Оглавление
Marvin Rausand. Risk Assessment
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Illustrations
Guide
Pages
WILEY SERIES IN STATISTICS IN PRACTICE
Risk Assessment. Theory, Methods, and Applications
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
What is Changed From the First Edition?
Supplementary Information on the Internet
Intended Audience
Selection of Methods
Use of Software Programs
Organization
Online Information
Reference
Acknowledgments
About the Companion Site
Chapter 1 Introduction. 1.1 Risk in Our Modern Society
1.2 Important Trends
1.3 Major Accidents
1.4 History of Risk Assessment
1.4.1 Norway
1.5 Applications of Risk Assessment
1.6 Objectives, Scope, and Delimitation
1.7 Problems
References
Note
Chapter 2 The Words of Risk Analysis. 2.1 Introduction
2.2 Risk
2.2.1 Three Main Questions
Definition 2.1 (Risk)
Remark 2.1 (Positive and negative consequences)
Remark 2.2 (Danger)
2.2.1.1 Expressing Risk
2.2.2 Alternative Definitions of Risk
Remark 2.3 (Risk: singular or plural?)
2.3 What Can Go Wrong?
2.3.1 Accident Scenario
Definition 2.2 (Accident scenario)
Example 2.1 (Accident scenario in a process plant)
2.3.1.1 Categories of Accident Scenarios
Definition 2.3 (Reference accident scenario)
Definition 2.4 (Worst‐case accident scenario)
Definition 2.5 (Worst credible accident scenario)
2.3.2 Hazard
Definition 2.6 (Hazard)
Example 2.2 (Accident scenario involving more than one hazard)
2.3.3 Initiating Event and Hazardous Event
Definition 2.7 (Event)
Definition 2.8 (Initiating event)
2.3.3.1 Hazardous Event
Definition 2.9 (Hazardous event)
Example 2.3 (Hazardous events)
Example 2.4 (Crane operation)
2.3.4 The Bow‐tie Model
2.3.5 End Event and End State
Definition 2.10 (End event)
2.3.6 A Caveat
2.3.7 Enabling Events and Conditions
Definition 2.11 (Enabling events and conditions)
2.3.7.1 Active Failures and Latent Conditions
2.3.8 Technical Failures and Faults
Definition 2.12 (Failure of an item)
Definition 2.13 (Fault of an item)
Remark 2.4 (Analogy to death and being dead)
Example 2.5 (Pump failure)
Definition 2.14 (Failure mode)
Example 2.6 (Pump failure modes)
Definition 2.15 (Failure cause)
Definition 2.16 (Failure mechanism)
2.3.8.1 Failure Classification
Example 2.7 (Cruise ship near accident)
2.3.9 Terminology Comments
2.3.10 Accident
Definition 2.17 (Accident)
Example 2.8 (Helicopter accidents)
2.3.11 Incident
Definition 2.18 (Incident)
2.3.12 Precursors
Definition 2.19 (Precursors)
2.3.13 Special Types of Accidents
Definition 2.20 (Organizational accident)
Definition 2.21 (Individual accident)
Definition 2.22 (System accident)
Definition 2.23 (Component failure accident)
2.4 What is the Likelihood?
2.4.1 Probability
2.4.1.1 Classical Approach
2.4.1.2 Frequentist Approach
2.4.1.3 Bayesian Approach
Definition 2.24 (Subjective probability)
Example 2.9 (Your subjective probability)
Definition 2.25 (Prior probability)
Thomas Bayes
Definition 2.26 (Posterior probability)
2.4.1.4 Likelihood
Remark 2.5 (The term likelihood)
2.4.2 Controversy
Remark 2.6 (Objective or subjective?)
2.4.3 Frequency
2.5 What are the Consequences?
Definition 2.27 (Harm/consequence)
2.5.1 Assets
Definition 2.28 (Asset)
2.5.2 Categories of Human Victims
Example 2.10 (Victims of Railway Accidents)
2.5.3 Consequence Categories
2.5.4 Consequence Spectrum
2.5.5 Time of Recording Consequences
2.5.6 Severity
Definition 2.29 (Severity)
2.6 Additional Terms
2.6.1 Barriers
Definition 2.30 (Barrier)
2.6.2 Safety
Definition 2.31 (Safety)
2.6.3 Safety Performance
Definition 2.32 (Safety performance)
Remark 2.7 (Was the risk analysis wrong?)
2.6.4 Security
Definition 2.33 (Security)
Definition 2.34 (Threat)
Remark 2.8 (Natural threat)
Definition 2.35 (Threat actor)
Definition 2.36 (Vulnerability)
2.6.4.1 An Illustration
2.6.5 Resilience
Definition 2.37 (Resilience)
2.7 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 3 Main Elements of Risk Assessment. 3.1 Introduction
Definition 3.1 (Risk analysis)
Definition 3.2 (Risk assessment)
3.1.1 The Role of the Risk Analyst
Remark 3.1 (Terminology)
3.2 Risk Assessment Process
3.2.1 Step 1: Plan the Risk Assessment
3.2.1.1 Step 1.1: Clarify Decision and Decision Criteria
Example 3.1 (Decision criteria)
3.2.1.2 Step 1.2: Define Outputs from Risk Assessment
3.2.1.3 Step 1.3: Define Objectives and Scope
3.2.1.4 Step 1.4: Establish the Study Team and Organize the Work
3.2.1.5 Step 1.5: Establish Project Plan
3.2.1.6 Step 1.6: Identify and Provide Background Information
3.2.2 Step 2: Define the Study
3.2.2.1 Step 2.1: Define and Delimit the Study Object
3.2.2.2 Step 2.2: Provide Documentation and Drawings
3.2.2.3 Step 2.3: Familiarization
3.2.2.4 Step 2.4: Select Method
3.2.2.5 Step 2.5: Select Data
3.2.2.6 Step 2.6: Identify Relevant Assets
3.2.3 Step 3: Identify Hazards and Initiating Events
3.2.3.1 Step 3.1: Identify and List Generic Hazards and Events
3.2.3.2 Step 3.2: Define Specific and Representative Events
3.2.3.3 Step 3.3: Identify Causes of Events
3.2.3.4 Step 3.4: Determine Frequencies of Events
3.2.4 Step 4: Develop Accident Scenarios and Describe Consequences
3.2.4.1 Step 4.1: Identify Barriers and Other Factors Influencing the Scenarios
3.2.4.2 Step 4.2: Describe Representative Scenarios
3.2.4.3 Step 4.3: Describe End Events
