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Hastening Force Buildup before and during War

Military force design—which includes the elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities—entails many levels of risk management. This chapter focuses on two major risks: miscalculating the outbreak date of the next war, and planning for a particular scenario when a different scenario might occur (based on a mistaken assumption).

Throughout Israel’s history, the likelihood of the eruption of a full-scale confrontation has arisen every few years, causing the Israel Defense Forces to hasten preparations for war; these preparations are termed “force buildup.” This chapter examines three events—the Sinai War, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War—where the decision to augment the army’s readiness (professional competency, basic organizational suitability, weapons upgrade, and improved stockpile levels) was put to the test, followed by a discussion of what can and cannot be done when war appears on the horizon.

These three events were chosen because they can be analyzed within the limits of declassified information. They illustrate a range of time factors and types of action taken—for instance, the time interval between a decision to prepare for war (based on the perception that a fundamental change has occurred and war is imminent) and the actual outbreak of hostilities. Preparation for the Sinai War lasted a whole year—from the public announcement of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal in late September 1955 to the outbreak of war on October 29, 1956. Preparation time for the Six-Day War was shorter—roughly three weeks—from the alert on May 15, 1967, to the outbreak of war on June 5. Preparations for the Yom Kippur War continued for half a year—from the announcement of the “Blue-White” alert on April 16, 1973, to the Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6.¹ In addition, the chapter discusses the airlift that took place in the midst of the Yom Kippur War and the effort to assimilate new weapons in the course of fighting.

A determination that war is likely to erupt within a few months or a year enhances tensions in certain areas. (Note that this chapter deals with wartime scenarios, when the main force has to be deployed at the onset of hostilities, and not in a limited or pinpoint operation, where such tensions may be more circumscribed.) The main tension is between the heightened readiness for the approaching clash and the future relevancy of the weapons procured (as well as supplies and structural organization) if war does not occur at the expected time. Given that the army receives funding to improve its readiness in the face of impending war and that cutbacks routinely occur after hostilities abate, investment in the immediate time frame—that is, to procure weapons and supplies and undertake relevant training exercises for the expected confrontation—comes at the cost of developing military capabilities for a more distant clash whose nature cannot be known in advance.

In the case of weapons, the dilemma is whether to increase stocks of existing weapons or wait for newer and better ones to become available. For example, should an army upgrade its tank cannons and procure ammunition to improve its immediate military capability or take a risk and wait to acquire more advanced weapons that are better suited to oppose the new tanks the enemy will presumably receive after the war has ended. It should be remembered that every new weapons system requires a learning period. An additional element in risk management is the balance between the quantity of primary weapons (tanks and planes, for example) and the amount of ammunition and spare parts purchased for training and operational use.

Another tension is the reliance on a foreign source for weapons, ammunition, and replacement parts versus reliance on domestic production. The dilemma revolves around the relatively high costs of developing, maintaining, and expanding independent production versus reliance on a foreign state in an emergency, with the inherent risks of embargo, delayed delivery, partial or gross incompatibility with the army’s needs, and so forth. This is one of the most complex tensions, and it involves an assessment of the political situation and long-term economic considerations. Although this aspect is irrelevant to the United States, it is a major consideration for America’s smaller allies, and US decision makers must understand this.

Training and exercises for assimilating new weapons are necessary steps whether those weapons are acquired from foreign sources or domestically. The dilemma is whether to gain proficiency in the use of a current weapon or wait for a more advanced weapon to become available, at the price of less time for assimilation and training. It must be remembered that the transition from a known weapons system that the forces are skilled in operating to a new weapons system often entails not only learning new procedures but also unlearning or overriding old habits.² Another issue is the diversity and scope of the retraining required. For example, training pilots to fly new aircraft demands many flight hours. In addition, ground-crew technicians need time to learn how to identify and fix problems in the new aircraft. There are other tensions related to the supply of ammunition and weapon operability (due to the numerous replacement parts and the time needed to repair breakdowns that occurred in the training period) and between the desire to train as much as possible and the need to maintain a sufficient degree of readiness in case of sudden war. Another source of tension is the ability to modify trainers (instruction teams), training areas, and training aids.

In the area of force organization, the dilemma is whether to restructure the forces based on the specific needs of the coming conflict (even though this lengthens the time needed to assimilate changes and bring them to fruition on the battlefield) or to act within known frameworks that may be less suited to the specific threat. (This refers to the establishment of new units, headquarters, and so forth—not to manning the combat forces.)

A final risk involves a low level of compatibility between the force elements: weapons replenishment (which includes several factors, such as the number and quality of weapons, the amount of ammunition, and the availability of replacement parts), the level of proficiency in their use (training and exercises), and the level of maintenance. When compatibility is low, the weak link in the chain dictates a unit’s operability. For example, there is no sense in maintaining a highly trained division equipped with the latest weapons if ammunition is in short supply.

I claim that once a decision has been made, readiness can be significantly improved within a matter of months. The main improvement results from the force’s increased competency and not from the assimilation of new weapons. This chapter analyzes the IDF’s accelerated force buildup after the decision had been made to prepare for war. Strong points and shortcomings are identified, and rules are presented for future scenarios. Although the focus is on the IDF’s experience, other events in other armies could have been used, for example, the Red Army’s preparation for war after the German invasion of Poland and France, the preparation of American armed forces for war between September 1939 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, or the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942.

The Sinai War

The year before the Sinai War (which started in October 1956) was a special period for the IDF in terms of force design and buildup. Armor’s operational order of battle increased more than twofold, and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was in the midst of converting from piston-engine (propeller-driven) aircraft to jet planes. The accelerated force buildup taking place under the constant threat of war involved numerous risks and therefore serves as a model, allowing us to analyze risk management and learn the necessary lessons. All the while, the fledgling state of Israel was struggling to absorb massive waves of immigrants and recuperate economically from the lengthy War of Independence. Economic measures at the time included gasoline and food rationing.

During most of the first half of the 1950s, the IDF operated based on the assumption that war was unlikely in the near future (within two or three years); therefore, the 1953 three-year plan was built on this premise.³ A dramatic change in the regional balance of power occurred in September 1955 when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a huge arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Prior to that deal, Egypt enhanced its armored force by acquiring British Centurions and upgraded cannons for its Sherman tanks. Israel estimated that Egyptian armor would increase from 130 tanks in late 1955 to between 310 and 430 tanks with the addition of Russian T-34s and Stalins to the British Centurions and French AMX-13s.⁴ Furthermore, the Egyptians were scheduled to receive a large number of modern Mig-15s and Mig-17s.⁵ The Syrian army, too, would be replenished with tanks and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). On October 18,

1955, Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett announced that “something has happened in the Middle East that portends the bleak prospect of our strongest enemy state gaining a decisive military advantage that will confront us with dangers unlike any we have known since the War of Independence.”⁶ At a government meeting in December 1955, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (who had returned to office after Sharett’s resignation) stated that the Egyptians would be ready for war in a few months and would attack Israel in the spring or summer of 1956. While Israel studied the possibility of an Israeli-initiated war before Egypt could assimilate its new weapons, it attempted to purchase offensive arms to counterbalance the Egyptian acquisition.

