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Chapter 1

The Black Cat Track

Chaos was the law of nature; Order was the dream of man.1

The Black Cat Track runs between Salamaua on the northern coast and Wau in the highlands of the Morobe Province of Papua New Guinea. Tourist pamphlets and tour guide websites tell enthusiastically of magnificent scenery, exotic flora and fauna, and of the people of an ancient and mysterious culture who live along the track. Yet in spite of these glowing testimonials, the Black Cat Track is no tourist nirvana. It is reputed to be one of the toughest tracks to negotiate in the world, and is a place of blood and pain, born to chaos.

The early history of the people of the region through which the track wends its torturous way was characterised by violence. The various tribal groups in the area were quick to anger, deeply suspicious of strangers, practised ritual head-hunting and cannibalism, and conducted raids on other communities for slaves. Each act of violence was reciprocated, paid back, with more violence, continuing until the honour of both sides was satisfied either in blood, or through the exchange of gifts of value, such as land or pigs. Even after the advent of European influence in the region, change to this way of life was slow and strongly resisted by the local people.

In 1910, Canadian prospector Arthur Darling discovered gold somewhere in the wild and unexplored country of the upper Bulolo Valley in New Guinea’s Morobe Province. At the time, the region was under the colonial control of Germany, though German administration and commercial operations were generally limited to the coastal regions. Darling’s discovery was in the streams around the village of Wau, a four-day trek into the interior. But before he could explore the full potential of the find, he and his party were attacked by the local Biangai people and forced to withdraw from the area.

The German administration of the province encouraged the exploitation of local resources, but they also demanded a cut of any wealth generated for the German government. On his return to the coast, Darling denied the Administration any hint of what he had found. He clearly planned to exploit the find for himself and avoid paying any kind of tribute to Germany. However, he did share knowledge of his find with his mate, William ‘Sharkeye’ Park.

Unfortunately for Darling, he died in 1921 before he could realise his plans for the gold, but luck had certainly smiled on Sharkeye Park, who was left with the details of his friend’s bonanza. Sharkeye had no doubt that Darling’s story of gold was true. However, it would not be until 1922 that he, in the company of several other white prospectors, was able to act on this knowledge and mount a successful expedition to find Darling’s gold. Indeed the location Darling had provided was to yield a sizeable deposit of gold, and in less hazardous circumstances would almost certainly have led to a major gold rush. But at that time the remoteness of the region, the harshness of the terrain, and the aggressive nature of the local people, who were strongly rumoured to be cannibals, served at least as a temporary deterrent to a mass rush for riches. These fears were gradually overcome, and by 1926 around 219 European miners and 1324 coastal labourers had invaded the Wau-Bulolo Valley, where they had established numerous mining operations.2

It was during this period of initial exploitation of the region that prospectors forced a new track from Salamaua to Wau. Using the most direct route possible, these trailblazers paid little attention to the difficult and hazardous terrain, but pushed onward toward their goal. The track they blazed was approximately sixty-one kilometres in length and passed through swamps, forests of kunai grass and dense jungle. It crossed rivers and creeks, traversed along the western edge of the Bitoi River gorge, and up and over numerous steep and rugged ridgelines. At around the forty-six-kilometre mark when travelling from Salamaua, and approximately fifteen kilometres to the northeast of the track’s endpoint at Wau, the track passed a large open-cut goldmine known as the Black Cat, and this mine gave its name to the new track.

Those who chose this pathway had to endure tropical heat, torrential rain and, on the higher features of the trek, freezing cold. Leeches and mosquitoes were their almost constant companions, while along the way snakes and crocodiles might also be encountered. When it rained, which was often, the track turned to mud that clung to the feet and legs of a traveller, making basic movement an energy-sapping experience. Rain also turned the steep slopes into dangerous, slippery obstacles precipitating catastrophic falls that often resulted in injury. Disease, particularly malaria, was an ever-present menace, adding to the dangers of the track. It took a minimum of four days hard trekking to traverse this track from start to finish, and almost always the conditions exacted a toll in men, mules and equipment.

