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TRANSLATORS’ FOREWORD

The work presented here is an English translation of Martin Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes—Volume 32 of the Gesamtausgabe (Complete Edition)—which constitutes the lecture course given by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg during the winter semester of 1930/31. The German edition, edited by Ingtraud Görland, was published in 1980 by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag.

The text of this lecture course occupies an important place among Heidegger’s writings on Hegel. There are several crucial discussions of Hegel—in Section 82 of Being and Time and in the essays “Hegel’s Concept of Experience”¹ and “Hegel and the Greeks”²—as well as brief analyses of Hegel spread throughout Heidegger’s writings. However, the present text represents Heidegger’s most substantial treatment of Hegel published so far. Bypassing the preface and the introduction to Hegel’s work, this lecture course explicates Sections A (“Consciousness”) and B (“Self-Consciousness”) of the Phenomenology of Spirit.³

The Character of the Text: A Reading. What distinguishes the following text, setting it apart from a commentary in the usual sense, is the fact that in this lecture course Heidegger offers a simple reading of Sections A and B of the Phenomenology of Spirit. If one looks at Heidegger’s reading of Hegel from the outside, without taking into account what actually transpires in it, then the reading might be characterized as an interpretation of the chapters “Sense Certainty,” “Perception,” “Force and Understanding,” and “Self-consciousness.” But what actually transpires in this interpretive reading is a careful and meticulous unfolding of the movement of thinking that is called “the phenomenology of spirit.” This reading reveals the phenomenology of spirit as a thinking which gathers itself up in a gradual, always conscious and always self-assured manner. The emergent unfolding of this gathering of “the phenomenology of spirit” marks the simplicity of Heidegger’s reading.

What we read in the text presented here in translation is not the establishment of a position or the expression of an intellectual superiority that is out to score points for or against Hegel. The interpreter of those sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit finds here a reading in which the process of the phenomenology of spirit becomes alive again. That Heidegger intended this—rather than a survey of various interpretations of Hegel’s thought—is shown by the fact that he assigns a limited space to the discussion of works about Hegel. The process of the phenomenology of spirit can come to live again independently of an extensive and thorough treatment of the Hegel literature. As the work of thinking progresses, and as we are drawn into the movement of thinking, it becomes increasingly clear how little this movement depends on the vast and growing literature on Hegel.

This does not mean that Hegel scholarship should be forfeited. Rather, in its powerful stroke, Heidegger’s reading reveals from within how necessary it is to inaugurate one’s reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit prior to and independent of the debate created by the secondary literature on that work. What we learn from the example that Heidegger provides is that the movement of thinking that occurs as the conditio sine qua non of coming to terms with the Phenomenology of Spirit needs to be initiated each time anew. Instead of being on the lookout for what this or that one has said about this work, the reader should initiate his or her own reading. What safeguards this reading from deteriorating into a subjective rendition of the Phenomenology of Spirit is not the authority of the secondary literature, but the essential character of this work as a work of thinking.

The simplicity of the reading which is at stake here and the movement which this reading is to bring about can be reached only when the Phenomenology of Spirit is taken as a work of thinking. The phrase “work of thinking” should not be mis-taken as a platitude on the basis of which the Phenomenology of Spirit might be seen as the product of Hegel’s intellectual efforts. The phrase “work of thinking” refers to the work-character of the work Phenomenology of Spirit, to its ἔϱγον, which is never experienced in a mere reading of the text.⁴ It is important to bear in mind that this ἔϱγον (in which the attentive reader participates) is not something added to the work as a supplement. A philosophical work such as Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit exists as the ἔϱγον which it brings to light from within itself.

The priority which Heidegger ascribes to the work as a work of thinking helps us to understand why the familiar characterization of the Phenomenology of Spirit as a product of Hegel’s intellectual efforts is far from adequate. When we take the work to be the product of Hegel’s intellectual effort, then we are immediately confronted with the question: Who is Hegel? Is he the focal point of any number of biographical studies? What is fundamentally objectionable in this characterization is that it immediately opens the door for an assessment of the work in terms of biography—in terms of a correlation between work and life. By considering the work as a by-product of life, we reduce the work to an outgrowth of subjectivity, thus blocking access to the ἔϱγον (to what is going on), which is summed up in the word work.