3.2.4.4 Step 4.4: Describe Consequences
3.2.4.5 Step 4.5: Determine Frequency of End Events
3.2.4.6 Step 4.6: Quantify the Consequences
3.2.5 Step 5: Determine and Assess the Risk
3.2.5.1 Step 5.1: Summarize the Results
3.2.5.2 Step 5.2: Assess Uncertainty
3.2.5.3 Step 5.3: Evaluate the Risk
Definition 3.3 (Risk evaluation)
3.2.5.4 Step 5.4: Identify Risk Reduction Measures
3.2.5.5 Step 5.5: Determine Risk Reduction Effect
3.2.5.6 Step 5.6: Determine Cost of Risk Reduction Measures
3.2.6 Step 6: Risk Presentation
3.2.6.1 Step 6.1: Prepare Report
3.2.6.2 Step 6.2: Present Results
3.3 Risk Assessment Report
3.3.1 Contents of the Report
3.3.1.1 Title Page
3.3.1.2 Disclaimer
3.3.1.3 Executive Summary
3.3.1.4 Document References
3.3.1.5 Acronyms and Glossary
3.3.1.6 Study Team
3.3.1.7 Introduction
3.3.1.8 Description of the Study Object
3.3.1.9 Analysis Approach
3.3.1.10 Risk Acceptance Criteria
3.3.1.11 Hazards and Hazardous Events
3.3.1.12 Models
3.3.1.13 Data and Data Sources
3.3.1.14 Frequency and Consequence Analysis
3.3.1.15 Sensitivity and Uncertainty Assessments
3.3.1.16 Identification and Assessment of Risk Reduction Measures
3.3.1.17 Discussions of Results
3.3.1.18 Conclusions and Recommendations
3.3.1.19 Appendices
3.3.1.20 General Comments
3.4 Risk Assessment in Safety Legislation
3.5 Validity and Quality Aspects of a Risk Assessment
3.6 Problems
References
Note
Chapter 4 Study Object and Limitations. 4.1 Introduction
4.2 Study Object
4.2.1 System
Definition 4.1 (System)
4.2.2 Sociotechnical System
Definition 4.2 (Sociotechnical system)
Remark 4.1 (Sociotechnical systems treated as technical systems)
4.2.3 Deterministic Versus Non‐Deterministic System
Definition 4.3 (Deterministic system)
4.2.4 System Breakdown Structure
4.2.5 System Boundary
Definition 4.4 (System boundary)
4.2.6 Assumptions
4.2.7 Closed and Open Systems
Definition 4.5 (Closed system)
Definition 4.6 (Open system)
4.3 Operating Context
Definition 4.7 (Operating context)
Example 4.1 (Operating context for a washing machine)
Example 4.2 (Operating context for a passenger ship)
4.4 System Modeling and Analysis
Definition 4.8 (Model)
4.4.1 Component Modeling
4.4.2 System Modeling
4.4.2.1 The Newtonian–Cartesian Paradigm
4.4.3 System Analysis and Synthesis
Definition 4.9 (System analysis)
Definition 4.10 (Synthesis)
4.5 Complexity
Definition 4.11 (Complexity)
4.5.1 Emergent Properties
Definition 4.12 (Emergent property)
4.6 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 5 Risk Acceptance. 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria
Definition 5.1 (Risk acceptance criteria, RAC)
Definition 5.2 (Acceptable risk)
Example 5.1 (Choosing the option with highest risk)
Example 5.2 (RAC for nuclear power plants)
Example 5.3 (RAC for offshore oil and gas installations)
5.2.1 Acceptable and Tolerable Risk
Definition 5.3 (Acceptable risk level)
5.2.2 Value of Life
5.2.2.1 Value of a Statistical Life
Alternative Concepts
5.2.3 Equity, Utility, and Technology
5.2.3.1 Equity Principle
5.2.3.2 Utility Principle
5.2.3.3 Technology Principle
5.3 Approaches to Establishing Risk Acceptance Criteria
5.3.1 The ALARP Principle
5.3.1.1 Cost–Benefit Assessment
Remark 5.1 (SFAIRP)
5.3.2 The ALARA Principle
5.3.3 The GAMAB Principle
5.3.4 The MEM Principle
5.3.5 Societal Risk Criteria
5.3.6 The Precautionary Principle
Definition 5.4 (Precautionary principle)
Example 5.4 (Deliberate release into the environment of GMOs)
5.4 Risk Acceptance Criteria for Other Assets than Humans
5.5 Closure
5.6 Problems
References
Note
Chapter 6 Measuring Risk. 6.1 Introduction
6.2 Risk Metrics
Definition 6.1 (Risk metric)
Example 6.1 (Car accident fatalities)
Definition 6.2 (Safety performance metric)
6.3 Measuring Risk to People
6.3.1 Potential Loss of Life
Definition 6.3 (Potential loss of life, PLL)
6.3.1.1 PLL for a Specified Population
6.3.1.2 PLL as Safety Performance Metric
Example 6.2 (PLL for selected occupations in Norway)
6.3.2 Average Individual Risk
Definition 6.4 (Individual risk, IR)
Example 6.3 (Average individual risk in Norway – Traffic accidents)
Example 6.4 (Total average individual risk)
Example 6.5 (Average individual risk for air travel)
Example 6.6 (Individual risk on cargo ships)
6.3.2.1 PLL Within an Area
6.3.3 Deaths per Million
6.3.4 Location‐Specific Individual Risk
Definition 6.5 (Location‐specific individual risk, LSIR)
6.3.4.1 LSIR is a Property of the Location
6.3.4.2 LSIR for Different Types of Scenarios
6.3.5 Individual‐Specific Individual Risk
Definition 6.6 (Individual‐specific individual risk, ISIR)
Example 6.7 (ISIR with reduced exposure)
6.3.6 Risk Contour Plots
Example 6.8 (Iso‐risk contours in the Netherlands)
6.3.7 Fatal Accident Rate
Definition 6.7 (Fatal accident rate, FAR)
Example 6.9 (Risk of rock climbing)
6.3.7.1 Accident Rates in Transport
6.3.8 Lost‐Time Injuries
Definition 6.8 (Lost‐time injury, LTI)
Example 6.10 (Calculating LTIF)
6.3.8.1 Lost Workdays Frequency
Example 6.11 (Calculating )
6.3.9 Curves
6.3.9.1 Criterion Lines
6.3.9.2 Some Comments
6.3.10 Potential Equivalent Fatality
Definition 6.9 (Potential equivalent fatality, PEF)
Example 6.12 (London Underground QRA)
6.3.11 Frequency of Loss of Main Safety Functions
Example 6.13 (Offshore oil/gas installation)