Armor Buildup

In September 1955 the IDF had 86 operational tanks (76 Shermans with M-3 cannons and 10 AMX-13 reconnaissance tanks); in addition, there were 131 nonfunctioning tanks without armament. The IDF planned to organize the Shermans in four tank battalions and to attach three of the battalions to armored brigades (the 7th, 27th, and 37th), with the fourth as a general support to the infantry units.⁷

In May 1955 the French government expressed a willingness to sell a large number of aircraft, tanks, and antitank missiles to Israel. The deal was stymied, however, due to opposition from the French Foreign Office and gaps in Israeli financing. In early November these obstacles were overcome (the reasons for the removal of French opposition have been studied in detail elsewhere) because of the shock of the Egyptian acquisition. The director of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, went on a procurement mission to Europe and succeeded in signing sales agreements for French Ouragan and Mystère aircraft, 60 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans, 175 75mm M-50 cannons for mounting on the Shermans, SS-10 missiles, and 500 73mm bazooka rockets.⁸ “Some of the items, such as the Super-Shermans and bazookas would be taken out of French army stores and units and quickly supplied, while the rest, the planes, light tanks and missiles, were still in production which meant that their delivery would take a few months.”⁹ The French put a freeze on the deal after signing it, but in April, after learning that Egypt was aiding the rebels in Algeria and determining that strengthening Israel would be in France’s interest, French and Israeli negotiators agreed on the sale of 72 Mystère-4s, 120 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans (with 76.2mm cannons), and 18 selfpropelled cannons. Delivery was scheduled for late July to late September 1956.

Within a year, the IDF’s number of operational tanks had more than doubled, from 86 in 1955 to approximately 181 tanks that took part in the Sinai War (120 Shermans of various models and 61 AMX-13s). The IDF’s total tank force rose that year to nearly 450, more than twice the number in September 1955. Between late July and the opening of hostilities in late October 1956, 233 tanks arrived: 120 AMX-13s, 40 Super-Shermans, 25 Sherman M-50s, and 48 Sherman M-1s.¹⁰ Israel’s beefed-up strength made a major impact on the order of battle (the establishment and dismantlement of units), crew training, and unit exercises with the new weapons. All this was carried out mainly between July and October while assimilating the weapons.

Tank Procurement and Upgrade

The case of the AMX-13 illustrates the problems inherent in the rapid procurement of an existing weapon with limited capabilities, when taking into account the enemy’s threat and serious technical serviceability weaknesses. Israel complied with French demands to purchase 180 light tanks, a larger number than its operational needs called for (112, according to the original plan) at a very high price (nearly $150,000 per tank), compared with a smaller number of Shermans at $25,000 per tank.¹¹ The relatively new AMX-13 tank (production began in France in 1951) had a three-man crew, weighed fourteen tons, offered a high speed and high muzzle velocity, and had the only shell that could penetrate the Egyptians’ Centurion armor. Nevertheless, the tanks’ protective armor was very thin (a 0.5-inch machine gun bullet could penetrate it), and it was unsuited for Israel’s combat conditions of heat and dust. Because of these limitations, the AMX-13 was originally defined as an antitank (or tank destroyer) weapon and not as a battle tank.¹² After testing and trials, the ordnance branch concluded that basic changes were needed to improve the tank’s durability in Israel’s soil and climate conditions: modifying the cooling system, switching the air filters to oil filters, and replacing the gear system. The decision was made to buy the tank before the necessary changes and repairs had been finalized. It should be noted that some of the modifications that were considered essential required further examination. Another complication was that many of the tank’s parts were being produced in factories spread across France and Germany.

In mid-1955, after the contract had been signed, it was revealed that production and delivery would take longer than expected. “Israel faced a dilemma: whether to wait and insist that the tanks not be sent until the modifications were introduced or receive them as soon as possible regardless of their limitations.”¹³ Israel decided to obtain the tanks before the modifications had been made so that assimilation and training could begin and the tanks could be rendered operable as early as possible. After the improved systems were developed, Israel would install them. The decision to develop crew proficiency before the adaptations had been completed had a profound effect on the tanks’ capability while the army was preparing for war.¹⁴ The incomplete modifications for desert fighting were a factor during the war. A tank company of regulars in the 9th Battalion, 7th Brigade, that was attached to a paratrooper brigade suffered many types of breakdowns. For example, on October 27 “the tank crews had to deal with an unexpected problem: instead of Browning .30 caliber machineguns that fire parallel to the cannon, they received, without warning, a new French Lebel-model machinegun they had never seen before.”¹⁵ Only seven out of thirteen tanks survived the trip when the brigade moved from Ein Husub (Hatzeva) in the Arava (Israel’s southern border with Jordan) to Kunteila in Sinai: “All the rest had their gears burnt out or their filters clogged with dust.”¹⁶ Only three tanks reached the Tamed area in Sinai’s depth because “the three others had gotten stuck due to clogged filters.”¹⁷

The IDF’s acquisition and assimilation of the AMX-13 highlight the downside of trying to attain a higher degree of readiness for an approaching battle with an available weapon—in this case, the relatively unsuitable AMX-13 tank (excluding the cannon). This consideration overrode the potential benefit of obtaining a better weapon, such as the Sherman tank, in the future. The large number of AMXs that were purchased (40 percent of the IDF’s total order of battle at the start of hostilities) exceeded the amount needed by one and a half times. The AMX-13’s service in the IDF was fairly short-lived. Before the Six-Day War, the army had already begun to transfer them from the armored brigades to regional command armored battalions. The AMX-13’s flaws were blatant in the Six-Day War: its inadequacy in dealing with the enemy’s advanced tanks (T-55s and Stalins), its light armor plating, difficulties in command and control (C2) at the company commander level and higher, and maintenance problems. They were taken out of the order of battle at the first opportunity, and many were sold to foreign countries in 1968–1969.¹⁸

The Sherman tank’s life expectancy was extended after being converted to the Sherman M-51. The gun barrel was replaced with a 105mm cannon, the gasoline engine was replaced by a Cummins diesel engine, rotation and elevation were upgraded to a hydraulic system, and the tracks were widened for improved maneuverability. When the Six-Day War broke out, 178 M-3s had been already been converted to M-51s, and the engines of 186 M-50s had been replaced.¹⁹ The M-51s with the 105mm cannons also fought admirably in the Yom Kippur War. The Shermans were employed in the mechanized brigades’ tank battalions (three M-51 companies and a platoon of M-50s). The 4th, 9th, and 670th Mechanized Brigades fought on the Golan Heights; the 11th Mechanized Brigade in the northern sector of Suez Canal; and the 875th Mechanized Brigade battled in the canal’s southern sector.²⁰

The conversion of the Sherman cannons was another example of very complex risk taking. The decision to substitute the short-barreled 75mm M-3 cannon (originally designed for infantry assistance because of its relatively low armor-penetrating capability) with the long-barreled 75mm M-50 cannon (the AMX-13’s cannon, with improved armor-penetrating ability) contributed significantly to the IDF’s readiness. “The idea to mount the M-50 cannon on Sherman tanks, which began in September 1953, was still incomplete after two years.” By June 1956, “the IDF had approximately 70 operable Shermans (without cannons) that were waiting for the tests and checks of the mounted M-50 cannon to be completed.”²¹ Although the M-50 cannon had arrived from France with mounting instructions in late 1955, it was still far from being operational. In mid-March 1956, even after additions and modifications such as smoke canisters and a new telescopic sight, field tests revealed that twenty alterations were still needed. “The tank’s testing in Israel and the changes that had to be made, pushed back the start of the ordnance work by a few months. On August 7 the chief quartermaster estimated that the first twenty tanks with M-50 cannons would be ready only on September 1, 1956 (about six months after the cannons’ arrival in the country).”²² Be that as it may, in the months preceding the Sinai War, the ordnance branch accelerated its pace and succeeded in converting twenty-four Shermans to the M-50 model. A few weeks before hostilities began, fourteen were delivered to Major Moshe Brill, the commander of A Company, 82nd Battalion, 7th Brigade (the brigade that would capture the Ruefa Dam).²³ During the retraining exercise, a serious flaw was discovered: the cannon’s weight caused cracks in the screws connecting the elevation arch to the turret. The problem was fixed before the war.²⁴

The length of time that passed until the armored battalions were equipped with M-50 cannons proved to be crucial. Even as the IDF was planning offensive operations and was in a state of alert against an Egyptian or Egyptian-Syrian armored attack, the battalions were in short supply of Shermans. A June agreement with France regarding the arrival of forty Super-Shermans (with 76.2mm cannons) starting in late July was key in bridging the quantitative and qualitative gap during the long wait for the M-50s.²⁵ This illustrates the tension that arises when weighing the risks of waiting for advanced weapons with long-term operational durability versus attaining a high level of readiness with technologically inferior weapons.