The Black Cat Track remained a major supply route and played an important role in the development of the region’s gold mining industry until 1927. In April of that year, Mr Ernest Mustar landed the first aircraft at Wau on a newly constructed landing strip. This single action was to have a profound impact on the Morobe Province and the ultimate fate of the Black Cat Track. Almost as soon as Mustar had completed his flight from Lae into Wau, the mining industry began to change its means of supply from the overland tracks, such as the Black Cat, to air transport. Soon an additional landing strip was established at Salamaua, and regular airlifts between Salamaua and Wau were established. As aircraft capacities improved, heavy mining equipment components began to be airlifted into the area. The requirement for costly porter and mule trains to carry these items along the Black Cat dwindled away. It would not be until 1942 that the Black Cat Track was to again resume a position of importance.

On 7 December 1941, Japan entered World War II with a devastating attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour. Japanese forces followed this attack with a successful advance across the Pacific toward New Guinea and Australia. On 8 March 1942, Japanese forces captured the New Guinea town of Salamaua. The invading force met very little opposition as it came ashore, as the only Allied ground force at Salamaua was a small element of New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR), a militia battalion of the Australian Army. The battalion members were part-time soldiers called up for full-time service when the Japanese intentions in the South West Pacific had become clear. The battalion was generally lacking in training, it was poorly armed and equipped, and its members wore a mix of uniforms, some of which had been homemade. However, the NGVR had some major assets: knowledge of the local people and of the geographic and climatic conditions.

Tasked with observing Japanese activity in the Huon Gulf region, the battalion had been placed in various locations, watching and reporting all they saw. However, it was in no position to offer any serious resistance to the determined and well-trained Japanese. As a result, when the Japanese invasion force arrived at Salamaua the NGVR group in location could do little but destroy some installations and supplies before making a hasty withdrawal inland, leaving the Japanese in complete control of the village.

The threat posed by the Japanese presence at Salamaua had not been overlooked by Allied command. However, in March 1942 the defence of Port Moresby, Japanese landings at Milne Bay and their advance along the Kokoda Track were assessed as being the greater threat. As a result, troops could not be spared to reinforce the NGVR.

For the next two months the NGVR continued watching and reporting Japanese activity. It was not until May, after the Allied naval victory at the Coral Sea, that Allied command could finally afford to pay the Salamaua area of operations any additional attention. The force earmarked to address the Japanese presence at Salamaua was titled ‘Kanga Force’.

Kanga Force was raised in April 1942, and was comprised of the 1st and 2/5th Independent Companies. These were commando units and had a combined total strength of around 500 officers and men. Commando units were designed for small-scale operations behind enemy lines, but for the Salamaua campaign Kanga Force was to be deployed in a more conventional infantry role. For this task Kanga Force was reinforced with approximately 200 soldiers from the NGVR, making a total force of around 700.

In late May 1942, the two commando companies of Kanga Force were flown in to Wau to link up with their NGVR elements. Almost as soon as the commandos landed at Wau, Kanga Force began operating against the Japanese in the Salamaua region. It was an unequal contest. Allied command at this stage of the war estimated the Japanese had a force of around 2000 soldiers at Lae, and a further 250 troops as a garrison force at Salamaua. Kanga Force was soon to reassess this estimation of the enemy presence to include a further 1000 Japanese troops at the village of Mubo.

By August 1942, the Japanese had landed more men and supplies at Salamaua, and Kanga Force withdrew to Wau, from where they continued to harass the Japanese. The Australian soldiers who took part in this campaign soon began to see themselves as ‘forgotten men’. They were fighting the same brave and determined enemy that faced other Australians at Kokoda and Milne Bay, but they were receiving a fraction of the support afforded to those campaigns. War photographer Damien Parer tried his hardest to publicise their plight, but while he did achieve a measure of public awareness, he also created some controversy when his newspaper published a photograph taken from a hidden Australian observation post that overlooked Japanese positions. The photograph compromised the Australian post and resulted in Japanese attacks against it. Parer’s other efforts to bring the campaign to the attention of Allied command were unsuccessful, and Kanga Force continued its lonely campaign.