6.4 Risk Matrices
6.4.1 Classification of Likelihoods
6.4.2 Classification of Consequences
6.4.3 Rough Presentation of Risk
6.4.4 Risk Priority Number
Example 6.14 (Two approaches for determining RPN)
Example 6.15 (Fire in a subway train)
6.5 Reduction in Life Expectancy
Example 6.16 (Calculating RLE)
6.6 Choice and Use of Risk Metrics
6.7 Risk Metrics for Other Assets
6.7.1 Measuring Environmental Risk
6.7.2 Measuring Economic Risk
6.8 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 7 Risk Management. 7.1 Introduction
Definition 7.1 (Risk management)
Definition 7.2 (Risk management)
7.2 Scope, Context, and Criteria
7.3 Risk Assessment
7.4 Risk Treatment
Remark 7.1 (Risk perception)
7.5 Communication and Consultation
7.6 Monitoring and Review
7.6.1 Safety Audits
7.7 Recording and Reporting
7.8 Stakeholders
Definition 7.3 (Stakeholder)
7.8.1 Categories of Stakeholders
7.9 Risk and Decision‐Making
7.9.1 Model for Decision‐Making
7.9.1.1 Deterministic Decision‐making
7.9.1.2 Risk‐Based Decision‐making
Definition 7.4 (Risk‐based decision‐making, RBDM)
7.9.1.3 Risk‐Informed Decision‐making
Definition 7.5 (Risk‐informed decision‐making, RIDM)
7.10 Safety Legislation
7.10.1 Safety Case
7.11 Problems
References
Note
Chapter 8 Accident Models. 8.1 Introduction
8.2 Accident Classification
8.2.1 Jens Rasmussen's Categories
8.2.2 Other Categorizations of Accidents
Definition 8.1 (Organizational accident)
Definition 8.2 (Component failure accident)
Example 8.1 (Aviation accidents)
8.2.3 Major Accidents
Definition 8.3 (Major accident)
8.3 Accident Investigation
8.4 Accident Causation
8.4.1 Acts of God
Remark 8.1 (Act of God)
8.4.2 Accident Proneness
8.4.3 Classification of Accident Causes
Example 8.2 (Car brake failure)
Example 8.3 (Direct causes of airplane accidents)
Example 8.4 (Car accident causes)
8.5 Accident Models
8.5.1 Objectives of Accident Models
8.5.2 Classification of Accident Models and Analysis Methods
8.6 Energy and Barrier Models
8.6.1 Haddon's Models
8.6.1.1 Causal Sequence of Events
8.6.1.2 Haddon's Matrix
8.6.1.3 Haddon's 4Es
8.7 Sequential Accident Models
8.7.1 Heinrich's Domino Model
8.7.2 Loss Causation Model
8.7.3 Rasmussen and Svedung's Model
8.7.4 STEP
8.8 Epidemiological Accident Models
8.8.1 Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
Example 8.5 (Herald of Free Enterprise)
8.8.2 Tripod
8.8.2.1 Tripod‐Delta
8.8.2.2 Basic Risk Factors
Definition 8.4 (Basic risk factors)
8.8.2.3 Tripod‐Beta
8.9 Event Causation and Sequencing Models
8.9.1 MTO‐Analysis
8.9.2 MORT
8.9.2.1 S‐Branch
8.9.2.2 M‐Branch
8.9.2.3 R‐Branch
8.10 Systemic Accident Models
8.10.1 Man‐Made Disasters Theory
8.10.2 Rasmussen's Sociotechnical Framework
8.10.2.1 Structural Hierarchy
8.10.2.2 System Dynamics
8.10.3 AcciMap
8.10.4 Normal Accidents
Definition 8.5 (Normal accident)
8.10.4.1 Interactive Complexity
Definition 8.6 (Interactive complexity)
8.10.4.2 Tight Coupling
Definition 8.7 (Tight coupling)
Remark 8.2 (Criticism of the normal accident theory)
8.10.5 High‐Reliability Organizations
8.10.6 STAMP
8.10.6.1 CAST
8.11 Combining Accident Models
8.12 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 9 Data for Risk Analysis. 9.1 Types of Data
9.1.1 Descriptive Data
9.1.2 Probabilistic Data
9.2 Quality and Applicability of Data
9.3 Data Sources
9.3.1 Data Collection Mandated Through Regulations
9.3.2 Accident Data
9.3.2.1 Some Accident and Incident Databases
9.3.2.2 Accident Investigation Reports
9.3.3 Component Reliability Data
9.3.3.1 Component Failure Event Data
9.3.3.2 Component Failure Rates
9.3.3.3 Generic Reliability Databases
9.3.4 Data Analysis
9.3.5 Data Quality
9.3.5.1 Failure Modes and Mechanisms Distributions
9.3.5.2 Plant‐Specific Reliability Data
9.3.6 Human Error Data
9.3.6.1 Human Error Databases
9.3.6.2 Human Error Probabilities
9.4 Expert Judgment
9.4.1 Adjusting Existing Data
Example 9.1 (Adjusting failure data for valves in a process system)
9.4.2 Providing New Data When No Data Exists
9.5 Data Dossier
9.6 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 10 Hazard Identification. 10.1 Introduction
Definition 10.1 (Hazard identification)
10.1.1 Objectives of Hazard Identification
10.1.2 Classification of Hazards
Example 10.1 (Hazards for a ship)
10.1.3 Hazard Identification Methods
Remark 10.1 (Brainstorming versus functional methods)
10.2 Checklist Methods
10.2.1 Objectives and Applications
Example 10.2 (Structuring information from a hazard identification)
10.2.2 Analysis Procedure
10.2.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.2.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
10.3.1 Objectives and Applications
10.3.2 Analysis Procedure
10.3.2.1 Step 2: Identify Hazards and Select Hazardous Events
10.3.2.2 Step 3: Determine the Frequency of Hazardous Events
10.3.2.3 Step 4: Determine the Consequences of Hazardous Events
Example 10.3 (Falling down stairs)
Remark 10.2 (Benefit of consequence ranking)
10.3.2.4 Step 5: Suggest Risk Reduction Measures
Example 10.4 (Changing of frequency category)
10.3.2.5 Step 6: Assess the Risk
10.3.2.6 Step 7: Report the Analysis
Example 10.5 (LNG transport system)
Remark 10.3 (Extended PHA worksheet)
10.3.2.7 HAZID
10.3.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.3.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.4 Job Safety Analysis