The M-10 tank destroyers were an example of a threefold problem: the acquisition of low-cost, secondhand equipment; the need to budget for replacement parts; and a manpower shortage in the ordnance layout. This weapon was purchased from Britain in late 1951, entered service in late 1955 (four years after its purchase),²⁶ and was withdrawn from service in the mid-1960s following the procurement of 100 additional Shermans from Iran.

Organization of the Armored Units

The reestablishment of the 7th Brigade as a basic armored formation of regulars contained all the elements of combined-arms warfare (after the brigade had been disbanded in 1954, its units came under the command of the armored corps). This process began before the Czech arms deal was announced and continued until the war broke out. The 7th Brigade’s commander, Colonel Uri Ben Ari, writes that the AMX-13 tanks reached the 9th Battalion on October 24, 1956, six days before the war began.²⁷ The 52nd Battalion, an infantry battalion that had been transferred from the dismantled Givati Brigade in early September, had to be converted into a mechanized infantry battalion. The 61st Motorized Infantry Battalion, made up of reservists, had never trained as a motorized infantry battalion attached to an armored brigade. The reconnaissance unit that was designated to fight from AMX-13 tanks went into battle in jeeps. “According to IDF plans the 7th Brigade would be fit for war only in early 1957!”²⁸

The establishment of the 27th Armored Brigade (reservists) took five years. The brigade already had armored battalions, but now the brigade headquarters had to be formed, the mechanized infantry and maintenance units had to be trained, and the reconnaissance company had to be converted to the AMX-13. The process culminated with a brigade exercise in May 1956. The assimilation of new weapons continued until just before the war. Colonel Haim Bar-Lev, who assumed command of the brigade only in mid-October,²⁹ recalled that “the Super-Shermans arrived a few days before the general mobilization [and] the M-50s two days before the operation.”³⁰

The formation of the 37th Brigade (reservists) began in April 1955. The battalions were being built while the brigade’s headquarters and combat support units were still only partially manned. The brigade assimilated the new tanks and half-tracks only two weeks before the war,³¹ which had an unfavorable effect on the brigade’s proficiency. When it went into action on November 1, “the brigade had just completed its basic replenishment that morning and still lacked equipment, mainly communications gear.”³²

Seven AMX-13 companies were organized on the basis of existing tanks and those that were supposed to arrive. The companies were scheduled to operate within the framework of regional command reconnaissance battalions and a General Headquarters (GHQ) “reserve” battalion. Forming tank crews with troops who lived in the area where the unit was expected to be deployed, and transferring troops from existing units for retraining, encumbered both the companies being established and the units that had lost soldiers for retraining.³³

The armored corps was not alone in undergoing organizational change. It was decided to reduce the number of “elder” infantry brigades (six at the time) and raise the proficiency level of those that remained. It was also decided to convert the 202nd Paratroop Battalion into a brigade on the basis of four battalions: the jump-school battalion, the 890th Battalion, the Nachal Airborne Battalion, and a reservist battalion.³⁴ During the reorganization of the regulars’ order of battle, the 5th Brigade (Givati) was disbanded, and two battalions of regulars reinforced the 7th Brigade and Golani (Infantry) Brigade (which consisted of only two regular battalions). Most of the Givati Brigade’s combat support units became the foundation of the new 202nd Brigade.³⁵

Two events related to unit organization stand out as important with regard to risk management in force buildup. The first was the formation of the armored corps in early 1954. This involved the dismantling of the command echelon of the armored brigade as a basic formation and the subordination of armored battalions to the new armored corps, which would allocate them as battle teams to headquarters according to their missions. Amiad Brezner, the corps historian, writes: “The changes that the armored forces underwent cannot be separated from the rosy evaluation that prevailed in late 1953 that chances were slim that war would break out in the coming years. Only an army that is not under the threat of an approaching war can opt for long range preparations instead of maintaining immediate readiness, and embark on deep structural changes that entail dismantling the existing organizational system and building units to be organized and employed in an untested formation.”³⁶ The return to an organization in which the brigade was the basic formation began unofficially in July 1954, a few months after the start of the reorganization, and was officially approved in late April 1955, almost half a year before the IDF began preparations for war.³⁷

The second event was the dismantling of the reconnaissance companies of five-man crews on Staghound armored cars and their conversion to three-man crews on AMX-13s before the tanks arrived. The change required splitting up the crews and the platoons or companies and transforming the machine gunners into the more demanding roles of tank commanders, loaders, and drivers. A worrisome situation was created by the delay in the tanks’ delivery from France. This was not the first time delivery had been held up, but “unlike the other occasions, no preliminary actions that were so comprehensive had been taken that disrupted the existing combat formation.” In this case, “the regional command’s armored battalions, which were supposed to supply armored forces to the commands, were non-operational because the previous organization had been thrown into disarray (the Staghounds could not be used and the crews that had been converted to tanks were still without the AMX-13s). The dismantlement of the Staghound companies that had seemed a calculated risk, turned out to be genuinely unsound.”³⁸ The general staff and the armored corps scrambled to remedy the situation by taking the following steps: the remnants of the Staghound crews in the reconnaissance battalions were mustered into company frameworks, the untrained manpower was channeled to the formation of new companies, and some of the crews that had already undergone retraining on tanks were sent back to the armored cars.

The Rotem event is another example of the problems that can arise when there is no overlap between the removal of outdated equipment from service and the addition of new equipment. In early March 1960 the IDF learned that the Egyptian 4th Division was deployed in forward positions in Sinai. In light of this surprising development, the IDF heightened the level of alert in certain areas. At the same time, it was replacing World War II–era antitank cannons with newer jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless cannons. The transition was taking place without overlap—that is, the old cannons had been withdrawn from the regulars’ units, and the recoilless cannons were only beginning to enter service. The Golani and Nachal infantrymen, however, were unfamiliar with the old weapons and inexperienced in the use of the new ones. Southern Command allocated one week for rapid training exercises.³⁹

Training and Exercises

The new AMX-13 posed a great training challenge to the armor school. New courses had to be developed for tank commanders, drivers, and loaders, and the crews had to undergo intensive training. Many mishaps occurred during training, especially because of the disproportionate number of trainees to available tanks and the lack of sufficient training facilities, such as open-range firing areas. Thus, training was only partially completed. An AMX-13 commander who was sent to France completed a mere two-week crew training course on the new tank, plus an additional two-week instructors’ course. Upon his return to Israel, he was given the responsibility of converting infantrymen into tank crews in a three-week course.⁴⁰ The first company commanders’ course opened in March 1956. When the Sinai War erupted, the second course was canceled, so the first course was the only training company commanders received before the war.⁴¹ The low proficiency of the AMX-13 companies led to the creation of an instruction staff made up of commanders and instructors who had trained on the tank in France. The staff’s goal was to oversee training for autonomous armored units—brigade reconnaissance and AMX tank companies. In reality, due to the delayed delivery of the bulk of the tanks and snags with the existing ones, only one reconnaissance company and two armored car companies had undergone training by the time the war broke out, and an emergency call-up order was sent to reserve officers to act as instructors.⁴² “As a rule it was decided to train the maximum number of units this year and make sure they familiarized themselves with enemy territory. The task was assigned to the IDF’s head of the instruction branch, Major General Yitzhak Rabin. The emergency mobilization of reservists was meant to continue for half a year.”⁴³