As the Japanese probed inland toward Wau, the Black Cat Track became the scene of numerous clashes with the Australians. The soldiers of both sides, and the local carriers who supported them, soon found that the track had not softened with age. The same conditions that had bedevilled pre-war prospectors now presented an additional major stress to the already stressful occupation of war. Aside from the actions of the enemy, the weight of equipment requirements, combined with the climatic and geographic conditions, became a major operational factor. The soldiers carried their weapons, sufficient ammunition for immediate use, and other equipment, a total weight of around approximately thirty kilos. The carriers laboured under loads that were often over fifty kilos. These working conditions, combined with an almost constant lack of food (both sides prioritised the carriage of ammunition), weakened the men and slowed movement for Australian and Japanese alike. An average rate of advance for a patrol was about five to six kilometres per day.

During the course of the battle, communications between fighting units and their commanders was a vital aspect to both the Australians and the Japanese. However, the geographic and climatic conditions adversely affected the communication systems employed by both sides, creating constant command and control issues. Radio communications were uncertain at best, making tactical coordination difficult, often impossible. Both sides were frequently reduced to the use of ‘runners’ to carry information from one group to another, a means that was open to disruption by enemy action. Under these conditions Kanga Force and the Japanese conducted an almost private vicious war of attrition. The way this struggle was fought would only be changed by events far away from the Black Cat Track.

In light of the various setbacks suffered by Japanese forces, Japanese high command had devised a revised strategy. This strategy aimed to preserve Japanese conquests and to provide an outer defence to the Japanese home lands. Pivotal to this strategy was their positions in New Guinea, where they controlled significant areas to the north of the Owen Stanley Range and west of the mountains to the coast region of Morobe. Under this new strategy the capture of Wau was essential to Japanese plans, and as a result Kanga Force was identified as a major threat and was to be destroyed.

Throughout the campaign both sides had been faced with a similar dilemma, that of logistic supply. However, as the Japanese intentions for Wau developed, the issue of logistic supply became a critical element for success.

The Australians were totally reliant on a difficult and dangerous air supply route across the Owen Stanley Range. This route was subject to interruption by Japanese fighter aircraft, and more regularly by weather conditions over the Owen Stanleys. The Japanese, on the other hand, placed their reliance on the sea. They sent convoys of ships bearing reinforcements and materiel from Rabaul bound for Lae and Salamaua. These convoys were subject to merciless Allied air attacks. In a series of engagements that were to have a dramatic influence on the outcome of the battle for Wau, these convoys were either defeated in detail, or suffered such loss that the cargo they were able to deliver was unable to sustain the force detailed to attack Wau and to destroy Kanga Force. It was during the battle for the convoys that an event took place that was to add further mystique to the Black Cat Track.

On 8 January 1943, a United States Air Force B-17E Flying Fortress aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Ray Dau was engaged on a bombing mission against a Japanese convoy near Lae. As Dau’s aircraft commenced its bombing run it was hit by anti-aircraft fire, and then attacked by enemy fighter aircraft. Several of Dau’s crew were wounded in these attacks and the aircraft’s engines damaged. Losing height, Dau piloted his damaged craft toward Wau, however he was forced to crash-land on the side of a mountain in the Wau valley. The aircraft broke its back on impact and every member of the crew suffered injury — two of the members were critically injured and later died. Luckily, the crash had been seen by the Australian troops at Wau and a rescue mission was successfully mounted, the surviving airmen then evacuated to Port Moresby. The Australians salvaged the aircraft’s .50 calibre machine guns and added them to the defences at the Wau airstrip. The remainder of the wreck was abandoned.

It was shortly after Dau’s crash-landing that the Japanese began to martial its forces to advance on Wau. This activity placed Kanga Force in a situation that was beyond its capabilities to manage, a fact that was quickly recognised by New Guinea Force Headquarters. Orders were issued to reinforce the beleaguered force.

The AIF’s 17th Brigade, veterans of the campaigns in the Middle East and Greece, were ordered to deploy to Wau to counter the Japanese advance. Time was of the essence, so to ensure the Brigade arrived in time to affect the course of the battle, it was decided they should be deployed by air from Port Moresby directly to Wau. The Japanese had considered that an air move was an option for the Allies, but believed that such a deployment was beyond their enemy’s capability. This assessment was incorrect, but only just.

The operational aim of the Allies New Guinea Command for the air deployment was to deliver the AIF’s 17th Brigade group of infantry and artillery soldiers with their equipment and supplies into Wau, and to evacuate the wounded to Port Moresby.3 However, due to competing priorities, only fourteen C-47 Dakota transport aircraft were allocated to the 17th Brigade’s task. As the load capacity of the C-47 Dakota was about twenty-seven men with their weapons and personal equipment, or 4500 kilograms of cargo, deploying a brigade of approximately 2000 men with fourteen aircraft was a major challenge.