We might, then, distinguish the several meanings of the word work—and along with that the concomitant root issues involved: (1) the work that we have as a product of Hegel’s efforts, (2) the work as the book that we have (the Phenomenology of Spirit as a text-work), and (3) the work of thinking that is going on in the text-work, a work of thinking that our attentive reading can participate in. The first meaning of work—as product—Heidegger dismisses as peripheral, nongermane, and utterly external to the movement of thinking that his reading is intended to stimulate. The second meaning of work—as text-work—comes up whenever Heidegger makes reference to the work as text. The third meaning of work as process, as the movement of thinking, is the root issue and is central to Heidegger’s concern in this lecture course. Because of a certain style used in German—of not necessarily italicizing titles of books—these last two meanings (the ones that actually bear on Heidegger’s reading) are not distinguished in the German edition: The words “die Phänomenologie des Geistes” (not italicized in German) can refer to the book Phenomenology of Spirit or to the process or movement of “the phenomenology of spirit.” In order to provide an English translation in accord with standard English style, we had to determine in each instance which of the two senses was meant. This became a matter of interpretation, a task that the German edition could avoid.

In order to see the originality of the work, we must go beyond the legacy of Romanticism and historicism, which assumes a direct correlation between life and work and reduces the work to an accomplishment of human subjectivity. When Heidegger began a lecture course on Aristotle, instead of giving the customary account of the philosopher’s life, he chose merely to say: “Aristotle was born, he worked, and he died.”⁵ Thus, he intimates that biographical data do not provide a reliable starting point for entry into the work of a philosopher. Any view which assumes that a work is born out of life is an explanation offered about the work instead of an attempt to come to grips with its originality. The notion of the “history of the evolution of a work in the course of the development of the life of an author” tends to lead away from what occurs in the work—it is a mis-leading notion. The unexamined assumption concerning the nature of the work as a by-product of life is a way of explaining the work away rather than coming to terms with its original character. This explanation tends surreptitiously to annihilate the work’s questioning power.

As Heidegger returns to the originality of the work as a work of thinking, as he demands that the reader be guided by the ἔϱγον (which is the work) rather than by the desire to place the work alongside other biographical peculiarities of the author, he leads the reader back to the original togetherness of thinking and questioning. Thus, Heidegger points beyond the correlation of life and work to the work’s independent stature as a work of thinking.

It is certainly naive to want to explain anything in the Phenomenology of Spirit by going back to the events of Hegel’s life in Jena before 1807. For understanding what goes on in this work, curiosity about Hegel’s life in that period is a bad guide. Rather, it is the Phenomenology of Spirit as a work that made that life to be Hegel’s life. As a work of thinking, the Phenomenology of Spirit inheres in itself: Its independence forbids external and biographical explanations. It is good to pause for a moment and to wonder about the phenomenology of spirit as that which claimed Hegel’s “attention” in the midst of the events that made up his life in Jena. What is it that occurs in the work of the phenomenology of spirit that made this life to be Hegel’s life? Is it not the overriding concern with the phenomenology of spirit that stamps life with a Hegelian mark? The response to this question should come from a direct exposure to the ἔϱγον of thinking, which, as the phenomenology of spirit, leads the way in Hegel’s life. This is to suggest that, in opposition to romantic and historicistic views, we should see life in the light of the work. If we take up the questions that make up the very fabric of the phenomenology of spirit (or of the Phenomenology of Spirit), then we gain access to a plane from which the written history of the life of Hegel (his biography) appears in a new light. It is from such a plane that we understand Heidegger when he asks: “Is it not rather such that the work makes possible an interpretation of the biography?”⁶ This question is a warning that the work should be viewed not as a by-product of life, but rather as a central light which colors and tunes the contingencies and inevitabilities that are called life.

The independent and integral character of the work of thinking is central for Heidegger’s own work and applies to the works of others as well. In order to preserve this independent and integral character and to stress the need for taking up the work as it claims one’s thinking in its immediacy, the volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe are published without an interpretive introduction and a commentary. This is a significant point and has direct bearing on the character of the present text. Thus, it needs to be addressed briefly here.