In May 1956 a full armored brigade exercise was carried out for the first time since 1952. During that interval, only battalion formations had been deemed necessary for training exercises.⁴⁴ But the exercises encountered numerous difficulties (see below). The Merkava exercise for airborne units in March 1956 was also of major importance. This exercise for the remodeled 202nd Airborne Brigade tested its airborne and seaborne capabilities, which would be employed in the war.⁴⁵

Complicating matters was the need to bolster the units’ readiness through training despite the growing wear and tear on their weapons. The combination of intensive training, relatively new (and more sophisticated) weapons, and limited maintenance experience created a major operational problem in 1956. The number of engine hours in 1956–1957 was more than twice that of the previous year, with the extra hours attributed to the new tanks.⁴⁶ The May 1956 Pelet exercise that concluded the training of the newly established 27th Brigade (reservists) ended with a crisis in mechanical serviceability. In an attempt to limit damage to the AFVs’ operability, the armored corps’ training AFVs were used in the exercise instead of the brigade’s combat vehicles. The combination of AFVs in need of repair after training, reservists who were generally lax about vehicle maintenance, and a brigade maintenance system that had not been trained to perform under pressure led to the “final undoing of the armored forces’ level of readiness as far as tanks were concerned…. Of the 60 AMXs, about 40 were rendered inoperable; 13 of them from this exercise,” wrote chief of staff Moshe Dayan in his diary.⁴⁷ A report on June 14 noted that approximately half of the armored corps’ Shermans, AMX-13s, and half-tracks were no longer fit for action.⁴⁸ The armored corps, which used the AFVs, and the ordnance branch, which was responsible for their maintenance, blamed each other for the situation.⁴⁹ Dayan accused the armored corps commander of putting Israel’s survival at risk.⁵⁰ He ordered that 100 tanks remain continuously operable and on full alert; this, in effect, canceled all training until new tanks arrived.⁵¹

Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and training for the AMX-13 encountered problems due to mistranslations of the tank’s operating instructions from French to Hebrew. The tactical training material also had to be translated. “In mid-1956, the amount of official instruction material that was published reached its low point,” for two reasons:⁵² the volume of armored corps headquarters’ training and organizational assignments in recent years, and the shortage of professional officers at headquarters.

Regarding efficient force buildup, a quantitative imbalance existed between the number of tanks acquired and the number of trained crews. At the beginning of the Sinai War, the IDF had 104 fully manned AMX-13s out of 180 tanks (58 percent); it had 120 fully manned Shermans of various models out of 166 operational tanks and 205 in total (72 and 58 percent, respectively).⁵³ “Although the replenishment of the main fighting equipment was impressive, armor lacked certain items (ammunition for the M-1 cannon, refueling pumps, fillers for loading the cartridge belts, lubrication equipment, and camouflage netting) that prevented it from exploiting the large number of AFVs and hampered the fighting units from realizing their potential.”⁵⁴

Organization of the Antitank Units

When Israel grasped the full extent of the threat from Arab armor, it accelerated its force buildup and went further than just upgrading its medium tank force and purchasing AMX-13 light tanks.⁵⁵ It now increased its tank destroyer layout and acquired antitank cannons, missiles, and rocket launchers. The cutbacks of the previous years had resulted in the concentration of antitank platoons into brigade antitank companies, the truncation of regular army antitank units (which subsequently created a manpower shortage in the reservist units), and a gap between the number of cannons (57mm or 6-pounder) in service and the table of equipment. Instead of purchasing additional cannons, Dayan acquired light AMX-13s from France, upgraded the Sherman cannons, and waited for Israel Military Industries (IMI) to produce rocket launchers. The light tanks’ disadvantage was their price tag—$150,000, compared with $5,000 for antitank cannons—and the relatively long assimilation period. The development of the 82mm rocket launcher also proved more troublesome than envisaged, and replenishment was scheduled for the beginning of 1957 at the earliest. As an interim solution, 500 73mm rocket launchers were acquired in 1954 and concentrated in company-level antitank squads. Although they were effective, they were too few for Israel’s needs.⁵⁶

Antitank Cannons

In late 1955 the antitank battalions’ situation was flawed. Although the battalions’ manpower status in the infantry brigades was acceptable, most of the antitank units had undergone training only at the crew and battery level, not as battalions. Furthermore, the transfer of batteries between battalions in the first months of 1956 detracted from their combat proficiency. In 1955–1956 six antitank battalions of the elder infantry brigades were established without undergoing combat training. Another drawback was the need for vehicles to tow the antitank cannons. The vehicle fleet allocated to this task and to transporting the crews and ammunition was unsuited for the job. Nearly one-third of the ammunition carriers were civilian vehicles that had been conscripted, and their use was limited because of their diversity, the shortage of spare parts, and the absence of towing hooks on many of them. Mobility was especially problematic for the heavy 17-pound cannons, which had a greater penetrating ability than the 6-pounders and were more effective against the enemy’s heavy tanks (Stalins and Centurions). Half-tracks were supposed to be used for towing, but instead, five-ton 6-by-6 trucks—unsuited for towing heavy antitank cannons—were allocated. To make matters worse, the 6-pounders failed to receive proper technical maintenance: their sights were not calibrated, and their range tables were found to be off. Thus, in May–June 1956 a frantic effort was made to calibrate the cannons and correct the range tables. According to Ze’ev Elron, the weakness in the antitank and armor layout, as revealed by the Pelet exercise in May, was probably one reason that Ben-Gurion decided not to initiate hostilities and opted instead for a defensive posture.⁵⁷

SS-10 Missiles

Israel purchased SS-10 antitank guided missiles from France in late 1955. In early 1956 it was decided that the artillery branch would establish four antitank battalions, each with three batteries: three regional command battalions and one as a general staff reserve. In March thirty-five missiles and two launchers arrived from France, and the first unit was set up under a veil of secrecy. In early April the trainees returned from France and began to organize the unit. The first battery was expected to be operational in July 1956, the second in August, and three more by July 1957. However, the organization took longer than planned, and in the end, the missiles were not used in the Sinai War.⁵⁸

Rocket Launchers

In early 1955 the IDF had 560 73mm rocket launchers and 3,000 PIAT launchers, far short of the 5,000 launchers and 100,000 rockets it required. To close the gap, Israel decided to purchase American 3.5-inch rocket launchers and additional 73mm rocket launchers and to order 1,000 82mm rocket launchers and 20,000 rockets from IMI. France agreed to supply an additional 500 73mm rocket launchers. With these acquisitions and the possibility of purchasing thousands of rocket launchers of various models, discussions were held regarding the units’ table of equipment. Four types of rocket launchers were acquired and produced in this period:

1. American 3.5-inch (89mm) rocket launchers. In November 1955 the director of the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, recommended buying these launchers because of their low price. At the same time, he warned that the manufacturer might be unable to supply them within the one month promised. The 350 launchers that arrived in July 1956 turned out to be inferior to the French 73mm ones, and they were assigned to regional defense and noninfantry units.

2. Belgian 83mm rocket launchers. The IDF purchased 1,000 rocket launchers from Belgium before testing them. The ammunition that came with them had apparently passed the expiration date, and two years after the transaction, one-third of the rockets were deemed unfit for use.

3. Israeli 82mm rocket launchers. Despite the plan to produce 60 to 90 rocket launchers and 1,000 rockets each month, the IDF had only six launchers in its inventory in early October 1956. Distribution to the units began only in early 1958—a major miscalculation in planning.

4. French 73mm rocket launchers. The IDF doubled the number of these weapons (compared with early 1955) to 1,090 launchers and 19,000 rockets. The 200 launchers that were taken out of the French army and urgently sent to Israel proved to be inoperable. One thousand additional launchers and 30,000 rockets arrived on the eve of the Sinai War but came too late to be used in combat.⁵⁹

Given the sense of urgency, some of these weapons were acquired before their suitability to Israel’s professional needs or technical conditions had been thoroughly examined, only because their price was attractive or an early delivery date was promised.