Using a shuttle service between Port Moresby and Wau, it took almost three weeks to achieve the deployment. The operation was affected by adverse weather conditions over the Owen Stanleys, then on reaching the Wau valley, low cloud, Japanese fighter aircraft and ground fire were all factors that affected the deployment’s schedule. A number of Allied aircraft were lost, but most successfully made the hazardous journey. As each aircraft load of 17th Brigade elements landed at Wau, they were immediately deployed in various roles against the advancing Japanese. As the battle reached its climax and Japanese troops threatened the Wau airstrip, some aircraft were obliged to unload their troops directly into the firefight.

During the defence of Wau, the Black Cat Track became an important route for the 17th Brigade’s operations. Along the track and in the areas around it, numerous acts of desperation and courage characterised the Australian operations. One notable action involved the 2/6th Battalion’s A Company, led by Captain William (Bill) Sherlock. The 2/6th was the first major 17th Brigade unit to arrive at Wau, and soon after arriving the battalion established a blocking force at the Black Cat Mine. From that position a reconnaissance patrol was sent to a point lower down the Black Cat Track known as ‘House Copper’. From that location the patrol established that Japanese troops were deviating from the Black Cat Track at House Copper, and appeared to be heading toward Wau along a previously unknown track. When this information was received at Brigade Headquarters it was assumed that the Japanese the patrol had observed was a relatively small group. Acting on this assumption, A Company of the 2/6th Battalion was tasked with finding and destroying the Japanese group.

On the morning of 28 January, a few kilometres north of Wau, A Company made contact with the Japanese. Far from being a small group, however, the Japanese were at an estimated strength of around 2258 men, and they were indeed moving toward Wau. In spite of being heavily outnumbered, A Company engaged the enemy. Under Sherlock’s inspired leadership, the Australians held the Japanese at bay for the next thirty-six hours. During the course of this action, Sherlock and many of his men were killed.4 The delay they imposed on the Japanese force enabled the remainder of 17th Brigade to land at Wau, a pivotal achievement for the Australians’ successful defence of the village.5

Other Australians were to demonstrate similar desperation and bravery during the battle. In early February 1943, Lance Corporal Leo Lasgourgues mounted a personal attack on a Japanese machine gun position, killing the crew. He then employed the weapon on its erstwhile owners before being seriously wounded and evacuated. That same month, to the south of the Black Cat Track at a place called Crystal Creek, stretcher-bearer Corporal Leslie ‘Bull’ Allen rescued a number of wounded Australians under extremely hazardous conditions.6 Both Lasgourgues and Allen were awarded the Military Medal for their bravery.

Faced with the Australians’ determined defence, and almost completely devoid of supply support, the Japanese attack on Wau lost momentum. By mid-April the Australians had achieved the tactical advantage, and attacked back along the Black Cat Track. It took a further six months of hard fighting before a combined Australian and American force was finally able to capture Salamaua, on 11 September 1943.

When the tide of war finally moved away from Wau and Salamaua, the Black Cat Track was once again forgotten by the outside world. Renamed as Skin Diwai, or ‘War Track’, the track assumed a new significance as the main link to the coast for the local communities of Waipali, Godogasul and Mubo. However, the track’s next metamorphosis would challenge the understanding of even the most imaginative of its previous users. For one thing is certain: few of them would have thought of walking the Black Cat Track for recreational pleasure.

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1 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.

2 Jamon Halvaksz, ‘Cannibalistic Imaginaries: Mining the Natural and Social Body in Papua New Guinea’, The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 18, no. 2, 2006, pp. 335–59.

3 Phillip Bradley, The Battle for Wau: New Guinea’s Frontline 1942–1943, Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 212.

4 Sherlock was awarded with a Mention in Dispatches.

5 Bradley, The Battle for Wau.

6 Five months later, Allen was to gain further recognition for courage under fire. During the advance on Salamaua in an engagement on Mount Tambu, he rescued twelve American wounded. For this action the Americans awarded him the Silver Star for courage.