When we come to a work of thinking, we should entertain no illusion as to what awaits us in reading the work. We do not come to grips with a work if we seek refuge in the convenience which an introduction or brief commentary provides. Either we are prepared for confronting the task with all its demands, or we are simply not yet prepared. No interpretive introduction or commentary will change that. We must be sincere with ourselves. More than anything else, a work of thinking calls for sincerity. Such a sincerity already knows that the labyrinthian device of an introduction cannot circumvent the actual encounter with the work of thinking. We must face the work as it is. If we fail to do so, if we get into the work in accordance with the suggestions made in the introduction, then we run the risk of learning later that those suggestions are peripheral, external to the work, and inappropriate. Thus, they will need correction. But since the correction of those views or suggestions is accomplished by getting into the work itself, then why not begin with the work in the first place? That is why volumes of the Gesamtausgabe of Heidegger’s works are not supplemented with an introduction or brief commentary. Instead, the reader should face the work in the freedom in which the work comes forth as a work of thinking. This freedom is not preserved when the work is considered to be a riddle whose basic solutions are expected to be found in a brief commentary or introduction.

The text of Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes appears without an introduction or brief commentary, because nothing should stand between this work and its readers, who attentively participate in the work of thinking therein. This present text needs not to have such a commentary or introduction, because the character of this text—as a reading that participates in the movement of the work of thinking that is opened up for us in the text-work—demonstrates above all else the inappropriateness of such an introduction. There is no question that, when an introduction is added to a work, a specific way of reading the work is suggested. But this specific way of reading the work is not the only way to read the work. An exceptional and extreme case—but nevertheless relevant—is Jacques Derrida’s French translation of Husserl’s Ursprung der Geometrie. When Derrida supplements his translation of this work with an introduction and commentary, he suggests a certain way of reading this work, which is certainly not the only way to read it. Whatever the merits of Derrida’s commentary—and these merits are certainly there—there is no doubt that his introduction and his comments stand between the reader and Husserl’s work. By contrast, we can say: The absence of an introduction in the original edition of Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes safeguards the independence of the work of thinking as it occurs in the space of freedom that is necessary for the flourishing of the work itself.

The Tension of Translation. The work character of the work of thinking, whether it is the Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit by Heidegger, is primarily manifest in the language of the work. In both Hegel and Heidegger, this language takes on a unique character. In order to say what needs to be said, both Hegel and Heidegger speak a rigorous and precise language that goes beyond the traditional language of philosophy. In this new territory that language traverses, as it is molded in the works of Hegel and Heidegger, thinking itself enters new territories. It is easy to accuse both Hegel and Heidegger of taking inappropriate measures with language, of wanting to be deliberately abstruse, obscure, and unclear. This accusation comes from the reluctance to recognize that in both philosophers language manifests new territories of thinking. If we grasp the urgency of what these philosophers want to think, then we realize that they cannot say what they think without saying it in their own way.

But precisely this demand that the work of thinking places on both Hegel and Heidegger, as language was molded in their thinking, sometimes leads to virtually insurmountable difficulties for the translator. The difficulties in translating Hegel and Heidegger arise mainly in pointing, in another language, to the territories that these thinkers have opened up. It goes without saying that there is no general rule or universal method for doing this. Beyond bending and twisting the existing resources of a language, in order to let it fit the needs of what is being translated, we as translators are mindful of the realms or territories that this work opens up. (The desire to deal as adequately as possible with these difficulties prompted us to work closely with the French translation of this volume, by Emmanuel Martineau.)⁷

Aware of these difficulties and with an eye or ear toward letting those difficulties resonate for the reader of this English translation, we offer here the following reflections on significant tensions that arose in our work of translation and how we have chosen to resolve them:

1. As already mentioned, the phrase “die Phänomenologie des Geistes” appears in the German edition without italics. Sometimes it refers to Hegel’s text and is a title; and sometimes it refers to the process or movement of the thinking that is underway: the phenomenology of spirit as the very work of thinking. In each case we have tried to determine which sense of the phrase was operative. In this translation, Phenomenology of Spirit (in italics and capitalized) refers, obviously, to the Hegel text, whereas the phrase “the phenomenology of spirit” (without italics, in lower case, and without quotation marks) refers to that movement in thinking that is the work of the phenomenology of spirit. (The same problem, distinction, and solution apply to the Logic—Hegel’s text—and to “logic”—the movement of logic in the work of thinking.) We are aware that there is interpretation involved in this procedure and, moreover, that we are thereby making a distinction that the German edition—and perhaps even Heidegger himself—did not or did not need to make. (Does the work of thinking that we the readers participate in suffer more with the distinction or without it?)