Given the pace of events, there was little opportunity to discuss the new equipment’s assimilation and employment before it arrived in the country. Thus, the army had to develop doctrine for using equipment it had not requested or that it suddenly found itself in possession of—often in quantities far exceeding its needs. Instead of an orderly procedure in which equipment is acquired because of its applicability to a fighting concept, in this period, the IDF had to devise a combat doctrine for the weapons it already had.

The basic change in the work plans was necessitated by the acquisition of tanks in June 1956 that far exceeded the army’s needs. The procurement was incompatible with professional requirements, devoured huge sums of money, and weighed heavily on the maintenance budget in the following years. The funds required for this tank acquisition were thus not available for vital investment in the readiness of many defensive weapons purchased in early 1956 or for ammunition, operational accessories, and the training of their operators.⁶⁰

Dismantlement and Reestablishment of Southern Command Headquarters

The proposal to eliminate Southern Command and save 400 manpower positions was broached in September 1954. Two months later, Central Command assumed responsibility for the southern half of the country and all the units attached to Southern Command. In place of Southern Command, a newly formed Negev Headquarters was established in Beer Sheva to deal with routine security matters. A few months after this major shift, however, second thoughts were expressed, and there was talk of reestablishing Southern Command due to Central Command’s need to deal with the rising Egyptian threat owing to the escalation of incidents on the Gaza border.⁶¹

“In November 1954 Moshe Dayan dismantled Southern Command and subordinated it to Central Command in order to cut expenses…. [The following summer] he realized that his decision had been a gross mistake.”⁶² On the eve of the Khan Yunis operation (August 31, 1955), a heightened state of alert was declared, and Southern Command was reinstated.⁶³ “Southern Command’s headquarters was hastily restored to the former framework of 1954, although at this stage it was still called the ‘Negev Headquarters’ within Central Command. The headquarters’ commander was Colonel Meir Amit, who had headed General Staff Directorate until then. His first task was to evaluate the likelihood of war.”⁶⁴

According to Amit, he reestablished Southern Command in stages, first as the head of a setup team composed of people he knew and trusted. On October 28, 1955, Amit was formally appointed commander of Southern Command. “The first thing we did was build the command from scratch,” he wrote.⁶⁵ Simultaneously, they had to cope with attacks by fedayeen (Arab infiltrators) and reinforce the regional defense layout. Amit recalled that Southern Command focused its war preparations on the offensive: “We carried out frequent maneuvers and prepared intelligence files on vast areas in Sinai for the units.”⁶⁶ “Because Southern Command had been mothballed, the team that was supposed to keep close tabs on the Egyptian forces consisted of only one officer and two soldiers who were reinforced with three reservists at the start of tension.”⁶⁷ On August 5, 1956, Amit was replaced by Colonel Asaf Simchoni, whose first assignment was to transfer the command from Kastina to Beer Sheva.⁶⁸

The Air Force

In aerial combat, the more complex the weapons, the more difficult their assimilation. In the months preceding the war, the IAF was transitioning from World War II piston-driven aircraft to jet aircraft. The head of the IAF’s history branch, Motti Habakuk, notes that the IAF was in the midst of assimilating advanced jet aircraft—the Ouragan and Mystère IV—while it was also scrupulously preparing for war. Thus, the number of pilots qualified to fly the new aircraft was insufficient, and the use of these planes was minimal. On October 29, 1956, the day the war broke out, of the sixty Mystères in the country, only fourteen were operable, and even they were limited by their imprecise gun-firing capability.⁶⁹

Weapons

As noted earlier, the main difficulty in risk management is deciding whether to replenish troops with readily available weapons (as war approaches) or wait for more advanced weapons that are expected to become available. General Ezer Weizman describes how the French army urged the IDF to procure the Mystère II, a fighter plane that could not be converted into an attack aircraft. Although the Mystère II was available for immediate delivery, it was plagued by sundry problems.⁷⁰ The Mystère IV, a more advanced model with multipurpose capability as both a fighter and an attack plane, would be available in a few months. According to Weizman, despite pressure from Dayan, Peres, and many others who insisted that the Mystère II should be purchased, IAF commander Dan Tolkowsky “displayed obstinacy in the face of all the counter-arguments that stood between the IAF and the Mystère II procurement.”⁷¹ Eleven years later in the Six-Day War, the Mystère IV proved invaluable in Operation Moked. Though planned to be utilized until 1973, it was taken out of service in 1970.⁷² The decision to back down on the Mystère II and wait for the Mystère IV apparently came at the price of readiness for the Sinai War. In his book There Will Be War in the Summer, Motti Golani describes a conversation in early July 1956 between Prime Minister–Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and Tolkowsky about a Mystère squadron with twelve pilots: “six who can fly and six who are still learning.” Later, in answer to Ben-Gurion’s question about how much time it would take for sixty pilots to be ready for war, Tolkowsky replied, “A year, at the very least.”⁷³

Some of the Ouragan pilots, too, were inexperienced; six of the eighteen pilots had spent only eight hours flying the aircraft.⁷⁴ Weizman describes how he piloted the Ouragan in the war after only ten hours of training and learned some of the aircraft’s capabilities while in flight.⁷⁵ “Even though Israel had enough Mystères for three squadrons, only one was operational—Squadron 101 [under the command of Major Benny Peled]—and this too was achieved at the cost of the Meteor and Ouragan squadrons that had been reduced to only a dozen pilots each.”⁷⁶ The IDF was fortunate that the rest of the new Mystères were flown by French pilots in the Sinai War.⁷⁷ French assistance proved priceless in carrying out air reconnaissance; this freed the Israeli squadrons for offensive missions, such as attacking the retreating Egyptian convoys.⁷⁸

The Mystères’ 30mm cannon ammunition arrived from France in limited supply just one or two days before the war. The “Mystères’ bombs were unavailable and only a handful of 68 mm rockets had arrived. The newest plane in our arsenal had not been installed [with the necessary equipment] to drop bombs.”⁷⁹

Lieutenant Ran Ronen (Pekker) describes his first combat mission in a Mystère squadron in the Sinai War, which he carried out with insufficient knowledge of the aircraft he was flying: “Only after we crossed the Israeli-Egyptian border east to Gaza did I realize that we were actually headed for war! I found myself seated in a new plane that I’d accumulated only 15 hours in the air with and was just beginning to learn its maneuverability in aerial combat or in attacking ground targets. I’d never operated its weapons systems…. This was a lethal combination of flying too low for strafing, uncontrolled deviation of the new and unfamiliar aircraft, and precarious terrain.”⁸⁰

The ground crew also had problems with the new aircraft: “‘Jettisoning drop tanks!’ I looked at the wings and was horrified to see the detachable fuel tanks were still locked in place and what was plunging to the ground were the rocket pods…. The munitions crew definitely got it wrong when they connected the jettison system which they were obviously uninstructed in…. The series of foulups in the aircraft was quite large. The technicians had lots to learn yet about the new plane…. The Mystère had just been assimilated and was already engaged in actual combat.”⁸¹

Lieutenant Yosef Tzuk, a young Mystère pilot, recalled: “We received our first air-to-surface training at a firing range only on the Saturday before the war. We didn’t have a clue what to do. The rockets were put into regular (and unfitted) launching pipes and some of them fell out in the flight to the range.”⁸²

The IAF’s control and monitoring system was being remodeled while the air force was undergoing a force buildup and switching to jet planes. The air force’s communications services, which were based on line links, were also in the midst of being upgraded. Work on the infrastructure of underground communications cables had begun in 1955, but the section between Tel Aviv and Haifa was halted in the final stage when hostilities broke out. Therefore, the IAF’s main control station suffered from excessive communications breakdowns and even cutoffs during the fighting.⁸³