10.4.1 Objectives and Applications
10.4.2 Analysis Procedure
10.4.2.1 Step 1: Plan and Prepare
JSA Team
JSA Meeting
Background Information
JSA Worksheet
10.4.2.2 Step 2: Become Familiar with the Job
10.4.2.3 Step 3: Break Down the Job
10.4.2.4 Step 4: Identify the Hazards
10.4.2.5 Step 5: Categorize Frequencies and Consequences
10.4.2.6 Step 6: Identify Risk Reduction Measures
10.4.2.7 Step 7: Report the Analysis
Example 10.6 (Lifting heavy containers)
10.4.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.4.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.5 FMECA
10.5.1 Objectives and Applications
10.5.2 Analysis Procedure
10.5.2.1 Step 2: Carry Out System Breakdown and Functional Analyses
10.5.2.2 Step 3: Identify Failure Modes and Causes
10.5.2.3 Step 4: Determine the Consequences of the Failure Modes
10.5.2.4 Step 5: Assess the Risk
10.5.2.5 Step 6: Suggest Improvements
10.5.2.6 Step 7: Report the Analysis
10.5.3 Resources and Skills Required
Remark 10.4 (A slightly different approach)
10.5.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.6 HAZOP
10.6.1 Guidewords
10.6.2 Process Parameters
Example 10.7 (HAZOP questions)
10.6.3 Objectives and Applications
10.6.4 Analysis Procedure
10.6.4.1 HAZOP Worksheet
10.6.4.2 Step 1: Plan and Prepare
Establish the HAZOP Team
Provide Required Information
Divide the System into Sections and Study Nodes
10.6.4.3 Step 2: Identify Possible Deviations
10.6.4.4 Step 3: Identify Causes of Deviations
10.6.4.5 Step 4: Determine Consequences of Deviation
10.6.4.6 Step 5: Identify Existing Barriers (Safeguards)
10.6.4.7 Step 6: Assess Risk
Risk Matrix
10.6.4.8 Step 7: Propose Improvements
Comments
10.6.4.9 Step 8: Report the Analysis
Example 10.8 (Filling a bucket)
10.6.5 Computer HAZOP
10.6.6 Resources and Skills Required
10.6.7 Advantages and Limitations
10.7 STPA
10.7.1 Objectives and Applications
10.7.2 Analysis Procedure
10.7.2.1 Step 2: Identify System‐Level Accidents and Hazardous Events
10.7.2.2 Step 3: Describe Constraints
Definition 10.2 (Safety constraint)
Example 10.9 (Hazardous events and safety constraints for an aircraft)
10.7.2.3 Step 4: Describe Control System Hierarchy
10.7.2.4 Step 5: Define Responsibilities
10.7.2.5 Step 6: Define Process Models and Process Variables
Example 10.10 (Pressure vessel)
10.7.2.6 Step 7: Describe Control Actions
10.7.2.7 Step 8: Identify Unsafe Control Actions
Definition 10.3 (Unsafe control action, UCA)
Example 10.11 (UCAs for braking of a car)
Example 10.12 (Formulation of unsafe control actions)
10.7.2.8 Step 9: Identify the Causes of UCAs
10.7.2.9 Step 10: Describe Detailed Safety Constraints
10.7.2.10 Step 11: Reporting
10.7.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.7.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.8 SWIFT
Example 10.13 (Examples of what‐if? questions)
10.8.1 Objectives and Applications
10.8.2 Analysis Procedure
10.8.2.1 SWIFT Worksheet
10.8.2.2 Step 2: Identify Possible Hazardous Events
10.8.2.3 Step 3: Determine Causes of Hazardous Events
10.8.2.4 Step 4: Determine the Consequences of Hazardous Events
10.8.2.5 Step 5: Identify Existing Barriers
10.8.2.6 Step 6: Assess Risk
Risk Matrix
10.8.2.7 Step 7: Propose Improvements
Comments
Example 10.14 (LNG transport by tank truck)
10.8.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.8.4 Advantages and Limitations
10.9 Comparing Semiquantitative Methods
10.10 Master Logic Diagram
10.11 Change Analysis
10.11.1 Objectives and Applications
10.11.2 Analysis Procedure
10.11.2.1 Step 2: Identify the Key Differences
10.11.2.2 Step 3: Evaluate the Possible Effects of the Differences
10.11.2.3 Step 4: Determine the Risk Impacts of the Differences
10.11.2.4 Step 5: Examine Important Issues in More Detail
10.11.3 Resources and Skills Required
10.11.4 Advantages and Limitations
Remark 10.5
10.12 Hazard Log
10.13 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 11 Causal and Frequency Analysis. 11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 Objectives of the Causal and Frequency Analysis
11.1.2 Methods for Causal and Frequency Analysis
11.2 Cause and Effect Diagram Analysis
11.2.1 Objectives and Applications
11.2.2 Analysis Procedure
11.2.2.1 Step 2: Construct the Cause and Effect Diagram
11.2.2.2 Step 3: Analyze the Diagram Qualitatively
11.2.3 Resources and Skills Required
11.2.4 Advantages and Limitations
11.3 Fault Tree Analysis
11.3.1 Objectives and Applications
11.3.2 Method Description
Example 11.1 (Separator vessel)
11.3.2.1 Common‐Cause Failures
Remark 11.1 (FTA and system analysis)
11.3.2.2 Reliability Block Diagrams
11.3.2.3 Minimal Cut Sets
Definition 11.1 (Cut set)
Definition 11.2 (Minimal cut set)
11.3.2.4 Identification of Minimal Cut Sets by MOCUS
Example 11.2 (Nonminimal cut sets)
11.3.2.5 Fault Tree with a Single AND‐gate
11.3.2.6 Fault Tree with a Single OR‐gate
11.3.3 TOP Event Probability
11.3.3.1 Inclusion–Exclusion Method
11.3.3.2 Boolean Analysis
Boolean laws of algebra
11.3.4 Input Data
11.3.4.1 Nonrepairable Item
11.3.4.2 Repairable Item
11.3.4.3 Periodically Tested Item
11.3.4.4 Frequency
Remark 11.2 (Event with duration)
11.3.4.5 On‐Demand Probability
11.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