2. In consultation with the French translation, we have occasionally changed the paragraph divisions in order to make possible a smoother and more readable text.

3. The use of italics in the translation varies from that in the German edition. Italics in Heidegger’s original text serve to emphasize certain things within the context of oral delivery and are less appropriate for the written text. Moreover, italics are part of the language and should be used according to peculiarities of the particular language. Thus, our italics are not always those that appear in Heidegger’s text. We found that at times we could not wisely carry the italics over into our English rendition. On the other hand, we found that at times the English requires italics when the German does not. Thus, in some instances our use of italics varies from the original German, based on our understanding that the use of italics is not just a technical aspect that exists independently of the specific language being used, but is part and parcel of the language itself, one of its gestures.

4. We used A. V. Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, while making emendations to that translation. At times we found it necessary to deviate from the English Hegel terminology—e.g., that used by Miller—because we had to adjust his rendition to the context of Heidegger’s work with Hegel’s text, and thus to the context of our translation.

5. Given these various issues in general and within that context, we offer the following reflections on significant tensions within individual words:

absolvent. There is no English equivalent for this word. It is, of course, not really a German word either. The term absolvent is crucial for the work that Heidegger does with Hegel’s text. Thus, we kept the word in our translation, without ignoring entirely the possibilities offered by such English words as “detachment” or “the act of detaching.” The term absolvent must be distinguished from “the absolute” (das Absolute). Absolvent knowing, for example, carries with it at all times several connotations: in the process of being absolved/detached, in the process of the absolute, becoming absolute.

aufzeigen. Throughout this translation, we have translated aufzeigen as “showing up”—and not, as is commonly done, as “pointing out.” It seems to us that the term “showing up” better accounts for the process of appearing, manifesting, shining—which is of utmost concern for Hegel and for Heidegger’s reading of Hegel.

dieses and diesig. A common word in German, dieses is used in Hegel’s text to indicate that he wants to think something which is not yet thought in traditional ways of thinking about a thing. When Hegel says “dieses,” he wants to think a thing as it is on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. When Heidegger uses the words “diesig” or “das Diesige,” he is reconsidering this same process and finds that to be “dieses” a thing must have the character of a dieses, must be diesig. Only thus can a thing be on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. Thus, we have translated diesig as “having the character of a this.” (Similar explanations can be offered in regard to other terms, such as hiesig and ichlich.)

einzeln. English has two possibilities: particular or individual. The nuance of each of these words in English is perhaps more a matter of style than of anything else. We have translated einzeln consistently as “particular,” even though we are aware that a case can be made for the appropriateness of the word individual in some instances.

gleichgültig. It is our judgment that Hegel uses this word in two senses: as “indifferent” and as “with equal weight or force.” In each instance we have chosen one or the other, trying to be mindful of this difference.

meinen, das Meinen, and das Meine. First, meinen and das Meinen can sometimes be translated into English as “meaning,” but more often as “intending.” We have used both English words. Second, the connection that these words have in their German rootedness is impossible to maintain in English translation. The reader simply needs to remember that the words are rooted together in German.

die Mitte. This is a crucial technical term for Hegel. It presented us with a special difficulty, in that the most readable English translation—“middle term”—carries with it a possibly misleading nuance. We might have chosen “middle,” “midpoint,” or “mid-point.” With great hesitation we have sometimes rendered die Mitte as “middle term,” aware of the risk that the language will tend to reduce the tension and movement in Hegel’s thought of “die Mitte” to a logical nexus—thereby covering over the experiential character of the phenomenology of spirit that Hegel’s work undertakes and that Heidegger’s reading of Hegel’s work invites us the reader to participate in.

rein. We hope that translating rein as “sheer” rather than “pure” will allow us to get closer to what Hegel has in mind. It seems to us that the English word sheer better reflects the absolute character of the process which Hegel has in mind.

wahrnehmen and die Wahrnehmung. These words are usually translated as “perceiving” and “perception” respectively. We have also done that. But in some crucial places we have used the more literal phrase “taking for true,” in order to keep visible the root meaning of wahr-nehmen. This meaning is implied in the English word perception, but it is not explicit. Wahr-nehmen as “taking-for-true” is of central philosophical concern for Hegel as well as for Heidegger reading Hegel.