Organization and Training

According to the Absalom training plan, which went into effect on September 25, 1956, and raised the level of alert, the propeller squadrons that had been mothballed in the Bedek storage facility in Lod in June–July 1956—the 69th (B-17s), 105th (Mustangs), and 110th (Mosquitoes)—were prepared for active flight. The ten days planned for training were shortened to just three.⁸⁴ To man the jet planes and prepare the best pilots to fly the newest aircraft, pilot training on the propeller-driven planes was minimized, operational training on the Mustangs was canceled, and flight-school graduates went directly from piston-driven Harvards to Meteors. One Ouragan squadron was fully designated for instruction.⁸⁵ “Preparation for war was hastily carried out before the force buildup with the new equipment was completed. All of Israel’s weapons had to be put to maximum use; the piston-powered aircraft had to be restored to combat capability and the air crews had to be quickly refreshed. Ironically, the air force went to war in the midst of a lull in its operational fitness and tactical preparedness.”⁸⁶

Israel was lucky that it could rely on the air capabilities of its coalition allies France and Great Britain; thus, its operational shortcomings were not conspicuously apparent. Weapons upgrade is a fact of life for every military organization. The fact of the matter is that every war catches an army in the middle of change. The IAF’s story is a classic example of war erupting when the military is undergoing a dramatic overhaul that temporarily diminishes its capabilities. The lesson to be learned is that before implementing an upgrade, the implications of the transition from tried and tested capabilities to new ones must be taken into consideration. Translating this principle into reality is complex and expensive because it often demands twice the amount of training. In other words, it entails employing old and new weapons simultaneously, maintaining two weapons inventories, and so forth. Naturally, the newer the weapons (or C2 systems), the more resources needed to assimilate them and the more convoluted the process becomes. Changing an infantryman’s personal weapon is much different from replacing an aircraft. The more complex a weapon’s technology, the more difficult its assimilation is, the longer the time required, and the greater the risks involved.

Besides the basic changes in the armored corps, the IAF, the antitank systems, and so forth, a number of senior commanders assumed new roles before the war broke out. Bringing in new players at the start of a war is a risky undertaking. In Israel’s case, the head of the J3 branch and deputy chief of staff, General Haim Laskov, was transferred to the armored corps to oversee the rapid force buildup (he later commanded the 77th Division based at the armored corps headquarters). Laskov’s former position as head of GHQ was assigned to Major General Meir Amit, the commander of Southern Command. Amit’s role was taken over by Colonel Asaf Simchoni in early August 1956.⁸⁷

The Six-Day War: The “Waiting Period”

In February–March 1967, on the basis of the Maccabee Multiyear Plan, the GHQ reviewed the assessment that an all-out Arab-initiated war was unlikely until 1970, although limited operations were possible.⁸⁸ This evaluation radically changed on May 19 when Egyptian advances in Sinai heightened the possibility of hostilities.⁸⁹

Ammunition Shortages and Tank Upgrades

The Bnei Or (Sons of Light) Multiyear Plan was designed to expand the Centurion and Patton order of battle to more than 600 tanks. Optimal operation of the 105mm Shreer (Muscle) tank cannons required 250,000 shells of various types. This amount was difficult to obtain because of the high cost of ammunition in Britain. At the conclusion of the arms deal with the United Kingdom in April 1965, and with domestic production by IMI, the total would be around 50,000. Therefore, the IDF signed another deal with Britain for 86,000 shells. This would bring the 105mm Shreer ammunition up to the standard (full tank belly and battalion-level truck reinforcement) for three days of fighting. The problem was that the supply of the ammunition was spread out through 1970 and 1971. Another complication was Britain’s development of a new kinetic energy armor-penetrating L-52 shell that was superior to and more expensive than the L-28. After weighing its options, Israel decided to acquire the new L-52.⁹⁰

In early 1965 the armored corps commander, General Tal, dramatized the situation estimate to Prime Minister–Defense Minister Levi Eshkol: “The armored corps is good for inspections and parades but it’s not ready for war if it lacks ammunition.”⁹¹ Upon hearing this, Eshkol agreed to add another 22,500 shells to the budget. Tal flew to Britain to facilitate the acquisition. Use of the shells in training exercises was banned because of the shortage of ammunition (20-pounders were used instead). In reality, and for myriad reasons, on May 15, 1967, the start of the alert preceding the Six-Day War, the full inventory of Shreers stood at 24,200 kinetic energy armor-penetrating shells, 16,500 high-explosive antitank (HEAT) shells, and 5,230 high-explosive squash head (HESH) shells. This was the approximate standard (excluding armor-penetrating shells) for three days of combat.

During the waiting period from May 15 to June 5, 1967, while the country held its breath to see whether President Nasser of Egypt would recall his troops from Sinai or the Israeli government would declare war, an impressive number of tanks were upgraded with Shreer cannons (sixty-five Centurions and fifteen Pattons). This effort “emphasized the urgent need for ammunition, especially HESH shells, in order to close the widening gaps. Britain, the source of these rounds, conditioned their delivery on the rate of production. Now the supply would have to come from the British army’s current stock.”⁹² Britain largely fulfilled Israel’s requests. By June 4, 3,670 HESH shells had arrived in Israel by air, and 4,700 arrived by sea the following day. The delivery of these munitions during the waiting period and after the war began had a substantial effect on the armored units. For example, a company of Centurion tanks that was hastily cobbled together by the chief armor officer’s headquarters and attached to the 10th Brigade on the eve of the war was armed with only armor-penetrating shells. On the morning of June 8, when the company reached Jericho, the first HESH shells finally arrived.⁹³

A similar problem was the shortage of HEAT shells for the 105mm cannons of the Sherman M-51s. On May 15 the ammunition inventory stood at 6,120 HEAT and 9,650 HESH shells. Thus, each of the 175 tanks was armed with only 34 HEAT shells and had enough HESH shells about three days of fighting.⁹⁴ As a result, “each Sherman in the 45th Brigade received only half a belly of HEAT shells (19–20 to a tank) and at the battalion and company level the stock was non-existent. Another delivery of the shells arrived on June 4.”⁹⁵

Brezner states that, as these data show, no meticulous planning had been performed to match ammunition stocks to existing tanks or the expected number of Centurions. At times, this led to an acute ammunition shortage and a critical threat to the effective operation of first-line tanks if war erupted in the near future. Although vast resources had been invested in improving the Centurions, given the lack of ammunition, their optimal combat capability could not be realized. In an extreme case, all efforts to upgrade the tanks would be in vain. Not only the new tanks but also the Sherman M-51s suffered from an ammunition deficit due to the long wait between placing the order and receiving the product. Some of the ammunition (HEAT shells) was still being developed, and the IDF had to stand by until research and development were completed. The Ministry of Defense hoped IMI would begin producing some of the ammunition and thus broaden the range of its products, which would save foreign currency and avoid lengthy delivery delays. Finally, budget cutbacks played a role in the dire shortfall in ammunition.⁹⁶

In ten hectic days (May 16–25) the ordnance workshops managed to upgrade 115 tanks, including 16 Centurions. When Central Command received them, they were still armed with 20-pound cannons, just as they had been when shipped from Britain. The tanks’ 20-pounders were not replaced with 105mm cannons after it was realized that Central Command had enough 20-pounder shells.⁹⁷

The three-week waiting period leading up to the war were of major significance because they enabled critical shortages to be filled. “The armored corps’ ammunition deficit taught Rabin that force buildup demands a planned parity between weapons’ replenishment and the acquisition of ammunition and spare parts…. ‘Better thirty tanks less and having what we possess with the necessary amount of ammunition and spare parts.’”⁹⁸

Force Organization

During the waiting period, the chief armor officer’s headquarters established two battalions and three companies made up of Armor School staff instructors and the armored corps’ testing unit. The headquarters made optimal use of the 900 officers and men who had trained in Israel or had returned from abroad by reinforcing the armored divisions with 197 additional crews.⁹⁹

The formation of the Eshkolot Landing Force (named after its commander, Ze’ev Eshkolot) on May 23 was also an important step. This force was designated to make a seaborne landing during the 55th Paratrooper Brigade’s airdrop in the El-Arish area in the event the 84th Division was delayed on the roads. The force consisted of two AMX-13 companies from the 60th Brigade, a platoon of 120mm towed mortars, an SS-11 missile platoon, and a motorized infantry platoon on half-tracks from the 55th Brigade. Much work went into ensuring the improvised force’s supply of fuel, ammunition, communications equipment, and machine gun mounts, as well as sealing (waterproofing) the AFVs and other vehicles. The tank crews underwent training at the Armor School’s firing range. The landing force carried out maneuvers in the Ashdod Port, completed its preparations and exercises by June 4, and assembled in the port on the night of June 4–5.¹⁰⁰ The next day the El-Arish landing was canceled, and the Eshkolot Landing Force came under the command of the 11th Brigade and participated in the capture of the Gaza Strip.