11.3.6 Importance of Basic Events
11.3.6.1 Birnbaum's Metric
11.3.6.2 Fussell–Vesely's Metric
11.3.6.3 Risk Achievement Worth
11.3.6.4 Risk Reduction Worth
11.3.6.5 Application of Importance Metrics
11.3.7 Analysis Procedure
11.3.7.1 Step 1: Plan and Prepare
Define the TOP Event
Establish Boundary Conditions
Computer Programs for Fault Tree Analysis
11.3.7.2 Step 2: Construct the Fault Tree
Rules for Fault Tree Construction
Example 11.3 (Fire pump failure)
11.3.7.3 Step 3: Analyze the Fault Tree Qualitatively
11.3.7.4 Step 4: Analyze the Fault Tree Quantitatively
11.3.7.5 Binary Decision Diagrams
11.3.8 Resources and Skills Required
11.3.9 Advantages and Limitations
11.4 Bayesian Networks
11.4.1 Objectives and Applications
11.4.2 Method Description
Example 11.4 (Job performance when raining)
11.4.2.1 Assumptions
11.4.2.2 Conditional Probability Tables
11.4.2.3 Bayesian Networks and Fault Trees
Fault Tree with Single AND‐gate
Fault Tree with Single OR‐gate
Example 11.5 (Risk‐influencing factor)
11.4.3 Analysis Procedure
11.4.3.1 Step 2: Construct the Bayesian Network
Example 11.6 (Identifying nodes in a Bayesian network)
11.4.3.2 Step 3: Define the States of the Nodes
Example 11.7 (Bayesian network for ship running aground)
11.4.3.3 Step 4: Build the Conditional Probability Tables
11.4.3.4 Step 5: Quantitative Analysis of the Network
11.4.4 Resources and Skills Required
11.4.5 Advantages and Limitations
11.5 Markov Methods
Example 11.8 (System of two pumps)
11.5.1 Objectives and Applications
11.5.2 Method Description
11.5.2.1 Kolmogorov Equations
11.5.2.2 State Equations
Example 11.9 (Single repairable component)
11.5.2.3 Steady‐State Probabilities
Example 11.10 (Pump system reconsidered)
Remark 11.3 (Independent failures and repairs)
11.5.3 Analysis Procedure
11.5.3.1 Step 2: Establish the State Transition Diagram and the Transition Rate Matrix
11.5.3.2 Step 3: Perform Quantitative Analysis
Monte Carlo Simulation
11.5.4 Resources and Skills Required
11.5.5 Advantages and Limitations
11.6 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 12 Development of Accident Scenarios. 12.1 Introduction
12.1.1 Objectives of the Development of Accident Scenarios
12.1.2 Methods for Development of Accident Scenarios
12.2 Event Tree Analysis
12.2.1 Objectives and Applications
12.2.2 Method Description
12.2.2.1 Barriers
12.2.2.2 Pivotal Events
12.2.2.3 Graphical Representation
Example 12.1 (Fire in a production hall)
12.2.2.4 Multiple Branching
12.2.2.5 Pivotal Events Analyzed by Fault Trees
12.2.2.6 What is Defined as End Event?
Remark 12.1 (End event versus end state)
12.2.2.7 Quantitative Analysis
Remark 12.2 (Dependencies on previous activations)
12.2.2.8 Dependencies
12.2.2.9 Fault Tree‐to‐Event Tree Transformation
12.2.2.10 Consequences
12.2.3 Analysis Procedure
12.2.3.1 Step 2: Define the Hazardous Event
Remark 12.3 (Different choices of hazardous events)
12.2.3.2 Step 3: Identify Barriers and Pivotal Events
Example 12.2 (Including time explicitly in an event tree)
12.2.3.3 Step 4: Construct the Event Tree
12.2.3.4 Step 5: Describe the Resulting Event Sequences
12.2.3.5 Step 6: Determine Probabilities/Frequencies for the Accident Scenarios
Example 12.3 (Offshore oil and gas separator)
12.2.4 Resources and Skills Required
12.2.5 Advantages and Limitations
12.3 Event Sequence Diagrams
12.4 Cause–Consequence Analysis
12.5 Hybrid Causal Logic
12.6 Escalation Problems
12.7 Consequence Models
Example 12.4 (Gas leakage scenarios)
12.8 Problems
References
Note
Chapter 13 Dependent Failures and Events. 13.1 Introduction
13.2 Dependent Failures and Events
Definition 13.1 (Dependency)
13.2.1 Deterministic Dependency
13.2.2 Statistical Dependency
Remark 13.1 (Dependency and interdependency)
13.2.3 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Dependency
13.3 Dependency in Accident Scenarios
13.4 Cascading Failures
Definition 13.2 (Cascading failure)
13.5 Common‐Cause Failures
Definition 13.3 (Common‐cause failure, CCF)
13.5.1 Background for CCF Modeling
Example 13.1 (Fault tree with single OR‐gate)
Example 13.2 (Fault tree with single AND‐gate)
13.5.2 CCF Probability Calculation
13.5.2.1 Conditional Probability of a Specific Multiplicity
13.5.3 Causes of CCFs
13.5.3.1 Shared Causes
13.5.3.2 Coupling Factors
Definition 13.4 (Coupling factor)
13.5.4 Modeling of CCFs
13.5.4.1 Explicit Versus Implicit Modeling
Example 13.3 (Explicit modeling of common‐cause failures)
13.5.5 Modeling Approach
13.5.6 Modeling Assumptions
13.6 β‐Factor Model
Example 13.4 (Parallel system of identical components)
Remark 13.2 (More failures lead to more maintenance)
13.6.1 Systems with Nonidentical Components
13.6.2 C‐Factor Model
13.6.3 Plant‐Specific ‐Factors
13.7 Binomial Failure Rate Model
13.8 Multiple Greek Letter Model
13.8.1 System with Three Identical Components
13.9 α‐Factor Model
13.9.1 Structure with Three Identical Components
13.9.1.1 A Brief Comparison
13.10 Multiple ‐Factor Model
13.11 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 14 Barriers and Barrier Analysis. 14.1 Introduction
14.2 Barriers and Barrier Classification
Definition 14.1 (Safety barrier)
Definition 14.2 (Barrier function)
Definition 14.3 (Barrier system)
Remark 14.1 (What is a barrier and what is not a barrier?)
