazis in battle in France, Hitler will never be defeated. So this must be your prime task.’

Winston Churchill’s orders to Lord Mountbatten in 1942.

In spring 1943 at the Anglo-American TRIDENT conference the British Chiefs of Staff committed themselves to Overlord and the Combined Chiefs issued their Directive to General F. E. Morgan, who had been appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) ‘COSSAC’ at the Casablanca Conference:

‘To mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom and with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some 26 to 30 divisions and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month.’

The target date of 1 May 1944 for invasion was later postponed a month to enable extra landing craft to be built and the initial assault was expanded from three to five Army divisions. Overlord proceeded in London under the direction of General Morgan and Brigadier-General R. W. Barker, who set up an Anglo-American HQ for the eventual Supreme Commander and prepared an outline plan for the invasion of North-West Europe from Britain. But where would the attack take place?

General Eisenhower and senior officers during a visit to the 2nd TAF station at Dunsfold.

John Bateman

‘The Pas-de-Calais has many obvious advantages such as that good air support and quick turn-around for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defence and the maximum air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his Air Forces. Moreover, the Pas-de-Calais is the most strongly defended area of the whole French coast . . . Further this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion . . . the Caen sector is weakly held; the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the air defence screen covering the approaches to Germany and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates the local neutralization of the German fighter force . . . In the light of these factors it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in the Caen area with a view to the eventual seizure of the lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg/Brittany group of ports.

Seine Bay, the area of Normandy chosen for the assault, is some 50 miles across and stretches from Barfleur eastwards to the mouth of the Seine. Because it was ultimately intended that American forces should be supplied directly from the United States, their troops were assigned to the western sector, while the British and Canadian beaches were in the eastern sector. The invasion would necessitate 24 different embarkation points spread over 1,000 miles of British coastline, made necessary by the total loading capacity in 24 hours, since the assault and follow-up had to load simultaneously. The British would load from Yarmouth to Portsmouth and the Americans from Southampton to Milford Haven. Each of the 24 points required its own embarkation camp, marshalling and concentration area and special road layout – many of which had to be either built or greatly improved.