Training

Training exercises in the waiting period were limited in order to conceal force preparation. The limitations applied mainly to heavy weapons. Absolute radio silence was maintained, and movement to concentration and training areas was reduced and done without radio communication. Training focused on proficiency enhancement and operations in special areas and under NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) conditions.¹⁰¹ The infantry (especially in Southern Command) underwent intensive training related to attacking fortified objectives. The IDF planned for an NBC threat because of its deep concern about Egypt’s use of chemical weapons in Yemen. A commander of a tank company, Lieutenant Avigdor Kahalani, recalled that, during the waiting period, “they surprised the hell out of us with anti-gas systems…. We carried out hasty training sessions in holding our breath while hooking up to the system.”¹⁰² Captain Yossi Peled, the commander of a mechanized infantry company, remembered that “they suddenly gave us these weird masks. What’s this? Protection from gas…. So how does it work? What’s it like under fire? What about training? How am I supposed to remember the drill? What if the radio suddenly conks out and I have to improvise, was I thoroughly trained for this?”¹⁰³

The 94th Battalion, 200th Brigade, which was still not completely formed, continued its program of instruction and refresher training into early June.¹⁰⁴

Intelligence Measures

Southern Command’s intelligence aids are of special interest. After ten years of quiet following the Sinai War, Southern Command was suddenly ordered to commence hasty planning for an IDF attack in May 1967. Zalman Gandler writes that since the start of the waiting period, IDF military intelligence had been working around the clock to prepare up-to-date material, and the quantity collected after two weeks equaled that normally compiled in an ordinary year. The area was photographed only at the end of the waiting period, and only some of the forces received the updated photostats. Even then, it was too late.¹⁰⁵

To sum up the Six-Day War case, the high level of readiness the IDF attained in three weeks enabled it to win the war. Good relations with European countries (France, Britain, Germany, and Holland) allowed Israel to narrow some of the gaps in aircraft equipment, tank ammunition, and NBC equipment.

The Yom Kippur War: The “Blue-White” Alert

At the April 16, 1973, general staff meeting, the chief of intelligence reported that the latest findings predicted war for May 15. His assessment, however, was that the likelihood of war was low. The chief of staff, Lieutenant General David (Dado) Elazar, decided to undertake a wide range of preparations, executed discreetly. These included increasing the available order of battle in Sinai and the Golan Heights; updating operational plans; advancing training schedules planned for later in the year; forming new reserve units and canceling orders for the dismantling of regular units; accelerating weapons replenishment; and speeding up the completion of operational infrastructure such as roads, fortifications, and antitank obstacles.¹⁰⁶ This section discusses some of the tensions involved in these preparations, and it highlights what can be accomplished in a relatively short time.

Organization

The formation of the 210th Division was originally planned for March 1974. On May 14, 1973, the date was brought forward to June 15.¹⁰⁷ The buildup of the division included the establishment of division headquarters, the 312th Communications Battalion, two tank battalions (the 106th and 183rd) in the 164th Shot (105mm L7 Centurion) Brigade, the headquarters of an artillery regiment (the artillery battalions had already been formed), the 923rd Engineering Battalion, and an improvised supply regiment headquarters.

The formation of the 418th Ivri Missile Unit, originally planned for 1974, was moved up to 1973, and the formation of the 440th Division headquarters, which was part of the Ofek A Multiyear Plan, was brought forward to August 1973. Similarly, the formation of three armored reconnaissance battalions for the 143rd, 146th, and 162nd Divisions, which had been planned for August–November 1973, was advanced to June–July.

In the corps of engineers, two assault roller bridging units were established in June 1973 (not originally planned for 1973). In addition, the formation of two reserve engineering battalions for the 252nd and 210th Divisions was advanced from October–December 1973 to June–August 1973.

The 1973 work plan called for the demobilization of the regular 75th Battalion, 7th Tank Brigade, but during the 1973 alert it remained a regular battalion.¹⁰⁸

Operational Infrastructure

The following infrastructure was present:¹⁰⁹

• Twelve kilometers of antitank trenches in Northern Command.¹¹⁰

• One hundred twenty-one kilometers of roads on the Golan Heights for artillery and tanks.

• Communications lines stretching between Nafakh-Safed (Northern Command) and Yalek-Refidim and Yalek-Dveila (Sinai).

• Reserve stores units at Abu-Rudeis (Sinai) for an infantry battalion, tank company, and battery of 122mm cannons, and at Bir Tmada (Sinai) for sixty-four tanks.

The 679th Brigade’s reserve stores unit advanced to Corazim (northern Galilee),¹¹¹ and the 179th Brigade’s reserve stores unit moved to the Filon Base (northern Galilee). After the war, the Agranat Commission report stated that advancing the reserve stores units of Northern Command’s armored brigades contributed decisively to their speedy arrival in the Golan and blocking of Syrian forces.¹¹²

Weapons and Equipment

The following weapons and equipment were available or added:¹¹³

• Hundreds of vehicular and portable radio communications sets were added.

• Water-crossing equipment—twenty-one carriages for transporting Unifloat pontoons—was brought forward, and a fifth Yiftach roller bridge was ordered.

• The Ivri Missile Unit received an additional four launchers and twenty rockets.

It should be noted that until the war broke out, the attempt to develop towing hitches that would enable the roller bridges to traverse the steep, sandy slopes in the Suez Canal area took place at a frenetic pace, regardless of cost, yet ultimately proved unsuccessful.¹¹⁴

Another area of tension during the force buildup was the development and replenishment of night-vision devices for tanks (Arab armies had been equipped with them since the Six-Day War). There were no plans to acquire infrared sights that could be procured in the West (such as those in Russian-made tanks) because, according to intelligence estimates, war was not expected. Instead, Israel planned to wait until its own technology for starlight enhancers was developed. However domestic production of electro-optic systems was beset by delays and cancellations,¹¹⁵ which put IDF tank crews at a grave disadvantage in the Yom Kippur War.