Example 14.1 (Barrier systems in a process plant)
14.2.1 Barrier Classification
14.2.1.1 Proactive and Reactive Barriers
Definition 14.4 (Proactive barrier)
Definition 14.5 (Reactive barrier)
Remark 14.2
Example 14.2 (Barriers related to driving an automobile)
14.2.1.2 Active and Passive Barriers
Definition 14.6 (Active barrier)
Definition 14.7 (Passive barrier)
14.2.1.3 Related to the Energy Source
14.2.1.4 Snorre Sklet's Classification
14.2.1.5 James Reason's Classification
14.2.1.6 ARAMIS Classification
14.2.1.7 Erik Hollnagel's Classification
14.2.1.8 Sequence of Barrier Activation
Example 14.3 (Barriers in oil/gas wells)
14.3 Barrier Management
14.3.1 Knowing Which Barriers Are in Place
14.3.2 Knowing Why We Have the Barriers that Are in Place
Example 14.4 (Fire water system)
14.3.3 Defining Performance Standards for Barriers
14.3.4 Knowing If the Barriers Are Functioning at Any Point in Time
Example 14.5 (Barrier panels)
14.4 Barrier Properties
14.5 Safety‐Instrumented Systems
Example 14.6 (SIS in automobiles)
14.5.1 Safety‐Instrumented Function
Definition 14.8 (Safety‐instrumented function (SIF))
14.5.1.1 Main Failure Modes
Example 14.7 (Airbags in automobiles)
14.5.2 High‐ and Low‐Demand Mode of Operation
14.5.3 Testing of SIS Functions
14.5.3.1 Diagnostic Testing
14.5.3.2 Proof Testing
14.5.4 Failures and Failure Classification
Example 14.8 (Safety shutdown valve)
14.5.4.1 Voting Logic
14.5.5 IEC 61508
14.5.5.1 Application‐Specific Standards
14.5.5.2 Safety Life‐Cycle
14.5.6 Safety Integrity Levels
Definition 14.9 (Safety integrity)
14.5.7 Probability of Failure on Demand
14.5.8 Probability of Dangerous Failure Per Hour
14.6 Hazard–Barrier Matrices
14.7 Safety Barrier Diagrams
Definition 14.10 (Safety barrier diagram)
14.7.1 Barrier Diagrams for Oil Well Integrity Assessment
14.8 Bow‐Tie Diagrams
14.9 Energy Flow/Barrier Analysis
14.9.1 Objectives and Applications
14.9.2 Analysis Procedure
14.9.2.1 EFBA Worksheet
14.9.2.2 Step 2: Identify the Energy Sources in the System
14.9.2.3 Step 3: Identify Assets Affected
14.9.2.4 Step 4: Describe the Energy Pathways
14.9.2.5 Step 5: Identify and Evaluate Barriers
14.9.2.6 Step 6: Propose Improvements
14.10 Layer of Protection Analysis
14.10.1 Independent Protection Layer
Definition 14.11 (Independent protection layer, IPL)
14.10.2 Objectives and Applications
14.10.3 Method Description
14.10.3.1 LOPA Worksheet
14.10.4 Analysis Procedure
14.10.4.1 Step 1: Plan and Prepare
14.10.4.2 Step 2: Develop Accident Scenarios
14.10.4.3 Step 3: Identify Initiating Events and Determine Their Frequencies
14.10.4.4 Step 4: Identify IPLs and Determine Their PFD
14.10.4.5 Step 5: Estimate the Risk Related to Each Accident Scenario
14.10.4.6 Step 6: Evaluate the Risk
14.10.4.7 Step 7: Consider Options to Reduce the Risk
14.10.4.8 Step 8: Report the Analysis
Example 14.9 (Oil and gas separator)
14.10.5 Standards and Guidelines
14.11 Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis
14.11.1 Objectives and Applications
14.11.2 Method Description
14.11.2.1 Hydrocarbon Release Scenarios
14.11.2.2 Generic Barrier Block Diagrams
Example 14.10 (Flange maintenance errors)
14.11.3 Analysis Procedure
14.11.3.1 Step 2: Establish Barrier Block Diagrams
14.11.3.2 Step 3: Evaluate the Safety Barriers
14.11.3.3 Step 4: Provide Initial Data
14.11.3.4 Step 5: Establish Bayesian Networks
14.11.3.5 Step 6: Determine Installation‐Specific State of RIFs
14.11.3.6 Step 7: Rank the Importance of the RIFs
Example 14.11 (The importance of RIFs)
14.11.3.7 Step 8: Determine Installation‐Specific Probabilities
Example 14.12 (Flange maintenance reconsidered)
Remark 14.3
14.11.3.8 Step 9: Calculate Installation‐Specific Risk
14.11.4 Resources and Skills Required
14.11.5 Risk OMT
14.12 Systematic Identification and Evaluation of Risk Reduction Measures
Example 14.13 (Standards and guidelines in the oil and gas industry)
Example 14.14 (Applying several accident models to investigation of accidents)
14.12.1 Inherently Safer Design
14.12.2 Haddon's 10 Countermeasure Strategies
14.12.3 Evaluation of Risk Reduction Measures
14.12.3.1 Effect of Measure
14.12.3.2 Reliability of Measure
14.12.3.3 Duration of Measure
14.12.3.4 Negative Effects
14.12.3.5 Risk Associated with Implementing Risk Reduction Measures
14.12.3.6 Cost of Measure
14.13 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 15 Human Reliability Analysis. 15.1 Introduction
Definition 15.1 (Human error)
Definition 15.2 (Human reliability)
15.1.1 Human Reliability Analysis
15.1.1.1 Main Steps of an HRA
15.1.1.2 HRA Methods
15.1.1.3 Main Benefits
15.1.2 Human Errors
Definition 15.3 (Task)
15.1.3 Human Error Probability
Definition 15.4 (Human error probability)
15.1.4 Human Error Modes
Definition 15.5 (Human error mode)
Example 15.1 (Error related to turning a switch)
15.1.5 Classification of Human Errors
15.1.5.1 Skill‐, Rule‐, and Knowledge‐Based Behavior
15.1.5.2 Slips, Lapses, Mistakes, and Violations
15.1.5.3 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
15.1.5.4 Errors of Omission and Commission
15.1.6 Causes of Human Error
Definition 15.6 (Performance‐influencing factor)
Definition 15.7 (Safety culture)
Remark 15.1 (Are PIFs different from RIFs?)
15.2 Task Analysis
Definition 15.8 (Task analysis)
15.2.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis
15.2.1.1 Objectives and Applications
15.2.1.2 Analysis Procedure
Step 2: Determine the Overall Goal of the Task
Step 4: Decompose Each Subgoal
Step 5: Analyze Plans
Example 15.2 (Making tea)
15.2.1.3 Resources and Skills Required
15.2.2 Tabular Task Analysis
15.2.2.1 Objectives and Applications
15.2.2.2 Analysis Procedure
Step 2: List All Actions in a TTA Table
Step 3: Identify Cues
Step 4: Identify Feedback
Step 5: Identify Possible Errors
15.3 Human Error Identification
15.3.1 Action Error Mode Analysis
15.3.1.1 Objectives and Applications
15.3.1.2 Analysis Procedure
15.3.1.3 Resources and Skills Required
15.3.2 Human HAZOP
15.3.2.1 Objectives and Applications
15.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure
15.3.3 SHERPA
15.3.3.1 Objectives and Applications
15.3.3.2 Analysis Procedure
15.4 HRA Methods
15.4.1 THERP
15.4.1.1 Objectives and Applications
15.4.1.2 Method Description
15.4.1.3 THERP Event Trees
15.4.1.4 Nominal Human Error Probability
Remark 15.2 (Is the lognormal distribution a suitable model?)