wissen. This term in Hegel refers at times to the process of knowing and at times to knowledge itself. Thus, we have translated wissen sometimes as “knowing” and sometimes as “knowledge.” Again, this occasionally became a matter of interpretation, something that the German edition—and perhaps Heidegger himself—did not need to make so explicitly. (Note: We have translated the German word die Erkenntnis as “cognition,” precisely to reserve the English words knowing and knowledge for wissen.)

zugrundegehen. We found that Heidegger’s word zugrundegehen is as diverse as Hegel’s aufheben. Thus, we have translated it variously as “running aground,” “going under,” and “being annihilated.”

Technical Aspects of the Text in Translation. All additions to the German text by the translators are within square brackets [ ], including information that was added in the footnotes. Significant and problematical German words that we chose to carry along in the body of the text are also in square brackets. The symbols { } are used to distinguish Heidegger’s additions or comments within quotations.

Footnotes from the German edition are at the bottom of the page and are numbered consecutively from the beginning of each major section—following the German text. Translators’ footnotes are at the bottom of the page, in brackets, and are designated by asterisks. Footnotes designated by asterisks without brackets contain information that appears in the text itself in the German edition. The numbers in the running heads refer to the pagination of the German edition.

References to Hegel Texts. In an attempt to clarify which texts by Hegel (and which editions) are being referred to in Heidegger’s text and to make proper and adequate reference to English translations of these Hegel texts, we have proceeded in the following way in all footnote references:

1. We have reproduced the references that appear in the German edition as they appear there. When there is simply a Roman numeral and page number, it refers to the volumes of Hegel’s Gesamtausgabe of 1832ff., which Heidegger refers to most of the time. The later and more accessible Jubiläumsausgabe reproduces in its margins the volume and page number of the 1832 edition.

2. References that are added in this translation and identified as “GW” refer to the Gesammelte Werke of Hegel published by the Hegel-Archiv through Felix Meiner Verlag.

3. For Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, abbreviations in the footnote references mean as follows:

II	Gesamtausgabe or Jubiläumsausgabe
GW IX	Phänomenobgie des Geistes, hrsg. Wolfgang Bonsieger und Reinhard Heede, Gesammelte Werke, Band 9 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980)
Hoff.	Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. Johannes Hoffmeister, Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 114 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952)
E.T.	Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Α. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)

4. Besides the Phenomenology of Spirit, the English translations of two other Hegel texts are referred to in the footnotes simply as “E.T.” These are:

The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy, trans. J. P. Surber (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1978) (Jubiläumsausgabe I; GW IV)

Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976) (Jubiläumsausgabe III; GW XI–XII and XXI–XXII)

5. All other references to English translations appear in brackets in the respective footnotes.

This translation owes an immeasurable amount to the generous help that it has received from Robert Bernasconi, both in terms of the preparation of references to the various editions of Hegel’s works and in terms of a careful and concern-filled reading of our text. We express our deepest gratitude to him, even as we assume full and final responsibility for this work of translation. We also thank John Sallis for his careful reading of the text of this translation.

We are grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for partial support of this project. Our gratitude is also due to the Faculty Research and Development Committee of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of DePaul University, the Research Council of DePaul University, the University Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, and the College of Arts, Letters and Sciences of the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse.

Parvis Emad

Kenneth Maly

Notes

1. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe, Band 5 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1977), pp. 115–208; trans. Hegel’s Concept of Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

2. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, Band 9 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1976), pp. 427–44.

3. Heidegger focuses on these sections because it is precisely in them that the further development and overcoming of Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Reason take place. Cf. in this regard the Editor’s Epilogue to this present volume.

4. R. G. Collingwood makes some interesting remarks on the fundamental inadequacy of merely reading a text, in his Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 40f.

5. Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1975), pp. 14ff.

6. Martin Heidegger, Lettre à J. M. Palmier (1969), in M. Haar (ed.), Martin Heidegger (Paris: Cahier de l’Herne, 1983), p. 117.

7. Martin Heidegger, La “Phénoménologie de l’esprit” de Hegel, trans. E. Martineau (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1984).