Training

The amount of prior training naturally had a major impact on the units’ competency. Among the various exercises were task-oriented maneuvers for the canalcrossing units. Avshalom Levi describes the 257th Armored Battalion, 421st Brigade, a reserve unit formed in April 1973 and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shimon Ben Shoshan. The battalion’s initial training lasted ten days. Officers at the platoon commander level and higher participated in a divisional skeleton exercise in August that gave an invaluable boost to the battalion’s proficiency. The 275th Battalion was scheduled to receive its tanks and equipment in 1974.¹¹⁶

Alert Level

Raising the alert level is not a factor in force buildup, but to complete the picture, the following should be noted: On May 25, 1973, the GHQ operations branch ordered that steps be taken to prepare for mobilizing the reservists.¹¹⁷ These steps included checking the emergency mobilization procedures and evaluating the regular army headquarters’ level of readiness to call up the reserve units. A plan was issued to hold mobilization drills, verify reserve soldiers’ addresses, and monitor the alert level of all reserve units during June–August 1973. Unit deployment exercises were carried out, reserve storerooms were readied, self-propelled artillery was sent to Sinai, crossing equipment was hastily deployed, and so forth.¹¹⁸

The Blue-White alert lasted four months (from mid-April to August) and concluded as planned. The cost of the alert was 69 million Israeli lira (in 2019, approximately $66 million),¹¹⁹ and it had a major impact on the IDF’s readiness for the Yom Kippur War.¹²⁰ According to deputy chief of staff Tal, “The IDF entered the Yom Kippur War a stronger army than what was planned for October 1973, even more powerful than the design for 1974–1975.”¹²¹

The American Airlift

The American airlift is a different type of issue from that discussed up to this point. Much can be learned from the attempt to introduce brand-new weapons into combat, illustrating what can and cannot be achieved during fighting. After many delays, the American airlift began on October 14, 1973. Most of the equipment was brought over on US Air Force Galaxies and Starlifters, as well as civilian aircraft. Between October 14 and 24, 8,775 tons of ammunition, weapons, spare parts, and other supplies reached the country.¹²² On October 8 the IDF ordered 120 TOW antitank launchers at a cost of $10 million. A few months earlier, Tal had vetoed a request for a small number of TOWs for testing.¹²³ Seventy launchers arrived on October 16, and a team was trained in their operation. The test firings proved successful.¹²⁴ According to an American report, Israel received eighty-one launchers and 2,000 missiles.¹²⁵ The IDF christened the missile Orev (Raven) and mounted it on Israeli-made reconnaissance jeeps. Within twenty-four hours of the jeeps’ and missiles’ arrival at the IDF Repair and Maintenance Center, the first antitank jeep model was produced. Officers and noncommissioned officers recently returned from training in the United States took the jeep and, accompanied by ordnance personnel, test-fired the missiles. Lessons were learned on the spot, and the ordnance branch began manufacturing dozens of replacement parts.¹²⁶ The jeeps were rushed to the southern Golan Heights to reinforce the thin defensive line being held by the aging Sherman tanks.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, not a single missile was fired during the war.

Another weapon provided by the airlift and rushed to the battlefield was the LAW antitank launcher. Given the difficulties of assimilating even so-called user-friendly weapons in the midst of fighting, the complexities involved in this task were readily apparent. According to an American report, the IDF obtained 16,000 launchers during the war.¹²⁸ “The [890th] battalion received two pallets of LAW rockets replete with English-language instructions attached. We were lucky that Egyptian tanks didn’t show up because no one had a clue what to do with the rockets.”¹²⁹ Two occasions on which the LAWs were fired illustrate the problem. On the night of October 21–22 Israeli naval commandos carried out a fourth attack on the Egyptian port of Hurghada and fired a LAW that had arrived the previous day. Their mission was to sink an Egyptian missile boat. The commandos reached the objective in swift attack boats. According to Ze’ev Almog, commander of the Red Sea sector:

Since we were given only 20 rockets, we had to use them for both training and combat operations. The weapon’s allocation was decided in this way: ten missiles for training … and ten for the mission. Only one fighter in each attack boat would undergo “sniper” training…. We didn’t know what the rocket’s range would be from inside a fast boat…. Therefore, on the morning of October 21 we practiced firing on a seaborne target. The effective range was calculated at 100 meters max. Then we decided to carry out a nighttime test on a firing range to determine the launching range…. During the operation the first eight rockets missed the target and the last two hit a Komar-class missile boat and destroyed it.¹³⁰

Captain Shaul Mofaz, commander of the paratrooper reconnaissance company in Operation Kutonet (Nightgown), recounted another occasion when the LAWs were used immediately after their arrival. The night operation took place deep behind Syrian lines on October 12 and was designed to hit Iraqi convoys reinforcing the Syrians on the Golan Heights. He recalled:

A few hours before setting out, weapons (including LAW rockets) arrived at the Tel Nof Airbase on the American airlift. The Americans are very organized. When they send weapons to foreign countries they include all the instruction paraphernalia. The LAW also came with blue plaster rocket training aids. We were the first IDF unit to receive this weapon. We didn’t exercise with them but some of the soldiers managed to read the operating manual before setting out on the mission. When a tank and the tank carrier overturned, one of the officers gave the order to fire the LAWs. Two rockets were fired and a large white stain spread across the tank. The soldiers were amazed and thought it was a secret weapon that fragmentized tanks or something like that, but in the debriefing it turned out that these were plaster training rockets.¹³¹

Even though Israel received thousands of LAW launchers, dozens of TOW launchers, and 2,000 missiles, almost none of them were used in the war.

Another new weapon that arrived was the Chaparral surface-to-air missile. This was an air-to-air Sidewinder missile repurposed as a mobile surface-to-air missile. Two Chaparral systems came in on the airlift, and the American operating instructions were quickly translated. The weapon was test-fired forty hours after its arrival, and eight hours later the force employed it operationally, defending a Hawk battery by ambushing Egyptian helicopters. This took place on October 23, one day before the end of the war. A week earlier, a contingent of fifty-four commanders, soldiers, and technicians had been dispatched to the United States. They completed a nineteen-day crash course on the Chaparral rather than the usual seven-week course. Upon their return they were deployed in the Israeli bulge in Syria.¹³²

These case studies illustrate what can and cannot be done, as well as the dilemmas and tensions inherent in a hasty force buildup.

Investment in the Present versus a Solution for the Future

In some cases, priority was given to acquiring available weapons, even if their effectiveness remained uncertain; in other cases, replenishment was postponed until a more suitable weapon arrived. The large purchase of AMX-13 tanks and rocket launchers was an example of the first choice, while waiting to acquire the Mystère IV and the long-barreled Sherman M-50 tanks represented the second choice. The rule is that hasty procurement in wartime is of limited value, and the equipment usually ends up remaining in service after the war because of insufficient funds to replace it. Upgrading existing weapons is generally less complicated and often provides an unmistakably greater contribution, as was the case with the dieselization of the Shot tank engines (105mm L7 Centurions), which was competed just before the Yom Kippur War.¹³³

Two cases illustrate the problem of mustering out old weapons before assimilating new ones. First, in the period preceding the Sinai War, replacing the Staghound armored car with the AMX-13 tank forced the IDF to make a volte-face. Second, the difficulty in assimilating and operating new jet fighters pushed the propeller squadrons, which were gradually being replaced, out of service. The rule should be: new takes priority over old, but only after the new has been assimilated. And assimilating new weapons just before or during a war is problematic. Their effectiveness is generally minimal. This was the case with the Mystère aircraft, the AMX-13 tanks, the LAW rockets, the TOW missiles, and so forth. The rule should be: do not introduce new weapons into service immediately before or during a short war. Another lesson is that a balance has to be maintained among all the elements: main weapons systems, ammunition, spare parts, users’ proficiency.

In the future, increasing the number of main weapons systems (such as tanks and aircraft) will become increasingly difficult due to the greater complexity of producing them. On the one hand, for Israel (and for small states in general), relying on the domestic production of AFVs, for example, significantly limits the ability to expand production. On the other hand, banking on foreign production creates dependency on an outside supplier that may decide to freeze sales (examples include France’s boycott of Israel after the Six-Day War and American political pressure in exchange for the supply of weapons and ammunition in the Yom Kippur War). The conclusion is that when war is expected, the working assumption should be that increasing the force size is impossible.

The prewar upgrade of weapons has also grown more complex. For example, the pace of technological advances in the computer software that supports a wide range of combat systems exacerbates the difficulty of upgrading sophisticated weaponry. The integration of a new component into a complex system, such as a tank or advanced aircraft that was produced a decade before the upgrade, is more challenging than ever. In addition to the engineering and mechanical hurdles that have always had to be overcome, adapting software and dealing with electromagnetic spectrum management issues present new challenges.