15.4.1.5 Performance‐Shaping Factors
15.4.1.6 Basic Human Error Probability
15.4.1.7 Time Reliability Correlation
15.4.1.8 Dependencies Between Errors
Example 15.3 (Securing the wheels of an airplane)
Remark 15.3
15.4.1.9 Error Recovery
15.4.1.10 Analysis Procedure
Step 1: Plan and Prepare
Step 2: Analyze Task
Step 3: Develop Event Trees
Step 4: Assign Nominal HEPs
Step 5: Assess the Effect of PSFs and Dependencies
Step 6: Determine the Effects of Recovery Factors
Step 7: Determine Success and Failure Probabilities
Step 8: Analyze Sensitivity
Step 9: Recommend Changes
Step 10: Report the Analysis
15.4.1.11 Resources and Skills Required
15.4.2 HEART
15.4.2.1 Objectives and Applications
15.4.2.2 Method Description
15.4.2.3 Generic Task Types
15.4.2.4 Nominal Human Error Probability
15.4.2.5 Error‐Producing Conditions (EPCs)
15.4.2.6 Assessed Human Error Probability
15.4.2.7 Remedial Measures
15.4.2.8 Analysis Procedure
Step 2: Perform HTA
Step 3: Assign Generic Task Type and Nominal HEP
Step 4: Determine EPCs and Assign Multiplication Factors
Step 5: Assess the POE of the EPCs
Step 6: Calculate the Context‐Specific HEP
Step 7: Consider Remedial Measures
15.4.2.9 Resources and Skills Required
15.4.3 CREAM
15.4.3.1 Objectives and Applications
15.4.3.2 Method Description
15.4.3.3 Analysis Procedure
Step 2: Perform a Task Analysis
Step 3: Describe the Context
Step 4: Specify the Hazardous Events
Step 5: Determine Error Propagation
Step 6: Select Task Steps for Quantification
Step 7: Predict Performance Quantitatively
15.4.3.4 Resources and Skills Required
15.4.3.5 Standards and Guidelines
15.4.4 Other HRA Methods
15.4.4.1 SLIM
15.4.4.2 ATHEANA
Definition 15.9 (Error‐forcing context)
15.4.4.3 MERMOS
15.5 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 16 Risk Analysis and Management for Operation. 16.1 Introduction
Example 16.1 (Some examples of operational decisions)
16.1.1 Operational Risk Analysis
Definition 16.1 (Operational risk analysis)
Definition 16.2 (Dynamic risk analysis)
16.1.2 Outline of the Chapter
16.2 Decisions About Risk
Example 16.2 (Decisions influencing risk in a railway company)
16.3 Aspects of Risk to Consider
Example 16.3 (Averaging of risk related to welding)
Remark 16.1 (Comparing APR and ACR)
16.4 Risk Indicators
Definition 16.3 (Indicator)
Definition 16.4 (Risk indicator)
Definition 16.5 (Safety indicator)
16.4.1 Leading and Lagging Indicators
Definition 16.6 (Leading indicators)
Definition 16.7 (Lagging indicators)
16.4.2 Identifying Risk Indicators
16.4.2.1 Step 1: Objectives and Users
16.4.2.2 Step 2: Identify Risk Contributors
16.4.2.3 Step 3: Identify RIFs
16.4.2.4 Step 4: Identify Indicators
16.4.2.5 Step 5: Develop Indicator Set
16.4.2.6 Step 6: Rules for Aggregation of Indicators
Example 16.4 (Use of indicators in risk models)
16.4.3 Accident Precursors
Definition 16.8 (Accident precursor)
16.4.3.1 Accident Precursor Analysis
16.5 Risk Modeling
16.6 Operational Risk Analysis – Updating the QRA
16.6.1 Updating the HAZID
16.6.2 Updating the Frequency and Consequence Models
16.6.3 Updating the Parameter Values
16.7 MIRMAP
16.8 Problems
References
Chapter 17 Security Assessment
17.1 Introduction
Definition 17.1 (Cyberattack)
17.1.1 Objectives and Delimitations
17.1.2 Standards and Guidelines
17.2 Main Elements of Security Assessment
17.2.1 Threat
17.2.1.1 Physical Threats
Remark 17.1 (Natural threats)
17.2.1.2 Cyber Threats
17.2.1.3 Threat Register
17.2.2 Threat Actors
17.2.2.1 Motives of the Threat Actor
Remark 17.2 (Threat and threat actor)
17.2.2.2 Threat Actor Register
17.2.3 Vulnerability
Example 17.1 (Vulnerability related to arson)
17.2.4 Attacks
17.2.5 Barriers
Example 17.2 (Dependent barriers)
17.2.6 A Brief Comparison of Risk and Security Terms
17.3 Industrial Control and Safety Systems
17.3.1 Industrial Control Systems
17.3.2 Industrial Safety Systems
17.3.3 Integrated Control and Safety Systems
Example 17.3 (Cyberattack on Hydro aluminum plants)
17.4 Security Assessment
17.4.1 Security Assessment of an Existing Study Object
17.4.2 Security Assessment of a Planned Study Object
17.4.3 Steps of the Security Assessment
17.4.3.1 Step 1. Asset Identification and Rating
17.4.3.2 Step 2. Threat Identification and Rating
17.4.3.3 Step 3. Threat Actor Identification and Assessment
17.4.3.4 Step 4. Potential Attack Paths
17.4.3.5 Step 5. Vulnerability Identification and Rating
17.4.3.6 Step 6. Barrier Assessment
17.4.3.7 Step 7. Vulnerability Evaluation
17.4.3.8 Step 8. Potential Attack Identification
17.4.3.9 Attack Event Likelihood
17.4.4 Integrated Safety and Security Assessment
17.5 Security Assessment Methods
17.6 Application Areas
17.7 Problems
References
Notes
Chapter 18 Life Cycle Use of Risk Analysis. 18.1 Introduction
18.2 Phases in the Life Cycle
18.3 Comments Applicable to all Phases
18.4 Feasibility and Concept Selection
Example 18.1 (Inadequate design for decommissioning and removal)
18.5 Preliminary Design
18.6 Detailed Design and Construction
18.7 Operation and Maintenance
Example 18.2 (Regular update of risk analysis)
18.8 Major Modifications
18.9 Decommissioning and Removal
18.10 Problems
References
Chapter 19 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Uncertainty
Definition 19.1 (Uncertainty)
19.2.1 Studies of Uncertainty
19.3 Categories of Uncertainty
19.3.1 Aleatory Uncertainty. Definition 19.2 (Aleatory uncertainty)
Example 19.1 (Toxic gas cloud)
19.3.2 Epistemic Uncertainty. Definition 19.3 (Epistemic uncertainty)
Example 19.2 (Nanotechnology)
Remark 19.1 (Discussions between Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein)
19.4 Contributors to Uncertainty
19.4.1 Model Uncertainty
19.4.2 Parameter Uncertainty
19.4.3 Completeness Uncertainty
19.4.4 When Uncertainty Analysis is Required
19.5 Uncertainty Propagation
19.5.1 Analytical Methods
Example 19.3 (Parallel system of two components)
19.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
19.5.2.1 Generation of Random Variables with a Specified Distribution
Example 19.4 (Constant failure rate)
19.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Definition 19.4 (Sensitivity analysis)
Example 19.5 (Sensitivity analysis)
19.7 Problems
References
Chapter 20 Development and Applications of Risk Assessment. 20.1 Introduction
20.2 Defense and Defense Industry
20.2.1 Important Organizations
20.2.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.2.3 Risk Assessment
Definition 20.1 (Tactical risk)
Definition 20.2 (Safety risk)
20.3 Nuclear Power Industry
20.3.1 Defense‐in‐Depth
Definition 20.3 (Defense‐in‐depth)
20.3.2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
20.3.3 US Reactor Safety Study
20.3.4 Human Reliability Analysis
20.3.5 Common‐Cause Failure Analysis
20.3.6 Important Organizations
20.3.7 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.3.8 Risk Assessment
20.3.9 Living PRAs
20.4 Process Industry
20.4.1 Important Organizations
20.4.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.4.2.1 Europe
20.4.2.2 United States
20.4.2.3 Australia
20.4.3 Risk Assessment. 20.4.3.1 HAZOP
20.4.3.2 Canvey Island
20.4.3.3 Process Hazard Analysis
20.4.3.4 ARAMIS
20.5 Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
20.5.1 Important Organizations
20.5.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.5.2.1 European Union
20.5.2.2 Norway
20.5.2.3 United Kingdom
20.5.2.4 Australia
Definition 20.4 (Major accident event, MAE)
20.5.3 Risk Assessment
20.6 Space Industry
20.6.1 Important Organizations
20.6.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.6.3 Risk Assessment
20.7 Aviation
20.7.1 Important Organizations
20.7.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.7.3 Risk Assessment
20.7.4 Helicopter Transport
20.8 Railway Transport
20.8.1 Important Organizations
20.8.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.8.3 Risk Assessment
20.9 Marine Transport
20.9.1 Important Organizations
20.9.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.9.2.1 Classification Society Rules
20.9.3 Risk Assessment
20.9.3.1 Formal Safety Assessment
20.9.3.2 SAFEDOR
20.10 Machinery Systems
20.10.1 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.10.2 Risk Assessment
20.11 Food Safety
20.11.1 Important Organizations
20.11.2 Legislation, Standards, and Guidelines
20.11.3 Risk Assessment
20.12 Other Application Areas
20.12.1 Environmental Risk
20.12.2 Critical Infrastructures
20.12.3 Municipal Risk and Vulnerability Assessments
20.12.3.1 Step 1: Identify and Select Relevant Accident Scenarios
20.12.3.2 Step 2: Evaluate the Relevant Accident Scenarios
20.12.3.3 Step 3: Evaluate Emergency Preparedness
20.12.3.4 Step 4: Revise and Allocate Resources
20.12.3.5 Other Countries
20.13 Closure
References
Notes
Appendix A Elements of Probability Theory. A.1 Introduction
A.2 Outcomes and Events
A.2.1 Random Experiment
A.2.2 Single Outcome
A.2.3 Sample Space
A.2.4 Event
Example A.1
Example A.2
A.2.5 Complementary Event
A.2.6 Venn Diagram
A.2.7 Intersection of Events
Example A.3
A.2.8 Union of Events
A.2.9 Mutually Exclusive Events
A.2.10 Simple Systems
A.2.10.1 Series Structure
A.2.10.2 Parallel System
A.3 Probability
A.3.1 Definition of Probability
A.3.2 Basic Rules for Probability Calculations. A.3.2.1 Probability of Complementary Events
A.3.2.2 Addition Rule of Probability
A.3.2.3 Conditional Probability
Example A.4
A.3.2.4 Product Rule of Probability
A.3.2.5 Independent Events
Remark A.1
A.3.2.6 Partition of the Sample Space
A.3.2.7 Total Probability
A.3.2.8 Bayes Formula
A.3.3 Uniform Probability Models
Example A.5
A.4 Random Variables
A.4.1 Discrete Random Variables
Example A.6
A.4.1.1 Probability Mass Function
A.4.1.2 Distribution Function
A.4.1.3 Mean Value, Variance, and Standard Deviation
A.4.1.4 Marginal and Conditional Distributions
A.4.1.5 Covariance and Correlation Coefficient
A.4.2 Continuous Random Variables
A.4.2.1 Time to Failure
A.4.2.2 Distribution Function
A.4.2.3 Probability Density Function
A.4.2.4 Survivor Function
A.4.2.5 Failure Rate Function
A.4.2.6 Mean Value
A.4.2.7 Median Life
A.4.2.8 Variance
A.4.2.9 Marginal and Conditional Distributions
A.4.2.10 Independent Variables
A.4.2.11 Convolution
A.5 Some Specific Distributions. A.5.1 Discrete Distributions. A.5.1.1 The Binomial Distribution
Example A.7
Example A.8
A.5.1.2 The Geometric Distribution
A.5.1.3 The Poisson Distribution and the Poisson Process
A.5.2 Continuous Distributions. A.5.2.1 The Exponential Distribution
A.5.2.2 The Exponential Distribution and the Poisson Process
A.5.2.3 The Weibull Distribution
A.5.2.4 The Normal (Gaussian) Distribution
Example A.9
A.5.2.5 The Gamma Distribution
Example A.10
A.5.2.6 The Beta Distribution
A.5.2.7 The Uniform Distribution
A.5.2.8 The Strong Law of Large Numbers
A.5.2.9 The Central Limit Theorem
Example A.11
A.6 Point and Interval Estimation
A.6.1 Point Estimation
Example A.12
A.6.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
A.6.2 Interval Estimation
Example A.13
Remark A.2
A.7 Bayesian Approach
Definition A.1 (Conjugate distributions)
A.8 Probability of Frequency Approach
A.8.1 Prior Distribution
A.8.1.1 Prior Estimate
A.8.2 Likelihood
Example A.14
Example A.15
A.8.3 Posterior Analysis
A.8.3.1 Life Model
A.8.3.2 Posterior Distribution
A.8.3.3 Posterior Estimate
A.8.3.4 Credibility Intervals
References
Note
Acronyms
Author Index
Subject Index
WILEY SERIES IN STATISTICS IN PRACTICE
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
